Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

24 November 2021 (*) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures against Syria – Freezing of funds – Error of assessment – Proportionality – Right to property – Right to pursue an economic activity – Misuse of powers – Obligation to state reasons – Rights of the defence – Right to a fair trial – Right to effective judicial protection)

In Case T‑259/19,

Aman Dimashq JSC, established in Damascus (Syria), represented by L. Cloquet and J.‑P. Buyle, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by S. Kyriakopoulou and V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents,

defendant,

APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 13), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 4), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 of 17 May 2019 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 36), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 of 17 May 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 1), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/719 of 28 May 2020 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 66), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/716 of 28 May 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 1), in so far as those acts concern the applicant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of S. Gervasoni, President, L. Madise and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: B. Lefebvre, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 21 October 2020,

gives the following

Judgment

 Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

1        The applicant, Aman Dimashq JSC, also named Aman Damascus JSC, is a legal person governed by Syrian law created on 7 October 2017 and registered in the Syrian Commercial Register under number 18 196. Its headquarters are in Damascus (Syria). It is active in the development of residential, commercial and leisure buildings.

2        Strongly condemning the violent repression of peaceful protest in Syria and calling on the Syrian authorities to exercise restraint instead of force, the Council of the European Union adopted, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2011 L 121, p. 11). In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Council imposed an arms embargo, a ban on exports of material which might be used for internal repression, restrictions on admission to the European Union and the freezing of the funds and economic resources of certain persons and entities responsible for the violent repression against the Syrian civilian population.

3        The names of the persons responsible for the violent repression against the Syrian civilian population and of the persons, natural or legal, and entities associated with them are listed in the annex to Decision 2011/273. According to Article 5(1) of that decision, the Council, acting upon a proposal by a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, may amend that annex. The applicant’s name was not included in that annex when that decision was adopted.

4        Since some of the restrictive measures against the Syrian Arab Republic fall within the scope of the FEU Treaty, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2011 L 121, p. 1). The content of that regulation is largely identical to that of Decision 2011/273 but provides for the release of frozen funds in certain circumstances. The list of persons, entities and bodies identified as being either responsible for the repression in question or associated with those responsible, set out in Annex II to that regulation, is identical to the list in the annex to Decision 2011/273. Under Article 14(1) and (4) of Regulation No 442/2011, where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the restrictive measures referred to, it is to amend Annex II accordingly and, furthermore, to review the list in that annex at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

5        By Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273 (OJ 2011 L 319, p. 56), the Council considered it necessary, in view of the gravity of the situation in Syria, to impose additional restrictive measures. For the sake of clarity, the measures imposed by Decision 2011/273 were grouped together with the additional measures into a single legal instrument. Decision 2011/782 provides, in Article 18 thereof, for restrictions on admission to the territory of the European Union of the persons whose names are listed in Annex I and, in Article 19, for the funds and economic resources of the persons and entities whose names are listed in Annex I and Annex II to be frozen.

6        Regulation No 442/2011 was replaced by Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2012 L 16, p. 1).

7        Decision 2011/782 was replaced by Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782 (OJ 2012 L 330, p. 21), which was itself replaced by Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2013 L 147, p. 14).

8        On 12 October 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1836 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2015 L 266, p. 75). On the same day, it adopted Regulation (EU) 2015/1828 amending Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2015 L 266, p. 1).

9        By Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 implementing Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 13), and by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 implementing Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 4) (together, ‘the initial measures’), the applicant’s name was inserted at line 73 of Table B of the lists of the names of the natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255 and in Annex II to Regulation No 36/2012 (together, ‘the lists at issue’), with the following reasons being given:

‘Aman Dimashq is a [18.9 million United States dollars (USD)] joint venture between Damascus Cham Holding and Aman [Holding]. Through its participation in the regime‐backed luxury development Marota City, Aman Dimashq supports and/or benefits from the Syrian regime.’

10      On 22 January 2019, the Council published in the Official Journal of the European Union a Notice for the attention of the persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2013/255 and in Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 C 27, p. 3).

11      By letter of 26 March 2019, the applicant’s representatives objected to the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and asked the Council to disclose to them the documents supporting that listing. By letters of 2 and 12 April 2019, the applicant’s representatives reiterated their request to the Council for access to the documents supporting the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue before lodging the application in the present case.

12      By letter of 13 May 2019, first, the Council informed the applicant’s representatives that, in essence, the applicant’s observations were not such as to call into question the decision to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. Secondly, the Council provided them with the document bearing the reference WK 54/2019 INIT, dated 28 February 2019, containing the evidence in support of the reasons for that listing.

