Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

7 September 2022 (*)

(Civil service – Officials – Disciplinary proceedings – Disciplinary penalty in the form of a reprimand – Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials – Principle of good administration – Right to be heard – Obligation to state reasons – Reasonable time – Psychological harassment – Principle of legal certainty – Material and non-material damage)

In Case T‑91/20,

WT, represented by V. Villante, D. Rovetta and D. Birkenmaier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by A.‑C. Simon and L. Vernier, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of S. Gervasoni, President, L. Madise and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: P. Cullen, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 10 March 2022,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By her action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, WT, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 17 April 2019 by which the Commission imposed on her a disciplinary penalty in the form of a reprimand (‘the contested decision’) and, second, compensation for the non-material and material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

I.      Background to the dispute

2        The applicant, a former official of the European Commission who is now retired, as specified at the hearing, entered the service of that institution as an assistant in grade AST 5 on 3 December 1981. She held the post of ‘Finance and Contracts Agent – Initiation’ at the Directorate-General (DG) for Communication (‘DG Communication’) before retiring.

3        On 29 November 2012, the applicant filed a request for assistance pursuant to Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), in which she claimed to be the victim of acts amounting to psychological harassment by her Head of Unit, her Head of Sector and her colleague sharing the same office as her. That request was registered under reference D/760/12.

4        On 18 March 2013, an incident which had taken place on 26 February 2013, involving the applicant and her colleague who shared the same office, was brought to the attention of the appointing authority by means of a note from the Security Directorate of the DG for Human Resources and Security (‘DG Human Resources’). According to that note, following an altercation, the applicant had called the Security Directorate to have them remove her colleague from their shared office.

5        On 20 March 2013, the appointing authority refused the applicant’s request for assistance, referred to in paragraph 3 above, owing to a lack of prima facie evidence of the harassment alleged by her. That refusal decision states, inter alia, that ‘as for the conduct of [her] colleague sharing the same office as [her], [the applicant doesn’t] relate any event that could be classified by the appointing authority as conduct that is abusive or degrading to [her]’ and that, ‘in fact, a simple disagreement between two colleagues sharing the same workspace cannot be classified by the appointing authority as harassment’.  The applicant did not lodge a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against that decision.

6        On 27 May 2013, the appointing authority mandated the Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission (‘IDOC’) to conduct a hearing with the applicant in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (pre-disciplinary hearing) as regards the facts listed in the annex to the mandate, namely her potentially inappropriate conduct in the office and potentially inappropriate remarks in a request for assistance. Accordingly, a case was registered under reference CMS 13/031.

7        The applicant’s hearing took place on 25 June 2013.

8        On 9 July 2013, DG Communication sent DG Human Resources an information file concerning the applicant’s conduct at the workplace between 2011 and 2013. That file indicated, inter alia, that, in previous years, the applicant had been reassigned six times within DG Communication.

9        On 19 July 2013, the applicant requested to be reassigned to another post. The appointing authority refused her request on 4 November 2013 on the ground that, in particular, such a reassignment was not in the interest of the service. On 20 December 2013, the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, which was registered under number R/895/13. The appointing authority rejected that complaint by decision of 15 April 2014. The applicant did not bring an action against that decision before the Court.

10      Between September 2013 and July 2014, the applicant’s Head of Unit at the material time sent additional information concerning the applicant’s conduct to IDOC.

11      On 20 May 2014, the appointing authority gave a complementary mandate to IDOC to conduct a hearing with the applicant in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations on the new evidence in her file, as described in the analytical note annexed to the mandate, namely her insubordination, failure to present a medical certificate after being absent for more than three days, and inappropriate conduct, characterised by a refusal to follow the rules and practices of the Commission, as well as her verbally and physically aggressive behaviour. That hearing took place on 18 November 2014.

12      On 12 December 2014, the applicant’s Head of Sector was heard as a witness.

13      On 9 January 2015, the applicant’s legal representative requested the appointing authority to discontinue the pre-disciplinary proceedings.

14      On 28 January 2015, the applicant’s Head of Unit at the material time was heard.

15      On 6 February 2015, the applicant, with the help of her legal representative, repeated her request that the pre-disciplinary proceedings be discontinued. The appointing authority refused that request on the same date.

16      On 16 February 2015, the applicant filed a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations on the ground that, according to her, her Head of Unit and Head of Sector had made defamatory statements about her when they were heard by IDOC. In her request for assistance, she also complained about the conduct of her colleague who shared the same office and the secretary of the unit in which she worked. The appointing authority refused the applicant’s request for assistance on 15 June 2015.

17      The applicant was subsequently requested to submit her comments on an incident involving her which had taken place in the medical service on 7 May 2015.

18      Throughout the procedure, the applicant and a staff representative who was assisting her sent a number of notes to the Vice-President of the Commission, the appointing authority, the Security Directorate and IDOC.

19      On 18 April 2016, IDOC sent the applicant a note setting out the facts in which she was involved and their legal classification. The applicant replied on 20 May 2016.

20      On 1 July 2016, the appointing authority decided to refer Case CMS 13/031 to the Disciplinary Board, to which it forwarded the report referred to in Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. The applicant was invited to a hearing by the appointing authority, composed of three members, which was to take place on 21 March 2017.

21      On 14 February 2017, the Court delivered a judgment concerning disciplinary proceedings conducted by IDOC (judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission, T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74). The Court held that IDOC must carry out an administrative investigation for the purposes of Article 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations before the appointing authority decides, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary proceedings under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.

22      On 10 March 2017, the appointing authority informed the applicant that, although the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), had been delivered after the disciplinary proceedings against her had been initiated, it had decided to discontinue Case CMS 13/031 without imposing any disciplinary penalty on her and to open a new procedure, in the interest of good administration.

23      On 21 March 2017, the appointing authority instructed IDOC to carry out an administrative investigation, under reference CMS 17/011, on the basis of Articles 1 and 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, in order to establish whether the applicant’s conduct was that expected of an EU official in the light of the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations. Accordingly, by note of 27 March 2017, IDOC informed the applicant that it was initiating an administrative investigation and invited her to attend a hearing.

24      On 20 April 2017, the applicant requested information concerning the administrative investigation and her hearing. She claims not to have received a reply to her request.

25      On 25 April 2017, the applicant was heard by IDOC.

26      On 27 April 2017, the applicant sent IDOC her observations and comments on the minutes of the hearing. The staff representative who accompanied the applicant at her hearing also sent an email to IDOC insisting that the irregularities raised concerning the progress of the procedure be duly taken into account. On 28 April 2017, IDOC sent the applicant the minutes, which included part of her observations, refusing to insert two paragraphs relating to matters which had not been discussed at the hearing.

27      On 19 May 2017, the staff representative who was assisting the applicant sent a letter to the Director-General of DG Human Resources in her capacity as the appointing authority, seeking to have the procedure discontinued on account of procedural errors resulting, in particular, from the lack of a precise investigation mandate and failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement.

28      In an email of 14 June 2017, addressed to the staff representative who was assisting the applicant, the Director of IDOC confirmed that the administrative investigation initiated in 2017 was based on information initially gathered as part of the procedure in Case CMS 13/031 and that the new case number CMS 17/011 had been allocated in the interest of administrative clarity and efficiency.

29      On 11 December 2017, IDOC invited the applicant to submit her comments on a note dated 8 December 2017 setting out the facts brought to light as a result of investigative measures. On 11 January 2018, the applicant sent her comments to IDOC.

30      On 12 April 2018, IDOC submitted the investigation report in Case CMS 17/011 to the appointing authority; it sent it to the applicant on 24 May 2018. That investigation report sets out 65 facts relating to the applicant’s conduct over a period of six years, from 2011 to 2017.

31      On 17 April 2018, the appointing authority gave IDOC a mandate to conduct a hearing with the applicant under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations in order to obtain her comments on the facts set out in the investigation report.

32      The applicant was heard on 11 July 2018. On the day before her hearing, the applicant sent a note with her comments as well as documents annexed to that note. In the days following the hearing, the applicant and the staff representative who was assisting her wrote to the Director-General of DG Human Resources on several occasions requesting clarifications and making a number of statements concerning the applicant’s case.

33      On 12 February 2019, the appointing authority informed the applicant of the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against her without consulting the Disciplinary Board, as provided for in Article 11 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. It also sent the applicant the disciplinary report setting out the facts alleged against her, namely 65 facts which had taken place over a period of six years, between 2011 and 2017, 26 of which were classified as recent (namely those which had occurred between 2014 and 2017). Those facts included acts of insubordination, failure to comply with the obligations relating to presence at work and, more generally, conduct characterised by rejection of rules and aggressiveness.

