England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OP JUSTICE
(CIVIL DIVISION)
(From: His Honour Judge McDonnell
- West London County Court)

		Royal Courts of Justice
		7th November 1975

(Revised)

(without calling on Counsel for Respondents)

LORD JUSTICE MEGAW: On 6th April 1974, Mr. William Charles Ayshford Sanford was killed in a motor accident. He was 68. He had been married twice. His second marriage was in 1951. There was one child of that marriage, a son, born in 1952. By his will, Mr. Sanford appointed Mr. Arthur Edward Leslie Horrocks and Mr. John Stephen Lloyd as his executors. They, in their capacity as executors, are the plaintiffs in the action out of which this appeal arises. The defendant in the action is Mrs. Maxine Forray. She had been Mr. Sanford's mistress for, it is said, some 17 years, and had so continued up to the time of his death. It would seem that he first met her when she was 15 years old. Though there was evidence, given by the defendant herself, as to the circumstances in which she met Mr. Sanford and became his mistress, I do not think that that evidence -- or indeed a good deal of the rest of the evidence relating to her subsequent life and activities -- is of relevance to the issue which this court has to decide. The evidence has been carefully reviewed by the learned judge, Judge McDonnell, who heard the action out of which this appeal arises in the West London County Court on 7th July 1975. He delivered his judgment on July 18. There has been no substantial criticism of the learned judge's findings of fact, based upon the evidence of the witnesses whom he saw and heard giving evidence. I shall refer hereafter to such of the facts found by him as appear to me to be relevant to the issues now before this court: issues which are substantially more limited in scope than those which the learned judge had to consider on the basis of the much more wide-ranging arguments which were presented before him on behalf of the defendant.

The claim by the plaintiffs is a claim for possession of a house, 7, Farm Place, Kensington, W.8. That house is, and has since about May 1973, been occupied by the defendant and, as I understand it, two children of hers. One of those children, a girl born in July 1961, is the child of the late Mr. Sanford. The other, a boy born in July 1968, is the son of another man, a Mr. Forray, whom the defendant married in September 1966. As I understand it, that marriage ended in divorce. But during its continuance, the defendant continued to be the late Mr. Sanford's mistress. She has also had not infrequent sexual intercourse with another man, apparently a great friend of the late Mr. Sanford, and apparently with his knowledge. She has sometimes been known by the name of that other man.

Mrs. Sanford, the widow of Mr. Sanford, had no knowledge or inkling of her husband's relationship with the defendant, whom she never met. Mrs. Sanford, as the judge records, throughout her marriage regarded her husband as a "marvellous husband." It was only after his death that his widow came to know of the defendant and of this relationship which had in fact existed, concealed from her by her husband, for many years. It was only after his death that she or the plaintiffs became aware of his ownership of 7, Farm Place, which the late Mr. Sanford had bought and which had been conveyed to him in his own name in May 1973, and which, since then, had been the residence of the defendant and her children. He had paid £36,500 for it in May 1973.

Mr. Sanford had at one time been a wealthy man, but he had lived extravagantly for many years. At the time of his death he was, as the judge says, "coming to the end of his financial tether." If the plaintiffs are unable to sell 7, Farm Place with vacant possession, it is probable that the estate will be insolvent. The widow, to whom Mr. Sanford by his will left all his estate for life with a gift over on her death to their son, would in those circumstances receive nothing from the estate. She, like the defendant's daughter, the late Mr. Sanford's illegitimate child, may recover compensation under the Fatal Accidents Acts as being dependants of Mr. Sanford, if negligence resulting in his death is proved as against the driver of the car, who was understood to be his brother. But so far as anything from Mr. Sanford's own estate is concerned, the widow, if the defendant is permitted by the law to remain in possession of 7, Farm Place, is likely to be left with nothing.

If, on the other hand, 7, Farm Place can be sold with vacant possession -- that is, if this claim against the defendant for possession succeeds -- the estate is likely to be, at least, solvent. The widow will get something. As to the defendant's, daughter, she may be entitled to damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts as being a dependant of the late Mr. Sanford. She would also be entitled to claim against the estate -- should the estate have anything to make such a claim fruitful -- under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, as amended. In the county court proceedings it was thought that there might be a conflict of interest between the defendant and her daughter, so the Official Solicitor became guardian ad litem of the daughter. We are given to understand that he does not think that there is a conflict which requires any intervention on his part.