13      On 17 May 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 36), which extended the application of the latter decision until 1 June 2020; on the same day, the Council also adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 implementing Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 1) (together, ‘the 2019 maintaining acts’).

14      By letter of 20 May 2019, the Council informed the applicant’s representatives of the adoption of the 2019 maintaining acts and of the possibility of submitting a request, before 28 February 2020, that the decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue be reconsidered.

15      By letter of 28 February 2020, the applicant, through its representatives, objected to its name being maintained on the lists at issue.

16      On 28 May 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/719 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 66), which extended the application of the latter decision until 1 June 2021, and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/716 implementing Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 1) (together, ‘the 2020 maintaining acts’).

17      By letter of 2 June 2020, the Council informed the applicant’s representatives of the adoption of the 2020 maintaining acts and of the possibility of submitting a request, before 1 March 2021, that they be reconsidered. The Council also informed the applicant that, in essence, the observations submitted in its letter of 28 February 2020 were not such as to call into question the decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue.

 Procedure and forms of order sought

18      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 15 April 2019, the applicant brought the present action for annulment of the initial measures in so far as they concern the applicant.

19      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 30 July 2019, the applicant modified the application under Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, with the result that the application also seeks annulment of the 2019 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant. The applicant also reiterated the form of order set out in the application.

20      On 8 August 2019, the Council lodged the defence and the observations on the first statement of modification at the Court Registry.

21      The reply was lodged on 1 October 2019.

22      By decision of 17 October 2019, the President of the General Court, pursuant to Article 27(3) of the Rules of Procedure, reassigned the case to a new Judge-Rapporteur, attached to the Fourth Chamber.

23      The rejoinder was lodged on 8 January 2020.

24      The written part of the procedure was closed on 8 January 2020.

25      By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89(3)(a) and (d) of the Rules of Procedure, on 23 July 2020, the Court asked the parties to answer a series of questions and to produce certain documents. The parties answered the questions and complied with the request for production of documents within the prescribed period.

26      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 13 August 2020, the applicant, under Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, modified the application a second time, with the result that the application also seeks annulment of the 2020 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant. The applicant also reiterated the form of order set out in the application and in the first statement of modification and put forward new arguments.

27      By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89(3)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, on 30 September 2020, the Court asked the Council to produce a document. The Council complied with the request for production of that document within the prescribed period. The applicant did not submit observations on the Council’s response to that measure of organisation of procedure.

28      The parties presented oral argument and replied to the questions put by the Court at the hearing on 21 October 2020, at which the Council also submitted its observations on the second statement of modification. In particular, the Council referred to the pleas and arguments contained in the defence and the rejoinder.

29      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the initial measures, the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts (together, ‘the contested measures’) in so far as they concern the applicant;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

30      The Council contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs;

–        in the alternative, should the Court annul the contested measures in so far as they concern the applicant, order that the effects of Implementing Decision 2019/87 and of Decisions 2019/806 and 2020/719 be maintained in so far as they concern the applicant, until the annulment of Implementing Regulations 2019/85, 2019/798 and 2020/716 takes effect in so far as they concern the applicant.

 Law

31      In support of its action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law, alleging (i) an error of assessment; (ii) infringement of the principle of proportionality; (iii) infringement of the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity; (iv) ‘abuse of power’; (v) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; and, lastly, (vi) infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to a fair trial and the right to effective judicial protection.

32      It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the fifth plea and then the sixth plea, before examining the first plea, the fourth plea and, lastly, the second and third pleas taken together.

 The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

33      The applicant submits that the statement of reasons provided by the Council does not satisfy the obligation incumbent on the EU institutions under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU. Specifically, the applicant claims that the statement of reasons adopted in the contested measures does not enable it to identify the disputed transactions. Furthermore, it adds that the Council did not ‘genuinely’ examine the statement of reasons adopted, which is ‘purely formal’ and was not properly thought out by the Council.

34      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

35      It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the EU judicature and, secondly, to enable the latter to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

36      It should also be noted that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

37      The statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposes a measure freezing funds must make it possible to identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretionary power of assessment, that that measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

38      However, the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure may have in obtaining explanations (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

39      It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, inasmuch as the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

40      In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables that person to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

41      Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the obligation to state the reasons on which an act is based is an essential procedural requirement, to be distinguished from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested act. The reasoning on which an act is based consists in a formal statement of the reasons on which that act is based. If those reasons are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the act, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

42      In the present case, first, it should be noted that the applicant’s argument that the Council did not carefully examine the statement of reasons adopted seeks, in fact, to challenge the factual evidence relied on by the Council. Since that argument seeks to call into question not the sufficiency of the statement of reasons for the contested measures specifically, but rather the existence of links between the applicant and the Syrian regime, it must be examined in the context of the first plea, alleging an error of assessment.

