Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

3 July 2024 (*)

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintaining the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘leading businessperson’ – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Plea of illegality – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Proportionality)

In Case T‑742/22,

Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, T. Marembert and A. Bass, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by P. Mahnič and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Republic of Latvia, represented by J. Davidoviča and K. Pommere, acting as Agents,

intervener,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of D. Spielmann, President, M. Brkan and T. Tóth (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: I. Kurme, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 6 February 2024,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, seeks annulment of:

–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the first set of maintaining acts’) and of the letter of 15 September 2022 by which the Council decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by the restrictive measures provided for by Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended, in so far as those acts maintain his name on the lists annexed to those acts;

–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1) (together, ‘the second set of maintaining acts’), in so far as those acts maintain his name on the lists annexed to those acts;

–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/811 of 13 April 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 101, p. 67) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/806 of 13 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 101, p. 1) (together, ‘the third set of maintaining acts’), in so far as those acts maintain his name on the lists annexed to those acts;

–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the fourth set of maintaining acts’; and, together with the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, ‘the contested acts’) and of the letter of 15 September 2023 by which the Council decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by the restrictive measures provided for by Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended, and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), as amended, in so far as those acts maintain the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to those acts.

I.      Background to the dispute

A.      The initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons subject to the restrictive measures

2        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

3        The applicant is a Russian national.

4        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, pursuant to Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

5        On the same date, the Council adopted, pursuant to Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

6        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria pursuant to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

7        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, reads as follows:

‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a)      natural persons responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

…

(g)      leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

8        The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds are laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of that article.

9        Article 1(1)(a) and (e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, prohibits the entry into or transit through the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a) and (g) of that decision.

10      Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing such freezing in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduces the content of Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.

11      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 of 9 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 of 9 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1) (‘the initial acts’), the applicant’s name had been added, respectively, to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145 and to that contained in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 (‘the lists at issue’) for the following reasons:

‘[The applicant] is the owner and [the] CEO of the mineral fertiliser company Uralchem. Uralchem Group is a Russian manufacturer of a wide range of chemical products, including mineral fertilisers and ammoniac saltpetre. According to the company, it is the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. [The applicant] is thus involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, in the aftermath of the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine, [the applicant], along with other 36 businesspeople, met with President … Putin and other members of the Russian government to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of [President] Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. It also shows that he is one of the leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of Russia, which is responsible for [the] annexation of Crimea and [the] destabilisation of Ukraine.

In December 2021 [the applicant] rewrote his Cyprus-based companies Uralchem Holding and CI-Chemical Invest, controlling “Uralchem”, to Russian jurisdiction at [the] special administrative district on Oktyabrsky Island of Kaliningrad Oblast.’

12      The Council published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union of 10 March 2022 (OJ 2022 C 114 I, p. 1) for the attention of the persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in the contested acts. That notice stated, inter alia, that the persons concerned could submit a request to the Council, together with supporting documentation, that the decision to include their names on the lists annexed to the contested acts be reconsidered.

13      By email of 21 April 2022, the applicant requested that the Council grant him access to the documents serving as the basis for the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning him.

14      By letter of 28 April 2022, the Council replied to the request from the applicant, referred to in paragraph 13 above, and communicated the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 3052/2022 INIT, dated 8 March 2022 (‘the first WK file’).

15      The applicant brought an action before the General Court of the European Union, registered under case number T‑282/22, seeking annulment of the initial acts, in so far as those acts concerned him. That action was dismissed by judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701).

16      By letter of 31 May 2022, the applicant asked the Council to reconsider the decision to include his name on the lists at issue.

17      By letter of 20 June 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures taken against him with a new statement of reasons.

18      By letter of 4 July 2022, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 20 June 2022, arguing that (i) the modus operandi of the Council was contrary to the principle of sound administration and infringed the right to effective judicial protection and his rights of defence, and (ii) the statement of reasons justifying the intention to renew the measures was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of the facts. Furthermore, the applicant requested that the Council grant him access to the documents serving as the basis for the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning him.

B.      The maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue until 15 March 2024

19      On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the first set of maintaining acts, which extended the application of the initial acts until 15 March 2023. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘[The applicant] is a major owner and former CEO of the mineral fertiliser company Uralchem. … According to the company, it is the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. [The applicant] is thus involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, in the aftermath of the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine, [the applicant], along with another 36 businesspeople, met with President … Putin and other members of the Russian Government to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of [President] Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. It also shows that he is one of the leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of Russia, which is responsible for [the] annexation of Crimea and [the] destabilisation of Ukraine.

In December 2021 [the applicant] rewrote his Cyprus-based companies Uralchem Holding and CI-Chemical Invest, controlling “Uralchem”, to Russian jurisdiction at [the] special administrative district on Oktyabrsky Island of Kaliningrad Oblast.’

20      By letter of 15 September 2022, the Council, after examining the observations submitted by the applicant in the letters of 31 May and 4 July 2022, and also on the basis of the similar arguments put forward in the defence lodged in Case T‑282/22, informed the applicant that, in its view, those observations did not cast doubt on the assessment that the initial listing was well founded and the restrictive measures should be maintained against him, and that, consequently, it had decided to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

21      On 16 September 2022, the applicant asked the Council for access to all of the new documents and evidence considered in support of its decision to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

22      By letter of 27 October 2022, the Council responded to that request for access to documents, stating that it had not relied on any document or any item of evidence other than those contained in the first WK file, to which the applicant already had access.

23      By email of 1 November 2022, the applicant requested that the Council grant him access to all of the new documents serving as the basis for the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning him.

24      On 25 November 2022, the applicant brought the present action, registered under case number T‑742/22, seeking annulment of the first set of maintaining acts, in so far as those acts concerned him.

25      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him, with a new statement of reasons, and communicated the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 17689/2022 INIT, dated 15 December 2022 (‘the second WK file’).

26      On 20 January 2023, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 22 December 2022.

27      On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the second set of maintaining acts, which extended the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 September 2023. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘[The applicant] is a major owner and former CEO of the mineral fertiliser company Uralchem and the largest shareholder of [the company] Uralkali. Uralchem Group is a Russian manufacturer of a wide range of chemical products, including mineral fertilisers and ammoniac saltpetre. According to the company, it is the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. [The companies] Uralchem and Uralkali have been designated as “strategic assets” by the Russian State. [The applicant] is thus involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, in the aftermath of the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine, [the applicant], along with another 36 businesspeople, met with President … Putin and other members of the Russian Government to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of [President] Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. It also shows that he is one of the leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of Russia, which is responsible for [the] annexation of Crimea and [the] destabilisation of Ukraine.

In December 2021 [the applicant] rewrote his Cyprus-based companies Uralchem Holding and CI-Chemical Invest, controlling “Uralchem”, to Russian jurisdiction at the special administrative district on Oktyabrsky Island of Kaliningrad Oblast.’

28      On 13 April 2023, the Council adopted the third set of maintaining acts, which were intended to update the entries concerning 35 persons subject to restrictive measures in the light of information received by the Council. In so far as concerns the applicant, the reasons for maintaining his name on the lists at issue remained the same as those for the second set of maintaining acts, with the exception of the entry ‘former CEO of JSC UCC Uralchem’ appearing under the heading ‘Function’ which replaced the entry ‘CEO of JSC UCC Uralchem’.

29      On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1).

30      Decision 2023/1094 amended, with effect from 7 June 2023, the criteria for listing the names of the persons subject to the freezing of funds, Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 being replaced with the following text:

‘(g)      leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; or’.

31      Regulation No 269/2014 was similarly amended by Regulation 2023/1089.

32      On 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures taken against him, on the basis of the file bearing the reference WK 7926/2023 INIT (‘the third WK file’).

33      On 10 July 2023, the Council once again told the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures taken against him, on the basis of the file bearing the reference WK 5142/2023 INIT (‘the fourth WK file’).

34      On 18 August 2023, the Council again told the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures taken against him, on the basis of the file bearing the reference WK 5142/2023 ADD 1 (‘the fifth WK file’).

35      On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted the fourth set of maintaining acts, which extended the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2024. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘[The applicant] is a major owner and former CEO of the mineral fertiliser company Uralchem. Uralchem Group is a Russian manufacturer of a wide range of chemical products, including mineral fertilisers and ammoniac saltpetre. According to the company, it is the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. [The applicant] is thus a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, in the aftermath of the initial stages of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, [the applicant], along with another 36 businesspeople, met with President … Putin and other members of the Russian government to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of [President] Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. It also shows that he is a leading businessperson operating in Russia. Moreover, he was among the leading Russian businesspersons who participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, where President … Putin gave a speech and urged billionaires to put “patriotism before profit”.

