Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

10 July 2024 (*)

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restriction on admission to the territory of the Member States – Lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and restrictions on admission to the territory of the Member States – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists – Concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ – Article 2(1)(a), (f) and (g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(a), (f) and (g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Plea of illegality – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment)

In Cases T‑309/22 and T‑739/22,

Vladimir Rashevsky, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by G. Lansky, P. Goeth and A. Egger, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by J. Rurarz and P. Mahnič, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of D. Spielmann, President, R. Mastroianni and I. Gâlea (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:

–      the application in Case T‑309/22 lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 25 May 2022;

–      the application in Case T‑739/22 lodged at the Court Registry on 25 November 2022;

–      the statements of modification lodged at the Court Registry on 23 May and 11 November 2023;

further to the hearing on 12 December 2023,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his actions under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Vladimir Rashevsky, seeks (i) in Case T‑309/22, the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87I, p. 44) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87I, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’), in so far as those acts include his name on the lists of persons and entities set out, respectively, in the annex to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16) and in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6) (‘the lists at issue’), and (ii) in Case T‑739/22, the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the September 2022 acts’), and, following the first modification of the application, the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1) (together, ‘the March 2023 acts’), and, following the second modification of the application, the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the September 2023 acts’), in so far as those acts maintain his name on the lists at issue.

I.      Background to the dispute

2        The applicant is a businessperson of Russian nationality.

3        The present cases arise in the context of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and, in particular, in respect of the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

4        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/145 on the basis of Article 29 TEU. That same day, it adopted Regulation No 269/2014 on the basis of Article 215 TFEU.

5        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted, first, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and, secondly, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

6        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, is worded as follows:

‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a)      natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

…

(f)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; or

(g)      leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

7        Article 1(1)(a), (d) and (e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, prohibits the entry into or transit through the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a), (f) and (g) of that decision.

8        Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing that freezing in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation largely reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.

9        In that context, on 15 March 2022, the Council adopted the initial acts.

10      By those initial acts, the applicant’s name was added to line 893 of the lists at issue, on the following grounds:

‘Vladimir Rashevsky is the CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG, one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers. Previously (between 2004 and 2020) he was the CEO of a coal company JSC SUEK. These are major Russian companies, co-owned by Russian billionaire Andrei Melnichenko, which generate and provide substantial revenue to the Russian Government. They also cooperate with Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin. EuroChem Group companies supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbas. SUEK signed contracts with Crimean sanatoriums for employee’s health programs.

He is therefore supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, Rashevsky attended a meeting of oligarchs at the Kremlin with Vladimir Putin to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend that meeting shows that he is a member of the inner circle of oligarchs close to Vladimir Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.’

11      By emails of 31 March 2022 and 7 April 2022, the applicant asked the Council to grant him access to the documents on the basis of which the restrictive measures concerning him had been adopted.

12      On 13 April 2022, the Council replied to the applicant’s emails referred to in paragraph 11 above and forwarded the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 3052/2022 (‘the first WK file’) and the addendum thereto bearing the reference WK 3645/2022 ADD 1 (‘the addendum’), both dated 12 March 2022.

II.    Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action

13      On 31 May 2022, the applicant submitted a request for reconsideration of the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue, claiming that he no longer held the positions giving rise to that listing.

14      On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the September 2022 acts extending the measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2023. Those acts maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on grounds identical to those set out in the initial acts.

15      On 15 September 2022, the Council replied to the request for reconsideration of 31 May 2022, refusing that request and stating that it would maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. In particular, it explained that it was still assessing the information to the effect that, on 15 March 2022, the applicant had resigned from all of his positions at EuroChem Group AG (‘EuroChem’) and from his non-executive positions at JSC SUEK.

16      By letter of 1 November 2022, the applicant submitted a further request for reconsideration.

17      By email of 22 November 2022, the applicant requested access to the documents postdating the first WK file and the addendum thereto on which the Council had relied.

18      By email of 25 November 2022, the Council replied that there were no other documents besides those contained in the first WK file and the addendum thereto.

19      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him and forwarded the information in the file bearing the reference WK 17625/2022 INIT, dated 14 December 2022 (‘the second WK file’).

20      On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the March 2023 acts extending the application of the restrictive measures against the applicant until 15 September 2023. The grounds for including his name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘Vladimir Rashevsky is the former CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG, having formally resigned from that position when listed under restrictive measures by the Union, whilst he continues to exert influence through shell companies. EuroChem is one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers. Previously (between 2004 and 2020) he was the CEO of a coal company JSC SUEK. These are major Russian companies – co-owned by Aleksandra Melnichenko, the wife of Russian billionaire Andrei Melnichenko – which generate and provide substantial revenue to the Russian Government. They also cooperate with Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin. EuroChem Group companies supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbas. SUEK signed contracts with Crimean sanatoriums for employee’s health programs.

He is therefore supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, Rashevsky attended a meeting of oligarchs at the Kremlin with Vladimir Putin to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend that meeting shows that he is a member of the inner circle of oligarchs close to Vladimir Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.’

21      By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant that the March 2023 acts maintained his name on the lists at issue.

22      On 31 March 2023, the Council, at the applicant’s request, sent him the second WK file, which was unchanged from the file previously sent and referred to in paragraph 19 above.

23      The criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014 (‘criterion (g)’) for the inclusion on the lists at issue of the names of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures was amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and by Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1). It follows from the new wording of criterion (g) (‘criterion (g) as amended’) that it applies to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’.

24      By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council notified the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him and also forwarded to him working documents WK 8089/2023 INIT of 14 June 2023 and WK 8179/2023 INIT of 15 June 2023 (together ‘the third WK file’), which were identical, containing six new items of evidence. On 3 July 2023, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 19 June 2023 with his observations.

25      On 10 July 2023, the Council sent a further letter to the applicant informing him that it was considering the possibility of maintaining the restrictive measures against him, on amended grounds. It also enclosed working document WK 8987/2023 of 30 June 2023 (‘the fourth WK file’) with that letter. On 24 July 2023, the applicant submitted observations on the Council’s letter of 10 July 2023.

26      By the September 2023 acts, the Council maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the same grounds as those referred to in paragraph 20 above.

27      On 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant that his name would be maintained on the lists at issue. On 24 October 2023, in response to a request from the applicant, the Council informed him that all the documents on which the maintenance of his name on the lists was based had already been sent to him.

III. Forms of order sought

28      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the initial acts, the September 2022 acts, the March 2023 acts and the September 2023 acts (‘the contested acts’) in so far as they concern him;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

29      The Council contends that the Court should:

–        in Case T‑739/22, dismiss the action as inadmissible in so far as it is directed at the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427;

–        dismiss the remainder of the actions as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

IV.    Law

30      After hearing the views of the parties in that regard, the Court has decided to join the present cases for the purposes of the judgment, in accordance with Article 68 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

A.      Admissibility

31      The Council argues that the application made by the applicant in Case T‑739/22 seeking annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 is inadmissible on the ground that it is out of time.

32      The applicant disputes that plea of inadmissibility and states that, notwithstanding the expiry of the time limit for bringing an action, he may challenge the lawfulness of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 indirectly, under Article 277 TFEU.

33      In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant seeks annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427, both in Case T‑309/22 and in Case T‑739/22, in which he also seeks, in particular, annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/1529.

34      Under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, proceedings for annulment must be instituted within two months of the publication of the contested measure, or of its notification to the applicant or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be. In accordance with Article 59 of the Rules of Procedure, where the time limit allowed for initiating proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication of that measure in the Official Journal of the European Union, that time limit is to run from the end of the fourteenth day after such publication. In accordance with the provisions of Article 60 of those rules, that time limit must also be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.

35      In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 12 above, the Council sent a letter to the applicant on 13 April 2022 expressly referring to Implementing Regulation 2022/427 and enclosing the first WK file and the addendum. The view must therefore be taken that the applicant became aware of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 on 13 April 2022 at the latest. The application in Case T‑739/22 was lodged at the Court Registry more than seven months after that date, on 25 November 2022. Thus, the claim for annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 in Case T‑739/22 was submitted out of time and must be dismissed as inadmissible.

36      As regards, moreover, the applicant’s argument challenging the lawfulness of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 under Article 277 TFEU, it should be recalled that that provision gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the basis of such a decision, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

37      In the present case, Implementing Regulation 2022/427 in no way constitutes the basis for the September 2022 acts, which is a prerequisite if a plea of illegality is to be raised against an act of general application.

38      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s claim for annulment of Implementing Regulation 2022/427 must be rejected as inadmissible, in so far as that claim is submitted in Case T‑739/22.