43      Secondly, as regards the reasons why the restrictive measures concerning the applicant were adopted and maintained, it should be noted that the reasons for listing the applicant’s name have remained unchanged since the adoption of the initial measures, since they were not amended when either the 2019 maintaining acts or the 2020 maintaining acts were adopted. Thus, the Council gave the following reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue:

‘Aman Dimashq is a USD 18.9 million joint venture between Damascus Cham [Holding] and Aman [Holding]. Through its participation in the regime‐backed luxury development Marota City, Aman [Dimashq] supports and/or benefits from the Syrian regime.’

44      First of all, it should be recalled that the general listing criterion laid down in Article 27(1) and Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, which are reproduced, as regards the freezing of funds, in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provides that persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Syrian regime are to be subject to restrictive measures.

45      It should be inferred from the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, referred to in paragraphs 9 and 43 above, that the applicant’s name was included and maintained on the lists at issue because of its connection with the Syrian regime. In other words, the listing of the applicant’s name is based on the criterion defined in Article 27(1) and Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of association with the regime).

46      Next, it should be noted that the actual and specific reasons which led the Council to include and maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are stated sufficiently clearly to enable the applicant to understand them. Those reasons relate to clear facts concerning the applicant, namely, first, its status as a joint venture created by Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding, secondly, its participation in the Marota City development project, which is backed by the Syrian regime, and, thirdly, the fact that it supports the Syrian regime.

47      Moreover, the pleas and arguments raised by the applicant in its pleadings indicate, first, that it was put in a position to ascertain the reasons for the measures concerning it so as to be able to challenge them effectively before the EU judicature and, secondly, that it was aware of the context in which the measures were adopted.

48      Lastly, the fact that the Council failed to set out in detail the disputed transactions which led to the applicant’s name being included on the lists at issue cannot lead to a finding that it infringed its obligation to state reasons, since, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 39 and 40 above, the Council is not required to specify all the relevant facts and points of law and the applicant was put in a position to understand the scope of the measures concerning it.

49      It must be concluded that the statement of the reasons on which the contested measures are based is comprehensible and sufficiently precise to enable the applicant to ascertain the reasons which led the Council to take the view that including and maintaining its name on the lists at issue was justified and to challenge their legality before the EU judicature, and to enable the latter to exercise its power of review.

50      In view of the foregoing, the fifth plea must be rejected.

 The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to a fair trial and the right to effective judicial protection

51      The applicant submits, in essence, that the contested measures infringe its rights of the defence and its right to a fair trial, as provided for in Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 6(3) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, in so far as the Council failed to hear it before those measures were adopted, as well as its right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

52      First, the applicant claims, in that regard, that, in view of the fact that it was not heard prior to the adoption of the contested measures, it was unable to exercise its rights of the defence effectively. Specifically, the applicant claims that the right to be heard requires that it be able to make known its point of view on whether the alleged facts are true and relevant as well as on the evidence adduced against it before the adoption of the measure in question. Furthermore, according to the applicant, there was no urgency or any risk that the applicant would compromise the effectiveness of the measure by being heard prior to the adoption of the contested measures, whereas the loss to the applicant after those measures were adopted was certain and foreseeable. The Council voluntarily refused the applicant access to the file of evidence in support of the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue and, therefore, infringed its rights of the defence.

53      Secondly, the applicant submits, in essence, that, in accordance with its right to effective judicial protection, it requested access from the Council, as soon as possible, to all the information and documents on which it relied to adopt the initial measures in respect of the applicant. It had not received the file of evidence relating to it before bringing the present action, despite having made that request to the Council on 26 March 2019 and repeating it twice, on 2 and 12 April 2019. In that regard, the applicant claims that the failure to produce the file of evidence relating to it shows that, prior to the adoption of the initial measures, the Council was not in possession of any document or factual evidence supporting the statement of reasons contained in those measures, even though the Council is required to compile a file before deciding to impose restrictive measures. It adds that the fact that document WK 54/2019 INIT was provided to it after the present action had been brought shows that it had been artificially created for the purposes of the present proceedings. Accordingly, the reasons for including its name on the lists at issue are unfounded and, consequently, unlawful. At the hearing, the applicant maintained that the Council had sent document WK 54/2019 INIT late and even though the application in the present case had already been lodged.

