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W (Minors) [1998] EWCA Civ 553 (26 March 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/553.html
Cite as:
[1999] WLR 205,
[1998] 2 FCR 405,
[1998] Fam Law 387,
[1998] EWCA Civ 553,
[1998] 2 All ER 801,
[1998] 2 FLR 135,
[1999] 1 WLR 205
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IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CCFMI
97/1613 CMS2
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON
APPEAL FROM LEEDS COUNTY COURT
(HIS
HONOUR JUDGE BARRY
)
Royal
Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2
Thursday,
26 March 1998
B
e f o r e:
LADY
JUSTICE BUTLER-SLOSS
LORD
JUSTICE JUDGE
LORD
JUSTICE MUMMERY
-
- - - - -
W
(MINORS)
-
- - - - -
(Computer
Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith
Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London
EC4A 2HD
Tel:
0171 831 3183
Official
Shorthand Writers to the Court)
-
- - - - -
MRS
J M BLACK QC & MR J GODFREY
(Instructed by Switalski's, West Yorkshire, WF1 2SX) appeared on behalf of the
Appellant (Mother)
MR
MICHAEL HARRISON QC & MR PAUL WILSON
(Instructed by Force Solicitor, Police H. Q., Laburnum Rd., Wakefield, WF1 3QP)
appeared on behalf of the Fourth Respondent (Police)
MISS
E R AUCKLAND
(Instructed by Town Hall, Wood St., Wakefield, WF1 2HQ) appeared on behalf of
the Local Authority
The
(First Respondent) Father did not appear and was not represented
The
Third Respondents (Maternal Grandparents) did not appear and were not represented
-
- - - - -
J
U D G M E N T
(As
approved by the Court
)
-
- - - - -
©Crown
Copyright
LADY
JUSTICE BUTLER-SLOSS:
1.
This appeal and cross appeal arise from the decision of His Honour Judge Barry
on the 7th November 1997 allowing in part an appeal from District Judge Giles
on the 22nd May 1997. The appellant is the mother of two children, D. born on
the 27th October 1995 and C. born on the 18th September 1996. The Chief
Constable has filed a Respondent´s Notice by way of cross appeal. The
local authority attended the appeal but its stance is neutral and Miss Auckland
on its behalf indicated that, if not restrained by a court order, it will
provide the police with the relevant documents. The guardian ad litem did not
attend the appeal but provided a written report about the children in which he
indicated that to provide the information to the police would not be in the
interests of the children.
2.
One difficulty in this case is that the police do not at this moment have all
the information which was before the judge and is before this Court since their
application to be provided with it has not yet been granted. Consequently it is
necessary in this judgment to be careful to give only a brief background to the
case on facts known to all the parties. The mother took the elder child to
hospital on the 4th July 1996 and he was admitted for reasons unconnected with
the police investigation. Whilst there the doctors were concerned about the
size of his head circumference and he was found to have two subdural haematomas
which raised the suspicion of non-accidental injury. On his discharge from
hospital the local authority obtained an interim care order and he was placed
with foster parents. After his birth the younger child also was the subject of
an interim care order and placed with foster parents. Since April 1997 the two
children have lived with their paternal grandparents. The local authority
obtained a care order by consent on the 2nd June 1997 and the current plan is
for the children to remain with the grandparents with supervised contact to the
parents.
3.
In September 1996 the social workers began an assessment of the parents. On the
8th October the police arrested both parents and interviewed them but to date
have not charged either of them. During the assessment interviews the mother
admitted to the social worker that she had shaken D. In February 1997 the
social work assessment was concluded. The local authority, on the advice of its
legal department, sought a direction from the district judge on the 20th
February whether it required the leave of the court to inform the police of the
admission by the mother. The district judge held that no leave was required to
inform the police of the general nature of admission made by the mother to the
social worker. The local authority then wrote to the police. The letter also
informed the police that the assessment report including the admission was
filed with the court and that leave would be required for the police to see the
report. The police applied to be made a party to the proceedings for the
purpose of seeing the assessment report and associated documents and for
permission to interview the social worker. On the 2nd May 1997 the Chief
Constable was joined as a party.