34      The hearing of the applicant by the appointing authority, in accordance with Article 11 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, took place on 13 March 2019. In that context, the applicant provided various explanations and submitted various documents.

35      By the contested decision, on 17 April 2019, the appointing authority decided to impose on the applicant a disciplinary penalty in the form of a reprimand, in accordance with Article 9(1)(b) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. It found that while, among the 65 facts set out in the investigation and disciplinary reports, some were not sufficiently serious to constitute failure on the part of the applicant to comply with her obligations under the Staff Regulations, others did amount to an infringement of Articles 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations. The appointing authority found, in particular, that:

‘The facts that [were] the subject of [its] decision [were] the following: On several occasions, [the applicant] refused to carry out standard work instructions; [she] repeatedly failed to inform her Head of Unit of her absences due to sickness; on several occasions, [the applicant] tried to circumvent the rules in place on providing reasons for absences or flexitime, using various excuses for her absences from the office; [the applicant] regularly sent aggressive messages to her interlocutors; on one occasion, [the applicant] sent messages emphasising colleagues’ skin colour, religion or status under the Staff Regulations, without however using abusive language. … The appointing authority considers the facts set out above to be established. They are based on written material either drawn up by [the applicant] or addressed to her, and to which she has had the opportunity to respond in good time. Their accuracy has not been disputed by [the applicant]’.

36      On 17 July 2019, the applicant lodged a complaint on the basis of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the contested decision.

37      By decision of 7 November 2019, the appointing authority rejected the applicant’s complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

II.    Forms of order sought

38      As was clarified at the hearing and recorded in the minutes of the hearing, the applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul, so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint;

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order the Commission to pay the sum of EUR 3 000, fixed ex aequo et bono and provisionally, by way of compensation for the non-material damage she claims to have suffered, as well as to pay the sum of EUR 3 500 by way of compensation for the material damage she claims to have suffered;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

39      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A.      The claims for annulment

40      In support of her claims for annulment of the contested decision and, so far as necessary, of the decision rejecting the complaint, the applicant raises two pleas in law. The first plea in law alleges breach of the duty of care and of the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). The second plea in law alleges, first, failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement, breach of the principle of legal certainty and infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations and, second, a manifest error of assessment.

1.      Preliminary observations

41      As regards the applicant’s claim seeking annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where such a decision lacks any independent content, the effect of claims formally directed against that decision is to bring before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 14 December 2017, RL v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑21/17, EU:T:2017:907, paragraph 26).

42      In the present case, it must be stated that the decision rejecting the complaint lacks any independent content. It merely confirms, in essence, the contested decision.

43      Therefore, the action must be regarded as being directed against that latter act, the legality of which must be examined by also taking into consideration the reasoning in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2020, AD v ECHA, T‑25/19, not published, EU:T:2020:536, paragraph 34).

2.      The first plea in law, alleging breach of the duty of care and the principle of good administration

44      The applicant puts forward several arguments seeking to establish that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in an unpredictable and arbitrary manner and that their duration was manifestly unreasonable.

45      When questioned at the hearing, the applicant confirmed that she agreed with the Commission’s presentation of her arguments. According to that presentation, the first part comprises the applicant’s arguments concerning the investigation procedure opened in 2013 under reference CMS 13/031. The second part contains the applicant’s arguments seeking to dispute the way in which her requests for assistance and her request to be reassigned to another post were handled. The third part consists of the applicant’s arguments relating to the material and temporal scope of the administrative investigation registered under reference CMS 17/011, and to her right to be heard. The fourth and final part comprises the applicant’s arguments relating to the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint.

46      The Commission disputes the merits of the arguments put forward by the applicant.

47      It is appropriate to examine together the arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the first and third parts of the first plea in law.

(a)    The first part of the first plea in law, concerning the investigation procedure opened in 2013 under reference CMS 13/031, and the third part of the first plea in law, concerning the material and temporal scope of the administrative investigation registered under reference CMS 17/011 and the applicant’s right to be heard during that investigation

48      In the first part of the first plea in law, the applicant challenges the decision to open procedure CMS 13/031. First, she claims that the incident of 26 February 2013 (see paragraph 4 above) involving her colleague did not warrant the initiation of a disciplinary investigation against her since it was the applicant herself that had contacted the security service on several occasions to complain about the verbal attacks by her colleague who shared the same office. The applicant also maintains that the note of 18 March 2013 from the Security Directorate, which was drawn up after the incident of 26 February 2013, contains several errors and inaccuracies.

49      Second, the applicant submits that the decision to open a procedure against her was vitiated by procedural irregularities and, in particular, by a breach of her right to be heard. She asserts that she was not heard by the Security Directorate concerning the incident of 26 February 2013 and that she was not able to include ‘certain parts of observations and writings in the file’. According to the applicant, the Security Directorate acknowledged that omission in an email addressed to her.

50      In the context of the third part of the first plea in law, the applicant submits that the opening of procedure CMS 17/011, following the delivery of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), had the effect of considerably extending the initial mandate given to IDOC in Case CMS 13/031, without any explanation of the reasons, with the sole aim of focusing on the applicant’s professional and personal situation. According to the applicant, the administrative investigation concerning her was thus unrestrained in scope, covering in particular facts which occurred between 2013 and 2017 and, for example, ‘an alleged altercation with an office colleague and remarks qualified as inappropriate in response to two superiors, concerning her requests for assistance’.

51      The applicant maintains that it follows from the mandate given to IDOC on 27 May 2013, which refers to the analytical note annexed to it concerning the facts giving rise to that mandate, that the material scope of procedure CMS 13/031 extended only to the incident of 26 February 2013 involving her colleague who shared the same office. That mandate was extended by a note dated 20 May 2014 following new evidence and facts communicated by the applicant’s Head of Unit. According to the applicant, the appointing authority, IDOC and, consequently, the Commission, with the mandate given to IDOC in Case CMS 17/011, exceeded the material scope of the initial mandate and of the Staff Regulations, by initiating a ‘fishing expedition’ which they attempted to justify afterwards. Furthermore, according to the applicant, it is ‘strange’ that ‘DG [Communication]’s [Human Resources] services provided IDOC with [a long] list of alleged faults’. She submits that the mandates conferred on IDOC are unlawful and states that that should lead to the annulment of the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint.

52      The applicant adds that her right to be heard was breached, on the ground that the excessively vague nature of the mandate conferred on IDOC in the procedure opened under reference CMS 17/011 did not allow her to understand its scope and made it impossible for her to defend herself. More specifically, temporal limits should have been placed on the investigation initiated against her, since that investigation covered ‘minor offences’ that had occurred in the distant past.

53      It is apparent from Article 86 of the Staff Regulations, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and Article 2(1) and (3), Article 3(2) and Article 4 of Commission Decision C(2004) 1588 laying down general implementing provisions on the conduct of administrative inquiries and disciplinary procedures (‘the 2004 Implementing Rules’), adopted pursuant to Article 2(3) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, that, where the appointing authority is of the opinion that an official may be criticised of a failure to comply with his or her obligations, it is for it to conduct an administrative investigation – initiated by IDOC in the case of the Commission – which is closed by an investigation report drawn up after the official concerned has been duly heard in advance. On the basis of that investigation report, the appointing authority may decide to initiate disciplinary proceedings, which, if there is no referral to the Disciplinary Board, may lead, inter alia, to the imposition of a reprimand on the official, who must, however, be heard in advance.

54      In the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74, paragraph 63), it was held that Article 86 of the Staff Regulations and Article 1(1) and Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Annex IX thereto do not permit disciplinary proceedings to be initiated, even without the matter being referred to the Disciplinary Board, without an administrative investigation having first been carried out and without an investigation report having been drawn up, at the end of that administrative investigation, after the official concerned has first been heard, on the pretext that the facts are sufficiently ‘clear’ for the institution concerned.

55      As regards the applicant’s argument alleging that the fact that unlawful acts were committed in the context of the procedure initiated under reference CMS 13/031 means that the contested decision is unlawful, the following must be noted.