54      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

55      It should be borne in mind that observance of the rights of the defence includes, inter alia, the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality, which are enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

56      Furthermore, the right to effective judicial protection, which is affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for him or her to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited, and of 21 January 2016, Makhlouf v Council, T‑443/13, not published, EU:T:2016:27, paragraph 38).

57      Article 52(1) of the Charter nevertheless allows limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, provided that the limitation concerned respects the essence of the fundamental right in question and, subject to the principle of proportionality, that it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

58      Lastly, the question whether there is an infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

59      It is in the light of that case-law that the sixth plea must be examined.

60      In the first place, as regards the first complaint, alleging that the applicant was not heard prior to the adoption of the contested measures and that it was unable to exercise its rights of the defence effectively, it should be borne in mind that the EU judicature distinguishes between, on the one hand, the initial entry of an entity’s name on the lists imposing restrictive measures and, on the other, the maintenance of that entity’s name on those lists (judgment of 30 April 2015, Al-Chihabi v Council, T‑593/11, EU:T:2015:249, paragraph 40).

61      First, as regards the initial measures, including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the EU authorities cannot be required to communicate the reasons for those measures before the name of a person or entity is entered on the list imposing restrictive measures for the first time (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 January 2015, Makhlouf v Council, T‑509/11, not published, EU:T:2015:33, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

62      So that its effectiveness may not be jeopardised, such a measure must, by its very nature, be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to apply immediately. In such a case, it is, as a rule, enough if the institution notifies the person or entity concerned of the reasons and affords it the right to be heard at the same time as, or immediately after, the decision is adopted (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61).

63      In the present case, the notification of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 22 January 2019.

64      In addition, by letter of 26 March 2019, the applicant’s representatives, in essence, asked the Council to disclose to them the documents in support of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which the Council did by letter of 13 May 2019.

65      Therefore, it must be held that, in the present case, the fact that the applicant was not heard prior to the initial entry of its name on the lists at issue constitutes a justified limitation of its rights of the defence within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 57 above.

66      That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the applicant’s unsubstantiated argument that there was no urgency or any risk of it compromising the effectiveness of the initial measures by being heard prior to their adoption, while the opportunity to be heard a posteriori did not prevent it from suffering losses.

67      Secondly, as regards the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be borne in mind that, in the case of acts by which the name of a person or entity already included on the lists imposing restrictive measures is maintained, a surprise effect is no longer necessary in order to ensure that those measures are effective, with the result that the adoption of such acts must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by affording the person or entity concerned an opportunity to be heard (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 62).

68      In that regard, the Court of Justice has made clear that the element of protection afforded by the requirement of notification of incriminating evidence and the right to make representations before the adoption of decisions maintaining the name of a person or entity on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is fundamental and essential to the rights of the defence. This is all the more the case because the restrictive measures in question have a considerable effect on the rights and freedoms of the persons and groups concerned (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 64).

69      The purpose of the rule that the addressee of a decision affecting that person or entity adversely must be placed in a position to make representations before that decision is adopted is to enable the authority concerned effectively to take into account all relevant information. In order to ensure that the addressee is in fact protected, the object of that rule is, in particular, to enable it to correct an error or produce such information relating to its personal circumstances as will tell in favour of the decision’s being adopted or not, or of its having this content or that (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 65).

70      However, where maintaining the name of the person or entity concerned on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is based on the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the initial measure without new evidence being adduced, the Council is not obliged, in order to respect the right of that person or entity to be heard, to notify it again of the evidence against it (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council, C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited). There is a requirement to notify incriminating evidence, however, where there is new evidence on which the Council relies in order to update the information concerning the personal situation of the person or entity concerned or the political and security situation in the country against which the restrictive measures regime was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 72).

71      In the present case, first, as regards the 2019 maintaining acts, it should be borne in mind, as indicated in paragraph 67 above, that their adoption must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by affording the applicant the opportunity to be heard.

72      In that regard, it should be noted that, by letter of 26 March 2019, the applicant submitted a first request for access to the document containing the evidence supporting the reasons for including its name on the lists at issue. It repeated its request on 2 and 12 April 2019. The Council granted that request on 13 May 2019, being one month and three weeks after the first request for access and four days before the adoption of the 2019 maintaining acts.

