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Brightwell v Secretary Of State For Environment & Anor [1996] EWCA Civ 783 (22nd October, 1996)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1996/783.html
Cite as:
[1996] EG 170,
[1997] 2 PLR 38,
[1996] EWCA Civ 783,
(1997) 73 P & CR 418
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PAUL BRIGHTWELL v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENVIRONMENT v. BROADLAND DISTRICT COUNCIL [1996] EWCA Civ 783 (22nd October, 1996)
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
QBCOF
95/1649/D
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON
APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(HIS
HONOUR JUDGE RICH QC sitting as a High Court Judge
)
Royal
Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2
Tuesday
22 October 1996
B
e f o r e:
THE
MASTER OF THE ROLLS
(LORD
WOOLF)
LORD
JUSTICE ALDOUS
LORD
JUSTICE BROOKE
-
- - - - -
PAUL
BRIGHTWELL
Applicant/Appellant
-v-
SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
First
Respondent
-v-
BROADLAND
DISTRICT COUNCIL
Second
Respondent
-
- - - - -
(Computer
Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith
Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London
EC4A 2HD
Tel:
0171 831 3183
Official
Shorthand Writers to the Court)
-
- - - - -
MR
D OUSELEY QC
and
MR
D PUGH
(Instructed by Emmett & Tacon, Norwich NR1 1NB) appeared on behalf of the
Appellant.
MR
T MOULD
(Instructed by The Treasury Solicitors, London, SW1H 9JS) appeared on behalf of
the Respondents.
-
- - - - -
J
U D G M E N T
(As
approved by the Court
)
-
- - - - -
©Crown
Copyright
JUDGMENT
THE
MASTER OF THE ROLLS: Mr Paul Brightwell appeals against a decision of His
Honour Judge Rich, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, when he dismissed the
application of Mr Brightwell, made under section 288 of the Town and Planning
Act 1990, to quash a decision of the Secretary of State. That decision was
taken by an Inspector on written submissions on an appeal by Mr Brightwell
against the refusal of the Local Planning Authority to allow a caravan to be
cited at The Piggeries, The Turn, Hevingham, Norfolk. The Piggeries is
situated at the edge of a small settlement just to the west of the main village
of Hevingham.
There
are two separate parts to this appeal. The first part refers to the decision
of the judge only to grant leave to Mr Brightwell to amend his application
if he gave an undertaking to pay into court the costs of any adjournment, which
was a necessary consequence of the application. The second was as to the merits
of the decision of the judge.
So
far as the first part is concerned, Mr Brightwell is legally aided. The
intention of the judge in requiring the undertaking was that the lawyers should
be responsible for ensuring, if the undertaking was given, that it would be
complied with. The appellant disputes that the requirement of the undertaking
was something which could properly be demanded by the judge as a condition of
leave to amend the application.
I
have some sympathy with the approach of the judge. The application to amend
was made at a very late stage, after the commencement of the hearing. The
judge was concerned that the consequence of giving leave to amend would
necessarily involve an adjournment. He came to that view because the second
respondent, the Local Planning Authority (Broadland District Council) had taken
no part in the proceedings. However, the application before the judge was
being opposed by the Secretary of State, the first respondent. This is the
usual situation when a decision of this nature is being challenged. The
Secretary of State takes upon himself the responsibility of defending the
decision which was taken on his behalf.
The
first matter, therefore, which has to be considered in assessing the
appropriateness of the course taken by judge is whether an adjournment would
have been necessary if the application to amend had been granted. The judge
took the view that the Local Planning Authority would have to be notified of
the proposed amendment and, because they were not a party to the proceedings,
an adjournment would be necessary. However, I take a different view from that
of the judge on this matter, although I am very conscious of his very
considerable experience in this area.
If
the Local Planning Authority had decided to leave the matter to be dealt with
by the Secretary of State, they could not possibly have had any objection to
not being notified as to the proposed amendment. It was a desirable amendment,
but one which raised no different issue which would affect the Local Planning
Authority over and above the case already being made.
This
case involved an allegation that the decision letter of the Inspector disclosed
that no proper consideration had been given by him to one or more of the
material issues which were before him. The new allegation of a failure to give
adequate reasons was a natural accompaniment to the allegation of the failure
to give proper consideration to the issues. I cannot conceive that the second
respondent would seek to intervene because of a leave to amend being granted.
That is, therefore, sufficient to dispose of the first ground of appeal. There
was no need for an adjournment; if there was no need for an adjournment there
would be no additional costs incurred as a result of an adjournment, and the
requirement of the undertaking was unnecessary and inappropriate.