It is in those circumstances that the plaintiffs, as executors, started the proceedings which have led to this appeal. By their particulars of claim, which are dated 21st March 1975, they set out the late Mr. Sanford's ownership of 7, Farm Place. This is not challenged. They aver that the defendant, since about May 1973, has occupied the house pursuant to licence of the plaintiffs. That is not challenged; indeed, it is asserted on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiffs, in their particulars of claim, assert that the licence terminated with the death of Mr. Sanford or was determined by a letter dated 2nd August 1974. By that letter the plaintiffs' solicitors wrote to the solicitor who was then acting for the defendant, in these terms:

"With reference to 7, Farm Place, London, W.8, this property clearly falls into the estate and we shall be obliged if you will let us have the deeds of the property as soon as possible. The executors require vacant possession of the house but think it reasonable that Mrs. Forray and her daughter should be given a reasonable period in which to make arrangements for alternative accommodation. We would therefore suggest that Mrs. Forray make arrangements to vacate the premises by 30th November 1974."

The defence and counterclaim, which was originally delivered on 28th April 1975, has been amended and re-amended, the re-amendment being by leave of the court at the trial in the county court. It is a formidable document, but as events have turned out a substantial part of it is not now relevant. The defence "admits and avers" that the defendant and her daughter had a licence from the late Mr. Sanford to occupy 7, Farm Place. There was then an allegation, which is no longer pursued in this court, that the property was held in trust for the defendant or her daughter or for both. There was also a defence that the defendant had acquired a beneficial interest in the property as a result of contribution made by her to expenditure. It was also said that the plaintiffs were estopped from disputing the beneficial ownership of the house by the defendant or her daughter or both; and various particulars were given which are said to give rise to that estoppel. We in this court need not trouble about those defences because they are no longer pursued. It is not now, in this court, contended for the defendant that she has any proprietary right to -- any right of ownership in -- 7, Farm Place. Her claim is solely that she is entitled to remain in occupation by reason of a licence -- in ordinary language, by reason of permission to occupy -- given to her by the late Mr. Sanford.

So the defence which, having been pleaded by amendment, still remains is, in substance and effect, that the licence for the occupation of the premises -- and both parties agree that there was a licence -- was and is a contractual licence, the contractual terms of which were binding on Mr. Sanford and remain binding on his executors after his death. Those terms were pleaded, or at least are now put forward on behalf of the defendant perhaps not in precisely the form in which they were pleaded, as involving three possible alternatives. Those alternatives are (a) that the licence was to be for the lifetime of the defendant, so that no one could turn her out a long as she lived; or (b) that the licence was to continue so long as the daughter should be undergoing full-time education; or (c) that it was to continue so long as either or both of them -- the defendant and her daughter -- reasonably needed the accommodation. In amplification of those terms which are put forward as alternatives, I think it became clear from the argument presented by Mr. Goldblatt in this court on behalf of the defendant that so far as each of them was concerned he would say that it was an implied term that, though the defendant was entitled to continue to live in the house for one or other of those periods, she was not obliged to live there for one moment longer than she herself wished so to do.

Then the pleading sets out, by reference to later and earlier parts of the pleading, various matters on which the defendant would rely in support of this assertion in the amended pleading of a contractual licence. Thus, by reference to earlier particulars in the pleading, there was included reliance upon the assertion that the defendant and Mr. Sanford had, as it is put, "cohabited" for some 17 years prior to his, the testator's death, and from and since the birth of the daughter he wholly maintained and supported the defendant and the daughter and provided living accommodation for them, as well as clothes and holidays and all their day-to-day living expenses.

