Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

19 July 2024 (*)

(Interim relief – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of Russian actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Application for interim measures – Prima facie case – Urgency – Weighing up of interests)

In Case T‑257/24 R,

Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, T. Marembert and A. Bass, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by P. Mahnič, L. Berger and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

having regard to the order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published),

makes the following

Order

1        By his application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, seeks, in essence, (i) suspension of operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/847) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/849), in so far as they concern him (together ‘the March 2024 acts’), under the same conditions as those provided for in the order of 22 December 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R IV, not published, EU:T:2023:863); and (ii) the granting of any appropriate interim measures which would allow him to pursue his career as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver of other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union.

 Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties

2        The applicant is a Russian national.

3        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4        On 9 March 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31), by which the applicant’s name was added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended.

5        On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was added to the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), as amended.

6        On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1), by which the reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list annexed to Decision 2014/145, and on that in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 (‘the lists at issue’), were amended.

7        On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1), by which the reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended.

8        On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the September 2023 acts’), by which the reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended.

9        In the September 2023 acts, the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered were the following:

‘Nikita Mazepin is the son of Dmitry Mazepin, owner and former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. He was a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, sponsored by Dmitry Mazepin through Uralchem’s subsidiary, Uralkali. His foundation “We compete as one” is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali. He is also associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP, which was partly owned by Dmitry Mazepin through Uralkali and whose objective is to benefit Nikita Mazepin’s career as a motorsport driver, and which is now owned by a common business associate of the two men.

He is an immediate family member benefitting from and associated with his father, Dmitry Mazepin, a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

10      On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the March 2024 acts, by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue, on the same grounds as those recalled in the preceding paragraph.

11      By judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the Court annulled the acts referred to in paragraphs 6 to 8 above, in so far as they concerned the applicant.

12      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 15 May 2024, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the March 2024 acts.

13      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 16 May 2024, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which he claims that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should:

–        order the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts, in so far as those acts, in maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, prevent him from negotiating his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, as well as from participating in Grand Prix, tests, trainings and free sessions in Formula 1 and in other motorsport championships, races, tests, trainings and free sessions taking place in the European Union;

–        grant any appropriate interim measures which would enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver of other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, to get recruited as a driver by teams participating in the relevant championships as well as to exercise his rights and perform obligations under the relevant recruitment, including to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, trainings and free sessions and in other motorsport championships, races, tests, trainings and free sessions taking place in the European Union. More specifically, the applicant seeks the granting of any appropriate interim measures that would enable him to (i) enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists at issue; (ii) enter the European Union in order to participate in Formula 1 championships or in other motorsport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence; (iii) enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the Fédération internationale de l’automobile (‘the FIA’) or his race team; (iv) enter the European Union in order to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions, including simulator training; (v) enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors; (vi) open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses and benefits from his race team can be paid to him; and (vii) use that bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions, and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions in the European Union;

–        pursuant to Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and with immediate effect, order the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts, to the extent referred to in the first head of claim, and grant the measures sought under the second head of claim, until the date of the order terminating the interim proceedings;

–        order the Council to bear the costs of the present proceedings.

14      In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 4 June 2024, the Council contends, in essence, that the judge hearing applications for interim measures should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

 General considerations

15      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).

16      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.

17      The judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, with the result that an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited)

18      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application has a wide discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

19      Having regard to the material in the file, the Vice-president of the General Court considers that he has all the information necessary to rule on the present application for interim measures without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.

20      In the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate to examine first of all whether the condition relating to a prima facie case is satisfied.

 The condition relating to a prima facie case

21      According to settled case-law, the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied where at least one of the pleas in law put forward by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded. That is the case where one of those pleas reveals the existence of a major legal or factual disagreement the solution to which is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, but must be the subject of the main proceedings (see, to that effect, orders of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P-R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), not published, EU:C:2017:149, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

22      In order to determine whether the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied in the present case, it is necessary to carry out a prima facie examination of the substance of the complaints raised by the applicant in support of the main action and therefore to ascertain whether at least one of them is so weighty that it cannot be ruled out in the proceedings for interim measures (see order of 4 May 2020, Csordas and Others v Commission, T‑146/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:172, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

23      In the present case, in order to demonstrate that the March 2024 acts are, prima facie, unlawful, the applicant relies on a single plea in law in his application for interim measures, alleging error of assessment on the part of the Council. In essence, the applicant claims that the March 2024 acts should be annulled on the same grounds as those on which the Court relied in its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180) with regard to the September 2023 acts.