In December 2021 [the applicant] rewrote his Cyprus-based companies Uralchem Holding and CI-Chemical Invest, controlling “Uralchem”, to Russian jurisdiction at the special administrative district on Oktyabrsky Island of Kaliningrad Oblast.’

36      By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council, referring to the observations submitted by the applicant in the letters of 31 May, 30 June, 24 July and 31 August 2023, informed the applicant that, in its view, those observations did not cast doubt on the assessment that restrictive measures should be maintained against him and that, consequently, it had decided to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

II.    Forms of order sought

37      Following the modifications of the application, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested acts and the letters of 15 September 2022, 14 March 2023 and 15 September 2023, in so far as they concern him;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

38      Further to the observations on the modifications of the application, the Council contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action, first, as inadmissible in so far as it seeks annulment of the two letters of 15 September 2022 and 15 September 2023 by which the Council decided to maintain his name on the lists at issue and, second, as unfounded as to the remainder;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A.      Admissibility

39      The Council, without raising a formal objection under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, contends that the present action is inadmissible in part, based on the applicant’s lack of interest in bringing proceedings against the three letters of 15 September 2022, 14 March 2023 and 15 September 2023.

40      In the present case, as the Council rightly states, the three letters of 15 September 2022, 14 March 2023 and 15 September 2023 were sent to the applicant by the Council in response to the applicant’s claims challenging the maintaining of his name on the lists at issue by Decisions 2022/1530, 2023/572 and 2023/1767, and by Regulations 2022/1529, 2023/571 and 2023/1765. In those three letters, the Council communicated those acts to the applicant and informed him, in particular, that the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue remained justified since, in essence, the arguments he had put forward were not sufficient to alter the Council’s conclusions.

41      It follows that the three letters of 15 September 2022, 14 March 2023 and 15 September 2023 are merely informative documents addressed to the applicant, which, as such, cannot be challenged by way of an action for annulment, for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014, Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council, T‑43/12, not published, EU:T:2014:946, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

42      Consequently, the action must be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against those three letters.

B.      Substance

43      In support of the action, the applicant essentially raises six pleas in law, alleging (i) breach of the principle of sound administration and an error of assessment as regards the request for review of 31 May 2022; (ii) breach of the right to effective judicial protection and infringement of the obligation to state reasons; (iii) a manifest error of assessment, failure to discharge the burden of proof and breach of the applicable listing criteria; (iv) unlawfulness of the criteria laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 and as amended by Decision 2023/1094; and (v) breach of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights. In the second statement of modification, the applicant raises, against the fourth set of maintaining acts, a sixth plea alleging breach of the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty and infringement of Article 21(2)(d) TEU, Article 3(5) TEU and Article 215 TFEU. Furthermore, in the alternative, the application raises a plea of illegality and of inapplicability of the contested acts pursuant to Article 277 TFEU.

44      The Court deems it appropriate to examine, first of all, the first and second pleas; next, the fourth plea; and, finally, the third, fifth and sixth pleas.

1.      The first plea: breach of the principle of sound administration and error of assessment in so far as concerns the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022

45      In support of this plea in law, the applicant argues, in essence, that the Council failed to examine, carefully and impartially, the merits of the alleged reasons relating to him, in the light of the observations made in his request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022. First, the applicant claims that the Council has never provided any answers to the allegations and evidence produced in that request. Furthermore, it has not responded to his request for access to documents, which prevented him from assessing the grounds for the Council keeping him on the list at issue and from being able to defend himself. Second, the applicant takes issue with the Council for having referred, in its letter of 15 September 2022, to his defence lodged in Case T‑282/22, thereby mixing up the administrative review procedure with the earlier judicial proceedings. He argues that the Council was wrong to consider the two proceedings as a single procedure and to task the same officers with handling those two proceedings. Lastly, the applicant takes the view that the Council made an error of assessment by maintaining his name on the lists at issue without having examined the items of evidence that he submitted, which demonstrate that he had resigned all his management positions and reduced his shareholdings in the companies Uralchem and Uralkali.

46      The Council disputes the merits of this plea in law.

47      As a preliminary point, it should be pointed out that, even if, by his line of argument, the applicant were claiming, inter alia, that the Council committed an error of assessment by adopting the initial acts and the contested acts, it should be observed that, as regards the initial acts, the Court held, in paragraphs 50 to 95 of its judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701), that the Council made no error of assessment when adopting those acts. As to the contested acts, reference must be made to paragraphs 141 to 194 below, which deal with the plea in law alleging error of assessment on the part of the Council.

48      That said, it should be recalled that, in the context of the adoption of restrictive measures, the Council is under an obligation to observe the principle of sound administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), which, according to settled case-law, entails the obligation for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

49      In the first place, the applicant’s argument that the Council never responded to the allegations and items of evidence produced by the applicant in the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022 must be rejected.

50      In that connection, it should be noted that, following receipt of the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022, the Council sent the applicant two letters dated 20 June and 15 September 2022. While the letter of 20 June 2022 merely communicated the Council’s intention to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue for the same reasons as those set out in the initial acts, with the exception of the mention that the applicant had become ‘a major owner and former CEO of the [company] Uralchem’, the letter of 15 September 2022 provides a specific and detailed response to the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022.

51      The Council in fact pointed out that it had examined the observations and material presented by the applicant in the letters of 31 May and 4 July 2022. However, it considered that, despite those observations and that material, the Council remained convinced that the initial decision to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was based on sound reasoning, and that the statement of reasons in support of that inclusion was accurate.

52      In order to support that position, the Council referred, inter alia, to its defence submitted in Case T‑282/22, having regard to the similarity between the arguments set out by the applicant in the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022 and those in the application lodged in that case. Moreover, the Council deemed it opportune to provide further clarification. That clarification concerned all of the points raised by the applicant in his request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022, namely the complaints alleging infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons, manifest error of assessment, breach of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights, and breach of the principle of equal treatment. Finally, having pointed out that it took note of and was still assessing the information that the applicant had provided with a view to establishing that he had sold a 52% stake in the company Uralchem and that he had ‘resigned from all management positions in the [companies] Uralchem and Uralkali’, the Council informed the applicant that it had decided to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

53      It therefore clearly follows from the Council’s explanations, in the letters of 20 June and 15 September 2022, that it not only examined the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022, but it also set out the reasons for which it regarded the initial acts as being justified. Moreover, it is apparent from those letters that the Council necessarily took account of the applicant’s observations and the material that he provided since, from the letter of 20 June 2022 onwards, it appeared to have taken note of the fact that the applicant was no longer the owner or CEO of Uralchem, but had become ‘a major owner and former CEO of the [company] Uralchem’. The applicant cannot, therefore, validly maintain that the Council made an error of assessment by maintaining his name on the lists at issue without having examined the items of evidence that he submitted and which demonstrate that he had resigned from all his management positions and reduced his shareholdings in those companies.

54      In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument pertaining to the reference to the defence which, it is argued, demonstrates that the Council mixed up the two proceedings and involved the same officers (see paragraph 45 above), it is unambiguously apparent from the letter of 15 September 2022 that it is solely on account of the similarity between the arguments put forward by the applicant in his request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022 and in the context of the action in Case T‑282/22 that the Council deemed it useful to refer to its previous observations in that case.

55      However, contrary to what the applicant maintains, that in no way means that the Council failed to carry out an up-to-date assessment, or that it mixed up the reconsideration procedure and the proceedings in Case T‑282/22. As the Council rightly contends, it follows solely that it wished to give as complete an answer as possible to the arguments set out in the request for reconsideration, which were almost identical to those raised in the application in Case T‑282/22.

56      In any event, it must be pointed out that that reference to the defence is not the only answer given by the Council to the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022 since, in the letter of 15 September 2022, the Council replied specifically to that request (see paragraphs 51 to 52 above). As to the fact that the same Council officers dealt with the reconsideration procedure and the judicial proceedings, even if that fact were established, this is not, in itself, sufficient to support a finding that the applicant’s case was treated in a biased and unfair manner. Moreover, it is clear that the applicant has not cited any legislation giving rise to a prohibition, for the Council, on entrusting the same officers with the task of dealing with those two sets of proceedings.

