England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >>
Morris v Kwik Save Stores Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1102 (26 June 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/1102.html
Cite as:
[1998] EWCA Civ 1102
[
New search]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
No
LTA 98/5629/2
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION
FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND AN EXTENSION OF TIME
Royal
Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2
Friday,
26th June 1998
B
e f o r e:
LORD
JUSTICE KENNEDY
LORD
JUSTICE MORRITT
MORRIS
Applicant
-
v -
KWIK
SAVE STORES LTD
Respondent
(Computer
Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith
Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London
EC4A 2HD
Tel:
0171 831 3183
Official
Shorthand Writers to the Court)
The
Applicant Mr Morris appeared in person
The
Respondent was not represented and did not attend
J
U D G M E N T
(As
Approved by the Court)
(Crown
Copyright)
LORD
JUSTICE MORRITT: This is an application by the plaintiff, Mr Morris, for leave
to appeal and an extension of time within which to do so from the order of His
Honour Judge Gibson sitting in the Lambeth County Court made on 16th February
1998. By that order the judge awarded to Mr Morris £350 damages for
wrongful arrest on 6th March 1995, the wrongful arrest involving the
defendants, their cashier and manager. Mr Morris contends on a number of
grounds that the award of damages in his favour was insufficient, and that in
addition to compensatory damages he should also have been awarded aggravated
and exemplary damages.
The
facts, in summary, are as follows. On 6th March 1995 Mr Morris, as was his
then wont, was shopping at the Kwik Save Store in Walworth Road, London. In
circumstances I will describe in greater detail later, he was accused by the
cashier and the manager of shoplifting. Also involved was a store detective or
security guard employed by an independent contractor called Temple Security
Services Ltd. Mr Morris was greatly concerned at this false accusation. On
2nd March 1996 he obtained a psychiatric report from the Maudsley Hospital as
to the distress and inconvenience caused to him by the false accusations. On
3rd April 1996 he instituted proceedings in the Lambeth County Court against
Temple Security Services Ltd, claiming against them, in relation to the actions
of their servant the security guard, compensatory and exemplary damages in
respect of the incident of 6th March. On 24th January 1997 he recovered
judgment in Lambeth County Court against Temple Security Services Ltd for
£1,500 odd, but his claim in those proceedings for exemplary and
aggravated damages was dismissed.
This
action was commenced by Mr Morris on 20th March 1997 against Kwik Save in
relation to the same incident. On 16th April 1997 Kwik Save accepted that
there had been an incident when he had been wrongly accused but denied the
sting of the allegation made by Mr Morris. The application of Kwik Save to
dismiss his claim as being frivolous and vexatious due to the pre-existing
judgment in his favour against Temple Security Services Ltd was dismissed by
the district judge on 14th August 1997. The action came on for trial before
His Honour Judge Gibson on 16th February 1998. On that day, at 11.20 a.m. in
the morning, Mr Morris was handed by the solicitor for Kwik Save a copy of this
court's judgment in
Thompson
v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis
[1997] 2 All ER 762. The photocopy that he was handed was, he said, only
partially legible. He sought, and was refused, an adjournment. The hearing
commenced at about 3 p.m. in the afternoon. He told us that the defendants'
solicitor indicated that they did not contest liability. The defendants did
not call any evidence. When Mr Morris sought to give evidence he was
cross-examined as to the absence of any physical interference and matters of
that nature. He protested, so he told us, at the lack of any evidence from the
defendants giving a true picture of the events as he said they occurred.
In
the note of his judgment, which we have and to which I shall have to refer in
greater detail later as to one of the allegations Mr Morris makes, the judge
summarised the facts as follows:
"He
went into the store in order to buy groceries. His case, which is not
challenged on the facts, is that he completed a purchase of four different
items. He paid a £5 note for these items and received change from a
particular cashier.
He
suggests that he must have dropped the receipt. I accept this. The relevant
till receipt was later found in the vicinity.
Within
minutes of leaving the store, the plaintiff realised that he had forgotten
kitchen towels. He went back into the store with the other shopping and
obtained kitchen towels. He passed through the same checkout. He says that
eight minutes elapsed between the purchases.
When
he went out of the store for the second time, he was detained by a Security
Guard who brought him back into the store.
The
Guard was present for the remainder of the encounter but did not actually
participate in it.
Mr
Morris complains in these proceedings about the conduct of the manager and
cashier."
The
note of the judge's judgment indicates that the judge then considered
Thompson
v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis
,
and he referred to the other action against Temple Security Services Ltd.
He
returned to the facts of the case before him as follows:
"The
cashier was first involved when Mr Morris came back into the store. The
plaintiff said to her, ´You remember me, don't you?' The cashier brushed
that suggestion aside and without doubt denied that she had served Mr Morris on
the first occasion.
As
a result, the manager was brought on to the scene. The plaintiff complains
that the manager was hostile and said ´I'll call the police.' Mr Morris
accepts that no one laid a hand upon him, but this was due to Mr Morris raising
his voice and drawing the attention of other customers.
The
plaintiff complains that the manager did not allow him to look for the receipt.