24      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. In essence, the Council claims to have established, by relying on a sufficiently solid factual basis, that the applicant pursues common interests with his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, and that he has, in the past, obtained and currently continues to obtain undue benefits from him.

25      In that connection, as the applicant rightly observes, by its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the Court annulled the September 2023 acts, in so far as they concerned the applicant, on the ground that the material submitted by the Council did not constitute a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish to the requisite legal standard, on the date of adoption of those acts, the existence of common interests, for the purposes of the association criterion, between the applicant and his father, or of benefits for the purposes of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20).

26      It is clear that the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, set out in the March 2024 acts, are identical to those contained in the September 2023 acts. Furthermore, the March 2024 acts are based on the same items of evidence as the September 2023 acts. In that regard, first, it should be noted that the evidence files produced in the context of the present interim proceedings and cited in the Council’s observations are from the period preceding the September 2023 acts. Second, it should be observed that those evidence files are referred to in the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180). Prima facie, it is therefore apparent that the items of evidence put forward by the Council in its observations on the present application for interim measures were also contained in the evidence files examined by the Court in the case that gave rise to that judgment. Lastly, since no appeal has been brought against that judgment, it has become final.

27      It follows from the foregoing that, without prejudging the decision of the Court on the main action, the single plea relied upon in the context of the present application for interim measures appears, prima facie, not unfounded within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 21 above.

28      It must therefore be found that there is a prima facie case.

 The condition of urgency

29      In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Courts of the European Union. To attain that objective, urgency must generally be assessed in the light of the need for an interim order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

30      It is in the light of those criteria that it must be examined whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.

31      In the first place, in order to demonstrate the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged damage, the applicant claims that there is a significant risk, unless the interim measures applied for are granted, that he will be prevented from pursuing his efforts to resume his professional career. In particular, he will then be unable to use the visa issued by the Hungarian authorities, which will give rise to an unacceptable interference with those efforts. Any attempts to prevent irreparable harm to the applicant will therefore be made practically futile.

32      In the second place, the applicant argues that motorsport teams are obviously unwilling to enter into serious negotiations or, a fortiori, conclude contracts with a fully listed driver on the lists at issue and who does not have at least a derogation for his professional activities.

33      In the third place, the applicant claims that he cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage to his professional career as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships, such as Formula 2, FIA World Endurance Championship or Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters.

34      The Council maintains that the applicant has failed to demonstrate urgency. First, according to the Council, there is no causal link between the damage alleged and the restrictive measures at issue, which means that suspension of operation of those measures cannot offer the applicant protection against the type of damage he seeks to avoid. Second, the alleged damage is not quantified or supported by evidence, with the result that it is purely hypothetical and based on the occurrence of future and uncertain events. Third, in any event, the damage claimed by the applicant is purely pecuniary and, therefore, reparable by way of an action for damages. Last, the applicant seeks protection of a right that, as a third-country national, he does not have within the EU legal order, that is to say, the right to enter and reside in the European Union.

35      In that connection, in the first place, it should be observed that, in paragraph 75 of the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), and in paragraph 93 of the order of 19 July 2023 Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), the President of the General Court found that the damage alleged by the applicant – namely the loss of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships – is of a non-pecuniary nature. There is nothing in the file in the present interim proceedings that would lead to a different finding.

36      In the second place, the Council’s argument that there is no causal link between the March 2024 acts and the damage alleged by the applicant, must be rejected. First of all, the findings relating to the September 2023 acts, set out in paragraphs 86, 90 and 91 of the order of 22 December 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 RIV, not published, EU:T:2023:863), remain, to a certain extent, relevant to the March 2024 acts. That is the case, specifically, for the reservations expressed by a race team participating, in particular, in the Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters championship, in its letter dated 22 September 2022, as to the possibility of recruiting the applicant while he does not benefit, at least, from a suspension of the restrictive measures against him. Furthermore, the applicant has produced, in annex to his application for interim measures, a letter dated 14 May 2024 from a race team that appears to be disposed to hold discussions with him with a view to possible recruitment for the FIA World Endurance Championship. It is also apparent from that letter that the applicant may be recruited only if the restrictive measures against him were lifted or, at the very least, suspended beforehand.