57      In the third place, as regards the argument that the Council failed to reply to the applicant’s request for access to documents, this can only be rejected. It is sufficient, in fact, to observe that, by the letter of 27 October 2022, the Council informed the applicant, in essence, that in order to adopt the first set of maintaining acts, it had relief on no item of evidence other than those contained in the first WK file, to which the applicant had already had access. The Council therefore cannot be validly criticised for not having replied to the applicant’s request for access to documents.

58      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant is wrong to claim that the Council breached the principle of sound administration and committed an error of assessment. Consequently, the first plea in law must be rejected.

2.      The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons

59      The applicant submits, in essence, that the statement of reasons in the contested measures does not make it possible for him either to defend himself or understand the criteria that the Council intends to apply, or even how and why those criteria are applicable to him. The statement of reasons is either almost absent or contradictory, or does not conform to the requirements of specificity, and is, in any event, incomplete. Furthermore, neither the statement of reasons in the contested measures nor the documents contained in the WK file make it possible for the applicant to identify the individual, specific and concrete reasons so as to provide him with sufficient information to make it possible to determine whether the contested measures are well founded.

60      First, the applicant submits that the Council failed to identify the economic sector allegedly providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and failed to adduce evidence that such revenue had been provided. The Council failed to explain how and to what extent the economic sectors in which the applicant was involved constitute a ‘substantial source of revenue’ for that government. He adds, in essence, that he cannot understand how two private companies, namely the companies Uralchem and Uralkali, could be regarded as a ‘substantial source of revenue’ for the Government of the Russian Federation given that the only way in which they contribute to the national budget is through taxes. Furthermore, the applicant claims not to understand, first, the accusation made against him that he is a ‘major owner’ of the company Uralchem and, second, the reasons why the fact of having been CEO of that company would call for the applicant to be kept on that list rather than be removed from it. He claims that, usually, a former CEO of a company no longer has any directive powers, or any other power over that company, and a mere ‘owner’ of the company is not, per se, in control of the ordinary everyday administration of the company at issue.

61      As for the second set of maintaining acts, the applicant adds that the allegations that, first, he ‘is the largest shareholder’ in the company Uralchem and, second, that ‘both Uralchem and Uralkali have been designated as “strategic assets” by the Russian State’ do not add any new or clear element to the Council’s statement of reasons supporting the renewal of the restrictive measures against him. Moreover, the Council has failed to identify the ‘strategic assets’ that it means to use as a logical link between the companies ‘Uralchem and Uralkali’ and ‘the Russian State’. The applicant observes that none of the evidence supports a finding that he is the largest shareholder in the company Uralkali. Finally, in so far as concerns the fourth set of maintaining acts, he claims, in essence, that the Council failed to indicate how, as a leading businessperson, he might have benefitted from or supported the Government of the Russian Federation. The applicant also states that he fails to see how his allegedly being a member of the closest circle of President Putin and the fact of having taken part in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023 justify including his name on the lists at issue.

62      Second, the applicant claims that it is not clear from the statement of reasons what specific conduct the restrictive measures are a response to and whether that conduct consists of support for or implementation of actions or policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. He states, inter alia, that he cannot see why having been invited to a meeting with President Putin would mean that he supports or implements Russian actions or policies in Ukraine.

63      The Council disputes the merits of this plea in law.

64      According to settled case-law, the right to effective judicial protection affirmed in the third paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons. That is without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for him or her to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his or her applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited, and of 21 January 2016, Makhlouf v Council, T‑443/13, not published, EU:T:2016:27, paragraph 38).

65      Furthermore, it should be recalled that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

66      The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that same measure, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

67      Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (see judgment of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council, T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).

68      In the present case, the statement of reasons relied on vis-à-vis the applicant in the contested acts is the statement of reasons set out in paragraphs 19, 27 and 35 above.

69      In the first place, the Court finds that the general context that led the Council to adopt the restrictive measures at issue is set out in the recitals of the contested acts. Similarly, those acts clearly indicate the legal basis on which they were adopted by the Council, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU respectively.

70      In the second place, as the Council correctly points out and contrary to what is argued by the applicant, it is clear, from reading the statements of reasons of the contested measures, that the Council had included his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria concerning:

–        ‘natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine’ (the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and, in essence, in Article 1(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329; ‘criterion (a)’);

–        ‘leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, and natural or legal persons associated with them’ (the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and, in essence, in Article 1(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329; ‘the original criterion (g)’).

–        ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia … [(‘the first part’)] or … businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’ [(‘the third part’)] (the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094, in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2023/1089, and, in essence, Article 1(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094; ‘criterion (g) as amended’ and, together with the original criterion (g), ‘criteria (g)’).

71      In the contested acts, the Council stated inter alia that the applicant was a major owner and former CEO of the company Uralchem, and that he had attended a meeting with President Putin on 24 February 2022. However, in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, the Council drew the conclusion that, first, the applicant ‘is thus involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’ and that, second, he ‘is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine’. As to the fourth set of maintaining acts, the Council drew the conclusion that the applicant, first ‘is …a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’; next, that he ‘is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine’; and, lastly, that he is ‘a leading businessperson operating in Russia’. As that corresponds to the wording of criteria (a) and (g), even though those criteria are not expressly referred to in the grounds of the contested acts, the applicant cannot legitimately claim that the grounds did not make it clear what criteria had been applied to him.

72      In the third place, contrary to what the applicant claims, it must be held that the specific and concrete reasons which led the Council to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are set out in a sufficiently clear manner as to enable the applicant to understand them.

73      First, as regards criterion (a), the grounds of the contested acts state that, given that the applicant attended the meeting of 24 February 2022, he is a member of the inner circle of President Putin and is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.

74      Second, as to criteria (g), the grounds of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts clearly state that the applicant must be regarded as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. As to the fourth set of maintaining acts, the grounds expressly state that the applicant must be regarded as ‘a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ and as being ‘a leading businessperson operating in Russia’. That classification as a leading businessperson follows entirely unambiguously from the fact that he is a major owner and former CEO of the company Uralchem, having regard to the significance of that undertaking in Russia, and from the fact that he was invited to attend the meeting with President Putin on 24 February 2022. In that connection, the applicant cannot validly claim not to understand the accusation against him of being ‘a major owner’ of the company Uralchem in the absence of a definition from the Council of that concept. The applicant himself states in the application that, in March 2022, he sold a 52% stake in the holding company of Uralchem Group, and remained the owner of 48%. There is, therefore, no doubt that the applicant could readily understand that, by the words ‘a major owner of the company Uralchem’, the Council was referring to the fact that he was one of the main shareholders.

75      Third, with regard to the relevant economic sector, the grounds state, at the beginning, that the applicant is a major owner of the company Uralchem which is a ‘mineral fertiliser company’. It is then stated that Uralchem Group manufactures a ‘wide range of chemical products, including mineral fertilisers and ammoniac saltpetre’. Lastly, the grounds point to the fact that the company Uralchem is ‘the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers’ in Russia. On the basis of that description, the Council concluded that the applicant satisfied criteria (g) and that he could therefore be regarded as being ‘involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of those criteria (g) and, a fortiori, as operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of criterion (g) as amended. As the Council essentially observes, this is a clear indication of the relevant economic sector in which Uralchem Group carries out its economic activities – namely the fertiliser sector – and the applicant’s role within that sector.

76      It should be added that, by letter of 28 April 2022, the Council granted the applicant’s request for access to the file and sent him the first WK file (see paragraph 14 above). That file contained information relating to the evidence substantiating the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, including the legal basis for that inclusion, and made it clear that criterion (a) and the original criterion (g) had been applied on account of his activities within Uralchem Group and because he attended the meeting of 24 February 2022 (judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 34). It should be added that, by the letters of 22 December 2022 and of 19 June, 10 July and 18 August 2023, the Council sent the second, third, fourth and fifth WK files to the applicant (see paragraphs 25, 32, 33 and 34 above).

77      In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the observance of the duty to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the information available to the applicant at the time the application was brought (see judgment of 28 November 2019, Portigon v SRB, T‑365/16, EU:T:2019:824, paragraph 174 and the case-law cited).

78      Thus, when the applicant lodged his action, contrary to what he claims, a combined reading of the grounds set out in paragraphs 19, 27 and 35 above, the wording of criteria (a) and (g), and the evidence in the five WK files would easily have allowed him to understand the allegations made against him and to defend himself. That is, moreover, fully confirmed by the pleas and arguments that he raises in his pleadings, from which it is apparent, first, that he was put in a position to ascertain the justifications for the measures taken against him so that he could effectively challenge them before the Courts of the European Union and, second, that the context of those measures was known to him.