I shall not refer to the other points that were indicated in the pleadings because they seem to me to be appropriate to the now abandoned allegations of trust or acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property, rather than to the only point now maintained -- that is, a contractual licence. It is perhaps desirable, however, to refer to the pleading which appears in sub-paragraph (iii) of the particulars given under paragraph 3 of the defence, as to the consideration which is alleged to exist as giving legal force to the alleged contractual licence. What is said is:

"Further, so far as necessary the defendant will say that she had offered and given consideration for the licence (a) by relinquishing her possession or occupation of her previous dwelling-house and (b) by reason of the facts and matters pleaded in paragraph 5 of this defence" -- those are matters pleaded in relation to estoppel -- "and further (c)" (and this was added by re-amendment at the trial) "by her agreement and acceptance that the testator" -- that is Mr. Sanford -- "should fulfil his legal obligation to support [the daughter] principally by the provision of accommodation and accordingly by her withholding any action or process to enforce such obligation, by seeking an affiliation order or otherwise. In the premises the said licence is not determinable at the behest of the plaintiffs in these proceedings."

So much for the pleadings. The way in which this defence to the claim for possession is now presented on behalf of the defendant is as follows.

There is authority of this court, particularly the decision in Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346, that a woman who had been a man's mistress was entitled to remain in occupation of a house which had been provided for her and her child by the man whose mistress she had been. The facts of that case are accurately, though briefly, summarised in the headnote which says this.

"In November 1969 the defendant, a spinster, gave birth to twin daughters of whom the plaintiff was the father. In early 1970 the plaintiff and the defendant decided that a house should be purchased to provide a home for the defendant and her baby daughters. In July 1970 the plaintiff bought a house on mortgage, and the defendant left her rent controlled flat and moved with the babies into the house. Three years later the plaintiff offered the defendant £ 4,000 to move out of the house. The defendant refused on the ground that the house was hers and the children's until the latter left school. The plaintiff's solicitor wrote to the defendant purporting to terminate her licence to live in the house and asking her to leave. When she did not do so the plaintiff brought possession proceedings in the county court. The defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that she was entitled to a beneficial interest in the house. The county court judge rejected the defendant's contentions and made an order for possession, in pursuance of which the defendant and her children were rehoused by the local authority."

The defendant appealed and this court allowed the appeal. There was a complication there which does not arise in the present case, that as, by order of the county court, the defendant had gone out of possession, there was not any order by the court restoring her to possession of the house; but she was in lieu of that given damages because what had been done at the instance of the plaintiff had been inconsistent with her contractual rights. Continuing with the headnote:

"Held, allowing the appeal, (1) that the inference to be drawn from all the circumstances was that the defendant had a contractual licence to have accommodation in the house for herself and the children so long as the children were of school age and reasonably required the accommodation; and that, accordingly, the order for possession ought not to have been made."

That is a decision of this court which any other division of the court would, of course, follow. We have got to ascertain, as that is the case principally relied upon in support of the defendant's contention, what Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 decided, and then apply that to the facts of this case.

What was decided in Tanner v. Tanner was really very simple. It was decided that on the evidence that had been adduced in that case there was a fair inference to be drawn that the man and his mistress had entered into a contract by which the man had agreed, for consideration, that the house which was being bought by him for the occupation of the woman and her children should remain available to her, with a continuing licence for her to occupy it so long, at any rate, as the children were of school age, or unless some other circumstances arose meanwhile which would make it reasonable for the possession to cease. It was, therefore, a decision on the facts of that case that there was a contract. There was not an express contract: that is to say, there was no evidence that one had said to the other "I promise that I will do so-and-so." But of coarse this court is entitled to infer a contract, even though it is clear that words have not been spoken expressly stating a contractual promise or an offer and acceptance in express words. The court is entitled to infer the existence of a contract. In the circumstances of that case, this court inferred that there was a contract such as I have mentioned.

There is really no doubt about what was the basis of the decision there. It may be that the bringing in of the conception of contract into situations of this sort does give rise to difficulties. It may be that some other approach to situations of this sort would be preferable. But that is not a matter for us. We have got to take the law as it is and to apply it as it stands. The law as it stands does involve that the defendant can only succeed in this case, on the submission now made on her behalf, if she shows that it is proper to infer the existence of a contract which permitted her to remain in this house for one or other of the three alternative periods which have been put forward and which I have already mentioned. And, of course, she has to establish that that is a contract which, properly viewed and in accordance with the terms which have to be applied, was one which continued to exist as a matter of law after the death of the late Mr. Sanford.