B.      Substance

39      In support of his action in Case T‑309/22, the applicant relies, in essence, on two pleas in law, alleging (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons, and (ii) an error of assessment. In Case T‑739/22, he puts forward five pleas in law, alleging (i) that the provisions of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 3(1)(f) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, (‘criterion (f)’) and the provisions laying down criterion (g) and criterion (g) as amended are unlawful, (ii) an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, (iii) an error of assessment, (iv) that the penalty is of a criminal nature and a misuse of powers, and (v) an infringement of the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights. In the first statement of modification, the applicant also puts forward a sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to good administration.

1.      The plea in law alleging that some criteria are unlawful

40      In Case T‑739/22, the applicant raises a plea of illegality in respect of criteria (f) and (g). In the first place, he submits that the restrictive measures at issue disregard Article 21 TEU.

41      First, the applicant argues that, in accordance with the objective of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries with the aim of eradicating poverty, set out in Article 21(2)(d) TEU, the imposition of restrictive measures on leading businesspersons holding positions in undertakings active in the production of fertilisers is precluded, so as to avoid causing food shortages and, therefore, famine. The reference to EuroChem, which is the world’s second-largest producer of fertilisers, in the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue had economic consequences for EuroChem and contributed to the introduction of trade barriers in the internal market of the European Union.

42      Secondly, the applicant claims that the Council’s decision to halt coal imports from Russia and, therefore, to import coal from Brazil and Australia makes transport routes longer and increases carbon dioxide emissions, which is also at odds with Article 21(2)(f) TEU. Thirdly, by failing to meet the listing criteria, the restrictive measures at issue disregard Article 21(2)(b) TEU, which protects, inter alia, human rights.

43      In the second place, the applicant submits that criteria (f) and (g) are unlawful and should be declared inapplicable under Article 277 TFEU since, first, they fail to establish a link between the persons targeted and the war in Ukraine, thus conferring unlimited discretion on the Council. Secondly, those criteria are not sufficiently precise, as the terms used in those provisions are not defined and are open to different interpretations. Criterion (f), by referring to persons ‘supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from’ the Russian Government, could potentially cover any Russian official or even any Russian retiree. Furthermore, criterion (g) could apply to any wealthy person of Russian nationality. Thirdly, the Council applies those criteria in a discriminatory manner. Accordingly, the provisions laying down those criteria lack clarity and predictability and do not respect the rule of law.

44      In the first statement of modification, the applicant adds that the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘criterion (a)’), is too vague and also infringes the principle of legality.

45      In the second statement of modification, which refers, in essence, to the application to the applicant of criteria (a), (f) and (g) as amended, the applicant claims that he has consistently criticised the lack of clarity of the criteria.

46      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

47      Under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

48      Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the basis of such a decision, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general measure claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested individual decision and the general measure in question (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

49      According to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

50      The fact remains that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the acts laying down the criteria at issue concerned by this plea in law – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error of law, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 149 (not published)).

51      Moreover, the principle of legal certainty requires that EU legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (see judgments of 5 March 2015, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v Council, C‑585/13 P, EU:C:2015:145, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited, and of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

52      In the present case, criteria (g) and (f) provide for the freezing of funds and economic resources of:

‘(f)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; or

(g)      leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’.

53      Furthermore, following the amendment introduced by Decision 2023/1094 and Regulation 2023/1089, criterion (g) as amended allows restrictive measures to be imposed on ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’.

54      In the first place, first, it should be observed that it is unequivocally clear from the very wording of Regulation No 269/2014 that criterion (f) is aimed in a targeted and selective manner at natural and legal persons who, even if they have no actual connection with the destabilisation of Ukraine, support, materially or financially, or benefit from the Russian Government responsible for such destabilisation. Criterion (f) thus consists of two elements, namely the provision of material or financial support to the Russian Government responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine and the fact of benefitting from that government, those two elements being alternative.

55      Secondly, criterion (g) is aimed in a sufficiently clear and precise manner at, inter alia, leading businesspersons involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. In the light of the wording of that criterion, the persons concerned must be regarded as leading persons on account of their importance in the sectors in which they operate and the importance of those sectors for the economy (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157).

56      Thirdly, the same is true of criterion (g) as amended, which is aimed, on the one hand, at leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, and, on the other, at businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and pursuing the same ends.

57      In addition, it should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue form part of the objectives pursued by the overall strategy of responding in a rapid, united, graduated and coordinated manner, implemented by the European Union, through the adoption of a series of restrictive measures, with the ultimate aim of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 (judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163). Moreover, the Council’s discretion must also be assessed in the light of the objective pursued by the restrictive measures, namely to put pressure on the Russian Government in order to diminish its ability to finance actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 158).

58      In that regard, there is a rational connection between, on the one hand, the targeting of leading businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, in view of the importance of those sectors for the Russian economy, and, on the other, the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited). In the same vein, there is also a rational connection between targeting natural persons who support, materially or financially, the Russian Government and that objective. That is also the case as regards criterion (g) as amended, which is aimed, on the one hand, at leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, and, on the other, at businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

59      Moreover, the discretion conferred on the Council by the criteria at issue is offset by an obligation to state reasons and strengthened procedural rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).

60      It must therefore be held, as regards criterion (g), criterion (f) and criterion (g) as amended, that the discretion conferred on the Council in assessing what is covered by the concepts, first, of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ and ‘economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue’ and, secondly, of ‘supporting, materially or financially’ or ‘benefitting’ cannot be regarded as falling short of the degree of foreseeability required by EU law.

61      The complaint alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty must therefore be rejected.

62      Accordingly, in so far as the complaints alleging infringement of the rule of law, of the principle of proportionality, of the right to property and of the principle of legality are based solely on the lack of foreseeability and clarity of the criteria at issue, those complaints must also be rejected.

63      In the second place, it must be stated that the applicant’s complaint that the Council applies the criteria at issue in a discriminatory manner relates to the examination of the applicant’s individual situation and not to the lawfulness of the listing criteria. Similarly, by his arguments alleging infringement of the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU, the applicant questions the effect on the global food situation of taking restrictive measures against him. Thus, such a line of argument is concerned with the question whether the individual restrictive measures taken against the applicant are well founded, not with whether the criteria at issue are lawful.

64      In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument raised in the first statement of modification to the effect that criterion (a) is too vague, suffice it to note that the statement of modification in no way substantiates that argument, which must therefore be rejected. Furthermore, it must be stated that the argument that the meeting of 24 February 2022 does not provide sufficient grounds for the applicant’s listing under that criterion also relates to the examination of the plea in law alleging an error of assessment.

65      Accordingly, the first plea in law, alleging that criteria (f) and (g) are unlawful, must be rejected.

2.      The plea in law alleging a failure to state reasons

66      With regard to the initial acts, the applicant submits that the grounds for listing do not expressly refer to the criteria laid down in Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014.

67      In his action against the September 2022 acts, first, the applicant states that he cannot understand why his name was maintained on the lists at issue given that he did not hold the positions for which he was ‘condemned’. Secondly, he argues that the complete lack of any reference to the listing criteria in the grounds for listing cannot be offset by the fact that he ‘guess[ed]’ the ‘relevant’ listing criteria in Case T‑309/22. The applicant also states that the letter of 15 September 2022 referred to in the defence is of no assistance, since the statement of reasons must be included in the contested act itself. In the first statement of modification, the applicant adds that, although the statement of reasons for the March 2023 acts appears at first sight to be different, it does not actually put forward any new legal grounds.

68      In the second statement of modification, in the first place, the applicant submits that the statement of reasons for the September 2023 acts shows that the listing of his name was based solely on criteria (a) and (f), and that the wording of that statement of reasons never explicitly reproduced criterion (g) and gave rise to uncertainty. He also maintains that, as is apparent from the Council’s letter of 10 July 2023, the Council had intended to amend the statement of reasons in order to add a sentence which would have expressly stated that he was a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. However, no such sentence was included in the grounds on which the September 2023 acts are based, which remained unchanged.

69      In the second place, the applicant asserts that the wording of criterion (g) as amended draws a distinction between, on the one hand, ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ and, on the other, ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. Thus, he submits that he is not able to ascertain from the statement of reasons which of those two categories concerns him, giving rise to legal uncertainty. Therefore, as from at least the adoption of the September 2023 acts, the applicant’s name is not listed under criterion (g) as amended.

70      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

71      According to the case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49).

72      The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that same measure, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53).