79      In the fourth place, the fact that the Council allegedly failed to set out in detail what conduct had constituted support or implementation of Russia’s actions or policies in Ukraine or to explain why and to what extent the economic sectors in which the applicant is involved constitute a ‘substantial source of revenue’ for the Government of the Russian Federation, or even that the Council failed to provide any information as to ‘strategic assets’ cannot lead to a finding that the Council has failed to meet its obligation to state reasons. In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 66 above, the Council is in fact not required to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. Furthermore, the applicant was placed in a position to understand the scope of the measures taken against him. The applicant’s arguments, relating to the fourth set of maintaining acts, that the Council failed to state how, as a leading businessperson, he benefitted from or supported the Government of the Russian Federation, or how the fact that he is allegedly a member of the closest circle of President Putin and took part in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023 justify his inclusion on the lists at issue, must also be rejected for the same reasons.

80      Lastly, in the fifth place, it should be noted that the applicant’s arguments to the effect that he does not understand how two private companies such as Uralchem and Uralkali could be regarded as being a ‘substantial source of revenue’ for the Government of the Russian Federation, or the reason why the fact that he was invited to a meeting with President Putin would mean that that he supports or implements actions or policies of Russia in Ukraine, do not seek to call specifically into question whether the statement of reasons of the contested acts is sufficient, but rather the substantive lawfulness of those acts. Consequently, those arguments must, where necessary, be examined in the context of the third plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment. The same may be said with regard to, first, the argument relating to the second set of maintaining acts that there is no evidence that he is the main shareholder in the company Uralkali and, second, the question whether, in essence, in his capacity as former CEO and mere shareholder in the company Uralchem, he can still be included on the list of restrictive measures.

81      It must be concluded that the statement of reasons on which the contested acts are based is comprehensible and sufficiently precise as to enable the applicant to ascertain the reasons which led the Council to conclude that including his name on the lists at issue was justified and to challenge the lawfulness thereof before the Courts of the European Union, and to enable the latter to exercise their power of review, in accordance with the rules referred to in paragraphs 64 to 66 above.

82      The applicant’s arguments that the statement of reasons for the contested acts is virtually absent or contradictory, is imprecise or incomplete, and thereby infringes his right to effective judicial protection and the obligation to state reasons, must therefore be rejected.

83      Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected.

3.      The fourth plea in law, alleging unlawfulness of criteria (g)

84      Under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

85      Article 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of that decision, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general measure the illegality of which is pleaded must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the circumstances which are the subject of the action, and there must be a direct legal connection between the individual decision contested and the general measure in question (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

86      In so far as concerns the intensity of judicial review, it is settled case-law that the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

87      The fact remains that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining these criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the contested acts providing for the criteria at issue, referred to in the present plea in law – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error of law, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 149).

(a)    The plea of illegality in respect of the original criterion (g)

88      The applicant pleads that criterion (g) is unlawful because it constitutes, first, a breach of the principle of proportionality and, second, a breach of the principle of legal certainty.

(1)    The first complaint, alleging that the original criterion (g) is unlawful in that it constitutes a breach of the principle of proportionality

89      In support of this complaint, the applicant claims that the original criterion (g) is inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued, namely to weaken Russia. He states, in essence, that this criterion sanctions only natural persons who are neither significant taxpayers nor even CEOs of companies that qualify as such, but who are simply involved in sectors that generate major tax revenue for Russia. The applicant argues that alternatives, such as widening the scope of sectoral sanctions, would be less onerous and more appropriate to the objective pursued.

90      The Council disputes that line of argument.

91      The principle of proportionality requires that the limitations which may be imposed by acts of EU law on rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to meet the legitimate objectives pursued or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 26 April 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑401/19, EU:C:2022:297, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited; judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 168).

92      With regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the Court of Justice has held that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The Court of Justice concluded that the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

93      In the present case, the stated objective of the original criterion (g) is to increase the pressure on the Russian Federation and the cost of the latter’s actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis (judgment of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 85). Such an objective is consistent with the objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU (judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 115, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 46).

94      However, the original criterion (g) refers to ‘leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’, in other words, persons in respect of whom the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue is such as to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and the cost of the latter’s actions.

95      There is therefore a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing substantial revenue to the government, in view of the importance of those sectors for the Russian economy, and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation as well as the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 49).

96      The approach which consists in targeting such persons must be regarded as consistently satisfying that objective of increasing the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and cannot be considered to be manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued, within the meaning of the applicable case-law cited in paragraph 92 above.

97      The applicant’s argument that the original criterion (g) sanctions only natural persons who are neither significant taxpayers nor even CEOs of companies that qualify as such, but who are simply involved in sectors that generate major tax revenue for Russia, must be rejected.

98      Contrary to the applicant’s arguments, the original criterion (g) does not sanction natural persons only since, in so far as concerns the freezing of funds, it also applies to legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

99      Furthermore, the fact that that criterion applies to the persons in question, irrespective of the taxation thereof in Russia, where they are involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, satisfies the objective pursued and therefore does not appear to be manifestly inappropriate.

100    What is more, the assessment of whether the application, to individual situations, of the restrictive measures at issue is disproportionate does not fall within the scope of the assessment of the lawfulness of the criterion. In any event, it must be noted in that connection that these are temporary and reversible restrictions which provide for possible exemptions that may be granted by the Member States.

101    Moreover, the applicant states that recital 11 of Decision 2022/329, which refers to persons and entities providing a substantial source of revenue to the government, is worded differently to the original criterion (g). However, as is clear from settled case-law, the preamble to an EU act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting them in a manner clearly contrary to their wording (judgments of 19 November 1998, Nilsson and Others, C‑162/97, EU:C:1998:554, paragraph 54; of 24 November 2005, Deutsches Milch-Kontor, C‑136/04, EU:C:2005:716, paragraph 32; and of 19 June 2014, Karen Millen Fashions, C‑345/13, EU:C:2014:2013, paragraph 31).

102    It follows from the foregoing that the original criterion (g) is not vitiated by illegality in that it constitutes a breach of the principle of proportionality, and that the first complaint must be rejected.

(2)    The second complaint, alleging that the original criterion (g) is unlawful in that it constitutes a breach of the principle of legal certainty

103    In support of this complaint, the applicant claims that the original criterion (g) does not satisfy the requirement of foreseeability in that, in essence, it is defined in terms that are too general. It is therefore enough that a person is active in a particular economic sector for the relevant criterion to be satisfied, regardless of that person’s conduct or that of the two companies in which he is involved.

104    The Council disputes that line of argument.

105    It should be recalled that the principle of legal certainty requires that European Union legislation must be clear and precise and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (see judgments of 5 March 2015, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v Council, C‑585/13 P, EU:C:2015:145, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited, and of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

106    In respect of the original criterion (g), it should be observed that its wording refers sufficiently clearly and precisely to leading businesspersons involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. In the light of the wording of that criterion, the persons targeted must therefore be regarded as ‘leading’ on account of their importance in the sector in which they operate and the importance of that sector to the Russian economy (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 45).

107    Furthermore, the original criterion (g) forms part of a legal framework that is clearly delineated by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, namely the need, in view of the gravity of the situation, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against that country. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 115 and 123; of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163; and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 46).

108    Furthermore, the discretion conferred on the Council by the original criterion (g) is counterbalanced by an obligation to state reasons and strengthened procedural rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 47).

109    It follows that that criterion meets the degree of foreseeability required under EU law.

110    Finally, it should be noted that neither Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, established a presumption of a link between the status of leading businessperson and the Government of the Russian Federation (judgment of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 104).

111    Accordingly, the application of the original criterion (g) to a specific person presupposes that the Council first proves, in particular by means of a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence, on the one hand, that the person subject to a restrictive measure is a leading businessperson and, on the other hand, that the person is involved in a sector which provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (judgment of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 105).

112    Inasmuch as it applies to persons in respect of whom the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue is such as to increase the cost of the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, that criterion thus responds to the Council’s desire to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to put an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. Accordingly, contrary to the applicant’s claims, there is therefore a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing substantial revenue to the government, in view of the importance of those sectors for the Russian economy, and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation as well as to increase the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraphs 107 and 108).