Having
come to that conclusion, it is unnecessary to deal in detail with the
suggestion that, in any event, such a requirement of an undertaking would be
improper. However, I confess that I have real reservations as to its
propriety. The Secretary of State did not seek to suggest before this court
that it was a proper requirement, and it interferes with the position of a
legally aided litigant under the Legal Aid Act. It also by-passes the
requirements that have to be considered by a court before it imposes a wasted
costs order which, as the appellant contended, was, in effect, the result of
requiring such an undertaking having regard to Mr Brightwell's needs.
Having
dealt with the first part of the appeal, I turn to the second ground which
concerns the merits. Mr Ouseley, QC, who appeared on behalf of Mr Brightwell
on the appeal, but did not appear in the court below, divided his case into
three sections. He submitted that the Inspector, in coming to his conclusion,
had not properly dealt with the functional consideration which arose out of the
application, nor had the Inspector dealt with the financial or viability
considerations. Finally, he submitted that the Inspector had failed to deal
with the possibility of allowing the appeal and granting planning permission
for a limited period of time.
Mr
Ouseley included as part of his contentions, on the assumption that Mr
Brightwell's appeal with regard to the leave to amend point would succeed, an
alternative allegation that if the Inspector had properly considered the matter
then he had not explained it by giving adequate reasons.
The
matter was dealt with before the Inspector on written submissions. The
applicant relied on letters written by his legal advisers and a report by an
expert. The Local Planning Authority put in a written submission. It was an
essential part of the application that the judge, and the Inspector on the
appeal to him, would weigh the evidence which was relied upon by the applicant
and the Local Planning Authority against the numerous planning policies which
applied to an application of this sort.
An
application for planning permission in a rural area for the siting of a caravan
is clearly a matter which can give rise to planning considerations of an
important nature. There were local and national policies which had to be taken
into account. The written submissions of the Local Planning Authority set out
the local policies to which I should refer. The first of these was the general
policy statement H6 which was applicable. This provided:
"Outside
towns and villages planning permission for new residential development will not
be given unless it is justified for agriculture, forestry, organised recreation
or tourist facilities....and the need for the development could not be met
within an existing settlement and there are no overriding environmental
objections."
The
District Council had adopted a policy H11 of the previously approved structure
plan which was also relevant. That deals with the fact that we are not
concerned with the normal residential development but a caravan. It is
relevant because it states:
"Applications
for mobile homes, including residential caravans, will be determined as if they
were for permanent housing."
The
third policy to which I must refer is H8 of the Rural Parish Policies which
provides:
"Outside
the villages, planning permission for new residential development will not
normally be given. However, permission may be given for dwellings connected
with agriculture, forestry, organised recreation or tourist facilities....if it
can be demonstrated that the need for the proposed development could not be met
within an existing settlement. In the case of dwellings for agricultural
workers, planning permissions will normally be granted where there is a proven
agricultural need and when such dwellings are sited in close proximity to
existing agricultural buildings."
The
national policy which is applicable is PPG7 annexe E which is headed,
Agricultural and Forestry dwellings. E1 states:
"One
of the few circumstances in which isolated residential development in the
countryside may be justified is when accommodation is required to enable farm
or forestry workers to live at or in the immediate vicinity of their place of
work. Normally it will be as convenient for such workers to live in nearby
town or villages as it will be for them to live where they work. This may have
domestic and social advantages as well as avoiding potentially intrusive
development in the countryside.
E2:
There will be some cases, however, in which the demands of the farming or
forestry work concerned may make it
essential
for one or more of the people engaged in this work to live at or very close to
the site of their work. Whether this is essential in any particular case will
depend on the needs of the farm or forestry enterprise concerned and not on the
personal preferences or circumstances of any of the individuals concerned."
E3
refers to the need for strict controls and then goes on to say:
"It
is, therefore, essential that all applications for planning permission for new
agricultural or forestry dwellings are scrutinised thoroughly with the aim of
detecting attempts to abuse the concession that the planning system makes for
such dwellings.
E4.
In particular, it will be important to establish that stated intentions to
engage in farming or forestry are genuine, are reasonably likely to materialise
and are capable of being sustained for a reasonable period of time. It will
also be important to establish that the needs of the intended enterprise
require one or more of the people engaged in it to live nearby. In assessing
applications for new agricultural or forestry dwellings local planning
authorities may therefore find it useful to apply functional and financial
tests."