73      Thus, first, the reasons given for a decision adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that decision was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her. Secondly, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a measure must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for taking the measure (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

74      In addition, it has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposed a restrictive measure had not only to identify the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

75      Furthermore, it must be stated that the absence of an explicit reference to the criterion applied to a person does not necessarily entail an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, provided that it is sufficiently clear from reading the statement of reasons adopted by the Council which criterion it applied in respect of that person (judgment of 11 September 2019, Topor-Gilka and WO Technopromexport v Council, T‑721/17 and T‑722/17, not published, EU:T:2019:579, paragraph 79; see also, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 51). However, such explicit reference is indispensable where, in its absence, the parties concerned and the Courts of the European Union are left uncertain as to the precise legal basis (judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 68).

76      Finally, it is important to note that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (see judgment of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council, T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).

77      In the present case, the statement of reasons relied on in relation to the applicant in the contested acts coincides with that set out in paragraphs 10, 20 and 26 above.

78      In the first place, it should be noted that the general context which led the Council to adopt the restrictive measures at issue is set out in the recitals of the contested acts. Similarly, those acts indicate the legal basis on which the measures were adopted by the Council, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU respectively.

79      In the second place, as regards the statement of reasons for the initial acts and the September 2022 acts, first, it should be noted that the reasons for those acts state that the applicant is the chief executive officer (CEO) and director of EuroChem, one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers, and that, previously, he was the CEO of the coal company SUEK, companies presented as major Russian companies which generate and provide substantial revenue to the Russian Government. Thus, those reasons enabled the applicant to understand that the Council had applied criterion (g) to him and the grounds on which that criterion had been applied to him. Secondly, in the statement of reasons for the initial acts and the September 2022 acts concerning the applicant, the Council indicated that EuroChem companies had supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbas and that SUEK had signed contracts with sanatoriums in Crimea for employee health programmes, before stating that the applicant’s invitation to participate in the meeting of 24 February 2022 showed that he was a member of President Putin’s inner circle and that he supported or implemented actions or policies which undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine. That part of the statement of reasons, which essentially refers to the wording of criterion (a), enables the applicant to ascertain that the Council applied such a criterion to him and to ascertain why it did so. Thirdly, the Council expressly stated that the applicant supported, materially or financially, and benefitted from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, which corresponds in essence to criterion (f).

80      Therefore, it must be held that, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 79 above, even in the absence of an express reference to the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue, it is possible to ascertain from reading the statement of reasons relied on by the Council in relation to the applicant in the initial acts and the September 2022 acts which criteria were applied in order to include his name on the lists at issue, without there being any infringement of the Council’s obligation to state reasons.

81      In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the wording of the statement of reasons never explicitly reproduced criterion (g), it must be pointed out that, as the applicant asserts in paragraph 60 of the application in Case T‑309/22, the first paragraph of the statement of reasons relied on against him includes the expression ‘which generate and provide substantial revenue to the Russian Government’, which refers, to some degree, to criterion (g). In addition, in the application in Case T‑739/22, the applicant raises a plea of illegality in respect of, inter alia, criterion (g) and submits, in essence, that that criterion is too vague to serve as a legal basis for the restrictive measures against him. The applicant’s argument must therefore be rejected.

82      In the fourth place, concerning the September 2023 acts, the amendment of criterion (g) cannot be considered to be so extensive that the applicant could no longer clearly discern that that criterion continued to apply to him. Although criterion (g) as amended comprises two parts, namely, first, ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ and, secondly, ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, the second part differs from criterion (g) as worded prior to the amendment introduced by Decision 2023/1094 and Regulation 2023/1089 only in the deletion of the word ‘leading’. It follows from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 that the Council intended to broaden the designation criteria in order to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation.

83      Consequently, as regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the complete lack of any reference to the listing criteria and the discrepancy between the criteria arising from the contested acts and those set out in the first WK file, the applicant cannot reasonably claim that that led to confusion as to the precise understanding of the criteria on which the Council intended to base its decision. In addition, the fact that criterion (f) is not mentioned in the first WK file as having served as the basis for listing the applicant’s name is irrelevant. The reasons set out in the contested acts reproduce that criterion word for word, namely the fact that the applicant ‘is therefore supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’. Moreover, the applicant himself admits that the reference to criterion (f) is clear.

84      In the fifth place, as regards the statement of reasons for the March 2023 acts, it should be noted that the applicant does not deny that it is apparent from reading them that the Council maintained his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (a), (f) and (g). Furthermore, the actual and specific reasons which prompted the Council to maintain the applicant’s listing are set out in a sufficiently clear manner enabling him to understand them.

85      In the last place, the applicant’s argument that he does not understand why restrictive measures were taken against him given that he no longer holds the positions which justified the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue does not specifically seek to call into question the adequacy of the statement of reasons for the contested acts, but rather the substantive lawfulness of those acts.

86      Accordingly, the statement of reasons for the contested acts is comprehensible and sufficiently precise to enable the applicant to ascertain the reasons which led the Council to consider that the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists at issue were justified and to challenge the lawfulness thereof before the Courts of the European Union, and to enable the latter to exercise their power of review, in accordance with the rules referred to in paragraphs 75 to 80 above.

87      Such a finding is, moreover, fully confirmed by the arguments raised by the applicant in his pleadings, from which it is apparent, first, that he was put in a position whereby he was able to ascertain the reasons for the measures taken against him so that he could challenge them effectively before the Courts of the European Union by identifying criteria (a), (f), (g) and (g) as amended as the basis for including and maintaining his name on the lists at issue, and, secondly, that he was aware of the context of those measures.

88      Accordingly, the applicant’s plea in law alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons must be rejected.

3.      The plea in law alleging errors of assessment

89      First of all, it is important to note that this plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment and not a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

90      Next, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

91      It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).

92      The assessment as to whether those reasons are well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 53).

93      It is in the light of those principles of case-law that the Court must determine whether the Council made an error of assessment in considering that, in the present case, there was a sufficiently solid factual basis capable of justifying (i) the initial listing, and (ii) the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

(a)    The initial acts

(1)    The evidence

94      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the first WK file and the addendum thereto provided by the Council contain 10 items of evidence, namely:

–        an extract from the Twitter account of a journalist dated February 2022 (Exhibit 1);

–        an article announcing the applicant’s appointment as CEO of EuroChem published on the company’s website on 7 September 2020 (Exhibit 2);

–        a page from EuroChem’s website accessed by the Council on 28 February 2022 presenting the EuroChem Group’s management committee and containing a short biography of the applicant (Exhibit 3);

–        a biography of the applicant published on the website ‘tadviser.com’ (Exhibit 4);

–        an article in Russian from the news agency ‘tass.ru’ published on 27 April 2021 (Exhibit 5);

–        an article published on SUEK’s website in February 2020 (Exhibit 5a);

–        a photo published on the Sputnik website on 7 February 2018 (Exhibit 6);

–        an article published on the website ‘cbonds.com’ on 11 October 2021 (Exhibit 7);

–        an article published on the website ‘open4business.com’ on 3 February 2018 (Exhibit 8);

–        an article published by the Centre for Eastern Studies on 7 February 2022 describing EuroChem as one of the largest producers of fertilisers (Exhibit 10).

95      The applicant argues that the first WK file and the addendum thereto contain inaccuracies and are vague. In terms of content, they are nothing more than an insubstantial compilation of materials from social media which have very little to do with the applicant. The applicant questions the relevance of all the exhibits produced to justify the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue in the light of the grounds for listing, since no link has been established between the content of those exhibits and criteria (a), (f) and (g) on which that listing was based.

96      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

97      It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In that regard, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard must be had to the credibility of the information it contains, taking account in particular of the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).

98      In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).

99      Furthermore, it must be noted that the situation of conflict in which the Russian Federation and Ukraine are involved makes it extremely difficult in practice to access certain sources, to expressly state the primary source of certain information and to potentially gather evidence from persons who are prepared to be identified. The ensuing investigative difficulties may therefore constitute a barrier to the production of precise evidence and objective information (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).

100    In the present case, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council did not rely on an insubstantial compilation of materials from social media, since it produced, among other things, screenshots from the websites of EuroChem and SUEK (Exhibits 2, 3 and 5a) and from Russian news agencies (Exhibits 5 and 6).

101    The arguments by which the applicant calls into question the reliability or relevance of certain specific exhibits, in particular Exhibits 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8, will be addressed, where appropriate, in the context of the examination of whether the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are well founded.

(2)    Criterion (g)

102    The applicant maintains that he cannot be regarded as a ‘leading’ businessperson as it has not been shown that he was closely associated with the Russian regime. Furthermore, he disputes the Council’s assertion that the word ‘leading’ should be understood as meaning ‘important’ rather than ‘capable of influencing’. According to the applicant, the Council merely stated that he was the CEO and director of EuroChem and, between 2004 and 2020, the CEO of SUEK. Moreover, the Council has not substantiated its claim that EuroChem and SUEK were major Russian undertakings providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government. In that connection, first, the applicant submits that EuroChem is a company which has its registered office in Switzerland, operates in many countries and makes most of its sales outside Russia. Its net revenue in respect of the Russian Federation is negative. Secondly, the applicant states that he stood down from all executive positions at SUEK in May 2020 and that his role within the company between 18 May 2020 and 15 March 2022 was limited to a non-executive position on the board of directors.