113    Consequently, the applicant’s argument concerning the erasure of the link between the situation in Ukraine and the role of natural persons who are subject to the restrictive measures at issue must be rejected.

114    Accordingly, the second complaint must be rejected, along with the plea of illegality relating to the original criterion (g).

(b)    The plea of illegality relating to the third part of criterion (g) as amended

115    The applicant maintains, in essence, that the third part of criterion (g) as amended concerned ‘leading businesspersons … operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ is unlawful in that it infringes the principle of legal certainty. That criterion does not enable him to understand the conduct which he is supposed to adopt in order to satisfy the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures and therefore be removed from the lists at issue. Furthermore, he claims, in essence, that that criterion infringes his right to property and his freedom to conduct a business, since the only course of action that he could envisage in order not to be subject to restrictive measures any longer would be to sell all of his shares, which would render those measures definitive and irreversible.

116    The Council disputes that line of argument.

117    In the present case, it should be observed that, like the original criterion (g), the third part of criterion (g) as amended forms part of a legal framework that is clearly delineated by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue (see paragraph 107 above).

118    Moreover, it should be recalled that it is apparent from recital 2 of Decision 2023/1094 that ‘the Union remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’, and from recital 4 of that decision that the Council considered that the designation criteria should be extended by including ‘businesspersons who are involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, in order to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine.

119    It is therefore as a result of the persistence, even worsening, of the situation in Ukraine that the Council took the view that it had to extend the circle of persons and entities covered by the third part of criterion (g) as amended in order to achieve the objectives pursued. It follows from such an approach, which is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures, that the proportionality of those measures is established (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 104).

120    Furthermore, the removal of the word ‘leading’ cannot be interpreted as resulting in this new criterion being abstract, unforeseeable and completely unrelated to the objectives of the restrictive measures at issue.

121    It should in fact be borne in mind that the original criterion (g) is worded in such terms that the persons referred to were to be considered to be ‘leading’ on account of their importance in the sector in which they are involved and the importance of that sector for the Russian economy, and that, as a result, the ‘concept of “leading businesspersons”’ was to be understood as referring to their importance in the light, in particular, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they are involved (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143).

122    Admittedly, compared to the earlier version of that criterion, which used the term ‘leading’, the third part of criterion (g) as amended is wider in scope and no longer refers solely to ‘leading’ – and, therefore, ‘important’ – businesspersons. However, the new wording used in the third part of criterion (g) as amended cannot be interpreted as referring to all ‘businesspersons’, but rather that it targets ‘businesspersons’ who, without necessarily being classified as ‘leading’, are nevertheless of particular importance, be it on account of their position or their activities, in the economic sector concerned, and the inclusion of whose names on the lists at issue can increase pressure on the Russian Federation and increase the costs of that federation’s actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Furthermore, the part of criterion (g) as amended that the applicant challenges still requires that the Council demonstrate not only that the person concerned is not a businessperson of no importance, but also that that person is involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to that government.

123    Such an interpretation of that criterion in fact reflects the Council’s intention, as is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 107) and to increase the costs of the actions of the Government of the Russian Federation, since such sectors, by providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, contribute, directly or indirectly, to the capacity of that government to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine.

124    Thus, targeting businesspersons who, inter alia, hold shares or occupy positions in companies that are active in such sectors, is liable to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

125    Consequently, the third part of criterion (g) as amended contains conditions relating to the positions or interests held by the persons concerned within certain structures that are involved in certain sectors, which serves to establish a sufficient and subjective link between those persons and the third country concerned, which, in the present case, is the Russian Federation.

126    Accordingly, there remains a rational connection between, on the one hand, the targeting of businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, in view of the importance of those sectors for the Russian economy and, on the other hand, the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation as well as to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

127    It follows that that criterion satisfies the degree of foreseeability required under EU law.

128    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments. It should be noted that those arguments relate to the application of the third part of the amended criterion (g) to the applicant’s individual situation and therefore do not form part, as a matter of principle, of the assessment of the lawfulness of that criterion.

129    It follows from the foregoing that the third part of the amended criterion (g) is not vitiated by illegality in that it constitutes a breach of the principle of legal certainty.

130    Accordingly, the plea of illegality concerning the third part of the amended criterion (g) must be rejected, as must the fourth plea in law.

4.      The third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, failure to discharge the burden of proof and breach of the applicable listing criteria

131    In essence, the applicant argues that, in the contested acts, the Council does not adduce, in accordance with its burden of proof, specific, precise and consistent evidence constituting a sufficient factual basis to support maintaining his name on the lists at issue pursuant to criteria (a) and criteria (g).

132    The Council disputes the merits of this plea in law.

(a)    Preliminary observations

133    It should be pointed out that the third plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment and not a manifest error of assessment. While it is admittedly true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based, are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Union acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraphs 54 and 55, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

134    Moreover, it should be emphasised that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).

135    There is no requirement that that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act the annulment of which is sought. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 67).

136    The assessment of whether the factual basis adopted by the Council is sufficiently solid must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited). The Council also points out that press articles may be used in order to corroborate the existence of certain facts if they are sufficiently specific, precise and consistent as regards the facts described therein (see judgment of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited).

137    It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is nevertheless necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).

138    In addition, it should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their aims. It is thus incumbent on the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to achieve the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59; see also judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

139    In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on the list, provided that the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been set, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

140    It is in the light of those principles of case-law that the Court must determine whether the Council made an error of assessment in considering that, in the present case, there was a sufficiently solid factual basis capable of justifying the applicant’s name being maintained on the lists at issue.

(b)    The first, second and third sets of maintaining acts and the application of the original criterion (g) to the applicant

141    As a preliminary point, first, it should be observed that the applicant acknowledges, in the application, that it is apparent from the WK file that the original criterion (g) was applied to him. As has been stated in paragraphs 70 and 71 above, that is also clear from the statement of reasons for the contested acts. Second, it should be noted that, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, it is not disputed that the Council relied on the same evidence as that contained in the first WK file and on the basis of which it adopted the initial acts. It should be pointed out that the information in question is publicly available, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots relating to the applicant and his father. Third, nor is it disputed that, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in the second and third sets of maintaining acts, the Council relied on evidence contained in the first WK file and on supplementary items of evidence contained in the second WK file, which items are also information that is publicly available. It is therefore in the light of the items of evidence in the first WK file, as regards the first set of maintaining acts, and both WK files, as regards the second and third sets of maintaining acts, that the lawfulness of those acts must be assessed and that a determination must be made as to whether the conditions for applying the original criterion (g) are satisfied in the present case.

142    As regards the interpretation of that criterion, it should be borne in mind that the original criterion (g) includes the concept of influence in connection with involvement ‘in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the [Government of the Russian Federation]’, without any further condition concerning a link with the regime. By that criterion, the Council seeks to exploit the influence that the category of persons concerned is likely to exert on the Russian regime in the present case, by prompting them to put pressure on that government to change its policy. Moreover, it must be held that the concept of ‘leading businessperson’ must therefore be understood as referring to the importance of those persons in the light, inter alia, of their occupational status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more of the companies in which they pursue those activities (judgments of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 67; of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 54; and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143).

143    Such an interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the objective of the restrictive measures is to put pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (judgments of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 68, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 144).

144    The objective referred to in paragraph 143 above implies that, by the expression ‘providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, it is the economic sectors and not businesspersons that are referred to, which corresponds to one of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures, namely to affect economic sectors which constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Russian Federation (judgments of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 69, and of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 56).

145    Accordingly, the original criterion (g) must be interpreted as meaning that it is intended to apply, on the one hand, to leading businesspersons in the sense described in paragraph 144 above and, on the other hand, that it is the economic sectors in which those persons operate which must constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation (judgments of 13 September 2023, Rashnikov v Council, T‑305/22, not published, EU:T:2023:530, paragraph 70, and of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 57).

146    The merits of the grounds for listing set out in the contested measures must therefore be assessed in the light of that interpretation of the original criterion (g).

147    In the present case, it should be recalled that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue by way of the initial acts pursuant to criterion (a) and the original criterion (g) on the grounds, in essence, that the applicant was the owner and CEO of the company Uralchem and that he had attended a meeting with President Putin on 24 February 2022. The Court found that those grounds had been established, with regard to criterion (g), in its judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraphs 50 to 95).