56      In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 6 to 10 above, the appointing authority, as a first step, initiated procedure CMS 13/031 and mandated IDOC to conduct a hearing with the applicant under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (pre-disciplinary hearing). In the context of that procedure, the appointing authority decided to refer Case CMS 13/031 to the Disciplinary Board and a hearing of the applicant was scheduled for 21 March 2017. However, as stated in paragraphs 22 and 23 above, the delivery of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), led the appointing authority to decide to close procedure CMS 13/031 and to open, on 10 March 2017, a new procedure under reference CMS 17/011. The purpose of opening procedure CMS 17/011 was to conduct an administrative investigation for the purposes of Article 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations before deciding, where appropriate, to continue the procedure on the basis of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. In that procedure both the facts taken into account in Case CSM 13/031 and other facts which had taken place in recent years had to be examined in order to establish whether the applicant’s conduct was that expected of an EU official, having regard to the relevant rules of the Staff Regulations. On 27 March 2017, IDOC informed the applicant and, on 25 April 2017, she was heard.

57      It must be stated that it is true that there is a link between the procedure opened under reference CMS 13/031 and that opened under reference CMS 17/011, which gave rise to the adoption of the contested decision, on the ground, first, that the subject matter of those procedures was the applicant’s conduct and, second, that the information gathered in the procedure opened under reference CMS 13/031 was used also in the procedure opened under reference CMS 17/011.

58      However, it is common ground that the procedure registered under reference CMS 13/031 was closed without a decision to impose a penalty on the applicant. The appointing authority then decided to open a different procedure under a different reference, namely reference CMS 17/011, precisely in order to comply with the obligation, set out in the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), and referred to in paragraph 54 above, to initiate an administrative investigation before deciding to initiate disciplinary proceedings and, where appropriate, to impose a disciplinary penalty.

59      It is important to note that, in the contested decision imposing a reprimand on the applicant, the reference to the incident of 26 February 2013 is not among the facts warranting the penalty in the form of a reprimand (see paragraph 35 above). Thus, even assuming that that incident were, as the applicant submits, insufficient to open procedure CMS 13/031, it must be stated that the contested decision, which was adopted following procedure CMS 17/011, is based on other evidence.

60      It is apparent from the foregoing that the applicant’s arguments concerning the existence of alleged unlawful acts that affected the procedure opened under reference CMS 13/031 are ineffective for the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of the contested decision.

61      In any event, as regards the examination of the merits of the arguments put forward by the applicant to claim that there were unlawful acts which affected procedure CMS 13/031, first, it must be noted that the applicant’s claim that the note from the Security Directorate of 18 March 2013 drawn up after the incident of 26 February 2013 was ‘falsified’ is unsubstantiated. The applicant merely denies the facts relayed by her colleague who shared the same office to the staff of the Security Directorate and claims that, notwithstanding her being present at work, those staff members deliberately failed to question her. In addition, the applicant states, admittedly, that she received an email from the Security Directorate acknowledging that it had failed to comply with its obligation to hear her in respect of the incident of 26 February 2013. However, the applicant has not adduced any evidence of the existence of such an email. Lastly, the mere fact that the applicant disputed some parts of the Security Directorate’s note of 18 March 2013 and commented on other parts of it at her hearing on 25 June 2013 (see paragraph 7 above) does not support the conclusion that that note was inaccurate or falsified.

62      Second, as the Commission correctly states, the applicant appears to consider that the note from the Security Directorate was incomplete, since it did not refer to the ‘“incidents suffered” by her’ or to certain emails which she had sent to the Security Directorate. Furthermore, the applicant appears to criticise the fact that procedure CMS 13/031 was opened after she herself had contacted the security service on several occasions to complain about the conduct and verbal attacks to which her colleague who shared the same office had allegedly subjected her. The applicant complains that her numerous efforts to contact the administration in order to challenge the conduct of her colleague who shared the same office of which she felt she was the victim were never taken into account by the administration.

63      In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 86(2) of the Staff Regulations, where the appointing authority becomes aware of evidence of failure within the meaning of paragraph 1 of that article, it may launch administrative investigations to verify whether such failure has occurred.

64      In addition, when hearing a dispute relating to a disciplinary penalty, the judicature conducts a full review as to whether the relevant rules of law have been properly applied (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 November 2007, Germany v Commission, T‑374/04, EU:T:2007:332, paragraph 81).

65      In the present case, unless the discretion of the appointing authority is called into question, the applicant cannot rely on the sole fact that the administration did not deem it appropriate to initiate an administrative investigation into the allegations that she herself had made against her colleague who shared the same office in order to demonstrate that the appointing authority was not objective when it opened procedure CMS 13/031 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 December 2012, Z v Court of Justice, F‑88/09 and F‑48/10, EU:F:2012:171, paragraph 285 and the case-law cited).

66      Third, as regards the argument alleging procedural irregularities resulting from a breach of the right to be heard in procedure CMS 13/031, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the rights of the defence constitute a general principle in all procedures initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 2006, Commission v De Bry, C‑344/05 P, EU:C:2006:710, paragraph 37, and of 17 October 2006, Bonnet v Court of Justice, T‑406/04, EU:T:2006:322, paragraph 76).

67      Moreover, observance of the rights of the defence, of which the inter partes principle is a corollary, requires that the official against whom an EU institution has opened an administrative procedure has been placed in a position during that procedure effectively to make known his or her views on the truth and relevance of the facts, the alleged circumstances and the documents which that institution intends to use against him or her in support of its allegation that there has been an infringement of the provisions of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2018, Brahma v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑603/16, EU:T:2018:820, paragraphs 158 and 159 (not published) and the case-law cited, and of 11 April 2016, FU v Commission, F‑49/15, EU:F:2016:72, paragraph 97).

68      Furthermore, in the light of Article 4(4) of the 2004 Implementing Rules, an official must be given the opportunity to express his or her opinion on all the facts which relate to him or her, before conclusions on his or her behaviour may be drawn.

69      In the present case, it must be stated that the note dated 18 March 2013 that the Security Directorate sent to the Director-General of DG Human Resources describing its intervention was not supposed to provide a full description of the facts or be adversarial in nature. Thus, that note did not imply a right to be heard for persons referred to therein or a right to submit comments on its content. By that note, drawn up before the initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings, the Security Directorate did not initiate such proceedings, that prerogative belonging exclusively to the appointing authority, and therefore did not undermine the applicant’s interests. Moreover, as stated in paragraph 61 above, the applicant’s claim that the Security Directorate acknowledged, in an email, that it had failed to comply with its obligation to question her is unsubstantiated. Thus, since the Security Directorate was under no obligation to question the applicant, no irregularity can be inferred from the reference, in the note of 18 March 2013, to the fact that the applicant was not questioned.

70      In addition, even assuming that there were a breach of the right to be heard and also, more broadly, of the applicant’s rights of defence, it must be borne in mind that, for that infringement to result in the annulment of the contested decision, it is necessary that, in the absence of that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2010, Bui Van v Commission, T‑491/08 P, EU:T:2010:191, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

71      Any further explanations that the applicant might have provided prior to the adoption of the decision to open procedure CMS 13/031 against her in respect of the circumstances of the case could not have had the effect of altering the administration’s decision to close that procedure without imposing a disciplinary penalty on her and to choose to mandate IDOC to conduct an administrative investigation under reference CMS 17/011 in order to take account of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74).

72      Lastly, while the applicant claims that she did not have the opportunity, in procedure CMS 13/031, to make known her own version of the incident of 26 February 2013 and the facts alleged against her prior to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings in the strict sense, it should be pointed out that it was indeed only after the matter had been referred to IDOC pursuant to Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations without a prior administrative investigation under Article 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations having been initiated that she was heard, on several occasions and, inter alia, at the hearing on 25 June 2013 (see paragraph 7 above). Nevertheless, first, it should be borne in mind that such an argument is ineffective since procedure CMS 13/031 was closed without a decision to impose a penalty on the applicant having been taken. Second, it is apparent from the file that the applicant had the opportunity to make known her views on that incident and, more generally, on the facts alleged against her during the administrative investigation conducted by IDOC in that latter procedure.

73      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s arguments seeking to dispute the legality of the mandate given to IDOC in Case CMS 13/031 and of the information note drawn up by the Security Directorate on 18 March 2013 and to claim that there has been a breach of her right to be heard in the procedure opened under reference CMS 13/031 are, in any event, unfounded.