73      It should be recalled that, at the request of the party concerned, the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents within a reasonable period (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2013, Bank Kargoshaei and Others v Council, T‑8/11, not published, EU:T:2013:470, paragraphs 68 and 93).

74      It must be held that, in the circumstances of the present case, the Council failed to provide document WK 54/2019 INIT within a reasonable period. By providing the applicant with that document only four days before the adoption of the 2019 maintaining acts, the Council allowed it too short a period of time to enable it effectively to submit any observations. Thus, it did not ensure that the applicant was properly heard. Moreover, even if the applicant had time to submit its observations to the Council in the time available to it before the adoption of those acts, the Council was left with insufficient time to analyse those observations with the requisite care and attention. Thus, the fundamental and essential element of the protection of the rights of the defence consisting in the notification of incriminating evidence and the right to submit observations on that evidence before the adoption of the 2019 maintaining acts, as referred to in the case-law cited in paragraphs 67 and 69 above, was compromised by the late disclosure to the applicant of the file containing that evidence.

75      It follows that the document containing the evidence in support of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was provided too late in view of the date on which the 2019 maintaining acts were adopted, with the result that the applicant’s rights of the defence were infringed in that regard.

76      That said, it cannot be inferred from all of the foregoing that the late disclosure by the Council to the applicant of the evidence referred to in paragraph 74 above, before the Council adopted the 2019 maintaining acts, entails the annulment of those acts. It is for the EU judicature to verify, where an irregularity affecting the rights of the defence has occurred, whether, in the light of the specific factual and legal circumstances of the case, the procedure at issue could have resulted in a different outcome in so far as the applicant could have been better able to defend itself had there been no irregularity (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council, T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667, paragraph 84; of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 153; and of 13 September 2018, VTB Bank v Council, T‑734/14, not published, EU:T:2018:542, paragraphs 120 and 121).

77      In the present case, the applicant has not specified the arguments or information it could have put forward if it had received the documents at issue earlier nor has it demonstrated that those arguments or that information could have led to a different outcome in its case.

78      Accordingly, the infringement of the applicant’s rights of the defence does not entail, in the circumstances of the present case, the annulment of the 2019 maintaining acts.

79      Secondly, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the Council was not obliged, in order to respect the applicant’s right to be heard, to notify it, in advance and again, of the incriminating evidence. The reasons for the applicant’s listing remained unchanged and the incriminating evidence was identical to that taken into account in the adoption of the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts.

80      It therefore follows from the foregoing that the Council did not infringe the applicant’s rights of the defence in such a way as to justify the annulment of the 2020 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant.

81      Accordingly, the applicant’s first complaint must be rejected.

82      In the second place, the applicant relies, in essence, on a second complaint, alleging that the Council, by not allowing it access ‘in a timely fashion’ to the file containing the information and evidence on which the inclusion of its name on the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts was based, infringed its right to effective judicial protection.

83      First, the applicant claims that the failure to disclose in good time the file containing the information and evidence in support of the inclusion and maintenance of its name on the lists at issue shows that, before the adoption of the initial measures, the Council was not in possession of any document or factual evidence supporting the reasons for the listing.

84      In the present case, the first page of document WK 54/2019 INIT, which contains the evidence in support of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, bears the date 28 February 2019, whereas the initial measures, which included the applicant’s name on those lists for the first time, were adopted on 21 January 2019. In other words, the first page of document WK 54/2019 INIT bears a date subsequent to the date on which the initial measures were adopted.

85      In response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court aimed at confirming the existence of a file of evidence at the time of adoption of the initial measures, the Council contends that document WK 54/2019 INIT bears the date 28 February 2019 due to a technical issue linked to the fact that the document was placed in electronic archives on that date. The Council stated that the evidence in document WK 54/2019 INIT formed part of the proposal for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to the initial measures. The Council produced in that respect document ST 10250/20 of 15 September 2020, containing the proposal for listing the applicant’s name, bearing the reference COREU CFSP/0195/18 and dated 4 December 2018, on which it relied in order to adopt the initial measures. At the hearing, the applicant disputed that that document had been used as a basis for the initial entry of its name on the lists at issue, on account of the format of the document and the fact that the evidence is set out through a series of hyperlinks did not make the document, in the absence of any articulated reasoning, accessible and intelligible.