4.
At the hearing on the 22nd May the district judge refused leave to the police
to see the assessment report under rule 4.23 of the Family Proceedings Rules
1991. He also held that the preparatory documents for the assessment report and
any other records held by the social workers were not to be made available to
the police and the social workers were not to divulge to the police the
substance of the admissions made by the mother. The police appealed to the
county court judge who allowed the appeal in part. He held that no leave was
necessary for the social worker to pass on the information to the police and to
give a
statement
to the police for the purpose of criminal proceedings.
He
also held that:-
"to
give the Rule the effect that has been desired by Parliament and the author of
the Rules (its proper effect) it is necessary to read the Rule in a very broad
sense so that the expression "no document other than a record of an order"
should be read as to mean, "no information which has been enshrined in such a
document shall be disclosed other than to the listed parties without leave of a
Judge or District Judge."
I
am prepared to say that I cannot see how the Rule could have effect without
extending the protection it gives to copies of the documents referred to in the
Rule, or to drafts of such documents, or preliminary notes to the construction
of such a document. Each of those things, of course, would be documents
themselves and are so closely related to the documents covered by the Rule that
I accept the argument of Mr Godfrey that it would be absurd not to give the
protection to those as well, but it is such a stretch of inference, it seems to
me, to say therefore to give full value to the Rule the information itself has
to be protected so as to prevent the witness divulging it to anyone else."
He
ruled that the notes of the interviews and the meeting of the social workers
were covered by rule 4.23 and decided, for reasons to which I shall refer
later, to refuse leave to provide the documents to the police and gave leave to
appeal to this Court.
5.
The main issues before this Court are:-
a.
the scope of rule 4.23
b.
the status of the documents not covered by rule 4.23
c.
the exercise of discretion by the court on the application for leave to
disclose documents under rule 4.23.
6.
Mrs Black QC for the mother submitted that the documents were covered by
section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. This section protected
from publication proceedings which related to the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court with respect to minors and proceedings brought under the Children
Act 1989. Those proceedings were exceptions to the general rule under section
12 that the publication of information relating to proceedings before any court
sitting in private shall not of itself be a contempt of court. She also
submitted that rule 4.23 covered preparatory documents, in this case the
"working papers" from which the report was written. Not to do so, submitted
Mrs Black, would destroy the protection inherent in the rule and the
effectiveness of the court control, since, as a matter of common sense,
information contained in documents filed with the court is likely to be
available in note form or draft form in the files of the social workers. The
leave requirement could then be circumvented by calling for the notes or drafts
which did not require the leave of the court. Most of the information contained
in those documents would also be held in other documents and the use of rule
4.23 would be ineffective.
7.
Mr Harrison QC, upon behalf of the Chief Constable, asked us to take into
account the duties of the police to investigate as well as to prosecute and
submitted that the police in conjunction with the Crown Prosecution Service,
exercised their own discretion whether to prosecute based upon the Code for
Crown Prosecutors which included the public interest test and factors for and
against prosecution. These factors included - the seriousness of the offence,
the likelihood of it recurring, whether the offence was committed as a result
of a genuine mistake or misunderstanding and significantly in this case, the
state of health, mental or physical, of the offender at the time of the
offence. He argued that the judge was wrong to extend the ambit of rule 4.23
to include the notes of interviews and notes of the meeting which had not been
filed with the court. He further submitted that the judge erred in the exercise
of his discretion in refusing to allow the police to see the assessment report.
8.
Rule 4.23
Rule
4.23 states:-
"Confidentiality
of documents. (1) Notwithstanding any rule of court to the contrary, no
document, other than a record of an order, held by the court and relating to
proceedings to which this Part applies shall be disclosed other than to -
(a)
a party,
(b)
the legal representative of a party,
(c)
the guardian ad litem,
(d)
the Legal Aid Board, or
(e)
a welfare officer,
without
leave of the judge or district judge."