74      The arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the first part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

75      As regards the arguments put forward in the third part of the first plea in law, set out in paragraphs 50 to 52 above, in the first place, as regards the material scope of the investigation initiated against the applicant under reference CMS 17/011, it is important to note that it must be assessed in the context of the previous procedure CMS 13/031, of which the applicant was already aware. An administrative investigation had not been finalised in Case CMS 13/031. Thus, in order to apply the principles identified in the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), to the applicant’s situation, the appointing authority decided not to continue the procedure opened under reference CMS 13/031, to close that procedure and to open a new procedure under reference CMS 17/011, by giving a new mandate to IDOC (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). IDOC was thus instructed to carry out an administrative investigation into the facts which had already been examined concerning the applicant’s conduct and into other facts that might be brought to light during the investigation. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot claim that she was unaware of the subject matter of the administrative investigation. The appointing authority’s decision to open procedure CMS 17/011, and the underlying reasoning, were explained to the applicant at her hearing on 25 April 2017 (see paragraph 25 above), the minutes of which are included in a letter drawn up by IDOC, the report from the administrative investigation, the contested decision, and the decision rejecting the complaint.

76      Contrary to what the applicant claims, the scope of the investigation in Case CMS 17/011 was not ‘unrestrained’ and was comprehensibly worded. According to the mandate given to IDOC, the investigation sought to determine whether the applicant’s conduct was that expected of an EU official, taking into account the relevant rules of the Staff Regulations.

77      As regards the applicant’s argument that the initial mandate given to IDOC by the appointing authority was considerably extended, it should be noted that, admittedly, the facts examined in the previous case were not expressly listed in the new mandate relating to Case CMS 17/011. However, that new mandate had as its subject matter, like the previous one, the applicant’s conduct at her workplace and covered also more recent facts relating to that conduct, on the ground that it related also to the facts brought to light during the first investigation. In thus making reference to the applicant’s conduct, the appointing authority was not seeking to examine just any conduct on the part of the applicant, but only her conduct in her relationships with her colleagues and other interlocutors in a professional context. The subject matter of the investigation was not an appraisal of the applicant’s probity. The mandate conferred on IDOC was admittedly broad, but it could not be drawn up differently and was sufficiently precise, on the ground that its purpose was to assess whether the applicant’s conduct was that expected of an EU official.

78      The subject matter of the investigation was thus the applicant’s conduct in the workplace and in her interactions with her superiors and colleagues.

79      In that regard, first, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the administration was not required to open a case for each new fact taken into consideration in order to assess the applicant’s conduct at work and, in particular, in order to assess whether conduct liable to constitute a breach of the provisions of the Staff Regulations might be repeated. Second, it may be considered that the 26 facts classified as recent (relating to the period from 2014 to 2017) further warranted the interest in re-initiating an investigation.

80      Furthermore, a comparison between the report sent to the Disciplinary Board on 1 July 2016 in Case CMS 13/031 (see paragraph 20 above) and the report from the administrative investigation in Case CMS 17/011, communicated to the applicant in May 2018, shows that most of the facts at issue had already been referred to in the first of those two reports. Of the 65 facts referred to in the report from the administrative investigation relating to Case CMS 17/011, only 13 had not been referred to in the report sent to the Disciplinary Board on 1 July 2016. In addition, only one fact post-dates the mandate of 21 March 2017 and was relied on on the ground that the applicant herself had referred to it at her hearing on 25 April 2017 (see paragraph 25 above).

81      In the second place, as regards the period taken into consideration in the investigation, first, it must be noted that the applicant was fully informed that the procedure concerned facts that had taken place from 2011 onwards and she could not have been unaware of the temporal scope of the investigation.

82      Second, in so far as the applicant relies on the fact that the facts taken into account were too old, it is important to state that, in the investigation report, 65 facts relating to the applicant’s conduct over a period of six years (from 2011 to 2017) were established and 26 were classified as recent (from 2014 to 2017). The applicant does not contradict the explanations the appointing authority provided to her in response to her complaint, namely that, in the context of the 2004 Implementing Rules, applicable at the material time, no limitation period had been established in relation to facts that could be subject to investigation.

83      In addition, given that, in the absence of a limitation period, it is the ‘reasonable time’ principle that applies (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 June 2004, François v Commission, T‑307/01, EU:T:2004:180, paragraph 48, and of 8 March 2012, Kerstens v Commission, F‑12/10, EU:F:2012:29, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited) and, moreover, given that a limitation period of 10 years for the opening of an administrative inquiry is laid down in Commission Decision C(2019) 4231 final of 12 June 2019 laying down general implementing provisions on the conduct of administrative inquiries and disciplinary proceedings, it must be stated that, in the present case, IDOC and subsequently the appointing authority were entitled, without this entailing a breach of the principle of good administration and their duty to have regard to the welfare of officials, to investigate facts that had taken place up to 6 years before the investigation in Case CMS 17/011 was initiated.

84      It follows that the period to which the investigation in Case CMS 17/011 related was not unlawfully extended and that the facts in question, which had taken place up to six years before that investigation was initiated, were not time-barred and that no breach of the principle of good administration and the duty to have regard to the welfare of officials could be established.

85      Third, in so far as the applicant relies on the excessive length of the investigation procedure and therefore on a failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement in that regard, it must be stated that that claim overlaps with that put forward in the second part of the second plea in law and will therefore be examined in that context.

86      In the third place, as regards the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to be heard, it should be borne in mind that the aim of the rule that the addressee of a decision that adversely affects that person must be placed in a position to submit his or her comments before that decision is taken is to enable the authority concerned effectively to take into account all relevant information. In order to ensure that that addressee is in fact protected, the purpose of that rule is, inter alia, to enable that person to correct an error or submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the decision being adopted or not, or in favour of it having a specific content. The obligation to hear the official, provided for in Article 4(4) of the 2004 Implementing Rules applicable at the material time, thus seeks to enable that person to assert his or her arguments during the stage of the proceedings concerning the establishment of facts with a view to the potential initiation of disciplinary proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission, T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74, paragraphs 74 and 77).

87      In the present case, it is apparent from the file that on 27 March 2017 IDOC sent a note to the applicant informing her of the decision to initiate an investigation (see paragraph 23 above). Next, the applicant was heard by IDOC on 25 April 2017 (see paragraph 25 above). On 27 April 2017, she submitted her comments on the minutes of that hearing (see paragraph 26 above). On 11 January 2018, she submitted her comments on an IDOC note setting out the facts which had been brought to light following investigative measures (see paragraph 29 above). Furthermore, the applicant received the investigation report and the annexes thereto and was heard on the subject of that report at a hearing held on 11 July 2018 pursuant to Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 29 to 32 above). Lastly, the applicant also received the disciplinary report and was heard in relation to that report at a hearing held on 13 March 2019 in accordance with Article 11 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). In addition, the applicant and the staff representative who was assisting her contacted the administration on several occasions to submit documents as well as their arguments and statements (see paragraph 18 above). It follows that, during the procedure preceding the adoption of the contested decision, the applicant was placed in a position to make known her views effectively, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 66, 67 and 70 above, on the facts which had been established and which were alleged against her.

88      In the light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the arguments put forward by the applicant in the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that the material and temporal scope of the administrative investigation registered under reference CMS 17/011 was imprecise and had been unlawfully extended, with the result that she was not in a position to defend herself.

(b)    The second part of the first plea in law, seeking to challenge the handling of the applicant’s requests for assistance and reassignment to another post

89      The applicant claims that the appointing authority failed to take account of her requests for assistance. Questioned by the Court at the hearing, the applicant stated that she was referring in particular to the request of 29 November 2012 (see paragraph 3 above) and also the numerous informal requests to the appointing authority linked to that request. The applicant also asserts that the administration did not handle her case correctly, in particular by refusing her request to be reassigned to another post. According to the applicant, the appointing authority thus breached the principle of good administration and her right to be heard.

90      In the reply, the applicant submits that the disciplinary penalty imposed on her should be placed in the context of a happy and satisfactory career of approximately 30 years, followed by serious problems at work in that she felt psychologically harassed. She claims that it was only when she made a request for assistance that the appointing authority opened procedure CMS 13/031.

91      In addition, the applicant submits that the document produced by the Commission to show that she changed post six times in six different units is not a reliable source and was drawn up in order to be used against her. The great majority of changes were technical. According to the applicant, her former Head of Unit assigned her to different posts and used her position to fill vacant posts or to make use of the budget lines of DG Communication. The document in question served as the basis for taking disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, constitutes an obstacle to the development of her career or her internal mobility and could damage her reputation. The refusal of her request to be reassigned, based on a misrepresentation of the facts, is a key illustration of the superficial way in which the applicant’s hierarchy and the Commission handled the issue. Her request to be reassigned far from Unit D.4 of DG Communication was a logical and appropriate request in the light of her situation, in line with her desire to escape the psychological harassment to which she felt she was subjected.