103    The applicant also submits that the Council was required to demonstrate that the person in question or the sector in which that person operates provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. The Council has not proved that EuroChem and SUEK provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. The applicant adds that restrictive measures cannot be based solely on the fact that an entity is a prominent taxpayer and that it cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the applicant was a senior manager at major companies that he provided substantial revenue to the Russian Government. Lastly, the contribution made by EuroChem and SUEK was minimal.

104    In his reply, the applicant argues that the Council has not adduced any evidence of the substantial revenue generated by the fertiliser or coal sectors for the benefit of the Government of the Russian Federation.

105    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

106    It should be recalled that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (g), on the grounds that he was ‘the CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG, one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers’ and that ‘previously (between 2004 and 2020) he was the CEO of a coal company JSC SUEK’, EuroChem and SUEK being, according to those grounds, ‘major Russian companies … which generate and provide substantial revenue to the Russian Government’.

107    In the first place, as regards the classification of the applicant as a ‘leading businessperson’, it should be noted that criterion (g) encompasses the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ in connection with the exercise of an activity ‘in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the [Russian] Government’, with no other condition regarding ties, be they direct or indirect, with that government. The purpose of that criterion is in fact to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and the military aggression against that country (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited).

108    As recalled in paragraph 62 above, there is a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase the pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of the latter’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

109    However, there is nothing in the recitals or the provisions of Decision 2014/145 or of Regulation No 269/2014, as worded when the initial acts were adopted, to support the conclusion that it is for the Council to demonstrate the existence of close ties or interdependence between, on the one hand, the person included on the lists at issue and, on the other, the Russian Government or its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 140).

110    Furthermore, as stated in paragraph 59 above, in the light of the wording of criterion (g), the persons concerned must be regarded as leading persons on account of their importance in the sector in which they operate and the importance of that sector for the economy.

111    In the present case, the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson is apparent from Exhibits 2 and 3, taken from EuroChem’s website. Those exhibits show that, on the date of adoption of the initial acts, the applicant was the CEO and director of the EuroChem Group. In addition, EuroChem is described as a leading producer of fertilisers, with more than 27 000 employees worldwide. It is also apparent from those items of evidence that the group is vertically integrated with activities ranging from mining to the production of fertilisers, logistics and distribution. Moreover, it is stated in the exhibits that the applicant became CEO of EuroChem following his resignation, in May 2020, as CEO of SUEK, a leading coal and energy company on whose board of directors he still sits as a member.

112    Accordingly, the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson when the initial acts included his name on the lists at issue is sufficiently clear from the position he held at EuroChem and from the importance of that company within the Russian economy, and is confirmed by his previous position as CEO of SUEK, even though he no longer held that position when the initial acts were adopted.

113    Furthermore, the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson is also borne out by Exhibits 1 and 6, the content of which he does not dispute, according to which he attended meetings in the presence of President Putin, on 7 February 2018, as CEO of SUEK, and on 24 February 2022, the day after the invasion of Ukraine, as CEO of EuroChem.

114    Consequently, in the light of all of those considerations, the Court finds that the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering that, on the date of adoption of the initial acts, the applicant was a leading businessperson within the meaning of criterion (g).

115    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that his membership of SUEK’s board of directors is a non-executive position. First, the applicant was undeniably a leading businessperson on the date of adoption of the initial acts, having regard solely to his position as CEO of EuroChem. Secondly, the honorary nature of that position is not substantiated.

116    In the second place, as regards the economic sector at issue, it is clear from criterion (g) that it is the sector, and not the natural or legal person whose name is included on the lists at issue, which must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

117    In the present case, by making clear, in the statement of reasons, that EuroChem is one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers, the Council identified the relevant economic sector, namely the fertiliser sector.

118    As regards whether that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Federation, it should be noted, first of all, that Exhibit 10 attests to Russian expansion on the market for nitrogen-based fertilisers, the production of which is particularly profitable in Russia due to regulated gas prices, the importance of natural gas in the production of that type of fertiliser and the fact that EuroChem benefits from such low Russian gas prices. It is apparent from that exhibit that EuroChem is one of the world’s largest fertiliser producers and that, despite being based in Switzerland, most of its production is concentrated in Russia. Contrary to what is suggested by the applicant, who in no way disputes the information contained in Exhibit 10, there is nothing to cast doubt on the credibility of that exhibit or of the Centre for Eastern Studies, an independent research institute established in a Member State, in Warsaw (Poland), which published that article.

119    Next, Exhibit 2 confirms that EuroChem is a world leader in the production of nitrogen, phosphate and potash fertilisers. Similarly, Exhibit 7 refers to EuroChem’s particularly high revenue, since it is apparent from that exhibit that its Russian subsidiary alone reported profits of 51.15 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 600 million) for the first nine months of 2021 and a total increase in revenue of 39.46%.

120    Finally, it transpires from the international nature of the commercial trade mentioned in Exhibits 2, 8 and 10 that the fertiliser sector generates substantial exports and, consequently, an inflow of liquidity.

121    It follows from the foregoing that, on the date of adoption of the initial acts, the applicant was a leading businessperson involved in a sector, the fertiliser sector, which provided a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

122    Having regard to the preventive nature of decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

123    Accordingly, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (f), the Court must reject the plea in law alleging an error of assessment in so far as it is directed, in Case T‑309/22, at the initial acts and, therefore, it must dismiss the action in its entirety in that case.

(b)    The September 2022 acts

124    As a preliminary point, it is clear that the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are the same as the reasons given in the initial acts. It should be added that, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on those lists in the September 2022 acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that contained in the first WK file and the addendum thereto (see paragraph 19 above).

125    It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether all the evidence adduced by the Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it and constitutes a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to support the grounds for listing in the September 2022 acts.

(1)    Criterion (g)

126    The applicant states that, on the day on which the initial acts were adopted, he resigned from all of the positions he held at EuroChem and from the position he still held on SUEK’s board of directors. Therefore, the ground relating to his status as a leading businessperson is in no way adapted to the new facts. The Council thus maintained the restrictive measures at issue against the applicant, measures which were supposed to be provisional, without carrying out an updated assessment of the situation or adducing evidence establishing a sufficient link between the applicant and the situation giving rise to the restrictive measures.

127    The applicant adds that the Council’s argument that he maintained his positions at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (‘the RSPP’) was not mentioned in the statement of reasons for the September 2022 acts, with the result that that argument is not relevant in the context of reviewing the legality of the restrictive measures.

128    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

129    In the first place, the Council submits that, despite standing down, the applicant continues to be a leading businessperson. Furthermore, he chose to resign rather than to change the behaviour or status which justified the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue, which suggests that he tried to avoid the restrictive measures against him. In addition, he maintained his positions as a member of the board of the RSPP, as chair of the RSPP’s Mining Commission, as deputy chair of the Committee on Climate Policy and Carbon Regulation, and as head of the Coordination Council for the Siberian District. According to the Council, it follows that the applicant has not ceased to be a Russian businessperson operating in the energy sector, irrespective of the fact that he is no longer CEO of EuroChem or a member of SUEK’s board of directors. Consequently, the Council carried out an updated assessment before adopting the September 2022 acts and considered that the same conclusion could be drawn as in March 2022. The objectives of the restrictive measures, namely to put an end to the unlawful military aggression against Ukraine, has not yet been achieved and the reference to past conduct or previous positions cannot be irrelevant solely because that conduct and those positions date from the more or less remote past.

130    In the second place, the Council contends that the applicant was active in the mining and energy sectors, which provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

131    It should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their aims. Thus, when periodically reviewing those restrictive measures, it is for the Council to carry out an updated assessment of the situation and to take stock of the effects of those measures, with a view to determining whether they have made it possible to achieve the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether it is still possible to reach the same conclusion in relation to those persons and entities (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

132    Furthermore, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on the list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

133    It should be noted at the outset that, while it is true that the general context of the situation of Ukraine as regards the threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence did not change between the adoption of the initial acts and the September 2022 acts, the same cannot be said as regards the applicant’s situation, owing to his resignation from the positions he held at EuroChem.

