England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

"Although I find that both plaintiffs sadly have not been open and frank with the psychiatrist who examined them, and have tended to exaggerate their condition, I am satisfied that Mr. Reilly in that lift became so psychologically disturbed because of the claustrophobic feelings he had, and his worries about his wife, who was, I accept, already claustrophobic, that he became hot, he was feeling as though he would choke, and was sweating, no doubt brought about by his worries over his angina and whether he would have an attack. When he was eventually released from the lift, he could not walk, and had to be helped up the stairs from the basement where the doors were opened, and that night he could not sleep and was suffering chest pain, the angina, which was brought on by the experience he had gone through. I find that as fact as to what he went through.

Mrs. Reilly, as I have already indicated, had this pre-existing claustrophobia. She was very panicky in that lift. She was extremely worried about her husband's angina. She found it very difficult to breathe, and she became dizzy. She had to be helped up the stairs, and her knees gave way when the lift was opened. She could not sleep and she had nightmares for a few days. Both were in a state of collapse when they left that lift.

What I say simply, and I base my decision solely on the facts of this case, is that those two lists or catalogues of symptoms constitute physical injury in respect of both. I would say in the alternative that my own view is that even if they did not constitute physical injury, that, and the aftermath for approximately two months, and, in respect of both, the fear of lifts and enclosed spaces - in Mr. Reilly's case a new fear; in her case an aggravation of a pre-existing condition - would constitute a psychological injury or illness, which although cannot be given the label of post-traumatic stress disorder, or chronic anxiety state, is, in my judgment, of sufficient severity to entitle them to recover damages."

"The real claim presented by Mr. Brown is for fright. An elephant coming over the top of a booth would be a terrifying thing even for an ordinary man, and although the male plaintiff asserts that he was not frightened, I am satisfied that the shock must have been considerable. I should like to award him a substantial sum under this head, but I am satisfied that I cannot do so except to the extremely limited extent that the shock resulted in physical or mental harm."

i. Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40, where at p 42-43

"In English law no damages are awarded for grief or sorrow caused by a person's death. No damages are to be given for the worry about the children, or for the financial strain or stress, or the difficulties of adjusting to a new life. Damages are, however, recoverable for nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."

ii. McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC, where at p 431 Lord Bridge of Harwich said:

"The common law gives no damages for the emotional distress which any normal person experiences when someone he loves is killed or injured. Anxiety and depression are normal human emotions. Yet an anxiety neurosis or a reactive depression may be recognisable psychiatric illnesses, with or without psychosomatic symptoms. So, the first hurdle which the plaintiff claiming damages of the kind in question must surmount is to establish that he is suffering, not merely grief, distress or any other normal emotion, but a positive psychiatric illness."

iii. Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 All ER 690, where at 693 Parker LJ said:

"... it is clear from the nervous shock cases that horror and fear for oneself or others does not sound in damages. These are emotions which can no doubt be described as suffering but it is only when they result in recognisable psychiatric injury that an action lies. It is then for such injury, not for the fear or horror.

As I have already said, apprehension and fear are of themselves not compensatable, nor in my view are discomfort or shortness of breath by themselves. Anyone who regularly travels on the London Underground frequently suffers discomfort and shortage of breath from the press of bodies in overcrowded trains."

iv. Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire

Police [1992] 2 All ER, where at p 69 Lord Bridge of

"It is perfectly clear law that fear by itself, of whatever degree, is a normal human emotion for which no damages can be awarded. Those trapped in the crush at Hillsborough who were fortunate enough to escape without injury have no claim in respect of the distress they suffered in what must have been a truly terrifying experience. It follows that fear of impending death felt by the victim of a fatal injury before that injury is inflicted cannot by itself give rise to a cause of action ... ."

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