England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION (IN BANKRUPTCY)
(MR JUSTICE NEUBERGER)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		5 July 1999

LORD JUSTICE BROOKE: I will ask Lord Justice Robert Walker to give the first judgment

LORD JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER: Mr Ebert was adjudicated bankrupt by an order of Lloyd J made in the Chancery Division of the High Court nearly two years ago on 22 July 1997. Since then Mr Ebert has made a very large number of applications to the court seeking in one way or another to have the bankruptcy order annulled. His complaints have been considered frequently and at length, both by judges of the Chancery Division and in this court. Down to last March, many of his applications were recorded in detail in a reserved judgment of this court handed down by Lord Woolf, MR on 30 March 1999. That judgment upheld the validity of Grepe v Loam orders in progressively wider form made against Mr Ebert by judges of the Chancery Division (see Grepe v Loam [1887] 37 Ch D 168).

On 4 December 1998 HM Attorney General instituted proceedings against Mr Ebert under section 42 of The Supreme Act 1981 to have him declared a vexatious litigant. I am not sure whether those proceedings have yet been concluded.

On 30 March 1999, on the same day as the reserved judgment in the Court of Appeal was handed down, Mr Ebert applied in writing to Neuberger J in the Chancery Division for permission under the latest Grepe v Loam order to apply for annulment of the bankruptcy order. The judge refused permission and refused permission to appeal. It is from that application that Mr Ebert seeks permission to appeal.

The judge gave his decision in a written decision running to 15 pages. He said at the beginning of his judgment:

"Since the order of Lloyd J, Mr Ebert has made a large number (probably in excess of 40) of applications, most of them to me, for various types of relief, including the annulment of the bankruptcy order, setting aside the judgment which founded the debt upon which the statutory demand leading to his bankruptcy was based, committal of various persons for alleged contempt of court, and other types of relief. All his applications have failed, and he has sought to appeal on a number of occasions to the Court of Appeal, and on each such occasion his appeal has been unsuccessful."

Neuberger J then went meticulously through the matter as it then stood, including three decisions of the Court of Appeal which are contained in full judgments delivered on 25 March 1998, 5 June 1998 and the judgment of 30 March 1999 to which I have referred. Since then a further application by Mr Ebert has been rejected by the Court of Appeal. Neuberger J, having considered the matter in meticulous detail, said at the end of his recent written judgment:

"I have, rather unusually on an application of this sort, particularly bearing in mind the large number of previous applications which have been made and failed, expressed my reasons for refusing Mr Ebert leave at a little length. This is for two principal reasons. First, because, as I have mentioned, there are two observations of the Master of the Rolls which, if taken out of context, might appear to give Mr Ebert some support: it is only fair that he (and if he seeks leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal) should understand why I consider that there is nothing in his argument on the point.

Secondly, I have received a large number of applications from Mr Ebert, many of which seek to raise the same points that I have been dealing with in this judgment. I fear that this may continue. It is unfair on other litigants if court time is persistently taken up dealing with repeated, unreasonable and hopeless applications of the sort which Mr Ebert has been making. I am sorry to have to express myself in such strong terms, because Mr Ebert genuinely believes that he is not receiving justice. However, unless any further applications he makes raise genuinely new points or involve the production of new and relevant evidence, I do not propose to deal with them at any great length. Any reasonable and balanced person would, I believe, after reading the three decisions of the Court of Appeal which I have appended to this judgment, a large number of extemporary first instance judgments (most of them from me, but also from Rimer, Carnwarth, Laddie and Lloyd JJ) as well as an even larger number of written refusals of leave to proceed, under the Grepe -v- Loam order, would appreciate that, in the absence of some novel point or some fresh relevant evidence, it is quite inappropriate to bombard the Court with further misconceived and hopeless applications raising points which have been dealt with adversely to Mr Ebert on a number of previous occasions. Again, it does seem tome that this rather strong language is appropriate in Mr Ebert's case."

I do not propose to go through Mr Ebert's grievances yet again. None of the points raised in Mr Ebert's skeleton, or his written submission, has any validity or novelty. Mr Ebert takes a point on rule 6.206(3) of the Insolvency Rules, but the mandatory language of that rule is directed to the laying down of the procedure where there is a proper and admissible application made. In this case, because of his vexatious behaviour in the past, Mr Ebert is not able to make any application to the court without permission.

Mr Ebert also took a number of points on the form of the petition, the statutory demand and the affidavit supporting it. None of those points is new, although Mr Ebert referred to new evidence. These are all points which have been canvassed before the court on many occasions before. It seems to me that the judge was plainly right.

I would refuse permission to appeal from his direction.

LORD JUSTICE BROOKE: I agree.

Order: Application refused. Leave to appeal to

House of Lords refused.