37      Moreover, first, the applicant claims, without being contradicted by the Council, that negotiations with Formula 1 race teams are generally particularly intense during the summer holidays. Second, it is apparent from the application for interim measures and the letter dated 14 May 2024 from the race team referred to in paragraph 36 above, that recruitment for other championships relevant to the applicant pursuing a career as a motorsport driver or renewing his Super Licence, such as the FIA World Endurance Championship, remain possible for the 2024 season. It should be noted that, having regard to the state of the procedure in the main proceedings, the written phase of which is ongoing, it is plausible that the decision on the substance of the case will not be delivered before the end of the period during which the applicant may still be recruited as a full, reserve or test driver in Formula 1 or in other championships relevant to the applicant pursuing a career as a motorsport driver or renewing his Super Licence, or even before the date up until which Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2024/847, is applicable, namely 15 September 2024.

38      In that connection, the applicant has also produced, in annex to his application for interim measures, a letter dated 13 May 2024 from a European sports agency. The latter confirms its readiness to meet the applicant in order to go through the career opportunities in motorsports that may be available to him with that agency’s support. As the Council contends, that letter contains no indication of any concrete recruitment opportunity. However, it does constitute an indication of the interest that race teams may still have in recruiting the applicant. That letter must also be read in the context of recruitment opportunities that continue to exist with regard to certain motorsport championships, referred to in paragraph 37 above. It is in fact apparent from that letter that the sports agency has represented, inter alia, drivers in Formula 1, Formula 2, Formula E and motorsport championships such as Indy Car, GT 3 and the Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters.

39      Furthermore, suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts against the applicant, provisionally granted by the order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published), enabled the applicant to take part, in late May 2024, in a series of on-track training sessions and tests on a racing circuit in Hungary. Admittedly, as the Council states, the applicant has failed to produce material demonstrating that a further series of on-track training sessions and tests was scheduled to take place on that circuit when the application for interim measures was lodged. Nevertheless, the services agreement concluded between the applicant and the company managing the circuit provides for access to services provided by that company until 31 December 2024. Moreover, the fact that there are no longer any available dates for that circuit in June 2024 does not, in itself, preclude the possibility for the applicant of conducting a fresh series of on-track training sessions and tests on that racing circuit before 15 September 2024, in order to pursue his efforts to maintain his skills as a professional racing driver.

40      It is apparent from all of the foregoing that the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts is necessary in order to enable the applicant to pursue a career as a professional racing driver in championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union. It must therefore be found that the applicant has demonstrated, to the requisite standard, that there is a causal link between the effects produced by the March 2024 acts and the damage alleged.

41      In the third place, as regards the serious nature of the damage alleged, it should be observed that without the requested suspension, the applicant would be deprived of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motorsport championships until 15 September 2024, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2024/847.

42      The resulting damage to the applicant, in the absence of the suspension sought, may be characterised as particularly serious because it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver in view of his age, the fact that he would not be able to train regularly in Formula 1 or similar cars in the meantime and the likelihood that he would not be able to renew his Super Licence after an interruption of more than three years, should the Court annul the March 2024 acts at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings.

43      Admittedly, as the Council observes, the applicant took part in the 2023/2024 season of the Asian Le Mans Series, which is held outside the territory of the European Union, which attests to the pursuit of his career as a professional racing driver. However, it is clear that the 2023/2024 season of that championship ended before the March 2024 acts were adopted, and that the first race of the new season will only take place in December 2024.

44      It should be added that it is common ground between the parties that a number of championships other than Formula 1 may prove relevant to the renewal of the applicant’s Super Licence. In the event that the applicant’s involvement in such championships should not allow him to obtain points with a view to renewing his Super Licence, it would nevertheless be a means of pursuing his career as a professional racing driver in other championships.