134    It is therefore necessary to determine whether, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 135 and 136 above, the Council took proper account of the changes in the applicant’s situation when deciding to maintain his name on the lists at issue, whether his particular situation did not change in such a way that the evidence is now out of date, and whether it is apparent from the first WK file and the addendum thereto that the applicant could still be classified, on the date of adoption of the September 2022 acts, as a leading businessperson within the meaning of criterion (g) or, at the very least, whether the evidence in that file could constitute a body of evidence for that purpose, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 96 above.

135    In the first place, it is clear that the factual basis underpinning the ground relied on in the September 2022 acts in respect of the applicant, which relates to criterion (g), refers exclusively to his former position as CEO of SUEK and to his positions as CEO and director of EuroChem.

136    The applicant denies that, when the September 2022 acts were adopted, he was still the CEO and director of EuroChem, because he resigned from those positions on 15 March 2022, which the Council acknowledges in the present proceedings. In addition, it appears that the Council had been aware, at least since 31 May 2022, that the applicant had stood down. It follows that the applicant’s argument alleging an error of fact must be upheld as regards the assertion in the grounds relied on against him in the September 2022 acts that he ‘is the CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG’.

137    In the second place, it should be observed that the Council did not take into account the changes in the applicant’s individual situation. The specific grounds which justified the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue were essentially linked to his positions as CEO and director of EuroChem and as former CEO of SUEK.

138    Although the applicant’s position as CEO of EuroChem served to justify his initial listing (see paragraphs 110 to 125 above), the same cannot be said for the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue, which are based on a periodic review of the restrictive measures in order to enable the Council to take account of any changes in circumstances concerning, in particular, the individual situation of the persons subject to them. The September 2022 acts represent the outcome of that periodic review exercise.

139    First, the Council cannot assume from the mere fact that the applicant was CEO of EuroChem when his name was initially included on the lists at issue and, until 2020, CEO of SUEK, that he could be classified as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, even several months after leaving his positions in those groups. That would lead to the applicant’s situation being frozen and to the periodic review provided for, inter alia, in the third paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, as worded when the September 2022 acts were adopted, being deprived of any practical effect.

140    Secondly, it is also not possible to take the view that the mere fact that the applicant was CEO of EuroChem and of SUEK in the past may constitute sufficient evidence that his status as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government continued.

141    It is true that it cannot automatically be ruled out that the former CEO of a major group such as EuroChem or SUEK may still be classified as a leading businessperson, even after that person’s resignation, all the more so where that resignation coincides with his or her initial inclusion on the lists at issue. However, where that status is disputed, it is for the Council to put forward sufficiently probative evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the person concerned is still involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, justifying the inclusion of that person’s name on the list, even after his or her resignation (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2014, Alchaar v Council, T‑203/12, not published, EU:T:2014:602, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

142    In the present case, however, the Council has failed to adduce any evidence relating to the applicant in the context of the action against the September 2022 acts explaining why he was still to be regarded as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government within the meaning of criterion (g). On the contrary, it relied on the same evidence as the evidence relating to the applicant’s links with EuroChem and SUEK which had justified the initial inclusion of his name on the lists at issue, despite the changes in his individual situation.

143    In the defence, the Council simply contends that the applicant maintained his positions as a member of the board of the RSPP, as chair of the RSPP’s Mining Commission, as deputy chair of the Committee on Climate Policy and Carbon Regulation, and as head of the Coordination Council for the Siberian District. Such information does not relate to the grounds relied on against the applicant in the September 2022 acts, with the result that the Court cannot take it into account when assessing whether the September 2022 acts were well founded without effecting a substitution of grounds.

144    In any event, that information is not sufficiently substantiated to demonstrate that, when the September 2022 acts were adopted, the applicant could still be classified as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of criterion (g).

145    Furthermore, as regards the September 2022 acts, the mere fact that the applicant participated in the meeting of 24 February 2022 is not sufficient to establish that his listing under criterion (g) was well founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2023, Shulgin v Council, T‑364/22, not published, EU:T:2023:503, paragraph 63).

146    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first ground for listing relating to criterion (g) is not sufficiently substantiated as regards the September 2022 acts. It is therefore necessary to examine the second ground for listing, relating to criterion (a).

(2)    Criterion (a)

147    First of all, the applicant states that EuroChem and SUEK do not cooperate with the Russian authorities. That assertion is not relevant in the context of the listing criteria and no evidence was adduced to support it. He submits that the Council has not demonstrated that EuroChem supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbass. Furthermore, the argument that SUEK signed contracts with sanatoriums in Crimea for its employees is materially flawed. Indeed, it was the employees themselves who decided to holiday in Crimea and the Council has not adduced evidence that the applicant directly participated in the decision to cover the costs of those trips. The applicant further states that, since he did not occupy any position in those companies when the September 2022 acts were adopted, he cannot be held responsible for their past activities.

148    Next, the applicant reiterates that he was invited to the meeting of 24 February 2022 by the RSPP, which has criticised the Russian Government on several occasions, and not by the Office of the President. He states that that meeting was scheduled as an annual meeting. The applicant submits that describing his relationship with President Putin as a professional one is insufficient justification for his listing.

149    Lastly, the applicant argues that the actions relied on by the Council are, in any event, not capable of undermining or threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the meaning of criterion (a).

150    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments and contends that the applicant supported actions and policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine through the activities of the companies he managed. In that regard, it refers to the supply of fertilisers by EuroChem to the occupied areas of Donbas and the financing by SUEK of holidays for its employees in Crimea. The provision of that support is confirmed by the applicant’s participation in the meeting of 24 February 2022.

151    The Council also states that reliance on actions and policies undermining and threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine is necessarily based on actions and policies implemented in the past.

152    It should be observed that the reasons given in the September 2022 acts relating to criterion (a) stem from the fact that, in his capacity as CEO of EuroChem and former CEO of SUEK, the applicant participated in the meeting of 24 February 2022 with President Putin, which shows that he is part of the inner circle of oligarchs close to the president. In addition, those undertakings cooperate with the Russian authorities, including President Putin. The undertakings in the EuroChem Group supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbas and SUEK signed contracts with sanatoriums in Crimea for employee health programmes (see paragraph 10 above).

153    In that regard, it should be borne in mind at the outset that criterion (a), concerning the provision of support for actions or policies which undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine, implies that a direct or indirect link is established between the activities or actions of the person or entity targeted and the situation in Ukraine underpinning the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. In other words, those persons or entities must, by their conduct, have been responsible for supporting actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 74).

154    In the present case, first, it is not disputed that the applicant no longer held the position of CEO of EuroChem when the September 2022 acts were adopted.

155    Secondly, although the Council points to Exhibit 8 in the first WK file, that exhibit dates from 3 February 2018 and refers to the imposition of sanctions by Ukraine, in 2017, on certain undertakings in the EuroChem Group for having supplied fertilisers to the occupied areas of Donbas. In that regard, it is not disputed that the applicant’s appointment as CEO of EuroChem dates from September 2020. Consequently, no link can be established between the applicant and the supply of fertilisers to the occupied areas of Donbas. That exhibit is therefore not relevant for the purposes of justifying the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, under criterion (a), by means of the September 2022 acts.

156    Thirdly, the Council relies on the payment by SUEK of holidays in Crimea for its employees. In that regard, the Council merely produces a summary in English of an article in Russian (Exhibit 5a in the first WK file). According to the summary, that article states that, ‘in 2020 (and in previous years) SUEK financed the health and social programs for company’s employees by signing contracts with different sanatoriums and SPAs, including in Crimea’ and that ‘as this was done under the leadership of CEO Vladimir Rashnevsky [sic], it proves that Rashnevsky supported and implemented actions or policies, which undermine[d] or threaten[ed] the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’.

157    The applicant disputes the translation of the article in question and claims that the original wording in Russian does not state that SUEK signed contracts with sanatoriums and spas in Crimea. He maintains that the sentence to which the Council draws attention simply states that ‘in recent years employees of SUEK’s Krasnoyarsk enterprises have been actively exploring Crimea, choosing health resorts in Yalta and Alushta’.

158    When questioned at the hearing, the Council stated that it did not cast doubt on the translation provided by the applicant and conceded that the wording of the article published on SUEK’s website did not appear to mention a contract concluded, at least directly, by SUEK with sanatoriums in Crimea. Accordingly, the assertion in the statement of reasons that SUEK signed contracts with such sanatoriums for employee health programmes is not supported by Exhibit 5a in the first WK file provided by the Council and does not have a sufficiently solid factual basis in accordance with paragraph 94 above.

159    In that regard, pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraph 95 above, in order to address the applicant’s argument that the original wording of the article does not refer to a contract, it is for the Council to establish that the reasons relied on against the applicant, based on links between SUEK and sanatoriums and spas in Crimea, are well founded, and not for the applicant to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded.