E5
sets out the functional test which includes:
"Such
a requirement might arise, for example if workers are needed to be on hand day
and night:
-
in case animals or agricultural processes require essential care at short notice;
-
to deal quickly with emergencies that could otherwise cause serious loss of
crops or products, for example by frost damage or the failure of automatic
systems.
E6.
The protection of livestock from theft or injury by intruders may contribute
on animal welfare grounds to the need for an agricultural dwelling, although it
will not by itself be sufficient to justify one.
E7.
In determining whether a functional requirement exists it will be reasonable
to consider not only the requirements of an enterprise as it exists at present,
but also its likely future requirements, provided there is clear evidence of a
firm intention and ability to develop the farming or forestry business
concerned."
Annex
E clears the distinction between the functional requirements and the financial
or viability requirement.
Turning
to the written submissions which were before the Inspector, the starting point
is a letter of 26 October l994 written on behalf of the applicant. That letter
includes a background information as to Mr Brightwell's activities. Among
other things it states:
"Until
six months ago, Mr Brightwell lived at 31 Haslip Close with his family [in
Norwich]. At that time he had only approximately 30 sows and was constantly
running back and forth from his home and site to look after them. he would
have to be on site at all times of the day especially when they were farrowing,
and quite simply, Mr Brightwell had little time to spend with his family. We
understand that he had a very small touring caravan, which he would stay in
when he had to be on site at night.
Mr
Brightwell wished to increase the number of sows to the current number of 45
plus 3 boars so that he could run the piggery as a full time occupation. To
look after that number of sows, he would have to be constantly on site, at all
times of the day and therefore, the only way he could do that would be to live
in site with his family. There was no other way that he could do the job
properly. If one accepts that, then there is certainly no other property where
Mr Brightwell could live, as certainly he cannot afford another property, and
we believe there are no properties available, either to buy or to rent nearby."
The
letter continues by dealing with the environmental considerations. It was
followed by a letter which indicates that the approximate number of animals on
site are between 45 and 50. The matter is then taken further by a later letter
which indicates that the number of sows on the site had been increased to 60.
The
contents of the letter were supported by the report of the expert, Mr Smith,
who made an agricultural appraisal of what was involved. Among the matters to
which Mr Smith drew attention, was the history; that Mr Brightwell's business
had started off with a casual involvement in pig keeping. It stated that he
intended at that time to expand to 60 sows and makes various comments about the
informality of the business's approach, but it does refer to the fact that
during Mr Smith's visits to the site building work was taking place, blockwork
walls were being erected and a pole barn was nearing completion, the intention
being to use that for straw storage. There is also reference to security and
the fact that there had been one incident about 18 months previously when there
had been intruders and damage caused.
Mr
Smith makes an assessment of the financial viability of the project. He deals
with the matter by looking at general statistics which are available, and then
makes allowances for the particular manner in which the applicant was carrying
on his business, the most important aspect of which was the fact that he could
obtain pig food on very attractive terms which meant that his feed costs were
much less than the average. On the basis of that examination, he came to the
conclusion that a herd of 45 sows would yield a margin of £12,749 per
annum whereas a herd of 60 sows would yield just under £17,000. Mr Smith
expressed the opinion that, given the number of sows already at the piggeries,
which was 45, there should be someone close at hand at all times in the
interests of pig welfare, security and general efficiency. That report is
followed by a letter of the 3 March 1995 where he says:
"In
my opinion this would be technically possible but I believe it would be very
foolhardy, particularly in a commercial situation.....for Mr Brightwell to run
the existing pig unit from a Norwich address."
He
then explains why that is so.
The
Local Planning Authority in its written submissions dealt with the situation
when the herd was 50. Having referred to the relevant policies, the Local
Planning Authority stated in paragraph 4.3:
"The
issue in this case is whether there is sufficient justification for the
retention of a caravan for residential purposes on the appeal site, which
otherwise would clearly be contrary to established planning policies and which
would constitute an undesirable isolated development in the locality, which
would be detrimental to the visual appearance of the rural area."
It
then goes on to say:
"From
the information submitted with the application it would appear that there are
under 50 animals on the site at any one time. It is the opinion of the Local
Planning Authority that this number of stock does not require a person to live
on the site in order to provide good husbandry for the animals."
That
is expanded at paragraph 4.6 where it said:
"The
Local Planning Authority takes the view that the number of animals on the site
does not require the attention of a person permanently residing on the site.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the good husbandry of the animals does require
someone to visit the site on a regular basis, this could be done quite
adequately from a property in the nearby vicinity."