45      Thus, in the absence of the suspension sought and having regard to the potential duration of the proceedings in the main action, the possibility of the applicant resuming, at the end of the main proceedings, his career as a Formula 1 driver, which frequently requires his presence in the European Union, in particular in order to participate in Grand Prix, training sessions or tests, appears to be remote or, at the very least, severely limited.

46      In the fourth place, it must be held that the damage, consisting in depriving the applicant of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships, would be irreparable if the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts were not ordered.

47      In fact, by the time of the Court’s decision in the main action, the period in which the applicant could have been recruited as a driver or have taken part in a motorsport championship will have elapsed irretrievably. The resulting damage for the applicant would thus become final, and any pecuniary compensation would not be capable of restoring his position to what it had been before the damage occurred. Consequently, as the applicant submits, no compensation will be able to restore that non-pecuniary damage in the present case.

48      In the fifth place, it should be borne in mind that, in the event that the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts sought should be granted by the present order, the applicant, as a Russian national, would be able to enter and reside in the territory of the European Union solely subject to the conditions laid down by any visa as may be issued by the competent authorities of a Member State. The Council’s argument that the applicant in fact seeks to obtain, by his application for interim measures, protection of a right that he does not have in the EU legal order, must therefore be rejected.

49      In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied in the present case, since the likelihood of serious and irreparable damage occurring has been established to the requisite legal standard.

 The weighing up of interests

50      It is settled case-law that, in weighing up the different interests involved, the judge hearing the application for interim measures has to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the party seeking suspension of operation of the contested measure in securing that suspension outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the measure, by examining, more specifically, whether the possible annulment of the measure by the court when ruling on the main application would allow the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation to be reversed and, conversely, whether suspension of operation of the measure would prevent it from being fully effective in the event of the main action being dismissed (see order of 11 March 2013, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑110/12 R, EU:T:2013:118, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

51      As regards more particularly the condition that the legal situation created by an interim order must be reversible, it must be recalled that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision on the main action. Consequently, such proceedings are merely ancillary to the main action to which they are adjunct, and accordingly the decision made by the judge hearing an application for interim measures must be provisional in the sense that it cannot either prejudge the future decision on the substance of the case or render it illusory by depriving it of practical effect (see order of 1 September 2015, Pari Pharma v EMA, T‑235/15 R, EU:T:2015:587, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

52      It must therefore be examined whether the applicant’s interests in obtaining the immediate suspension of the March 2024 acts outweigh the interests pursued by the Council in adopting those acts.

53      As regards the interests pursued by the applicant, he claims that the possible annulment of the March 2024 acts by the Court at the end of the main proceedings would not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed. The non-pecuniary damage caused to his professional career would become definitive in respect of the potential days of activity elapsing from the date on which the restrictive measures took effect until the date of the decision in the main proceedings. Furthermore, as regards the period of activity potentially remaining after the decision in the main proceedings, it would be hardly realistic to consider that he could return to Formula 1, and even to Formula 2, the FIA World Endurance Championship or the Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters, if he had to wait for the Court’s decision on the substance to be delivered. Consequently, it would be impossible for him to compete or follow training programmes also during the 2024 season.

54      In addition, the applicant submits that, from the perspective of the Council’s interest, first, the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts would not impede the objectives which it pursues in the event that the main action is dismissed, since he is not seeking, in particular, the provisional unfreezing of all his funds or economic resources, but only the suspension of the March 2024 acts to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the next motorsport championships and to pursue his professional career. Second, the applicant claims that the interim measures sought would not jeopardise the objectives pursued by the European Union through Decision 2024/847 and Implementing Regulation 2024/849, since he is a professional racing driver who is not involved in any Russian business, who has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, who raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 Formula 1 season and who confirms that he is ready to sign the Driver Commitment, as amended in February 2023, required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.

55      The Council retorts that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of not suspending the operation of the March 2024 acts. In the first place, the granting of the interim measures applied for would lead to serious and irreparable damage for the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pursued by the restrictive measures laid down in Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014. In the second place, granting such measures would undermine the credibility of the CFSP measures taken to maintain and increase collective pressure on Russia, which is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, in clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations. In the third place, since restrictive measures are one of the most powerful tools available to the Council to implement the CFSP, depriving that instrument of its effect has a direct impact on the efficacy of the CFSP.