Now, in order to establish a contract, whether it be express or implied by law, there has to be shown a meeting of the minds of the parties with a definition of the contractual terms reasonably clearly made out and with an intention to affect the legal relationship, that is, that the agreement that is made is one which is properly to be regarded as being enforceable by the court if one or the other fails to comply with it; and it still remains a part of the law of this country, though many people think that it is time that it was changed to some other criterion, that there must be consideration moving in order to establish a contract. All those elements, on the facts in Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346, and on the evidence accepted by the court, were present. Are they present in this case? The county court judge thought not, and therefore he held that there was no contract and, therefore, no contractual licence, and the question did not fall to be considered whether, if there was a contract, its terms were alternative (a) or alternative (b) or alternative (c), as to the length of the period for which the defendant was to be entitled to remain in this house.

The basis of the assertion that there existed here a contractual licence is really this: that there was evidence that over a period of a good many years, beginning at any rate soon after the birth of the daughter, the late Mr. Sanford had continuously provided accommodation for the defendant and her daughter. That accommodation had, I think we were told, involved about nine different addresses at one time or another. In addition to continuing to provide accommodation for the defendant, the late Mr. Sanford had expended a very great deal of money, either by way of buying things for the defendant and her child or children, or by way of providing her with money with which she could herself buy things; and it is apparent that she was provided with what one could fairly describe as a reasonably luxurious existence. Her own evidence, as summarised by the learned judge in his judgment, was that the deceased had expended on her and her children something of the order of £4,000 or £5,000 a year. That was, as I understand it, in addition to the provision of accommodation.

There was also evidence that the late Mr. Sanford had at some earlier time indicated to a solicitor a desire to make some provision for the defendant. But the principal matter which is put forward as supporting the existence of a contract is what happened in relation to the purchase of 7, Farm Place itself. That is summarised, and as I think quite fairly and lucidly summarised, by the learned judge on the fifth page of his judgment, where he said:

"In 1973 the deceased" -- that is Mr. Sanford -- "decided to buy the house at 7, Farm Place, the subject matter of this action. He did not instruct the first-named plaintiff, who was his family solicitor, but a Mr. Signy to whom the defendant had introduced him. He told Mr. Signy that he was buying it for the defendant and her child so that they should have some security if anything happened to him but he did not ask for the house to be conveyed to the defendant. Completion of the purchase took place on 10th May 1973, and the deceased was registered as the owner of the freehold on 24th May 1973. After completion the deceased consulted Mr. Signy about transferring the property to the defendant. When he was told that there might be a liability to capital gains tax and that ad valorem stamp duty would be payable, he decided against doing so. On a later occasion he suggested to Mr. Signy that a trust should be created for the benefit of his child and was advised that ad valorem stamp duty would still be payable and so he took the matter no further. He later asked Mr. Signy to draft a codicil to his will leaving the house in trust for the child; Mr. Signy said he would like to see the will itself before doing so and the matter proceeded no further."

Pausing at that point in the learned judge's judgment, it may well be said that those facts, which were not really in dispute, at any rate indicated that the late Mr. Sanford, however anxious he was to make provision for the defendant, baulked at the financial responsibility that he was told would be involved by way of tax and stamp duty if this step were to be taken to transfer this house to the defendant. That he was not prepared to do. Nor, apparently, having thought about the completely different idea of leaving the house by his will in trust for the child, had he done anything about that at the time of his death. Of course, all those things do not make it impossible that he also had agreed with the defendant, or was minded to agree thereafter with the defendant, that she should, without obtaining any ownership of the property, nevertheless have a right to continue to live there under one or other of the three alternatives which have been put forward.

The judge then goes on:

"The defendant said in evidence that for 16 years the deceased had said that he would eventually get her a house and I accept that he may well have expressed such an intention in general terms from time to time. When No. 7, Farm Place was purchased she may well have believed that it would become her property but I do not believe that the deceased ever expressly told her so. ..."