92      According to settled case-law, the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations that the Staff Regulations have created in relations between the public authority and public service employees. That duty implies in particular that when the authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official or other staff member, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision, and when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned. In addition, the protection of the rights and interests of officials is subject to compliance with the rules in force (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2004, Brendel v Commission, T‑55/03, EU:T:2004:316, paragraph 133 and the case-law cited).

93      For that reason, it has previously been held that the requirements of the duty to have due regard to the welfare of officials cannot be interpreted as preventing the appointing authority from bringing disciplinary proceedings against an official. Such a decision is taken primarily in the interest that the institution has in uncovering and, where necessary, penalising breaches of an official’s obligations under the Staff Regulations (judgment of 13 January 2010, A and G v Commission, F‑124/05 and F‑96/06, EU:F:2010:2, paragraph 377).

94      In the present case, first of all, it must be borne in mind that the applicant did not lodge a complaint against the decisions refusing her requests for assistance (see paragraphs 3, 5 and 16 above). Furthermore, the applicant did not bring an action before the Court following the rejection of her complaint against the decision refusing her request to be reassigned (see paragraph 9 above).

95      In any event, first, as the Commission submits, it should be stated that the appointing authority referred, both in its reply to her request for assistance of 29 November 2012 and in the contested decision, to the situation of conflict at the office, complained of by the applicant. However, the appointing authority did not consider that that situation constituted acts capable of being classified as harassment of the applicant, or that it was a valid reason for her actions and wrongful conduct, or that it was such as to warrant her being reassigned.

96      Second, it must be stated, as the Commission submits, that the applicant does not explain the relationship which exists, according to her, between the contested decision imposing a penalty on her and the refusal of her request to be reassigned to another post.

97      Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s claim that the document produced by the Commission to show that she changed post six times in six different units is not a reliable source and was drawn up in order to be used against her, it must be stated, first, that the applicant fails to specify, including in response to questions put to her at the hearing, which of the reassignments to various units within DG Communication does not correspond to reality. Second, even assuming that the facts concerning the applicant’s reassignments during the period from 2007 to 2013 were incorrect, the applicant has not demonstrated that those facts had any effect whatsoever on the actual content of the contested decision imposing a reprimand on her, whose purpose is not to refuse her request to be reassigned.

98      Lastly, as regards the decisions taken by the appointing authority following the applicant’s requests for assistance and reassignment, produced by her before the Court, it should be noted that, in the decision of 20 March 2013 (see paragraph 5 above), the competent appointing authority stated, inter alia, that the facts complained of by the applicant could not be regarded as harassment on the part of her office colleagues. As regards the request for reassignment (see paragraph 9 above), the appointing authority found that the existence of pending disciplinary proceedings against her and her numerous reassignments suggested that it was not in the interests of the service or in the interest of the applicant herself for her to be reassigned to another post again. Therefore, it was for the applicant to adduce evidence of a possible error of assessment on the part of the administration. None of the factors relied on by the applicant demonstrates that, by refusing her requests for assistance and reassignment and by opening a procedure under reference, first, CMS 13/031, and subsequently, CMS 17/011, the appointing authority breached the principle of good administration, its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials or the applicant’s right to be heard.

99      The arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the second part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

(c)    The fourth part of the first plea in law, concerning the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint

100    The fourth part of the first plea in law consists of the arguments whereby the applicant maintains, first, that her right to be heard was breached when the decision rejecting the complaint against the contested decision was adopted; second, that the appointing authority was not independent; and, third, that the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons.

(1)    The alleged breach of the right to be heard when the decision rejecting the complaint was adopted

101    According to the applicant, her right to be heard was breached because, ‘at the [stage of the complaint lodged under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations] she was not provided … with the draft negative decision … and she was not allowed to exercise her rights of defence’.

102    In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the Court has repeatedly held that the appointing authority was not, in principle, required to hear or consult a complainant on a draft reply before replying to a complaint lodged under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 November 2018, Barata v Parliament, T‑854/16, not published, EU:T:2018:809, paragraph 93; of 14 December 2018, UC v Parliament, T‑572/17, not published, EU:T:2018:975, paragraph 90; and of 2 April 2020, Barata v Parliament, T‑81/18, EU:T:2020:137, paragraph 109).

103    Accordingly, the argument alleging breach of the applicant’s right to be heard when the decision rejecting the complaint was adopted should be rejected.

(2)    The alleged lack of independence of the appointing authority

104    The applicant claims that the authority that adopted the contested decision and then also reviewed her complaint was always the same body, namely the appointing authority, which calls into question that authority’s independence.

105    In the reply, the applicant claims, in addition, that IDOC is not independent or impartial. According to her, when the investigation in Case CMS 13/031 was closed and that in Case CMS 17/011 began, the IDOC officials who had taken part in the first investigation should have withdrawn from the case and new IDOC officials with no knowledge of her case should have conducted the second investigation in order to guarantee a fair and impartial investigation.

106    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 2 of the Staff Regulations, each institution is to determine who within it is to exercise the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the appointing authority. Within the Commission, the competent appointing authority is designated in Commission Decision C(2013) 3288 of 4 June 2013 on the exercise of powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the appointing authority (AIPN) and by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants on the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (AHCC), as last amended by Commission Decision C(2016) 1881 of 4 April 2016. As the Commission correctly points out, different persons perform the duty of appointing authority depending on the subject matter of the decision to be adopted. In the present case, the appointing authority which adopted the contested decision was the Director-General of DG Human Resources at the material time, whereas the appointing authority which adopted the decision rejecting the complaint was a different person, namely a member of the Commission.

107    In addition, as the Commission states, the mere fact that some members of staff worked both on Case CMS 13/031 and on Case CMS 17/011 does not indicate that the procedure in Case CMS 17/011 was not fair or impartial. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Case CMS 13/031 was closed without any disciplinary proceedings against the applicant being finalised and, thus, without the appointing authority being able to establish whether her conduct was in line with the rules of the Staff Regulations. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the first investigation had not been finalised and that, by her conduct, the applicant sought to discredit any person taking part in it, she was not justified in requesting that, in procedure CMS 17/011, all the members of staff whom she had addressed in Case CMS 13/031 withdraw from the case. Similarly, the applicant’s claim that, ‘if [the IDOC Director] felt offended by [the applicant’s] e-mail to her …, the proper conduct would have been that she [withdraw] herself from the investigation’, cannot succeed. As the Commission submits, if such an argument were to be accepted, it would have the effect of allowing any staff member to delay the adoption of disciplinary measures against him or her by simply sending emails to the persons responsible for taking decisions in his or her case, so that they would have to be replaced by others. Lastly, as regards the applicant’s claim that ‘[the Director-General of DG Human Resources] admitted in a meeting in front of colleagues of IDOC that she [had] not [replied] to multiple [Article] 90 requests submitted to her [by the applicant]’, it should be stated that that claim is not substantiated.

108    In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s argument alleging that the appointing authority and IDOC were not independent or impartial must be rejected.

(3)    The alleged failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons

109    The applicant maintains that the ‘circular stereotyped [reasoning]’ used in the decision rejecting the complaint did not allow her to understand why a reprimand was imposed on her. In addition, according to her, the Commission was ‘not entitled to [present its reasoning]’ at that stage.

110    In the present case, first, it should be noted that the contested decision explains in detail the facts which the appointing authority regarded as established (see paragraph 35 above). That decision sets out also the extenuating circumstances, namely that the applicant’s conduct was not so serious as to prevent her entirely from working in the unit and that the reopening of the procedure in order to take account of the case-law extended the length of the handling of the case by rendering some facts alleged against her old. Lastly, that decision contains the assessments taken into consideration by the appointing authority in deciding on the disciplinary penalty to be imposed.

111    More specifically, it is apparent from the contested decision that, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the appointing authority, in determining the penalty to be imposed on the applicant, took into consideration, in particular, the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances in which it occurred, the extent to which the misconduct adversely affects the integrity, reputation or interests of the institutions, the extent to which the misconduct involves intentional actions or negligence, the motives for the official’s misconduct, the official’s grade and seniority, the degree of the official’s personal responsibility, the level of the official’s duties and responsibilities, whether the misconduct involves repeated action or behaviour, and the conduct of the official throughout the course of his or her career.

112    Furthermore, the decision rejecting the complaint provides sufficient details to enable the applicant to defend herself and the Court to review the legality of the adopted measure. In addition, the contested decision was adopted in circumstances known to the applicant, which enables her to understand the scope of the measure applied to her.