For
this rule to apply, the requirements are: -
(i)
a document
(ii)
held by the court
(iii)
relating to proceedings.
In
Re
G (a Minor) (Social Worker:Disclosure
[1996] 1 WLR 1407, Sir Roger Parker said at page 1419:-
"The
wording of rule 4.23 of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 appears to me to be
plain. Leave to disclose is only required in respect of
documents
and only in respect of documents
held
by the court
.
The rule thus follows established wardship practice as can be seen from the
judgments of this Court in re D (Minors)(Wardship:Disclosure) [1994] 1 FLR 346.
I can see neither need nor justification for extending the scope of the words
so as to require leave for the disclosure of information imparted to a social
worker and recorded in case notes or a report which for one reason or another
has never reached the court. To do so would, in my view, not be construction
but a complete rewriting of the rule and thus legislation, which is neither the
function nor within the powers of the court.
I
said at page 1411 of re G:-
"The
narrow view is that documents treated for the purpose of court proceedings do
not attract control under rule 4.23 until actually filed with the court. The
alternative view is to include identifiable documents destined for the court
within the control of the court."
9.
It was not necessary for the decision in
re
G
to decide how far rule 4.23 extended but I inclined to the narrower approach
that it was limited to documents actually filed with the court. The issue on
this appeal is one stage further on from the facts in re G since the admission
has been made and written down both in notes which have not been filed with the
court and in the assessment report which has been filed with the court. The
passage from the judgment of Sir Roger (supra) applies,in my view, with equal
force to the present documents created by the social worker by way of notes and
drafts which were not filed with the court as in the case of re G (supra).
Interpreting the rule narrowly, the only relevant document which I have
identified above which has been filed with the court and is held by the court
is the assessment report. The "working papers" which are not held by the court
do not come within the ambit of the rule, unless its meaning is considerably
extended. The decision of this Court in
re
D
[1994]
1 FLR 346, a wardship case, draws a helpful distinction between the documents
for which leave has to be given and those which fall outside the control of the
court. The father and grandfather were charged with offences of indecency
against children. In order to assist their defences at the trial, they sought
disclosure of affidavits and transcripts of evidence used in the wardship
hearing, and social work files relating to the wards. In his judgment Sir
Stephen Brown, P. drew a distinction between the wardship documents which were
part of the wardship file in the custody and control of the court, in respect
of which there was no doubt that leave was required and documents held by the
local authority. The President said at page 352 :-
"So
far as the local authority documents (the case records, as I have termed them)
are concerned, they were not adduced in evidence in the wardship proceedings.
They have never been in the custody or control of the court and they do not
form part of the wardship, save in so far as they may be the basis of the
report which was annexed to the social worker's affidavit."
Rule
4.23 provides a protection similar to that invoked in wardship to Children Act
cases. For my part, however, I am satisfied that it is not designed to provide
cover which is wider than that exercised in wardship, as demonstrated in re D,
(supra), that is to say the material actually provided for the court
proceedings.
10.
Mrs Black has relied principally on the provisions of section 12 in order to
support her argument that documents not filed with the court are nonetheless
protected from disclosure to the police. Section 12 is designed to protect
information from publication in child family cases heard in private. The
protection covers the proceedings, principally the actual hearing before the
court and those proceedings cannot be, for instance, reported in the press.
This section was not intended to cover documents held by social workers which
have not been filed with the court nor used in the proceedings heard by the
court in private. It does not seem to me that the control by the court either
under the umbrella of rule 4.23 or of section 12 extends to documents outside
the court proceedings. The argument of Mrs Black supporting the judge´s
approach is, nonetheless, at first sight, very attractive since, if the purpose
of rule 4.23 is to protect the information contained in the documents, there
seems little point in having a rule which protects only the pieces of paper and
not the contents. It is not, however, necessary for the court to give rule 4.23
the extended meaning suggested. The appropriate protection of information,
notes and other papers from disclosure can be achieved by another route which
does not do violence to the clear words of rule 4.23.
11.