Then the learned judge, having reviewed the evidence and having dealt with various other issues, which no longer arise in this court because they have been decided against the defendant and are not the subject of appeal, went on to deal with Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346. He analysed that decision, as I think entirely correctly, and went on to say:

"In the present case I can find no circumstances whatsoever from which to infer an agreement that the defendant was entitled to live in the house for her life or whilst the daughter was of school age. There is a strong moral obligation on a man to provide and care for his illegitimate child and an additional obligation for the deep wrong he has done to that child by inflicting illegitimacy on her: In re T.B. [1967] Ch. 247. At common law there was no obligation on the father to provide for his illegitimate child -- Seaborne v. Maddy (1840) 9 C. & P. 497 -- but he may be ordered to provide weekly payments unlimited in amount under an affiliation order at the suit of the mother, the Supplementary Benefits Commission or a local authority under the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957, as amended. It is also well settled that a putative father may make a binding contract with the mother to contribute to the child's maintenance for which her undertaking to care for the child affords the consideration."

Then he referrs to Ward v. Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496.

"In the present case there was no such contract because the deceased provided handsomely for the maintenance of the child during his lifetime. Where an affiliation order has been made the death of the putative father puts an end to the order and arrears are not recoverable from his estate ... I therefore hold that the right of the child or its mother to maintenance from the putative father continues only during the latter's lifetime."

Then the referrs to the provisions of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, to which I have referred, which would enable this daughter to present a claim against the estate, if there was anything in the estate from which a claim could be met.

The judge, in substance, as I see it, was saying that on the facts of this case, as contrasted with the facts that emerged in Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346, he was unable to hold that there were shown any events or facts from which the inference could fairly be drawn, on the balance of probability, that there was a contract such as is suggested giving this defendant a legal right to remain in possession of the house for any of the periods suggested.

Mr. Goldblatt in this court summarised his submission to the contrary in this way. He submitted that, on the facts, over a period of years the defendant was, at the request and the instance of the late Mr. Sanford, subordinating her mode of life, or her "life-style," and her choice of residence to his directions on the "understanding" that he, Mr. Sanford, would generously maintain the defendant and her family in the meanwhile and would, when circumstances permitted, provide her with a permanent home. Then Mr. Goldblatt, as I understand it, submitted that the contract was made long before the purchase of 7, Farm Place, but soon after the birth of the daughter. But, said Mr. Goldblatt, that contract, made earlier and being in existence earlier, was varied when 7, Farm Place was bought, and was varied so that the home that was to be given to the defendant on these terms was now no longer left uncertain, but was now defined as being 7, Farm Place. The "understanding" which is referred to in that summary of the position was amplified by Mr. Goldblatt as involving that a promise -- a contractually binding promise -- had been given by the late Mr. Sanford, and that it related to the occupation of 7, Farm Place.

With great respect to Mr. Goldblatt's argument, I am quite unable to see, on the facts and circumstances of this case, that there was here any conceivable basis for an implication that any such binding promise had been made by Mr. Sanford as is suggested. The fact that he had it in mind to seek to provide some security for the defendant in the event of his death certainly does not go anything like far enough to bring into existence what is necessary to show a binding contract of this nature. There was here, in my judgment, simply nothing on the evidence that would have entitled the learned judge to come to the conclusion that there was any such contractual licence. I say that without going on to consider what I think might well be an extremely difficult further barrier in the way of the defendant. Supposing that she had established something which otherwise could be regarded as being a contract, where is the consideration for that contract to be found? In Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 the consideration was perfectly clear: the lady had given up her rent-controlled flat as a part of the bargain that she would move into the other accommodation. There is no such consideration here. However, I do not wish to decide this case, as far as I am concerned, on any question relating to absence of consideration. But I am satisfied that the learned judge was completely right in his view that the defendant had wholly failed to show the existence of a contractual licence. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.

LORD JUSTICE SCARMAN: So fully do I agree with the judgment of my Lord that I wish to add only a few comments. When an illegitimate child has been born, there is certainly nothing contrary to public policy in the parents coming to an agreement, which they intend to be binding in law, for the maintenance of the child and the mother. Parents of an illegitimate child have obligations towards the child. So far from its being contrary to public policy that those obligations should be regulated by contract, I would have thought it was in the public interest that they should be so. Certainly it seems to me far better that parents in such a situation should seek to regulate their position by contract than that they should have lo resort to the court under the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957.

But it does not follow that, because there exists a relationship which can be regulated by contract, the proper inference is that the parties in their particular circumstances have so regulated their relationship. In the present case there is no express contract.