113    Second, contrary to what the applicant claims, the possibility of supplementing the initial statement of reasons at the stage of the decision on the complaint is recognised by settled case-law, provided that the supplementary reasons coincide with the reasons for the decision against which the complaint was made (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2018, Spagnolli and Others v Commission, T‑568/16 and T‑599/16, EU:T:2018:347, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

114    Accordingly, the applicant’s argument alleging a failure to state reasons must be rejected.

115    Therefore, the arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the fourth part of the first plea in law and, consequently, the first plea in its entirety must be rejected.

3.      The second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement referred to in Article 41 of the Charter, breach of the principle of legal certainty and infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations concerning the prohibition of harassment as well as a manifest error of assessment

116    The applicant puts forward a number of arguments which may be grouped into five parts, like the structure adopted by the Commission in the defence and expressly accepted by the applicant herself at the hearing. The first part consists of the arguments whereby the applicant alleges that she was subjected to psychological harassment on the part of IDOC on account of excessive surveillance. The second part comprises the arguments claiming a failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement laid down in Article 41 of the Charter. The third part contains the arguments alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty owing to the absence of a limitation period in respect of the investigation procedure. The fourth part consists of the arguments relating to a failure to comply with the obligation to ensure that the facts are established. The fifth part consists of the arguments whereby she alleges harassment on the part of her colleagues.

117    The Commission disputes all the applicant’s arguments.

118    It is appropriate to examine together the arguments raised in the context of the first and fifth parts of the second plea.

(a)    The first part of the second plea in law, alleging psychological harassment on the part of IDOC, and the fifth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the applicant was a victim of harassment on the part of her colleagues

119    By the arguments grouped together in the context of the first part of the second plea in law, the applicant submits that the administrative procedure was improper due to ‘malicious acts on the part of the IDOC towards [her]’. According to her, IDOC displayed ‘hostility constituting [psychological] harassment … in the email exchanges where the IDOC explicitly transmits its instructions to monitor [her] behaviour to the members of the unit’.

120    In the context of the fifth part, the applicant submits that, by ‘refusing to qualify the disputed behaviour of her colleagues, as constituting … harassment, the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment’. She cites case-law relating to the definition of psychological harassment and makes a number of allegations of harmful acts committed against her. The applicant claims to have suffered ‘assaults and degradations of her personal objects and her personal integrity in the workplace’. She states that she was ‘the subject of ridicule among her colleagues, whenever they [saw] her appear in the corridors’. She submits that ‘office equipment and some of her personal belongings were thrown in the trash following a move’. Lastly, the applicant refers, in that context, to alleged ‘unjustified seizures on her salary’.

121    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ is defined in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations as ‘improper conduct’ which, first, takes the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts which take place ‘over a period’, suggesting that psychological harassment must be understood as a process that necessarily occurs over time and presumes the existence of repetitive or continual behaviour. Second, in order to come under that definition, such physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts must have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person (see judgment of 28 May 2020, Cerafogli v ECB, T‑483/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2020:225, paragraph 375 and the case-law cited).

122    In the present case, it is necessary to assess whether the emails produced by the applicant are capable of demonstrating the existence of harassment on the part of IDOC.

123    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that IDOC had been instructed to investigate, in Case CMS 13/031, and, subsequently, Case CMS 17/011, the applicant’s conduct at her workplace. Thus, that office needed, in order to gather information on the applicant’s conduct at her workplace, to contact her superiors and colleagues. The emails sent by the applicant’s Head of Unit to the IDOC investigators in October and December 2013, in which he gives an overview of the situation following the incident of 26 February 2013, cannot support the applicant’s allegation that the members of IDOC ordered her colleagues to put her under surveillance. The same applies to an exchange of emails, dated 1 to 3 April 2014, in which her Head of Unit supplied documents requested by IDOC’s new investigator who had taken over the case. Those emails were exchanged lawfully in the context of the ongoing investigation in Case CMS 13/031 concerning the applicant’s conduct. Moreover, as the Commission correctly states, the applicant herself provided IDOC with numerous additional items of information in the framework of that investigation.

124    It must therefore be stated that the emails in question, which were not, moreover, addressed to the applicant, do not come under the definition of harassment referred to in paragraph 121 above.

125    The argument alleging psychological harassment on the part of IDOC and the first part of the second plea in law must therefore be rejected.

126    As regards the arguments put forward in the context of the fifth part, set out in paragraph 120 above, first, it should be noted, as the Commission states, that the applicant repeats, in essence, the arguments put forward in the second part of her first plea in law, in which she challenges the refusal of the request for assistance which she had made on the ground of alleged psychological harassment on the part of some of her colleagues. It is therefore appropriate to refer to the answers given to those arguments in the examination of the first plea in law (see paragraphs 94 to 98 above).

127    Second, even assuming that the applicant is referring to events which had not been set out in her request for assistance, it must be stated, as the Commission asserts, that she makes only vague allegations, which are not supported by any evidence. Furthermore, the applicant does not even attempt to explain the link between those allegations and the contested decision.

128    Third, as regards the exchanges which the applicant produced before the Court to show that she lodged a complaint with the auditorat du travail (officer representing the public interest in labour matters) of the tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Labour Court (French-speaking), Belgium), it is important to note that the applicant does not specify against whom that complaint was lodged, in what way the mere existence of that complaint can support her action or what might be the link between that complaint, on the one hand, and the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint, on the other.

129    Fourth, the argument based on the seizure of the applicant’s salary is irrelevant. The Commission explained, without being contradicted, that between December 2017 and June 2020 seizures were carried out on the applicant’s salary on account of a decision on the seizure of her salary notified to the Commission by a Belgian court enforcement officer, and produced a note from the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) summarising the seizures carried out on her salary.

130    Fifth, it is apparent from the case-law that it is only on a purely exceptional basis that a plea in law based on a supposed case of harassment can be relied on in the context of a review of the legality of an act adversely affecting an official, that is to say, if it appears that there is a link between the alleged harassment and the statement of reasons of the contested act (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 December 2017, HQ v CPVO, T‑592/16, not published, EU:T:2017:897, paragraph 96, and of 19 September 2019, FV v Council, T‑27/18 RENV, not published, EU:T:2019:621, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the applicant has not proved either the accuracy of the alleged facts concerning the harassment or their link with the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint.

131    The arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the fifth part of the second plea in law must therefore be rejected.

(b)    The second part of the second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement referred to in Article 41 of the Charter

132    The applicant submits that the administrative procedure and disciplinary proceedings exceeded a reasonable time, thus infringing Article 41 of the Charter, without there being any particular circumstances warranting that excessive period.

133    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures constitutes a general principle of EU law the observance of which is ensured by the EU judicature and which is laid down as a component of the right to good administration by Article 41(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2006, Angeletti v Commission, T‑394/03, EU:T:2006:111, paragraph 162).

134    According to settled case-law, it follows from the principle of good administration that disciplinary authorities are under an obligation to conduct disciplinary proceedings with due diligence and to ensure that each procedural step is taken within a reasonable period following the previous step (see judgment of 10 June 2004, François v Commission, T‑307/01, EU:T:2004:180, paragraphs 47 and 48 and the case-law cited).

135    The unreasonable duration of disciplinary proceedings may thus be the result both of the conduct of prior administrative investigations and of the disciplinary proceedings themselves. The period to be taken into account in order to ascertain whether the duration of disciplinary proceedings is reasonable is not solely that commencing on the date of the decision to institute those proceedings. The question whether the disciplinary proceedings, once commenced, have been conducted with due diligence will be influenced by the length of the period between the occurrence of the alleged disciplinary offence and the decision to institute disciplinary proceedings (judgment of 13 October 2021, IB v EUIPO, T‑22/20, EU:T:2021:689, paragraph 87).

136    The reasonableness of the duration of the proceedings must be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (see judgment of 24 November 2021, CX v Commission, T‑743/16 RENV II, not published, EU:T:2021:824, paragraph 394 and the case-law cited).

137    No specific factor is decisive. Each must be examined separately and then their cumulative effect evaluated. Some instances of delay attributable to the appointing authority may not appear unreasonable in isolation but are unreasonable when considered together. The requirements of procedural diligence do not, however, go further than those compatible with the principle of good administration (judgment of 24 November 2021, CX v Commission, T‑743/16 RENV II, not published, EU:T:2021:824, paragraph 395).