Local Authority files
What,
therefore, is the status of the working papers and similar papers held by the
social workers and what protection, if any, is afforded to those papers? In my
judgment, all the documents with which we are concerned, created or obtained
by and held by the social services department of the local authority in the
course of its statutory duty, come under the protection of confidentiality.
This part of this appeal has nothing to do with publication of information
contrary to section 12 or rule 4.23 but is concerned with the limits of
confidentiality and public interest immunity. The issue is whether one agency,
the police, working in co-operation with another agency, social services, is
entitled to share information which is subject to confidentiality in the hands
of each agency and protected from general publication by the doctrine of public
interest immunity. In
re
M (a Minor)(Disclosure of Material)
[1990] 2 FLR 36, again a wardship case, this Court explained the special
category of immunity enjoyed by local authority records, see also
re
D (supra)
at page 352G. Access to confidential information, in furtherance of the best
interests of children, by agencies with separate statutory duties is the
subject of comprehensive guidance from Government departments.
12.
Working Together
As
a consequence of the passing of the Children Act, in 1991 four Government
Departments jointly published a guide to arrangements for inter-agency
co-operation for the protection of children from abuse, ´Working
Together´. The Government departments were the Home Office, Department of
Health, Department of Education and Science and the Welsh Office. The Local
Authority Social Services Act 1970 requires, by section 7(1), that:-
"Local
authorities shall, in the exercise of their social services functions,
including the exercise of any discretion conferred by any relevant enactment,
act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State."
The
1970 Act was amended by section 50 of the National Health Service &
Community Care Act 1990 to include section 7A which provides :-
"Without
prejudice to section 7 of the Act, every local authority shall exercise their
social services functions in accordance with such directions as may be given to
them under this section by the Secretary of State."
Absent
an order of the court, the local authority has, therefore, to comply with the
guidance given in Working Together and that requirement is set out in the
Preface. Working Together sets out in detail the procedures for the close
working relationship between social services departments, the police service,
medical practitioners, community health workers, schools, voluntary agencies
and others. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out in
X
(Minors v. Bedfordshire C.C.
[1995] 2 AC 633 at page 750 :-
"The
procedure by way of joint action takes place, not merely because it is good
practice, but because it is required by guidance having statutory force binding
on the local authority."
Under the heading ´Legal Framework´, (paragraph 1.11), the guidance
points out that the other agencies need to understand that they are not only
carrying out their own agency´s functions but are also making,
individually and collectively, a vital contribution to advising and assisting
the local authority in the discharge of its child protection and child care
duties. It states that:-
"
it is essential that Area Child Protection Committee procedures provide a
mechanism whereby, wherever one agency becomes concerned that a child may be at
risk, it shares its information with other agencies." (paragraph 1.11)
13.
Inter-disciplinary and inter-agency work is an essential process in the task of
attempting to protect children from abuse. There has therefore to be the free
exchange of information between the agencies in order to facilitate that work
and the protection of children. This partnership, as it is called in paragraph
3.10, requires the sharing and exchange of relevant information, in particular,
between the social workers and the police. At paragraph 3.10 it states:-
"Those
in receipt of information from professional colleagues in this context must
treat it as having been given in confidence. They must not disclose such
information for any other purpose without consulting the person who provided it."
At paragraph 3.11 it states:-
"Ethical
and statutory codes concerned with confidentiality and data protection are not
intended to prevent the exchange of information between different professional
staff who have a responsibility for ensuring the protection of children."
At
paragraph 3.15 it is recognised that confidentiality may not be maintained if
the withholding of the information will prejudice the welfare of a child. The
involvement of the police in investigation is set out in paragraphs 4.11 et seq
including the bases for a decision whether or not to initiate criminal
proceedings. At paragraph 4.14 it is pointed out that, irrespective of their
decision whether or not to institute criminal proceedings, the information they
hold should, where appropriate, be shared with other agencies. It is essential
that methods of joint working between police and social workers are established
over and above the joint interviewing of child victims, (paragraph 4.17). In
the present case the police attended the Case Conference held in October. The
crucial picture presented by the guidance is of co-operation between the
relevant agencies and free and frank exchange of information for the better
protection of children. If the arguments of Mrs Black are correct the
information available to social workers cannot be communicated to the police.