148    In the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, the Council continues to refer to the applicant’s position within the company Uralchem and to his attendance at the meeting with President Putin on 24 February 2022. It does, however, update the grounds relied upon against the applicant by stating, in the first set of maintaining acts, that he was ‘a major owner and former CEO of the … company Uralchem’ and, in the second and third sets of maintaining acts, that he was ‘a major owner and former CEO of the … company Uralchem and the largest shareholder of [the company] Uralkali’ and that ‘[the companies] Uralchem and Uralkali have been designated as “strategic assets” by the Russian State’ (see paragraphs 19 and 27 above).

149    In that context, it must therefore be ascertained whether, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 138 above, the Council could, following its updated assessment of the situation carried out in the context of the review of the restrictive measures at issue and on the basis of new information, maintain those restrictive measures against him. To that end, it is necessary to examine whether (i) the applicant could, as at the date on which the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts were adopted, be regarded as a leading businessperson within the meaning of the original criterion (g) as that criterion is defined in paragraph 145 above, and (ii) the exhibits contained in the WK files could constitute a body of evidence within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 135 above.

150    In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that, while it is true that the general context of the situation in Ukraine, as regards threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, has remained unchanged since the initial acts were adopted, the same is not true of the applicant’s situation.

151    In so far as concerns the applicant’s individual situation when the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts were adopted, it should be noted that he no longer held the position of CEO of the company Uralchem, which the Council took into account in the first set of maintaining acts as well as in the second and third sets of maintaining acts, by stating that he was ‘former CEO’ of that company (see paragraphs 19 and 27 above).

152    In the present case, it is clear that the factual basis of the grounds relied upon in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts against the applicant, which basis relates to the original criterion (g), refers to (i) the fact that when those acts were adopted, he was ‘a major owner of … the … company Uralchem’, (ii) his former position as CEO of that company, and (iii) his attendance at the meeting of 24 February 2022 with President Putin. As regards, in particular, the second and third sets of maintaining acts, the Council based its decision on the same facts, adding the statement that the applicant was also ‘the largest shareholder of [the company] Uralkali’ and that ‘both [the companies] Uralchem and Uralkali have been designated as “strategic assets” by the Russian State’.

153    It is therefore necessary to determine whether that factual basis could be sufficient to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which are based on a periodic review of the restrictive measures in order to enable the Council to take account of any changes in circumstances concerning, in particular, the individual situation of the persons subject to them.

154    In that regard, the applicant’s claim that, in essence, his inclusion on the lists at issue, on the basis of the original criterion (g), is principally due to the fact that Uralchem Group – of which the company Uralkali is a part and with which he is associated – provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, must be rejected at the outset.

155    Suffice it to state that such a claim is the result of a misreading of the grounds of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts. It is true that those grounds refer to the company Uralchem and Uralchem Group, of which the company Uralkali is part, as being the largest producer of ammonium nitrate as well as the second-largest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. However, the fact remains that it is unambiguously clear from those grounds that the applicant is regarded as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation because, in particular, he attended a meeting on 24 February 2022 organised by President Putin, and because he is ‘a major owner and former CEO of the … company Uralchem’.

156    That being said, it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether all of the items of evidence adduced by the Council when adopting the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts discharges the burden of proof borne by it and constitutes a body of evidence that is sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to support the ground for listing.

157    As regards the concept of ‘leading businessperson’, it should be recalled that it must be understood as referring to the importance of those persons in the light, as the case may be, of their occupational status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more of the companies in which they pursue those activities (see paragraph 145 above).

158    In that regard, first, it is common ground between the parties that, at least on the day on which the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts were adopted, the applicant held a 48% stake in the holding company of Uralchem Group, which is Russia’s largest producer of ammonium nitrate and one of the largest producers of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers in Russia. As regards the first set of maintaining acts, those elements are confirmed by the applicant himself in the application. Furthermore, as regards the second and third sets of maintaining acts, those same elements are confirmed by the first statement of modification and are contained, inter alia, in exhibits Nos 1 and 2 of the second WK file, which consist in an excerpt from the website of the company Uralchem and an article taken from the website ‘globalsecurity.org’.

159    Second, it should be pointed out that the applicant does not dispute that he was present at the meeting of 24 February 2022 organised by President Putin and attended by a number of Russian businesspersons. While that piece of information is not in itself decisive, it supports the assertion that the applicant is a leading businessperson. In fact, amongst all of the businesspersons active in Russia, only 37 were invited to that meeting.

160    Having regard to the importance of that company in Russia – as is emphasised by the applicant himself, in particular in the application – and the size of the stake held by the applicant in the holding company of Uralchem Group, the Council rightly found that he was a leading businessperson within the meaning of the original criterion (g). It should be added that that finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments, raised in the first statement of modification against the second and third sets of maintaining acts, that he had sold his controlling stake in Uralchem Group and was not the largest shareholder in the company Uralkali. Suffice it to state that the fact of holding 48% of the shares in the holding company of Uralchem Group is alone sufficient to classify the applicant as a leading businessperson within the meaning defined in paragraph 145 above.

161    It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Council could, without making an error of assessment, conclude in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts that the applicant was a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

162    The applicant disputes the claim that he is involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of the original criterion (g). In essence, his principal submission is that none of the evidence produced by the Council shows that he or the two companies in which he is involved can be regarded as providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, should the original criterion (g) be interpreted as authorising the listing of natural persons merely on the ground that they pay the relevant taxes, which are a legal obligation, the applicant maintains that that criterion should be declared invalid under Article 277 TFEU.

163    In the first place, it should be pointed out that while Uralchem Group’s tax contribution may be useful in determining the applicant’s economic significance in the sector concerned and whether he is a leading businessperson, it is not decisive for the purposes of answering the question whether the applicant can be classified as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. As is clear from paragraphs 142 to 145 above, it is the economic sector, and not a natural person or undertaking in particular, that must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

164    In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments set out in paragraph 162 above must be rejected as ineffective.

165    In the second place, as regards the economic sector at issue in the present action, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, it is clear from the grounds in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts and from Uralchem Group’s activity that the economic sector concerned is the fertiliser sector (see paragraph 73 above).

166    In the third place, as regards the issue of whether that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, it follows, inter alia, from exhibits Nos 4 and 6 of the first WK file, taken from the website of the company Uralchem, and without being challenged by the applicant, that, first, Russia is a major global player in the fertiliser market. The applicant himself acknowledges that Russia is the world’s biggest exporter of nitrogen fertiliser and the world’s second-biggest exporter of phosphorus and potassium fertilisers. Second, Uralchem is one of the biggest Russian manufacturers of mineral fertilisers; and, third, Uralkali is the biggest Russian manufacturer of potassium chloride.

167    It should be added that the fertiliser sector, in which those two companies operate, is highly significant, as evidenced, first, by exhibit No 12 in the first WK file concerning the influence of the Russian fertiliser industry on global supply chains and, second, by exhibit No 4 in that file, which discusses a meeting between the applicant and President Putin in January 2022. During that meeting, after stating that the two companies placed great importance on the development of the regions, the implementation of social projects at the federal level and the construction of infrastructure facilities, the applicant expressed his gratitude to President Putin and the Government of the Russian Federation for their support of the chemical industry which he described as being ‘a key component of the development of agriculture both in Russia and abroad’. The significance of the operations of those companies is, moreover, fully borne out by the applicant’s argument put forward in the context of the plea in law alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights. In fact, he himself states, first of all, that those two companies provide products such as fertilisers that are of crucial importance in avoiding food crises around the world; second, that a number of developing countries depend on Russia for at least one fifth of their imports; and, lastly, that the company Uralkali manufactures and provides high quality fertilisers necessary for agriculture.

168    Consequently, in the light of Russia’s position in the fertiliser sector worldwide and the importance of that sector in the Russian and global agri-food sector, which is clear both from the exhibits in the first WK file and from the applicant’s own written pleadings, it must be held that the fertiliser sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

169    Admittedly, as the applicant correctly points out, it is true that neither Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, defines the concept of a ‘substantial source of revenue’. It should be noted, however, that the use of the adjective ‘substantial’, which qualifies the nominal group ‘source of revenue’, implies that that source of revenue is significant and therefore not negligible. Similarly, the Council has not provided figures for the revenue obtained for that government. There is, however, no doubt, in the light of the foregoing and, in particular, of Russia’s importance in the fertiliser sector, that that business sector, in which the company Uralchem is involved, provides, directly or at least indirectly, a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation.