Mr. Goldblatt, for the defendant, has sought to persuade the court that a contract is to be inferred from a course of conduct, from the development of the relationship between the parties and its course over a period of years. This submission is, as a matter of law, open to him. That has been clearly decided, as I understand it, in two cases in the Court of Appeal to which he has referred us, Ward v. Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496 and Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346. In each of those cases, however, the relationship of man and mistress was either broken or on the point of collapse. The parties to the relationship, the man and the woman, had to consider what best should be done for the innocent product of their relationship, the illegitimate children. In a very real sense, both in Ward v. Byham and in Tanner v. Tanner, the man and the woman were making arrangements for the future at arm's-length. The woman was concerned for herself and her children, the man was concerned to limit and define his financial responsibilities towards the woman and the children. Here is a fertile area for the growth of an inference of a legally binding contract; and for myself I do not find it surprising, when I look at the facts in Ward v. Byham or Tanner v. Tanner, that the court came to the conclusion that a contract was to be inferred from the conduct of the parties. But how different is this case. Right up to the death of the man there was a continuing, warm relationship of man and mistress. He was maintaining his mistress in luxurious, even, so the judge thought, extravagant style, and, we now know, in a style beyond his means: his estate is now at risk of being insolvent.

Mr. Goldblatt has tried to tempt us to draw an inference of contract by dangling in front of our eyes various contracts that might be inferred. It one looks at that sort of fishing exercise with a dispassionate lawyer's eye, one begins to wonder whether he is not in difficulty in finding in the relationship any one, certain, contract. Since he is saying that three or four possibilities arise (my Lord has analysed them), one wonders whether these parties, in fact, entered into a legally binding agreement or intended to create legal relations upon the basis of terms sufficiently formulated to be clear and certain. But his real difficulty is that, whatever relationship did exist between these two, it could as well be referable to the continuance of natural love and affection as to an intention to enter into an agreement which they intended to have legal effect. In the other two cases, that relationship had ended and it was necessary to tie up the bits. In the present case the relationship was continuing until the unhappy and unexpected death of the man. Therefore Mr. Goldblatt is in difficulty with the facts of the case.

Fortunately for this court, the facts have been subjected to a most careful and detailed analysis by the trial judge, who, as my Lord has already commented, directed himself absolutely correctly on the question of law, that is to say, the effect and scope of Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346.

In the course of his analysis of the facts, the judge commented that the deceased had said, according to the defendant in evidence, that he would eventually get her a house, and the judge accepted that the deceased may well have expressed such an intention in general terms from time to time. But then the judge went on to find as follows:

"When No. 7 Farm Place was purchased she may well have believed that it would become her property but I do not believe that the deceased ever expressly told her so."

The judge later commented on the luxurious provision that this man chose to make for his mistress and their child (the relevance of that I have already mentioned); and then at the very end of his judgment, when he came to consider the effect of his findings, he said -- rightly, in my judgment --

"It is well settled that a putative father may make a binding contract with the mother to contribute to the child's maintenance for which her undertaking to care for the child affords the consideration."

Then he said:

"In the present case there was no such contract because the deceased provided handsomely for the maintenance of the child during his lifetime."

When I first read those words I was puzzled. But now that I have had the benefit of Mr. Goldblatt's argument on behalf of the defendant, I see exactly what the judge was saying. Here was a generous provision made for a woman who was still the mistress and for the child of that relationship. It was generous beyond what one would reasonably expect the man to accept a legally binding obligation to provide. It was generous, not because he was bound or was binding himself, to be generous, but because he chose to be generous to the woman for whom there was a big place in his heart.

Once one reaches that situation, one can see how the judge inferred that this was a case where there was no contract and where really it was unreasonable to infer a contract.

For those reasons, as well as for the reasons developed by my Lord, I think this appeal should be dismissed.

LORD JUSTICE BRIDGE: I agree with both the judgments in this court, and indeed with the careful, reserved judgment of the learned judge who tried the case in the county court. I have nothing of my own to add.

(Appeal dismissed with costs, In so far as it applies to costs incurred after 13th October, 1975, order not to be enforced without leave of the court, Vacant possession of premises in question to be given in 28 days, .Legal Aid taxation of Appellant's costs)