That would drive a coach and four straight through the carefully considered
guidance of the four Government Departments for joint working between police
and social workers from the moment that any important information is contained
in a document lodged with the court, unless or until a judge or district judge
gives permission. Since child abuse allegations, especially physical abuse, may
surface at a moment´s notice and an emergency protection order or interim
care order may be obtained quickly, no information thereafter could be shared
immediately or freely by the two main agencies bearing the brunt of the child
abuse investigations. Mrs Black recognised the difficulties such an approach
would create. An extreme example might be the effect of filing of police
witness statements in the care proceedings in that they might not thereafter be
used by the police in criminal proceedings without an application to and
obtaining leave from the district judge or judge in family proceedings.
14.
In
re
G (supra)
I expressed myself on this issue at page 1410 and nothing I have heard on the
present appeal leads me to change my mind that this result is as absurd as the
failure to protect information was said by the judge to be if the umbrella of
rule 4.23 is not extended to cover information as well as documents. The effect
of disclosure to the police by social services is for two agencies, each bound
at that stage by confidentiality, to share information and disclose documents
to each other in the spirit of "Working Together." The information and
documents remain confidential vis-a-vis the public unless or until it is
disclosed with leave in the family proceedings if it ever becomes part of those
proceedings, or it is necessary under the separate statutory duties of the
police to disclose it for the purpose of criminal proceedings. The
confidentiality by which both the agencies are bound is the appropriate and
sufficient protection of the information with which this appeal is concerned.
The notes of the two interviews with the mother and the notes of the social
workers´ meeting are not documents held by the court relating to
proceedings nor are they covered by the provisions of section 12. The police
are entitled to ask the local authority for an opportunity to see them without
reference to the court. It is important to make clear that, on this appeal, we
are concerned solely with documents held by and information known to social
workers and the decision has no application to the wholly different position of
a guardian ad litem or indeed a court welfare officer appointed for the purpose
of court proceedings.
15.
Exercise of discretion under Rule 4.23.
I
turn now to the assessment report which was filed with the court and clearly
requires leave of the court for it to be disclosed to the police. That leave
was refused both by the district judge and by the judge. Booth J in
re
S (Minors)(Wardship:Investigation)
[1987] Fam 199 considered the likely outcome and effect upon a ward of granting
the police application to disclose the information. She said at page 204:-
"when
balanced against the competing public interest which requires the court to
protect society from the perpetuation of crime it could only be in exceptional
circumstances that the interests of the individual ward should prevail."
Her
judgment was approved in re F (Minors)(Wardship: Police Investigation) [1989]
Fam 18. Sir Stephen Brown, P in
re
D (supra)
said at page 351 that the principle is quite clear that the judge:-
"has
to balance the importance of confidentiality in wardship proceedings and the
frankness which it engenders in those who give evidence to the wardship court
against the public interest in seeing that the interests of justice are
properly served."
16.
The factors to be taken into account in the balancing exercise were again
considered by the Master of the Rolls in
re
L (Police Investigation: Privilege)
[1996] 2 WLR 395. Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle on the appeal to the House of
Lords said in his speech at page 404:-
"Indeed,
in proceedings of this nature it would be most unsatisfactory if the court,
having information that the mother might have committed a serious offence
against the children whose welfare it was seeking to protect, should be
disabled from disclosing such information to the appropriate investigating
authority.
In
re
A (Criminal Proceedings:Disclosure)
[1996] 1 FLR 231 this Court gave further similar guidance. These decisions were
reviewed by this Court in
re
EC (Disclosure of material)
[1996] 2 FLR 725. In that case the information sought by the police was
principally the medical reports and transcripts of oral evidence given by the
medical witnesses in the care proceedings heard by Wall J. rule 4.23 applied to
the reports. Section 98(2) of the Children Act and section 12 of the
Administration of Justice Act governed the oral evidence at the hearing.
