England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE MAY)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London W2A 2LL
		20th December 1996

See: [1998] EWCA Civ 10

LORD JUSTICE HIRST: This a renewed application for leave to appeal after refusal by the single judge in an action brought by Mr Geenty, who is a police officer stationed in Gloucester against Channel Four Television, in relation to a programme screened on 14 January 1994.

We have read the papers fully and we have also seen the relevant parts of the programme. The notice of appeal so far as relevant is in the following terms: that the learned judge who came to a determination under Order 82, rule (3)(a) erred in holding that one of the words was not capable of bearing one of the two pleaded meanings which were put forward in the statement of claim, which are as follows:

"The said words in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean:-

1) that the Plaintiff had probably savagely beaten Mr Wiltshire while Mr Wiltshire, who had already sustained serious injuries, was in custody at Gloucester police station;

2) that the Plaintiff had gravely neglected the care of Mr Wiltshire when Mr Wiltshire was seriously injured in custody, and had thereby caused or at least contributed to Mr Wiltshire's death while in custody."

The judge ruled, contrary to the submission before him of the defendant, that the programme was capable of bearing the second of the two meanings. What he said was as follows:

"In my judgment the references by Mr Griffin [he was the active proponent in the programme]... to Detective Constable Geenty are, at least, capable of attributing to him, among others it may be, the alleged severe neglect which four, or by that stage nearly five, pages of the programme [he is referring to the transcript there] had been concentrating on immediately before he is introduced by name. He is the only relevant officer mentioned by name, and in my judgment his mention is in such close proximity with the allegations... as to make it at least a possible meaning which a jury might find that some of the alleged severe neglect is being attributed to him. It is in my judgment over-analytical to suggest that a viewer would think that Detective Constable Geenty was only being attributed with a lack of awareness of Mr Wiltshire's condition. Accordingly, for these reasons, the summons fails in relation to meaning number two."

With reference to the first meaning the judge held that the programme clearly raised the question whether the treatment of Mr Wiltshire at the police station was worse than mere neglect and constituted ill-treatment. This was based to a significant degree on the suggestion, clearly made in the programme, that he had sustained serious injuries not recorded in the hospital records, this being a case where he had spent some time in hospital before being removed to the police station. Then the judge then went on to say this:

"Here, however, the plaintiff has, I think, the added, and to my mind insuperable, problem of reference. He is not referred to at all in the only passage capable of containing the defamatory allusion referred to in the first meaning. Having allusively raised the possibility of positive injury in police custody, there is said to be no proof of this and there is then an immediate transition to allegations of police neglect. ... The reference by Mr Griffin to Mr Geenty then appears to two full further pages later. For practical purposes all the intervening material concerned possible police neglect and failure to observe regulations.

Though I have held that in that context the references by Mr Griffin to Mr Geenty are capable of being taken as suggesting that Mr Geenty was one of those against whom allegations of neglect were made, it is in my judgment stretching a viewer's awareness well beyond breaking point to see these references in the context in which they were made as referring back so as to link Mr Geenty with what are, in any event, only allusions made considerably earlier in the programme at a point at which he had not been named at all."

In other words the judge held that the discontinuity between the part of the programme referring to ill-treatment and the subsequent references by name to Mr Geenty later on was sufficient to break any possible link between Mr Geenty personally and those allegations.

In my judgment it is at least reasonably arguable that this distinction drawn by the judge is not sufficiently clear to warrant a ruling under Order 82, rule (3)(a), but that rather it is a question for the jury, viewing the relevant parts of the programme as a whole, to decide whether the plaintiff succeeds in establishing both meanings, i.e. that he is capable of being personally implicated in both and not just in the second meaning relating to neglect.

I would therefore grant leave to appeal in this case, though I stress that the plaintiff should not count on success in the appeal.

LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I agree.

Order: Application allowed; costs in the appeal.no lenghty discussion followed, just for costs to be in the appeal