The
Local Planning Authority then state that they are aware of the history and that
property in which the appellant lives is:
"....in
the centre of Norwich some 9 kilometres from the site and obviously indicates
that a business has been operated on a similar scale to that of the present day
without the requirement of the Appellant to live any closer than 9 kilometres
from the appeal site."
Finally,
in its conclusions, the Planning Authority indicates that the development
proposed is unacceptable and adds:
"If,
after consideration of these representations, the Inspector is inclined to
allow the appeal, Local Planning Authority (in accordance with the requirements
of Circular 16/86) requests that the Conditions outlined on the attached
appendix should be imposed."
and
those conditions are for a limited time period for the condition to be applied.
On
the basis of those written submissions, the Inspector gave a decision on 2 May
1995 when the herd was 60 in number, the relevant paragraphs of which, numbers
6 and 7, stated:
"Until
early in 1994 your client managed the site from Norwich. He then moved onto
the site and increased the number of pigs to about 45. From the evidence, the
management of this enterprise appears to be so informal as to cast doubt on the
functioning and viability of what is, according to your client's expert, a
DIY/low cost enterprise. You indicate a generalised concern that someone
should be close at hand at all times in the interest of pig welfare, security
and general efficiency as well as emergencies. However, your client has
managed about 30 pigs on site from his home in Norwich, and I have seen no
evidence to suggest that it is necessary to live on site to manage what is
still a relatively small enterprise.
Annex
E of Planning Policy guidance 7 requires a robust justification to establish
whether a dwelling of any sort is essential in the countryside for the proper
functioning of an agricultural enterprise. I consider that there is no clear
evidence to show that the enterprise is likely to be sustained for a reasonable
period of time. As the provision of a dwelling in the countryside is not
subject to personal preference, but to the needs of the enterprise, I conclude
the caravan would not be necessary for agricultural purposes. Neither would
the proposal satisfy the aims of current and emerging countryside policies. It
would consolidate the buildings presently on the site and would help to extend
the ribbon of development along The Turn. Thus, even though you say the site
is well screened, the caravan constitutes an unwarranted intrusion in the
countryside. therefore, I consider that the proposal would harm the open
countryside which should be protected for its own sake. Furthermore, if the
appeal were allowed, it would be difficult for the Council to resist further
similar applications."
In
his judgment. the judge examined the arguments advanced on Mr Brightwell's
behalf with care. In rejecting those arguments, he adopted what could be
described as a generous approach to the interpretation of the Inspector's
letter. Because the application to amend had not been granted, he was not
required to consider the quality of the reasoning, which is a matter which
arises for consideration on this appeal.
Under
the relevant legislation, the Inspector is under a statutory obligation to give
reasons for his decision. Those reasons must be intelligible and deal at least
with the primary issues which are before him. The general approach which I
would adopt is indicated in a speech of Lord Lloyd in the case of
Bolton
Metropolitan Borough Council v The Secretary of State
(1990) 61 P & CR 343 at 352. This is a case which is now generally
referred to on appeals of this nature and on applications before the single
judge. I must confess some surprise that the case only appears in specialist
reports.
While
the standard now has been laid down in a number of cases, including that to
which I have just referred, I would emphasise that the approach to the
reasoning of an Inspector on a decision of this nature must be pragmatic. One
must take into account the extent and the nature of the issues which are before
the Inspector. One should not be too astute to find defects in his reasoning.
It
is clear that the Inspector clearly had in mind the distinction between the
financial or viability consideration that he had to take into account as well
as the functional aspect. Paragraph 6 deals with the financial or
viability aspect and, clearly, the Inspector formed an adverse impression of
its future viability, notwithstanding that there was material before him which
he does not mention indicating that Mr Brightwell was investing in the piggery
and seeking to put it on a sound basis. So far as the financial consideration
is concerned, I would not criticise the Inspector for coming to his conclusion
that there was some doubt as to the viability.
Turning
to the other aspect, the criticisms of Mr Ouseley focused on the phrase: "I
have seen no evidence to suggest that it is necessary to live on site to manage
what is still a relatively small enterprise." If one reads that phrase as
referring strictly to the requirement to actually live on site, then I can
understand how the Inspector came to make that comment.
The
case which had to be answered by the Inspector, and indeed by
Mr Brightwell's lawyer, was one which was capable of being met by an
ability to live in the close vicinity; for example, in the nearby village or
the two nearby settlements. But, as I understand the case which was being put
forward, it was clearly making the point that the herd could not be looked
after properly from Norwich.