170    It must therefore be found that, in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, the Council has adduced a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that, since the applicant is ‘a major owner of the mineral fertiliser company Uralchem’ – which controls the company Uralkali, which is part of Uralchem Group – he is a leading businessperson operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

171    That finding cannot be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicant.

172    In the first place, the applicant claims, in essence, that the tax contribution of the companies Uralchem and Uralkali is limited to mandatory taxes and that that contribution is insignificant in the context of the total tax revenues of the Russian State budget. As regards income tax, he states that, in 2021, only 5.95 million United States dollars (USD) of USD 198.5 million paid by the company Uralchem and only USD 10.62 million of USD 354.08 million paid by the company Uralkali were allocated to the federal budget, that is to say a total amount of USD 16.57 million. According to the applicant, that is but a drop in the bucket of Russian federal revenues, which amount to approximately USD 343.3 billion. He adds that, in so far as concerns VAT, that tax is an indirect tax borne by consumers rather than by suppliers, with the result that it could hardly be fair to consider it to be a tax contribution paid by those companies.

173    In that regard, first, it should be observed that, assuming that the claim that the contribution of those companies is insignificant in the context of the total fiscal revenue of the Russian State budget, the fact remains that, although it may be smaller than other fiscal revenues, such as those coming from the energy sector, those contributions may also prove to be substantial. Moreover, it is clear that the application of the original criterion (g) does not necessarily mean that the Council is to take into account all of the tax revenue of the Russian State budget, but rather that it is to assess whether the economic sector in which the applicant is active provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

174    Second, it should be borne in mind that it is the economic sector, rather than a natural person or an undertaking in particular, which must constitute a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (see paragraph 163 above). It must therefore be held that the USD 16.57 million sum of income tax which the applicant claims was paid by the companies Uralchem and Uralkali to the Russian federal budget in 2021 clearly supports the fact that the fertiliser sector, overall, must provide a substantial source of revenue to that government. In the application, the applicant states, inter alia, that in the ammonium nitrate segment there are seven other important producers with significant market shares and also that Uralchem’s market position is less strong in other market segments, such as the production of ammonia, the production of urea and the production of nitrogen fertilisers. Since it is necessary to take into account the contributions of all players in the sector concerned, there can be no doubt that that sector constitutes a substantial source of revenue within the meaning of the original criterion (g).

175    That conclusion is all the more valid given that, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, there is no reason to take only direct taxes into account when assessing whether the conditions of the original criterion (g) are satisfied.

176    It should be noted that even though indirect taxes such as VAT are paid only by consumers, the fact remains that they can be a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation, and nothing in the wording of the original criterion (g) precludes such taxes from being taken into account. Indeed, there appears to be nothing to prevent any source of revenue for the Russian Government coming from the activities in the sector concerned, including VAT, or any other revenue directly or indirectly paid to the Russian State budget that is linked to that sector, from being taken into account.

177    In the second place, in the reply, the applicant submits, in essence, that if the Council’s interpretation of the original criterion (g) is correct, it would be enough that a person operates in a specific economic sector in order for the relevant criterion to be met, irrespective of his or her conduct or that of the companies in which he or she is involved, or of his or her role or conduct with regard to Russian policy in Ukraine. Thus, he raises a plea of illegality with regard to that criterion under Article 277 TFEU.

178    In that connection, reference must be made to paragraphs 103 to 114 above, which relate to the complaint alleging illegality of the original criterion (g) in that it constitutes a breach of the principle of legal certainty.

179    Consequently, in the light of all of the foregoing, it must be found that the ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, on account of his status as a leading businessperson within the meaning of the original criterion (g), is sufficiently substantiated, with the result that, in the light of that criterion, the inclusion of his name on those lists is well founded in so far as concerns the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts.

180    According to the case-law, given the preventive nature of the decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 18 May 2022, Foz v Council, T‑296/20, EU:T:2022:298, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited).

181    Consequently, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded in so far as concerns the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call criterion (a) into question.

(c)    The fourth set of maintaining acts and the application of criterion (g) as amended to the applicant

182    As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it is common ground between the parties that the Council relied on the first part of criterion (g) as amended, relating to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’, and the third part of criterion (g) as amended, relating to ‘businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’.

183    The applicant disputes the fact that either one of those parts of criterion (g) as amended should be applied to him, by essentially reproducing the same arguments as those put forward to dispute the merits of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts. He claims, first, that he cannot be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’; second, that ‘providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ can neither be attributed to nor concern him; and, third, that the companies with which he has ties do not provide substantial revenue to that government.

184    Furthermore, he adds that the third part of criterion (g) as amended cannot apply to him since he has sold his controlling stake in Uralchem Group, and that the Council has at no point demonstrated how he could still be involved in a specific economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

185    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

186    In that connection, in the first place, it should be noted that the general context of the situation in Ukraine, as regards threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, has remained unchanged since the initial acts were adopted.

187    In the second place, as to the applicant’s individual situation, it should be noted that the grounds for listing are still, in essence, the same as those set out in the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, aside from the reference to criterion (g) as amended. The Council in fact re-asserted that the applicant was ‘a major owner of the … company Uralchem’, that he was the former CEO of that company, and that he attended the meeting of 24 February 2022 with President Putin. The Council also added that the applicant had participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023.

188    In the present case, it should be observed at the outset that the applicant in no way disputes that, as at the date on which the fourth set of maintaining acts were adopted, he still held a 48% stake in the holding company of Uralchem Group, which is, moreover, substantiated by exhibit No 1 in the third WK file.

189    Consequently, it must be held that the applicant’s situation remains unchanged on that point compared to the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, and that he can therefore still be classified, at the very least, as a ‘businessperson’.

190    Furthermore, in so far as it has been found in paragraphs 160 and 170 above that the applicant is a ‘leading’ businessperson within the meaning of the original criterion (g), solely because he owns a 48% stake in the holding company of Uralchem Group, it cannot be held in the present case that the applicant is not a ‘businessperson’ within the meaning of criterion (g) as amended.

191    As to demonstrating involvement in economic sectors that provided a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, reference should be made to paragraphs 162 to 170 above, which have established to the requisite standards that the fertiliser sector – which continues to be covered by the fourth set of maintaining acts, and in which the applicant is still involved on account of the shares he holds in the holding company of Uralchem Group – does provide such a substantial source of revenue to that government.

192    It follows from the foregoing that the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding that the applicant met the third part of criterion (g) as amended relating to ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ and that, on that basis, his name could be maintained on the lists at issue in so far as concerns the fourth set of maintaining acts.

193    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments, referred to in paragraph 183 above and which have already been relied upon in order to dispute the merits of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts. It is sufficient to refer, in that connection, to the reasons set out in paragraphs 162 to 176 above, which apply mutatis mutandis with regard to the fourth set of maintaining acts and to criterion (g) as amended.

194    Consequently, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 180 above, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded in so far as concerns the fourth set of maintaining acts, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call the first part of criterion (g) as amended and criterion (a) into question.

5.      The fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights

195    The applicant claims, in essence, that the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified and disproportionate limitation of his fundamental rights, including, inter alia, the right to freedom to conduct a business and the right to property.

196    The applicant claims, in essence, that the restrictive measures concerning him are neither necessary nor appropriate to achieving the objective pursued by Decision 2014/145, as amended, and by Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. Their application amounts to taking the view that all persons carrying on significant economic activity in Russia who meet their tax obligations could, solely by virtue of that fact, be sanctioned. In addition, the Council should have taken account of the fact that the two companies in which he is involved, namely Uralchem and Uralkali, the latter of which is part of Uralchem Group, besides not contributing at all to Russian actions and policy in Ukraine, are also producers and suppliers of products such as fertilisers, which are of crucial importance in avoiding a world food crisis. He adds, in that regard, that the fact that those two companies are expressly mentioned in the reasons for the contested acts disrupts their business in that it deters partners from taking the risk of breaching the sanctions regime, thus contributing to the deepening of the world food crisis. Lastly, he maintains that the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter for his fundamental rights to be restricted are not satisfied.

197    The Council disputes the merits of this plea in law.

198    It should be borne in mind that the freedom to conduct a business is enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter. The right to property is enshrined in Article 17 of that Charter.

199    In the present case, the restrictive measures at issue are precautionary measures which are not supposed to deprive the persons concerned of their property or of their freedom to conduct a business. Nevertheless, those measures undeniably entail a restriction of the exercise of the applicant’s right to property and his freedom to conduct a business (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited).