138    Where decisions taken by the appointing authority have caused proceedings to exceed the period that would normally be considered reasonable, it is for that authority to prove the existence of special circumstances of such a nature as to justify that delay (see judgment of 24 November 2021, CX v Commission, T‑743/16 RENV II, not published, EU:T:2021:824, paragraph 396 and the case-law cited).

139    In the light of these principles, it must be verified whether the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were conducted within a reasonable time. That means, in the first place, rehearsing the main events that led to the initiation of proceedings and the main stages thereof before examining, in the second place, whether the objectively established duration may be considered reasonable.

140    In the present case, first of all, it should be pointed out that the procedure lasted a little under six years from the time when Case CMS 13/031 was opened, in May 2013, until the adoption of the contested decision, in April 2019. It should be noted that an initial mandate was given to IDOC in May 2013 and a complementary mandate was given the following year, in May 2014, to hear the applicant on the new evidence in the file (see paragraphs 6 and 11 above). On the basis of that latter mandate, the applicant was heard in November 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The hearings of the Head of Sector and the Head of Unit took place on 12 December 2014 and 28 January 2015 respectively (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). Next, the applicant had the opportunity to submit additional comments. Furthermore, throughout the procedure, the applicant and a staff representative who was assisting her sent numerous notes to the Vice-President of the Commission, the appointing authority, the Security Directorate and IDOC. Following that first procedure, the appointing authority decided, on 1 July 2016, to refer Case CMS 13/031 to the Disciplinary Board, and the applicant was to be heard on 21 March 2017. However, the appointing authority decided to close Case CMS 13/031 and to open a new case on 21 March 2017 under reference CMS 17/011, following delivery of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74).

141    The opening of a new procedure certainly contributed to the disciplinary proceedings being prolonged. However, that opening was decided in the interests of good administration and, more specifically, in order better to ensure observance of the applicant’s rights of defence. In Case CMS 13/031, an administrative investigation had not been finalised. In the light of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T‑270/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:74), the lawfulness of a decision imposing a penalty without the disciplinary proceedings having been preceded by an administrative investigation could be called into question. It should also be noted that, once it received the investigation report in procedure CMS 17/011, the appointing authority decided not to refer the matter to the Disciplinary Board specifically in order not to prolong the procedure in question. As the Commission stated at the hearing, having several members of a disciplinary board participate in the adoption of a decision imposing a penalty could have contributed to the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings being delayed.

142    Thus, it must be stated that, having regard to the facts taken into account, the hearings conducted, the comments submitted by the applicant and the staff representative who was assisting her and the explanations provided for the reasons for the opening of a new administrative procedure, the procedure which led to the adoption of the contested decision, in the present case, was conducted as a whole within a period of time which cannot be regarded as unreasonable.

143    Furthermore, as regards the time which elapsed between the facts alleged against the applicant and the date of adoption of the contested decision, it must be noted that the penalty was imposed not only on account of facts that had occurred before 2014, but also on account of more recent facts which had taken place during the period from 2014 to 2017 and are liable to demonstrate that the applicant continued to engage in wrongful conduct. Thus, it must be concluded that the time period, taken as a whole, cannot be regarded as unreasonable.

144    As regards the applicant’s argument that, since it had been concluded in the disciplinary report that several facts could not be considered to constitute infringements of the Staff Regulations, the excessive length of the procedure was unwarranted, it must be pointed out, as the Commission states, that the possibility that not all the facts established by IDOC in its investigation will be considered by the appointing authority to be breaches of the rules of the Staff Regulations such as to warrant a penalty at the end of the procedure is inherent in disciplinary proceedings. However, that cannot show that the length of the procedure was unreasonable or disproportionate.

145    Moreover, and in any event, according to settled case-law, breach of the principle of good administration cannot, as a general rule, justify annulment of the decision taken at the end of an administrative procedure. It is only where the excessive lapse of time is such as to have had an effect on the rights of the defence of the person concerned and thus, to affect the actual content of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure that the failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement affects the validity of that administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 April 2017, Azoulay and Others v Parliament, T‑580/16, EU:T:2017:291, paragraph 60, and of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 104).

146    In the present case, the length of the disciplinary proceedings, even assuming it were excessive, cannot affect the content of the contested decision. First, it is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint that the applicant had the opportunity to state her views throughout the procedure on the accuracy of the facts on which the penalty was based, which she has not disputed. Second, the applicant does not show how the time elapsed had the slightest effect on her rights of defence, given that it is apparent from the file that she was able to comment and state her views on all the facts taken into account in the contested decision, including the oldest facts, and that, as will be pointed out in paragraph 157 below, her arguments that the facts occurred ‘in the distant past’ and that it is difficult for her or her witnesses to recall them cannot succeed.

147    Lastly, as regards the applicant’s argument put forward in the reply maintaining that the length of the investigation concerning her was disproportionate, which appears to be based, first, on case-law according to which ‘the reasonable period of time … comprises both the administrative phase before the [appointing authority] as well as the judicial review phase …’ and, second, on the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and in particular Article 6(1) thereof, it is important to note the following.

148    First, since the Commission is not a court, it cannot be held liable for the time required by judicial proceedings.

149    Second, as regards the reference to the existence of alleged EU case-law according to which verifying that the reasonable time requirement has been complied with requires that the administrative stage before the appointing authority be considered together with the judicial review stage, it should be noted that the applicant does not specify to which case-law she is referring. As regards the references to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the citation of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in paragraphs 49 to 53 of the reply, it is not apparent from those references or from that case-law that the fact that the period comprising both the administrative stage before the appointing authority and the judicial stage before the court exceeds a reasonable time must lead to the annulment of the contested act in those judicial proceedings.

150    The second part of the second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement referred to in Article 41 of the Charter, must therefore be rejected.

(c)    The third part of the second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty

151    The applicant asserts that she had to prepare her defence relating to facts which she did not know with certainty to be covered by the mandate given to IDOC and facts which had occurred ‘in the distant past’. She states, moreover, that it is difficult for witnesses to recall past events and that documents may have disappeared.

152    In the reply, the applicant claims that the contested decision was adopted in breach of the principle of legal certainty because the investigation at issue was initiated in 2013 and the matter has not yet been resolved in 2021 by a decision constituting res judicata.

153    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty, which has as its corollary the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, requires, according to settled case-law, that legislation involving negative consequences for individuals should be clear and precise and its application predictable for those subject to it (see judgment of 7 June 2005, VEMW and Others, C‑17/03, EU:C:2005:362, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

154    When questioned at the hearing, the applicant did not provide any further details as to what she is seeking to claim when she submits that the principle of legal certainty has been breached.

155    Even assuming that the applicant is seeking to argue that a breach of the principle of legal certainty results from the absence of a limitation period for the initiation of an investigation against her and from the fact that that absence of a limitation period enabled the administration to take into account facts which were too old, it is important to note the following.

156    As stated in paragraphs 83, 133 to 138 and 145 above, where the legislation does not provide for a limitation period, it is the ‘reasonable time’ principle that applies. It is apparent from paragraphs 82 to 84 and from paragraphs 140 to 144 above that that principle was not breached in the present case as regards either the initiation of the administrative investigation or the disciplinary proceedings taken as a whole.

157    Lastly, as regards the applicant’s arguments that the fact that the taking into account of the facts alleged against her was not time-barred rendered her defence difficult, on the ground that witnesses and documents ‘may have disappeared’ and that the time that elapsed makes it more difficult for the persons concerned to recall the facts, it must be stated that the applicant does not specify which particular facts, among those referred to in the decision imposing the penalty, the witnesses or she herself would have difficulty in remembering. Nor does she specify who are the witnesses to whom requests could effectively be made or which documents ‘may have disappeared’. Thus, the applicant’s arguments, which are not substantiated, must be rejected.

158    The third part of the second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty, must therefore be rejected.

(d)    The fourth part of the second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the obligation to ensure that the facts are established

159    The applicant claims, in essence, that the appointing authority failed to comply with its obligation to establish the facts. She claims that the facts set out in the contested decision are inaccurate.

160    First of all, it must be borne in mind that the lawfulness of every disciplinary penalty requires that the truth of the facts alleged against the official concerned be established (see judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑273/18, not published, EU:T:2019:371, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).

161    Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires the EU judicature to carry out a full review of the accuracy of the facts (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2013, L v Parliament, T‑317/10 P, EU:T:2013:413, paragraph 70; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 10 January 2019, RY v Commission, T‑160/17, EU:T:2019:1, paragraph 38).