While
the Inspector was entitled to draw attention to the fact that Mr Brightwell had
managed 30 pigs on site from his home in Norwich with difficulty, it seems to
me that there was no justification for him not considering the point which was
being made about the need for someone close at hand. He expresses no
conclusion on that point. He had it in mind because just above the phrase
which I have cited he actually he uses the words "close at hand " but he does
not deal with it. What was being said on Mr Brightwell's behalf is that he
could not obtain any alternative to the site where he carried on his
agricultural activities. There was nothing within his means or, as far as was
known, available close by and, therefore, he had no alternative but to live on
site or to live some distance away, for example in Norwich.
In
addition, it is not clear from the Inspector's letter as to whether he was
aware, or whether he had failed to appreciate, the fact that there were now 60
pigs on site. He refers to 45 pigs, but nowhere appears to have in mind that
there has been another substantial increase, proportionately, to 60 pigs. To
contrast the position which relates to 30 pigs to that which now existed on
site, might be unfair to the case which Mr Brightwell was putting forward.
It
is contended on behalf of the Secretary of State that that is not a fair
criticism of the Inspector because of the use of the word "still" before
"relatively small enterprise". By using that word it is suggested that the
Inspector is indicating that he has in mind a herd of 60 pigs rather than a
smaller herd, as had previously been referred to. I do not know whether that
is a right deduction or not; certainly the letter is not clear in that regard.
Looking
at the reasoning as a whole, bearing in mind in particular the approach the
Inspector adopted in relation to the functional consideration, I am bound to
say that the letter does not meet the required standard of reasoning. Either
the Inspector has failed to take into consideration the question of the
possibility of the site being served from close at hand, or he has not
adequately set out his conclusions in that regard.
In
considering a matter of this sort, the decision letter has to be looked at as a
whole. It is for that reason, and that reason alone, that I refer to the third
consideration on which Mr Ouseley relied, namely, the failure of the Inspector
to say anything about the possibility of granting permission but with a limited
time condition.
So
far as that is concerned, I fully accept, as has been made clear in the case of
Top
Deck Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State
[1991] JPL 961 that there is no obligation on an Inspector, in the absence of
any reference to an appropriate condition, to search for a condition which
might be used to assist an applicant who is appealing against the decision of a
Planning Authority.
However,
in this case, one of the matters which clearly influenced the Inspector was the
viability of the whole operation. As I have indicated, there were signs that
the operation was improving in its viability and that Mr Brightwell was in fact
making a success of it. On the other hand, it was only viable on the basis
that he devoted a very considerable amount of time personally to the operation
and if, for example, he became ill the position could be transformed.
A
time condition was obviously a possibility and was relevant, as is recognised
by the specific reference by the Local Planning Authority. Again, I would say
that the appellant is not being unreasonable in making a criticism of the
Inspector for not making any mention of that possibility. That is a further
factor that I would put into the balance. One does not know whether the
Inspector has considered it but not mentioned it, or whether it is a case of
his failing to consider it. In either event, he could be criticised to a minor
degree in that regard. Whilst that is not a consideration with which I would
have interfered with the decision of the judge, I think it is a matter to be
taken into account on the general approach.
Looking
at the matter as a whole, which I have indicated to be the appropriate
approach, the decision I have come to is that the decision should be quashed.
I do not think there is any problem with Mr Brightwell establishing prejudice
in so far as that is required before a decision of this nature is quashed.
Clearly, he is entitled to know for the future management of his affairs the
basis of the decision and, in view of what I have indicated, it can be
concluded here that there is either a form of defect, failure of proper
consideration, or there is a failure of proper reasoning.
Accordingly,
I would allow the appeal and remit the matter to the Secretary of State so that
it can be reconsidered by an Inspector.
LORD
JUSTICE ALDOUS: I agree with the order that has been proposed and only wish to
add a few words on the merits. I have come to the conclusion that the
Inspector's decision on both the material issues did not provide adequate
reasons.
My
Lord has set out the evidence and submissions that were before the Inspector in
detail. I therefore can turn directly to the decision letter of the 2 May
1995.
In
paragraph 3 of that letter, the Inspector said:
"From
all the evidence, I consider that the main issue to be determined here is the
effect of the proposal on the open countryside near Hevingham."
I
believe that the Inspector mis-stated the issue which was properly stated by
the Local Authority in paragraph 4.3 of their submissions as:
"The
issue in this case is whether there is sufficient justification for the
retention of a caravan for residential purposes on the appeal site, which
otherwise would clearly be contrary to established planning policies and which
would constitute an undesirable isolated development in the locality, which
would be detrimental to the visual appearance of the rural area."