The manager told him not to.
The
plaintiff made a grab at the receipts and luckily, he found his receipt on the
floor.
That
was the key that unlocked the door and Mr Morris was allowed to go. He
suggested that the manager make an apology, and he got a mumbled apology from
the manager.
Mr
Morris was very shaken at the time and cannot now visit the store."
The
judge then referred to the report from the Maudsley Hospital which I have
mentioned and continued with his decision. First, he referred to the
£1,500 Mr Morris had been awarded in the proceedings against Temple
Security Services Ltd and the judge said:
"That
related to the consequences immediate and not immediate of the wrongful arrest
and the coercion back into the store. Mr Morris is entitled to be compensated
for suffering in the store caused by the manager and cashier.
I
take the view that the incident, wrongful though it was, was not abnormal and
[that this is] not a case for aggravated damages, still less for exemplary
damages.
Mr
Morris did suffer more due to the incident than another might have done in his
[position].
The
incident itself lasted for 20 minutes. Judge James awarded compensation for
the first (with the guard) and the later suffering. I find it impossible to
see any part of the experience and suffering referred to in the medical report
before Judge James that was not compensated.
I
think that Mr Morris should be compensated only [in respect of] time in the
store."
The
judge then referred to
Thompson
and the suggested starting point for liability of £500 for the first
hour. He continued:
"In
this case it was in a public place and very embarrassing. Against this, I must
allow for the fact that Mr Morris was already under restraint due to the
actions of the Security Guard. Having regard to the guidance of the Court of
Appeal and that part of the suffering for which he has already been
compensated, damages are assessed at £350. Nothing that happened later
needs further compensation."
On
18th March Mr Morris submitted his application for leave to appeal. In
connection with that it is necessary to obtain a note of the judge's judgment.
He applied to Lambeth County Court for a note and was told that there was not
one. The defendants' solicitor provided a note that he had made for the
approval of the judge. The note was approved by Judge Gibson on 24th April
1998. Mr Morris wrote to the court complaining that the note of the judgment
was not an accurate summary of the judgment the judge had given. This was
accepted by Judge Gibson in a letter of 29th May 1998 written by the listing
section of the Lambeth County Court which says:
"
..... [it] has been placed before the circuit judge ..... "
and
the circuit judge said:
"Responsibility
for the sentence ´The cashier was first involve[d] when Mr Morris came
back into the store is mine not that of the defendants' solicitors[.] I accept
that it is inconsistent with passage in Mr Morris's witness statement which
were not challenged in cross-examination[.] Whether this is significant is a
matter for argument. As I have concluded my function [in] the case it would
not be right for me to comment."
Before
us Mr Morris put his case on three separate grounds. First, he complained that
by virtue of the defendants admitting liability they avoided the necessity of
calling the cashier and the manager, thereby obscuring from the judge the
severity of the false allegation that had been made and its effect on Mr
Morris. It is suggested that, as a result, they avoided the liability which
they otherwise would have incurred for exemplary and aggravated damages. I,
for my part, do not accept that suggestion. The fact is that the judge was
well aware of all the circumstances, subject to the point on the note of
judgment, on which Mr Morris relied. And the absence of witnesses from the
defendants was no reason to interfere with the judge's judgment or the
conclusions he reached on the matters which were in issue before him.
The
second point was that there was unfair conduct of the trial. In that respect
Mr Morris complains that he was handed an illegible copy of
Thompson
v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis
at 11.20 am and was refused an adjournment. The fact is, as he told us, that
the trial commenced at 3 pm. The trial was inevitably somewhat truncated
because of the admission of liability. I, for my part, cannot see that the
intervening 3 hours 40 minutes was not adequate time for Mr Morris to prepare
by reading
Thompson
v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis
and making such other notes or submissions in due course as he wished. He
complains that the judge was, in his view, obdurate. That is as may be. The
judge was performing his judicial function, and I cannot see anything wrong in
refusing the adjournment.
The
third point arises in relation to the note of judgment. Mr Morris evidently
considers that the solicitor was seeking to mislead this court. I do not take
that view. The judge accepted that he was in error in saying that the cashier
was only involved when Mr Morris re-entered the store whereas Mr Morris's own
statement had indicated that the cashier was involved on the first occasion
when he pointed Mr Morris out to the security guard, and it was in consequence
of that action that the security guard followed Mr Morris out on the later
occasion. Be that as it may, that is no reflection on the defendants'
solicitor. I, for my part, do not see how it makes any difference to the award
of damages at which the judge arrived, bearing in mind, as he did and as he was
entitled to do, there had already been a judgment in favour of Mr Morris and
against Temple Security Services Ltd for £1,500.
The
other inaccuracy relied on, as I understood it, was that the judge referred to
Mr Morris's case before him as not abnormal whereas at the trial it is said
that he referred to the case as a standard case. I cannot regard that
difference as being in any way material as to the nature of the trial.
For
all those reasons I would refuse this application because I do not see that
there is any point which is reasonably arguable before the full court if leave
were granted.
LORD
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I agree.
Order:
Application dismissed