160    For the sake of completeness, if it were considered that the payment by SUEK of the travel expenses of its employees, some of whom had chosen to visit Crimea, as the applicant acknowledges, was linked to the statement of reasons, that fact alone would not be sufficient to support the applicant’s listing under criterion (a), since it is apparent from Exhibit 5a in the first WK file that the employees picked their holiday destination. Thus, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 157 above, that fact is insufficient to establish the existence of a link, even an indirect link, between the applicant’s activities or actions and the situation in Ukraine underpinning the adoption of the restrictive measures.

161    Fourthly, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 149 above, which must be applied by analogy in the context of criterion (a), the Council cannot infer from the mere fact that the applicant participated in a meeting organised by President Putin attended by representatives of large undertakings that he may be held responsible for actions or policies undermining or threatening stability in Ukraine, or may be considered to support such actions or policies.

162    Furthermore, the assertion that the applicant’s presence at the meeting of 24 February 2022 is evidence of a professional relationship and of the fact that it is impossible to run a large undertaking in Russia without the government’s approval in exchange for loyalty and support cannot be relied on in support of criterion (a). Such a general assertion is not capable of establishing a direct or indirect link with the situation in Ukraine underpinning the adoption of the restrictive measures.

163    Furthermore, the claim that the applicant is part of the inner circle of oligarchs close to President Putin is not, in itself, capable of establishing a link within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 157 above. In that regard, it should also be pointed out that the Council itself submitted, in the defence, that the applicant had been listed not because of a personal relationship with the president but because of a professional one. Therefore, the fact that the applicant participated in the meeting of 24 February 2022 is not in itself sufficient to establish that his listing under criterion (a) is well founded.

164    Fifthly, the meeting referred to in Exhibit 6 in the first WK file was concerned with the environmental situation in the territory of Krasnoyarsk, so that not only is it not related to the grounds relied on against the applicant in the September 2022 acts, but it does not demonstrate any link between the applicant and the actions and policies referred to in criterion (a).

165    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the ground for listing relating to criterion (a) is not sufficiently substantiated as regards the September 2022 acts. It is therefore necessary to examine the third ground for listing relating to criterion (f).

(3)    Criterion (f)

166    The applicant argues that the statement that he cooperates with the Russian authorities is imprecise and erroneous, as well as irrelevant. Moreover, the Council did not adduce any evidence in support of its claims that the applicant supported the Russian Government. Thus, the Council did not prove either that EuroChem or SUEK generated and provided substantial revenue to the Russian Government or that undertakings in the EuroChem Group supplied ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbass. Furthermore, SUEK did not sign any contracts with sanatoriums in Crimea. The proposition that it is impossible to run a large, successful undertaking in Russia without the government’s support in exchange for loyalty and support for government policies is insufficient justification for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. In his reply, the applicant states that the payment of taxes does not amount to the provision of support.

167    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments and contends that he was responsible for providing quantitatively and qualitatively significant support to the Russian Government through the companies he managed, first, on account of their contribution to the budget of the Russian State and, secondly, by the support provided to government policies as set out in criterion (a). In particular, it states that both the fertiliser industry and the coal industry are strategic sectors offering a major source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the direct taxes alone paid by EuroChem and SUEK distinguish them from ordinary companies. Lastly, the Council contends that those companies actively supported specific policies of the Russian Government by supplying fertilisers to the occupied areas of Donbas and by financing some employees’ holidays in Crimea.

168    The Council also argues that it is in the context of the analysis of criterion (f) alone that the revenues generated by individual companies are of importance. It maintains that it did not consider only taxes to be a form of support to the government, but also the strategic leverage that SUEK and EuroChem provided in sectors of key importance due to their exports.

169    First of all, it should be recalled that, in the September 2022 acts, the Council referred to the applicant’s position as CEO of EuroChem, even though he had resigned from that position when those acts were adopted (see paragraphs 140 to 159 above). Therefore, the applicant’s argument that he does not occupy any position in those companies must be upheld as regards the assertion in the grounds that he ‘is the CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG’.

170    In that regard, although the Council was entitled to rely on the link between the applicant and EuroChem in the case of the initial acts, that link was no longer valid in the case of the September 2022 acts.

171    Next, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 145 above, it is for the Council to put forward sufficiently probative evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the person concerned still supports, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation, justifying the inclusion of that person’s name on the list, even after his or her resignation (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2014, Alchaar v Council, T‑203/12, not published, EU:T:2014:602, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

172    The Council has failed to adduce any evidence showing that the applicant supported, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation such as to justify the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue under criterion (f). On the contrary, notwithstanding the case-law cited in paragraph 136 above, it relied on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which essentially related to his former positions at EuroChem and SUEK, despite the changes in his situation.

173    In addition, it should be noted that criterion (f), which is concerned with ‘natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’, is clearly worded in the present case (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, Prigozhina v Council, T‑212/22, not published, EU:T:2023:104, paragraph 92). Therefore, since the applicant no longer held any position at EuroChem or SUEK on the date of the adoption of the September 2022 acts, he was not able to provide such support through those companies.

174    Lastly, as regards the Council’s claim regarding the supply of fertilisers to the occupied areas of Donbas, the Court has found, in paragraph 159 above, that the Council has failed to adduce any evidence to establish a link between the applicant and that supply. Similarly, as regards the alleged signature of contracts by SUEK with sanatoriums in Crimea for employee health programmes, the Court has also found that that claim was not substantiated by Exhibit 5a in the first WK file and, therefore, did not have a sufficiently solid factual basis (see paragraphs 160 to 164 above).

175    Consequently, in the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments in respect of criterion (f) must be upheld as regards the September 2022 acts.

176    It follows from the foregoing considerations that the grounds for listing in the September 2022 acts relating to criteria (a), (f) and (g) are not sufficiently substantiated, with the result that those acts must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant.

(c)    The March 2023 acts

177    As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the statement of reasons for the March 2023 acts relied on against the applicant, the Council stated that the applicant was the ‘former CEO and Director of EuroChem Group AG, having formally resigned from that position when listed under restrictive measures by the Union, whilst he continue[d] to exert influence through shell companies’, that ‘previously (between 2004 and 2020) he was the CEO of a coal company JSC SUEK’, and that ‘these are major Russian companies – co-owned by Aleksandra Melnichenko, the wife of Russian billionaire Andrei Melnichenko’.

178    In support of its argument that the March 2023 acts are well founded in respect of the applicant, the Council refers to the second WK file, containing three exhibits, namely:

–        an article from the EuroChem website announcing the applicant’s resignation (Exhibit 1);

–        an article from the website ‘rambler.ru’, published on 18 March 2022 (Exhibit 2);

–        an article from the media outlet De Tijd, published on 28 March 2022 (Exhibit 3).

179    The applicant states that Exhibit 3 in the second WK file describes him as the CEO of EuroChem one week after his resignation. He disputes the probative value of that article for the purposes of the March 2023 acts, adopted one year after its publication. The applicant also reiterates that past conduct cannot provide sufficient grounds for the imposition of restrictive measures and that the Council has no evidence that his resignation was staged.

180    Moreover, the applicant submits that none of the exhibits in the second WK file shows that he exerts influence over the Russian Government. According to the applicant, the claim that he exerts influence over EuroChem through shell companies cannot validly be supported by the evidence adduced by the Council, in particular Exhibit 2 in the second WK file.

181    Finally, the applicant maintains that the information to the effect that EuroChem and SUEK are co-owned by Aleksandra Melnichenko is irrelevant for the purposes of his listing. He states that the remainder of the statement of reasons is unchanged and that he was not invited by President Putin to the meeting of 24 February 2022. He also refers to the role played by the RSPP, which he claims has challenged the policies of the Russian Government on many occasions.

182    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. Although it accepts that the applicant resigned from his position as CEO of EuroChem on the day on which the restrictive measures were imposed, the Council nevertheless contends that the effects of that resignation had to be assessed in order to check that it was not fictitious and maintains that that position was still relevant in the light of criterion (g). The Council considered that the applicant continued to be an important businessperson since he maintained links with EuroChem and that the word ‘leading’ cannot be interpreted restrictively. The Council also notes that the applicant maintained his positions at the RSPP.

183    As regards Exhibit 2 in the second WK file, the Council takes the view that, although the translation might contain errors regarding the applicant’s relationship with EuroChem, the statement that he continues to hold directorships in companies related to SUEK is not disputed by the applicant. Moreover, the fact that the publisher decided to withdraw the article in question in no way proves that its content was inaccurate, since that withdrawal could be the result of pressure exerted by the applicant. In response to the applicant’s criticism of the reliability of Exhibit 2 in the second WK file, the Council produces Annex F1 to its observations on the first statement of modification, which it claims shows that the applicant continued to be a member of the board of directors of Siberian Generating Company LLC (‘SGC’), a company related to SUEK. Accordingly, the exhibits in the second WK file support the conclusion that the applicant remained active in the energy sector.