The
mis-statement of the main issue by the Inspector does not appear to have misled
him as he went on to consider the essential issues which were relevant having
regard to the local and national planning policies.
In
paragraph 6 of the letter the Inspector turned to the relevant considerations.
He concluded that the applicant's appeal should be dismissed because he decided
that it was not necessary for the applicant to live on site and he concluded in
paragraph 7 that there was no clear evidence that his pig breeding enterprise
was viable.
His
reasons for his first conclusion were contained in the last sentence to
paragraph 6: first, he concluded as fact that the applicant had managed about
30 pigs on site from his home in Norwich and, secondly, he had seen no evidence
to suggest that it was necessary to live on site to manage what was a
relatively small enterprise.
It
is true that the applicant had managed a pig breeding enterprise of about 30
sows while living in Norwich, but it does not follow from that that it would
have been practical to do so after his herd had been increased to 60 sows.
That was made clear by Mr Smith, a consultant to the pig industry, in the
conclusion of his report. He said that somebody should be close at hand at all
times in the interest of pig welfare, security and general efficiency. He
elaborated on that in the letter of 3 March when he said that it was
technically possible, but it would be very foolhardy, particularly in a
commercial situation, to manage the enterprise from Norwich.
Therefore,
the applicant's case before the Inspector was that he needed to live in the
vicinity and, as stated in his solicitor's letter, there was no accommodation
within the existing settlement. That was challenged by the Local Authority.
There was no evidence to suggest that the applicant needed to live on site
rather than in the vicinity. Thus, potentially there were two issues before
the Inspector: namely, did the increase of the herd from 30 to 60 sows require
the applicant to move nearer to the farm than Norwich and, if so, was there
accommodation available close by?
The
Inspector rejected the applicant's case, but failed to state how he had arrived
at his decision. He may have concluded that the 60 sow herd could be looked
after by a person residing in Norwich. If so, he rejected the evidence of Mr
Smith. I suspect that he accepted Mr Smith's evidence on this part of the case
and therefore concluded that a herd of 60 sows could be looked after by a
person living within the existing settlement and also that there was suitable
accommodation to be found within the neighbouring villages. If so, I believe
that he was under a duty to say so. My Lord has referred to
Bolton
and it appears to me that one of the material issues in this case was whether
there was suitable accommodation in the surrounding area, there being no
evidence he needed to live on site. In my view the Inspector's decision cannot
be allowed to stand as he does not make it clear why he concluded that the
applicant need not live on site.
The
Inspector also held that there was no clear evidence to show that the
enterprise was likely to be sustained for a reasonable period of time. Mr
Smith's report showed that, upon the facts as then known, the income which
Mr Smith would receive would show a margin exceeding the wages of an
agricultural worker. No doubt that was with a "fair wind" behind him.
However, the statement by the Inspector must be read in the light of that
evidence. To arrive at his decision, the Inspector had to have doubts as to
part of the report, or doubts as to the viability in the future. However, he
failed to give any reason why he concluded that there was no clear evidence.
In my view, he should have stated the reason why he had concluded that the
evidence was not clear. That was necessary to enable the reader to know what
was the issue that the Inspector had in mind when he came to his conclusion.
For
those reasons, and the reasons given by my Lord, I agree with the order proposed.
LORD
JUSTICE BROOKE: I also agree with the order proposed. We have been told by
both parties in this court that at the hearing before the judge counsel for the
Secretary of State raised no objection to the late amendment for which leave
was sought by the applicant; nor did he ask for an adjournment to give him or
his client the opportunity to respond to the new point for which leave was
granted. He was quite ready to deal with it there and then.
I
agree with my Lord, The Master of the Rolls, that in the particular
circumstances of this case there was absolutely no need for the judge to make a
conditional grant of leave to amend on the terms my Lord has described.
Practitioners would, however, be unwise to treat the decision of this court
today as giving any sort of green light for any late amendment of this kind.
Late applications to amend will fall to be treated by the judge at the hearing
on its own merits, or lack of them, in accordance with well established
principles. In this particular case, I agree with my Lord that the judge was
clearly wrong in the manner in which he exercised his discretion on the
application.
So
far as the substantive merits of the appeal are concerned, I have nothing to
add to the judgments given by My Lords with which I agree.
Order:
Appeal allowed. Respondent to pay costs of appeal and in the court below.
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