Swinton Thomas LJ in his judgment at page 731 set out a list of 10 factors to
take into account which, he said, were not exhaustive and were not placed in
any order of importance since the importance of the various factors will
inevitably vary very much from case to case.
17.
In the present appeal we are concerned with the stage before the oral evidence,
but the guidelines set out by Swinton Thomas LJ are equally applicable to this
point of the proceedings. Judge Barry recognised that he had to take into
account a number of factors in the exercise of his discretion. He was right to
consider the welfare of the two children, the absence of danger to them or to
other children from the mother, the importance of the maintenance of
confidentiality and of encouraging frankness in children cases. But in
assessing the risks and benefits of permitting or inhibiting a prosecution, in
my judgment, he fell into error in a number of ways. His reliance upon the
importance of contact between the children and their mother is a factor likely
to arise in most cases, even where a prosecution is inevitable, and cannot
therefore carry much weight. He does not appear to have given any weight to
some of the factors set out by Swinton Thomas LJ, in particular, (5):-
"the
public interest in the administration of justice. Barriers should not be
erected between one branch of the judicature and another because this may be
inimical to the overall interests of justice."
and
(6):-
"The
public interest in the prosecution of serious crime and the punishment of
offenders, including the public interest in convicting those who have been
found guilty of violent or sexual offences against children. There is a strong
public interest in making available material to the police which is relevant to
a criminal trial. In many cases, this is likely to be a very important factor."
and
(8):-
"The
desirability of co-operation between various agencies concerned with the
welfare of children, including the social services departments, the police
service, medical practitioners, health visitors, schools etc. This is
particularly important in cases concerning children."
18.
Both he and the district judge considered, somewhat surprisingly as Mr Harrison
pointed out, that the seriousness of the offence and the possibility of the
mother receiving a prison sentence were reasons
not
to disclose to the police rather than to give the police the information. In
this case the alleged offence is serious although there appears to be evidence,
particularly psychiatric evidence, which may give a very different slant to the
reasons why the child was injured. At the stage of considering leave it is not
for the family judge to exercise the discretion of the police and the Crown
Prosecution Service whether or not the mother should face a trial. I am
satisfied that the judge´s approach to the exercise of his discretion
under rule 4.23 was flawed and cannot stand.
19.
It falls therefore to this Court to exercise its discretion on the police
application to see the assessment report. In reality, in this case, it does not
much matter whether they get leave or not. The thrust of the police case has
been to obtain the notes of the social worker and the assessment report may not
add very much. The effect of that situation gives, in my judgment, considerable
weight in the balancing exercise in favour of the police application. Material
disclosure will in any event take place when the local authority give the
police the notes of the interviews. The disclosure in this case will not
adversely affect the children. I would however go further. In a case such as
this where the police and the social workers are working together, a family
judge should hesitate before refusing to provide relevant and significant
information to the police. There will be cases where the evidence is peripheral
and the harm of giving leave will outweigh the value of the information. But
the police investigations require them to put together a jigsaw of information
in order to carry out their important public duty. The family judges ought not
to frustrate the investigation of potential crimes (which includes the
dissipation of unfounded suspicions against the innocent) without good reason,
even more so when the police are working alongside the social workers on the
same case. The arguments put forward by Mrs Black of stress on the mother, the
grandparents and consequently the children should not in a case like the
present prevail over the strong public interest in making the information
available to the police. I would exercise the discretion of this Court to give
leave to disclose the assessment report to the police. When the information is
made available to the police, I would urge them to take it together with our
judgments as soon as possible to the Crown Prosecution Service so that a
decision whether to prosecution can be made quickly in this unusually sad case.
I
would dismiss the appeal and allow the cross appeal.
LORD
JUSTICE JUDGE:
I
agree.
LORD
JUSTICE MUMMERY:
I
also agree.
Order: Appeal
dismissed; cross appeal allowed; no order as to costs, save legal aid taxation
to include costs reasonably incurred by the Guardian ad Litem.