184    Lastly, the Council states that the applicant’s participation in the meeting of 24 February 2022 also bolsters the conclusion that he supports or implements actions threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine, evidenced by the fact that he was responsible for providing quantitatively and qualitatively significant support to the Russian Government on account of (i) the contribution of the companies he managed to the budget of the Russian Federation, and (ii) the support provided to the policies of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(1)    Criterion (g)

185    In the first place, it should be recalled, as is clear from paragraph 144 above, that the previous positions of the applicant as CEO of EuroChem and CEO of SUEK cannot, in themselves alone, constitute sufficient evidence that he continued to hold the status of leading businessperson active in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, for the purposes of assessing criterion (g), it is necessary to determine whether the evidence submitted by the Council constitutes a set of indicia that is sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to support the ground that the applicant ‘continue[d] to exert influence through shell companies’.

186    In that regard, it should be noted that that assertion is based on Exhibit 2 in the second WK file, which is an excerpt from a news article published on the website ‘rambler.ru’, worded as follows:

‘According to a similar scheme, Andrey Melnichenko, the former owner of SUEK, has now come out of the sanctions. On March 10, a statement appeared about his resignation from the board of directors and the termination of his ownership of the company. “By the end of 2021, the legal entity representing Andrey Melnichenko’s business interests indirectly owned 92.2% of the company’s shares. After Mr Melnichenko left the Board of Directors and the number of SUEK’s beneficiaries, his controlled share was reduced to 0%,” SUEK said in a press release. Judging by SPARK-Interfax, 100% of SUEK is directly owned by the Cypriot SUEK Holdings. Its director is the enigmatic [A], one of the top managers of Dominanto Holdings and Exactco Holdings. Both of them are also registered in Cyprus and both of them have Vladimir Rashevsky as a director. He, like Melnichenko, was a member of the board of directors of SUEK and, having fallen under sanctions, left him. He also resigned from the position of chief executive officer of EuroChem, also controlled by Andrey Melnichenko (he pulled off a similar scheme, as in the case of SUEK, to “get rid of” EuroChem).’

187    It should be noted that while that article states that A is director of SUEK’s Cypriot holding companies and, in addition, is one of the senior managers at Dominanto Holdings and Exactco Holdings, also registered in Cyprus, it simply mentions that the applicant is director of Dominanto Holdings and Exactco Holdings. It therefore only follows from the article that A is a ‘top manager’ in two companies in which the applicant is director and that she is also director of SUEK’s Cypriot holding companies. Therefore, the link referred to between the applicant and A does not prove the existence of shell companies and does not mean that the applicant continues to exert influence over SUEK through such companies. Moreover, it should be noted that the ground according to which the applicant ‘continues to exert influence through shell companies’ appears to refer exclusively to EuroChem and that influence over SUEK is not mentioned in the grounds.

188    In addition, as regards the applicant’s possible influence over EuroChem through shell companies, the article provided by the Council merely states that ‘he pulled off a similar scheme, as in the case of SUEK, to “get rid of” EuroChem’ and that ‘100% of the EuroChem shares are owned by the Swiss EuroChem Group. It was not possible to find out who is behind the EuroChem Group, but it could be someone from Andrey Melnichenko’s entourage, even if he is the most ordinary purchasing or sales manager’.

189    In that regard, it should be noted that the Council itself, in its observations on the first statement of modification, acknowledges that the translation might contain errors regarding the applicant’s relationship with EuroChem. Thus, the article in question does not make it possible to determine with sufficient certainty whether it was the applicant or Mr Melnichenko who ‘pulled off a similar scheme, as in the case of SUEK, to “get rid of” EuroChem’. In addition, that article states that it is not possible to identify who is behind EuroChem. Accordingly, there is no indication given in Exhibit 2 in the second WK file that the applicant exerted any influence over EuroChem through shell companies.

190    Since it is apparent from paragraphs 192 and 193 that influence on the part of the applicant through shell companies cannot be considered to be sufficiently established, the conclusions to be drawn from the publisher’s removal of the article filed as Exhibit 2 cannot be decisive. Moreover, Exhibit 2 is not supported by other evidence and cannot in itself be sufficient.

191    In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, for the purposes of establishing whether the March 2023 acts are well founded, the Council has not provided a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to support the proposition that the applicant was a leading businessperson involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of criterion (g).

192    That finding cannot be called into question, first, by the Council’s argument that the applicant continues to be a leading businessperson because he is still a member of the RSPP. As stated in paragraph 147 above, that information does not relate to the statement of reasons for the March 2023 acts either and cannot therefore be taken into account by the Court.

193    Secondly, as regards the evidence produced by the Council during the litigation stage before the Court, consisting of an extract from the Spark-Interfax companies register attesting to the applicant’s membership of the board of directors of SGC, it must in any event be found that, even though the document appears to show that the applicant exerted influence over that company, it is not possible to infer therefrom that he would have exerted influence over SUEK through SGC.

194    Thirdly, as regards the Council’s argument concerning the applicant’s participation in the meeting of 24 February 2022, suffice it to recall that such participation is not in itself sufficient to establish that his listing under criterion (g) was well founded, as is apparent from paragraph 149 above.

195    In the second place, the Council acknowledges that the reference in the statement of reasons for the March 2023 acts to the effect that EuroChem and SUEK are ‘co-owned by Aleksandra Melnichenko’ is a purely factual assertion which has no bearing on the applicant’s situation.

196    Therefore, it must be held that the Council has failed to adduce a body of precise and consistent evidence to support the applicant’s listing under criterion (g).

(2)    Criteria (a) and (f)

197    First, it must be borne in mind that the grounds for listing relating to criterion (a) set out in the March 2023 acts are the same as those in the September 2022 acts and are based on the supply by EuroChem of ammonia nitrate to the occupied areas of Donbas, on the contracts signed by SUEK with sanatoriums in Crimea for employee health programmes, and on the applicant’s participation in the meeting of 24 February 2022.

198    It is apparent from paragraphs 156 and 169 above that, as regards criterion (a), the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to support the applicant’s listing under that criterion and it has adduced no evidence to that effect in the second WK file.

199    Secondly, as regards criterion (f), the grounds for listing are essentially based on the influence exerted by the applicant over EuroChem or SUEK. Since the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to support the existence of such influence, as is clear from paragraphs 189 to 194 above, it cannot be held that those grounds justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in the light of criterion (f).

200    Consequently, the grounds for listing in the March 2023 acts relating to criteria (a) and (f) are not sufficiently substantiated.

201    Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of sufficiently substantiating the grounds on the basis of which the March 2023 acts maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, under criteria (a), (f) and (g), with the result that those acts must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant.

(d)    The September 2023 acts

202    The applicant reiterates, in essence, the arguments put forward in the application and in the first statement of modification. In the first place, he disputes the merits of the claim that he continues to exert influence over EuroChem through shell companies. In the second place, he submits that he has no links to the alleged supply by EuroChem of fertilisers to the occupied areas of Donbass. In the third place, he argues that he has no responsibility whatsoever for the alleged contracts with sanatoriums in Crimea. In the fourth place, he denies being a member of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.

203    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. In the first place, it states that the new evidence files which it notified to the applicant contained information concerning his positions at SGC and the Skolkovo Foundation. The Council also asserts that, although additional material was examined and notified to the applicant so that he could submit observations on it, it was not considered to constitute separate grounds.

204    In the second place, the Council contends that the applicant continues to be an important businessperson and is still active in the energy and fertilisers sectors, even after resigning from his high-level positions, in particular having regard to his membership of the board of directors of SGC.

205    In the third place, the Council maintains that the other grounds for listing relating to criteria (a) and (f) remain valid. That is also demonstrated, in particular, by the applicant’s positions as a member of the board of the RSPP, as chair of the Mining and Industrial Complex Commission, as deputy chair of the Committee on Climate Policy and Carbon Regulation, and as head of the Coordination Council for the Siberian District, as attested by paragraph 39 of the application.

206    In the fourth place, the Council draws attention to Exhibit 1 in the third and fourth WK files, showing that the applicant continues to be a member of the board of directors of SGC. It also submits that the evidence adduced by the applicant to challenge that exhibit was not provided in tempore non suspecto and is unreliable.

207    As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the grounds for listing the applicant were not amended, but that the Council put forward additional evidence in order to substantiate that listing.