56      As regards the weighing up of interests, it should be noted that, in so far as the applicant’s interest is concerned, it follows from paragraphs 45 and 47 above that the annulment of the March 2024 acts would not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed, since the non-pecuniary damage would become definitive as regards the applicant’s period of potential activity up to the date of the decision on the substance of the case and since, on that date, it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver.

57      Consequently, should the applicant succeed in having the March 2024 acts annulled in the main proceedings, any damage which he may have suffered as a result of the harm to his interests cannot subsequently be assessed and made good or compensated.

58      As far as the Council is concerned, the interests relied on are public interests that aim to protect European security and stability and form part of an overall strategy seeking to put an end to the aggression suffered by Ukraine as soon as possible.

59      In the light of the paramount importance of the objectives pursued by the March 2024 acts, namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, which fall within the wider objective of maintaining international peace and security, it is necessary to examine whether the immediate suspension of the March 2024 acts, in so far as those measures concern the applicant, would threaten the European Union’s pursuit of the objectives, in particular peaceful objectives, which it has set for itself in accordance with Article 3(1) and (5) TEU, at the price, each day, of irreparable material and non-material damage.

60      In that connection, neither the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180) – by way of which the Court annulled the acts that included the applicant’s name on the lists at issue referred to in paragraphs 6 to 8 above – nor the findings in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, can be disregarded.

61      Furthermore, the applicant has claimed, without being challenged by the Council on that point, that he is not involved in any Russian business, has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and is ready to sign the Driver Commitment, as amended in February 2023, required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.

62      It must therefore be held that the applicant is in no way involved in the aggression suffered by Ukraine and is not engaged in any activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. He merely asks that he be given the opportunity to pursue his career as a racing driver, in particular in Formula 1, without the financial support of his father.

63      Finally, it should be recalled that the applicant seeks suspension of the application of the March 2024 acts only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the upcoming motorsport championships and to pursue his professional career. It must be acknowledged that suspension of the operation of the March 2024 acts, confined to that which is necessary to that end, will neither prejudge the future decision in the main proceedings nor compromise the very purpose of the procedure for interim relief, which is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision in the main action.

64      In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of the applicant.

65      Thus, the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts, in so far as they concern the applicant, must be limited to what is strictly necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motorsport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, the applicant is authorised only to (i) enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists at issue; (ii) enter the European Union in order to participate as a full, reserve or test driver in Formula 1 championships of the FIA or in other championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence; (iii) enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team; (iv) enter the European Union in order to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions, including simulator training; (v) enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors; (vi) open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses and benefits from his race team can be paid to him; and (vii) use that bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions. As has been recalled in paragraph 48 above, the specific conditions for the right to enter and reside in the territory of the European Union, during the period in which the applicant will be able to rely on the present order, are to be determined by any visa that may be granted to him, as a Russian national, by the competent authorities of a Member State.

66      Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, the applicant must race under a neutral flag and sign the Driver Commitment, required by the FIA for that purpose, in the version then in force.

67      It follows from all the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be granted to that extent. Furthermore, the applicant has neither stated nor demonstrated that other interim measures may be required in order to give the present order the effectiveness sought. The application for interim measures is therefore dismissed as to the remainder, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim, which is disputed by the Council.

68      Since the present order closes the interim proceedings, it is necessary to cancel the order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published), adopted pursuant to Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which ordered, subject to certain conditions, the suspension of operation of the March 2024 acts, in so far as they concern the applicant, until the date of the order terminating the present interim proceedings.

69      Under Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.

On those grounds,

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, is suspended in so far as the name of Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by those restrictive measures and only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motorsport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, Mr Mazepin is authorised only to (i) enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; (ii) enter the European Union in order to participate as a full, reserve or test driver in Formula 1 championships of the Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) or in other championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence; (iii) enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team; (iv) enter the European Union in order to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions, including simulator training; (v) enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors; (vi) open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses and benefits from his race team can be paid to him; and (vii) use that bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions.

Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motorsport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, Mr Mazepin must race under a neutral flag and sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for that purpose.

2.      The application for interim measures is dismissed as to the remainder.

3.      The order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R) is cancelled.

4.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 19 July 2024.

*      Language of the case: English.

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