162    In the present case, the objections relied on by the appointing authority against the applicant in the contested decision may be summarised as follows:

‘[The applicant] regularly sent messages to her interlocutors in a particularly aggressive tone in the context of her work, including to the director of IDOC. Furthermore, [the applicant] sent messages emphasising colleagues’ skin colour, religion or status under the Staff Regulations, without however using abusive language. Overall, that [manner of] communication does not correspond to the conduct expected of an EU official. …

[The applicant] repeatedly refused to carry out standard work instructions. Moreover, on several occasions she failed to inform her Head of Unit of her absences on account of sickness and attempted to circumvent the rules in force on providing reasons for absences or flexitime, using various excuses for her absence from the office. Taken together, the facts reveal repetitive conduct consisting of prioritising her own interest and her own interpretation of the rules over the interests of the service.

… The many examples documented by the investigation show, on the contrary, that [the applicant] has regularly expressed her disagreement in a brusque and disrespectful manner, has regularly challenged standard instructions and reacted strongly to being reproached.’

163    The appointing authority considered that the applicant’s conduct, taken as a whole, constituted an infringement of Articles 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations. After taking into account all the facts of the case, on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the appointing authority decided to impose a disciplinary penalty in the form of a reprimand on the applicant.

164    First, it must be noted that, in order to challenge the contested decision, the applicant claims that the incidents relied on against her are irrelevant, that the investigation was conducted in a biased manner and that she was subjected to incomprehensible surveillance on the part of IDOC. Such unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to show that the facts were not correctly established.

165    Second, it should be noted, as the Commission submits, that the applicant refers only to some of the facts on which the contested decision is based, namely the ‘Refusal to participate in unit meetings – Refusal to work – 4 facts’ referred to in the disciplinary report.

166    It must be stated that the facts relied on against the applicant were considered to have been established on the basis of evidence described in the disciplinary report, taking as reference the IDOC investigation report of 12 April 2018, annexed to that disciplinary report, evidence the accuracy of which was not validly called into question by the applicant.

167    It is also apparent from the document produced by the Commission containing the items of evidence, which were annexed to the IDOC investigation report, which was in turn annexed to the disciplinary report, that those facts were fully established. Moreover, in their comments or at their hearings, the applicant and the staff representative who was assisting her did not deny the facts relied on in the contested decision; nor did they adduce any evidence that those facts were inaccurate. They sought in particular to claim that the applicant’s conduct was warranted on the ground that it was a reaction to the working environment in which she performed her duties.

168    Lastly, the applicant’s claim that her conduct was warranted by the environment in which she performed her duties cannot succeed either. The applicant relies on the arguments alleging that she was the victim of harassment, which were rejected by the Court.

169    The applicant’s arguments alleging that the facts relied on in the contested decision are inaccurate, and, consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected; accordingly, the claims for annulment must be dismissed in their entirety.

B.      The claims for compensation

170    The applicant submits that the irregularities which allegedly affected the disciplinary proceedings and the disruption of her career caused her non-material and material damage. According to the clarifications provided at the hearing, she claims EUR 3 000 by way of compensation for the non-material damage she claims to have suffered and EUR 3 500 by way of compensation for the material damage she claims to have suffered.

171    In the reply, the applicant submits that, even assuming that the Court were not to annul the contested decision, she would in any event be entitled to compensation for the damage arising from the fact that the length of the disciplinary investigation at issue was excessive and that the requirement that it be concluded within a reasonable time was not complied with.

172    The Commission contends that the applicant’s claims for compensation should be dismissed.

173    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a claim for compensation submitted jointly with a claim for annulment which is unfounded is itself unfounded in law if it is closely linked to the claim for annulment (see judgment of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament, T‑214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

174    Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law that, in the system of remedies provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, a claim for compensation is admissible only if it was preceded by a pre-litigation procedure in accordance with the Staff Regulations. That requirement does not apply where there is a direct link between an action for annulment and a claim for compensation, the latter being admissible as incidental to the action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2012, A v Commission, T‑595/11 P, EU:T:2012:694, paragraphs 110 to 113).

175    In the present case, the applicant’s claims for compensation, submitted jointly with the claims for annulment, are based on the unlawfulness of the contested decision and of the decision rejecting the complaint, with the exception of the claim relating to the disruption of her career and, in part, the claim relating to the failure to act within a reasonable time in respect of the disciplinary investigation.

176    Thus, since the claims for annulment must be rejected, the claims for compensation closely linked with those claims for annulment must also be rejected. Moreover, since the Court found, in paragraph 142 above, that the length of the disciplinary investigation conducted against the applicant was not unreasonable, her claim for compensation for the damage resulting from the allegedly excessive length of that investigation must be rejected.

177    The claim alleging material damage resulting from her career being disrupted is inadmissible. There is no direct link between, on the one hand, the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint, the sole purpose of which is to impose a reprimand on the applicant, without having any effect on the development of her career, and, on the other, that alleged disruption of her career. Thus, the claim for compensation for that damage should have been preceded by a separate pre-litigation procedure, which was not the case here.

178    In any event, the non-material and material damage alleged by the applicant is not supported by any evidence.

179    In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s claims for compensation must be rejected in their entirety.

C.      The requests for measures of organisation of procedure and inquiry

180    First, the applicant asks the Court to order the Commission to produce all the documents relevant to the case and concerning reports drawn up against her and against her Head of Unit at the material time, her colleague and her Head of Sector before the beginning of the relevant disciplinary proceedings, and to produce all the documents relating to the initiation and conduct of those disciplinary proceedings, including the internal IDOC communications, in order to establish the relevant information which IDOC took into account and the way in which the investigation was conducted.

181    Second, the applicant asks to be called as a witness and also to have called as witnesses the Director-General of DG Human Resources in her capacity as the appointing authority, the Director of IDOC, her Head of Unit and her colleague who shared the same office, ‘in order to establish the relevant information taken into account by IDOC and the manner of the conduct of the investigation’.

182    The Commission contends that the applicant does not substantiate the relevance of the measures sought and states that she already has the investigation report and the disciplinary reports.

183    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is for the Court to decide on the need to make use of its power to adopt measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry to supplement the information available to it, given that whether or not the evidence is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland v Commission, C‑385/07 P, EU:C:2009:456, paragraph 163, and of 11 June 2015, EMA v Commission, C‑100/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:382, paragraph 80).

184    In the present case, the applicant has not explained how disclosure of the abovementioned documents was indispensable, whereas, in order to enable the Court to determine whether it is conducive to the proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party requesting them must not only identify the documents requested but also provide at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, C‑185/95 P, EU:C:1998:608, paragraph 93, and of 18 January 2005, Entorn v Commission, T‑141/01, EU:T:2005:10, paragraph 132). The same is true of the requests for witnesses to be called. The mere indication that calling those witnesses would make it possible to determine the relevant information taken into consideration by IDOC and the manner in which the investigation was conducted is not sufficient, having regard to the extensive information already in the Court’s possession which enabled it effectively to rule on the applicant’s pleas in law and claims.

185    Consequently, there is no need to grant the applicant’s requests for measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry.

IV.    Costs

186    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders WT to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 September 2022.

Table of contents

I. Background to the dispute

II. Forms of order sought

III. Law

A. The claims for annulment

1. Preliminary observations

2. The first plea in law, alleging breach of the duty of care and the principle of good administration

(a) The first part of the first plea in law, concerning the investigation procedure opened in 2013 under reference CMS 13/031, and the third part of the first plea in law, concerning the material and temporal scope of the administrative investigation registered under reference CMS 17/011 and the applicant’s right to be heard during that investigation

(b) The second part of the first plea in law, seeking to challenge the handling of the applicant’s requests for assistance and reassignment to another post

(c) The fourth part of the first plea in law, concerning the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint

(1) The alleged breach of the right to be heard when the decision rejecting the complaint was adopted

(2) The alleged lack of independence of the appointing authority

(3) The alleged failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons

3. The second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement referred to in Article 41 of the Charter, breach of the principle of legal certainty and infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations concerning the prohibition of harassment as well as a manifest error of assessment

(a) The first part of the second plea in law, alleging psychological harassment on the part of IDOC, and the fifth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the applicant was a victim of harassment on the part of her colleagues

(b) The second part of the second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement referred to in Article 41 of the Charter

(c) The third part of the second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty

(d) The fourth part of the second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the obligation to ensure that the facts are established

B. The claims for compensation

C. The requests for measures of organisation of procedure and inquiry

IV. Costs

*      Language of the case: English.

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