200    According to settled case-law, however, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection under EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

201    In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the] Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.

202    Consequently, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, the limitation in question must respect the essence of those rights. Third, the limitation must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, the limitation in question must be proportionate (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraphs 69 and 84 and the case-law cited, and of 13 September 2018, VTB Bank v Council, T‑734/14, not published, EU:T:2018:542, paragraph 140 and the case-law cited).

203    In the present case, contrary to what the applicant claims, those four conditions are satisfied as regards the contested acts.

204    In the first place, the restrictive measures at issue are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts which are, in particular, of general application, have a clear legal basis in EU law and are sufficiently reasoned in so far as concerns their scope and the reasons showing why they apply to the applicant (see paragraphs 69 to 83 above) (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in the context of the examination of the third plea in law, it has been established that it could be concluded from that statement of reasons for the contested acts that the Council could legitimately include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue (see paragraphs 141 to 179 above).

205    In the second place, in so far as concerns the question whether the limitation in question complies with the ‘essence’ of the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business, it should be observed that, having regard to the nature and scope of the restrictive measures at issue, these do not interfere with the essence of the applicant’s fundamental rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 153). In that connection, it must be pointed out that the restrictive measures imposed are temporary and reversible (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2021, Oblitas Ruzza v Council, T‑551/18, not published, EU:T:2021:453, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

206    Under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that persons and entities which no longer meet the necessary criteria are removed from them.

207    In the third place, the restrictive measures at issue are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective which falls within those pursued under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations.

208    In the fourth place, it must be recalled, as regards the principle of proportionality, that the latter requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question (see paragraphs 91 and 92 above).

209    In the present case, as to whether the measures in question are appropriate for attaining the objectives pursued, first, it should be observed that, given the importance of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures at issue, and the adverse consequences as described by the applicant resulting from the application of those measures, the restrictive measures are not manifestly inordinate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71, and of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 116).

210    That is particularly the case given that, in the context of the examination of the third plea, it has been established that the restrictive measures taken in the context of the contested acts against the applicant were justified, on the ground that his situation made it possible to conclude that he satisfied the conditions for the application of criteria (g).

211    Second, the fact that the applicant or the two companies in which he is involved did not have a direct role in actions against Ukraine is irrelevant, since he was not made subject to restrictive measures for that reason, but rather on account of the fact that he was a leading businessperson within the meaning of the original criterion (g), or a businessperson within the meaning of the third part of criterion (g) as amended, operating in economic sectors which constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

212    In so far as concerns the necessity of the restrictive measures at issue, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, namely bringing pressure to bear on Russian decision-makers responsible for the situation in Ukraine, particularly given the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). Moreover, it is clear that the applicant has failed to indicate which less restrictive measures the Council could have adopted.

213    Moreover, it must be recalled that Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting funds, other financial assets or other economic resources to be released.

214    Similarly, under Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the competent authority of a Member State may authorise listed persons to enter its territory, inter alia on urgent humanitarian grounds.

215    Lastly, the presence of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue cannot be described as disproportionate for being allegedly potentially unlimited. As has been stated in paragraph 206 above, those lists are to be periodically reviewed so that persons and entities which no longer meet the necessary criteria are removed from them (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 185 and the case-law cited).

216    It follows that, even if the adverse consequences put forward by the applicant and referred to in paragraph 196 above were established, the restrictions on his fundamental rights resulting from the restrictive measures at issue, adopted in the context of the contested acts, are not disproportionate and cannot lead to the annulment thereof.

217    That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that, in essence, the application of the restrictive measures against him is tantamount to allowing all leading businesspersons who successfully operate a business in Russia to be added to the lists at issue. Aside from the fact that that argument is unsubstantiated, it is sufficient to note that the applicant was made subject to restrictive measures following an individual assessment based on specific evidence, and that the objective of those measures is to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation seeking to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

218    As to the argument that those measures contribute to the deepening of the world food crisis, this can only be rejected. Suffice it to note that the contested measures do no more than freeze the applicant’s personal funds and prevent him from entering into or transiting through the territories of the Member States without in any way imposing restrictions on the two companies in which he is involved or, a fortiori, on the fertiliser sector. Consequently, the Council cannot be held liable for decisions of operators who prefer no longer to turn to the companies in which the applicant is involved. Lastly, it should be held that, while disruptions to food supplies have occurred, they are the result of Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine rather than the adoption of individual restrictive measures against the applicant.

219    In the light of the foregoing, the fifth plea in law must be rejected.

6.      The sixth plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, and infringement of Article 21(2)(d) TEU, Article 3(5) TEU and Article 215 TFEU

220    In essence, the applicant claims that, by maintaining restrictive measures against him on the sole ground that he is involved in the fertiliser sector, whilst clearly aware that those measures seriously hinder the capacity of the companies in which he is involved to continue to contribute to the agricultural sector and to the food security of a number of third countries, the Council has breached the aforementioned principles and provisions. The applicant adds that, in so far as the EU institutions have repeatedly affirmed that, even when implementing restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, the European Union is still fully committed to avoiding all measures which might lead to food insecurity around the globe, he had the legitimate expectation that the European sanctions did not target in any way the international trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers.

221    In the alternative, the applicant claims that, if the restrictive measures were to be interpreted as authorising the Council to take measures the probable and highly foreseeable consequence of which is an adverse impact on fertilisers and the agricultural sector, the applicant raises a plea of illegality and inapplicability of the criterion serving as the basis for including his name on the lists at issue.

222    The Council contests the applicant’s arguments.

223    In the present case, irrespective of the unsubstantiated nature of the claim that the restrictive measures at issue seriously hinder the capacity of the companies in which the applicant is involved to contribute to the agricultural sector and food security, the applicant’s arguments and the plea of illegality must be rejected in so far as these are based on the mistaken premiss that the restrictive measures, to which the applicant is subject, target international trade in agricultural and food products. It is clear, as the Council points out, that the contested acts do no more than to freeze the applicant’s personal funds and prevent him from entering into or transiting through the territories of the Member States without in any way imposing restrictions on the two companies in which he is involved or, a fortiori, on international trade in agricultural and food products or on the fertiliser sector (judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 122).

224    Since the objective of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant is in no way to target that trade or the companies to which the applicant is linked, it cannot be validly argued that the applicant’s legitimate expectations have been infringed, or that those measures have allegedly diminished the capacity of those companies to continue to contribute to the agricultural sector or to the food security of a number of third countries.

225    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Republic of Latvia blocked 200 000 tonnes of fertiliser destined for export on the ground that that merchandise came from companies linked to the applicant. The Council cannot in fact be held responsible for decisions taken by the Latvian national authorities which fall within the sovereignty of the Member States and which the applicant can challenge before national courts if he so desires. Lastly, even if it were established that the capacity of the companies linked to the applicant to contribute to the agricultural sector and food security has diminished, it must be held that such consequences are the result of Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, rather than the adoption of individual restrictive measures against the applicant (judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑282/22, not published, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 122).

226    In the light of the foregoing, the sixth plea in law must be rejected.

7.      The request for measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry

227    The applicant requests that the General Court order the Council, by means of a measure of organisation of procedure, to produce, first, the confidential administrative file which led to his name being kept on the lists at issue and, second, the ‘internal organisational structure dealing with the listing of individuals and the [administrative review procedure for de-listing] as well as with the litigation in Court of this kind of case together with any internal guidelines, document or administrative act the Council would have enacted to guarantee the impartiality and independence of the administrative review procedure for de-listing’.

228    With regard to the request to produce the confidential administrative file, the Council contends, in essence, that all the evidence relating to the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue has been provided to him. As for the request regarding the ‘internal organisational structure’, it maintains that that request is misplaced.

229    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the General Court is the sole judge of whether the information available concerning the cases before it needs to be supplemented (judgments of 10 July 2001, Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors, C‑315/99 P, EU:C:2001:391, paragraph 19, and of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 67).

230    In the present case, it should be noted that the information in the file is sufficient to enable the Court to give a ruling, the Court having been able to rule on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. As regards, in particular, the request that the confidential administrative file be produced, it should be added that the Council states that it has no material other than that already provided to the applicant.

231    It follows that the applicant’s request for measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry must be rejected and the action dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

232    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

233    In addition, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs.

234    In the present case, since the Council has applied for costs and the applicant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. The Republic of Latvia shall bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3.      Orders the Republic of Latvia to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 July 2024.

*      Language of the case: English.

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