208    In that regard, first, the third WK file contains a file comprising six new items of evidence, namely:

–        Exhibit 1, which is an extract from the ‘spark-interfax.ru’ website, dated 4 May 2023, showing that the applicant is a member of the board of directors of SGC, which, according to the Council, is part of the SUEK group of companies;

–        Exhibit 2, which is an extract from the official website of SGC, dated 4 May 2023;

–        Exhibit 3, which is an extract from the website of the ‘crunchbase.com’ database, dated 4 May 2023, showing that the applicant is chair of the board of the Skolkovo Foundation, an organisation established by the Russian Government in 2010;

–        Exhibit 4, which is also an extract from the website of the ‘crunchbase.com’ database, dated 4 May 2023, containing details about the Skolkovo Foundation;

–        Exhibit 5, which is an extract from the official website of the Skolkovo Foundation, dated 4 May 2023, showing that that foundation had been included in a government programme for economic development and innovation;

–        Exhibit 6, which is an extract from the website ‘opensanctions.org’, dated 21 March 2023, reproducing information relating to the restrictive measures to which the applicant is subject.

209    Secondly, the fourth WK file contains eight items of evidence. Exhibits 1 to 4 in the fourth WK file are identical to Exhibits 1 to 4 in the third WK file, listed in paragraph 208 above. The fourth WK file also contains four other exhibits, namely:

–        Exhibit 5, which is an article from the Russian news outlet Kommersant, dated 25 May 2018, showing that SGC participated in public contracts in the energy sector in Russia and that the owner of SUEK, Andrey Melnichenko, was considering a merger between SGC and SUEK;

–        Exhibit 6, which is an extract from the website of the local news outlet ‘newslab.ru’, dating from 2023, confirming the role of SGC in the energy sector;

–        Exhibit 7, which is an article published on the website of the local news outlet ‘newslab.ru’ on 9 September 2016 describing a meeting between the governor of the Krasnoyarsk Krai region and the management of SUEK and SGC, including the applicant, at that time general director of SUEK and member of the board of directors of SGC;

–        Exhibit 8, which is an article published on the website of the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, dated 18 May 2020, concerning a management reshuffle at SUEK and its subsidiary SGK.

210    The applicant maintains that the information provided by the Spark-Interfax database (Exhibit 1 in the third and fourth WK files) is incorrect and that he is not a member of the board of directors of SGC, and he submits evidence in rebuttal to that effect.

211    In the first place, it is necessary to examine whether the applicant’s position at SGC, on which the Council relies, is capable of demonstrating that the ground for listing, according to which ‘he continues to exert influence through shell companies’, is well founded.

212    In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the relevant part of the statement of reasons for the September 2023 acts states, in the first place, that the applicant is the former CEO and director of EuroChem; in the second place, that he officially resigned from those positions following the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue; in the third place, that he nevertheless continues to exert influence through shell companies; in the fourth place, that EuroChem is one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilisers; and, in the fifth place, that previously (between 2004 and 2020), he was the CEO of SUEK. Accordingly, it follows from reading the statement of reasons that that influence through shell companies refers to EuroChem, not SUEK. It does not in any way follow from Exhibits 1 and 2 in the third and fourth WK files that there was a link between SGC and EuroChem. Quite the opposite: while SGC was active in the energy sector, EuroChem’s business is in the fertiliser sector.

213    Furthermore, even if a very broad reading of the statement of reasons were to permit the inference that ‘[the applicant’s] influence through shell companies’ also covered SUEK, it is not sufficiently clear from the third and fourth WK files that the applicant exerted such influence through SGC. It is apparent from Exhibit 1 in the third and fourth WK files and Exhibit 8 in the fourth WK file that it was SUEK which was the founding company of SGC, or its parent company, which presupposes that SUEK was able to exert influence over SGC, not the other way around. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from those exhibits that SGC was a ‘shell company’ in relation to SUEK. Consequently, membership of the board of directors of a subsidiary of SUEK does not prove that the applicant continued to exert influence over that company through a shell company.

214    In any event, as regards whether the facts observed by the Council are materially accurate, it must be borne in mind that, in his letters of 3 and 24 July 2023, in response to the Council’s correspondence of 19 June and 10 July 2023, the applicant adduced evidence to support the contention that he had stood down from his position at SGC. In those letters, he also submits, providing supporting evidence, that he had stood down from his position at the Skolkovo Foundation in 2019.

215    In its letter of 15 September 2023 informing the applicant of its decision to maintain his listing, the Council states that the evidence adduced by the applicant had been ‘taken into account’.

216    Since the Council simply asserts that the evidence was not produced in tempore non suspecto and is unreliable, it must be held that the Council has failed to refute that evidence. As regards the reliability of that evidence, it should be noted that, although the applicant provides extracts from the Spark-Interfax website (Annexes 1 and 6 to the applicant’s letter of 3 July 2023), the Council itself relied on extracts from the same website (Exhibit 1 in the third WK file). Moreover, it was only after receiving the Council’s letters of 19 June 2023 that the applicant had the opportunity to challenge them.

217    In the second place, as regards the Council’s reasoning based on the applicant’s alleged status as member of the board of directors of SGC and on the activities of that company in the energy sector, in order to substantiate his status as a ‘businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, within the meaning of criterion (g) as amended, it must be held that such reasoning is not based on any link with the statement of reasons. Unless a substitution of grounds is admitted, the Council cannot rely on evidence to support an assertion which is in no way related to the reasons as they appear in the lists at issue. That assertion relates to a company which is not mentioned anywhere in the statement of reasons, which are based, as recalled in paragraph 212 above, on the influence exerted by the applicant over EuroChem and SUEK through shell companies.

218    Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Council acknowledges that, after examining the new evidence submitted by the applicant, it decided, in essence, that the earlier reasons were sufficient and that it was not necessary to amend them. In that regard, although material in the evidence file may supplement certain aspects of the statement of reasons, by linking to the latter, such material cannot be permitted to replace that statement of reasons. In the present case, it is impossible to identify the aspect of the statement of reasons to which the material concerning the applicant’s position at SGC relates.

219    The same applies to the applicant’s position at the Skolkovo Foundation. The evidence provided by the Council in that regard is not related to any part of the statement of reasons. Moreover, it is not clear whether that evidence goes to proving that the applicant continues to be either a ‘leading businessperson operating in Russia’ or a ‘businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, within the meaning of criterion (g) as amended, or whether he benefits from the Russian Government, within the meaning of criterion (f). Moreover, as regards criterion (g), the applicant’s position in a foundation  even a governmental one and even one involved in economic development projects  is not, in itself, capable of demonstrating that he is a ‘businessperson’.

220    In that regard, it must be observed that a scenario in which the Council could put forward new reasons that differ from those set out in the contested acts in order to regularise the absence of a statement of reasons or to correct factual inaccuracies in the statement of reasons for those acts would undermine the applicant’s rights of defence and right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2023, QF v Council, T‑386/22, not published, EU:T:2023:670, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

221    Thirdly, Exhibits 5, 7 and 8 in the fourth WK file, which concern the applicant’s position at SGC and the links between that company and SUEK, are not relevant to proving that, on the date of adoption of the September 2023 acts, the applicant was a member of the board of directors of that company. Those documents date from 2016, 2018 and 2020 and the applicant does not dispute that he was still a board member on those dates.

222    In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to demonstrate that the applicant continued to be a leading businessperson operating in Russia or a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

223    As regards criteria (a) and (f), it is clear from paragraph 202 above that, as regards the March 2023 acts, the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of sufficiently substantiating the ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, under those criteria, since it was not able to establish that the applicant exerted control over EuroChem and SUEK. Since the Council has failed to adduce evidence of such control, the findings made in paragraphs 169, 179 and 204 apply a fortiori to the September 2023 acts.

224    Thus, it must be concluded that the Council has failed to adduce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the applicant was a leading businessperson, that he supported the Russian Government, or that he was responsible for actions or policies which undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, for the purposes of establishing that the September 2023 acts were well founded, with the result that those acts must be annulled.

225    In the light of all of the foregoing, the third plea in law in Case T‑739/22 must be upheld and, therefore, the September 2022 acts, the March 2023 acts and the September 2023 acts must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas in law and arguments put forward in support of the action in that case.

V.      Costs

226    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

227    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful in Case T‑309/22, he must be ordered to pay the costs in that case, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

228    Since the Council has been largely unsuccessful in Case T‑739/22, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Joins Cases T‑309/22 and T‑739/22 for the purposes of the judgment;

2.      Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as those acts concern Mr Vladimir Rashevsky;

3.      Dismisses the action in Case T‑309/22;

4.      Dismisses the action in Case T‑739/22 as to the remainder;

5.      Orders Mr Rashevsky to pay the costs in Case T‑309/22;

6.      Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs in Case T‑739/22.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 July 2024.

*      Language of the case: English.

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