86      However, it should be pointed out that, first, the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18 is dated 4 December 2018, that is to say, it predates the adoption of the initial measures. Secondly, the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18 contains a series of hyperlinks to the evidence produced in document WK 54/2019 INIT, with the exception of the document relating to an article from the website ‘The Syria Report’, headed ‘Samer Foz, Syria’s Most Powerful Businessman’, published on 19 April 2018 (see paragraph 111 below). Thus, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the Council has demonstrated that it was in possession of a body of evidence before the adoption of the initial measures which supported the reasons for listing set out in those measures. It is therefore necessary to reject as unfounded the applicant’s argument that the disclosure of document WK 54/2019 INIT after the present action had been brought shows that that document was artificially created for the purposes of the present proceedings. Furthermore, the applicant’s argument that the document is unintelligible and inaccessible has no factual basis, since the hyperlinks are to articles that were reproduced in document WK 54/2019 INIT.

87      Next, the applicant submits that the failure to disclose the evidence in support of the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue, even though it requested access to that evidence in good time, that is to say, before the present action was brought, entails an infringement of its right to effective judicial protection.

88      As stated in paragraph 73 above, at the request of the party concerned, the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents within a reasonable period.

89      When assessing the reasonableness of the period for disclosure, it should be borne in mind that, in so far as the person or entity concerned is not afforded the opportunity to be heard before the initial inclusion of its name on the lists at issue, the access to the file referred to above is the first opportunity for it to be made aware of the documents used by the Council in support of that listing and, accordingly, is of particular interest for its defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council, T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

90      In the present case, as pointed out in paragraph 72 above, the applicant asked the Council on 26 March 2019 for access to the file of evidence supporting the reasons for the initial inclusion of its name on the lists at issue. The applicant twice reiterated its request for access, citing the need to have those documents as soon as possible in order to take a decision on the exercise of its rights before the Court. Document WK 54/2019 INIT was sent to the applicant on 13 May 2019, that is to say, after the present action had been brought. In the reply, the applicant confirms that it received document WK 54/2019 INIT.

91      It should be noted that document WK 54/2019 INIT, which seeks to support the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, supplements, in essence, the statement of reasons set out in the initial measures, but was disclosed to the applicant only after a period of one month and three weeks, which cannot be regarded as a negligible period of time. In that regard, contrary to the Council’s contention, the period which elapsed between the date of adoption of the initial measures and the date of the applicant’s request for access cannot justify the Council’s failure to reply within a reasonable period. The Council cannot rely on the period which elapsed before the applicant requested access to the documents concerning it in order to justify the period within which it itself actually granted the request for access. However, as the Council stated at the hearing, there are internal deadlines within the Council for obtaining approval from various bodies in order to send documents. It is true that those internal deadlines must be in line with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 73 and 89 above, in order for the evidence which has been produced and which seeks to support the restrictive measures against a person or entity to be disclosed to that person or entity in sufficient time to enable it to assert its rights before the EU judicature.

92      Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the applicant waited 21 days before the expiry of the time limit for bringing the present action before it sent, on 26 March 2019, the first request for access to the file. Thus, the applicant contributed to shortening the period of time that the Council had available to it to disclose document WK 54/2019 INIT to the applicant before the expiry of that time limit.

93      Consequently, the fact that the Council was not in a position to disclose document WK 54/2019 INIT to the applicant before its action was brought cannot be attributable entirely to the Council.

94      In any event, it is clear that the applicant had access to document WK 54/2019 INIT on 13 May 2019, that is to say, before the Council lodged its defence. It was thus able to state its views on the evidence in that document both in the reply and at the hearing.

95      Accordingly, it must be held that the disclosure of document WK 54/2019 INIT on 13 May 2019 was sufficient to enable the applicant to exercise its right to an effective judicial remedy.

96      In the light of the foregoing, the second complaint and, therefore, the sixth plea in its entirety must be rejected.

 The first plea, alleging an error of assessment

97      In the first place, the applicant does not dispute the facts described in the reasons for including its name on the lists at issue. However, in a first complaint, it submits that it is not a joint venture backed by the Syrian regime and, more particularly, it claims that the Council has adduced no evidence of its association with the Syrian regime or of the fact that it supports or benefits from it. By a second complaint, the applicant claims that the Marota City project to which it contributes cannot be regarded as a regime-backed project. Within the context of that project, it has not developed land expropriated from persons displaced by the conflict in Syria, which prevented those persons from being able to return to their homes. In the reply, it claims that the land on which the Marota City project is to be developed has not been the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and that the Damascus neighbourhoods in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict in Syria.

98      In the second place, in the second statement of modification, the applicant submits that Mr Bashar Assi, himself wrongly included on the lists at issue, is no longer a member of its board of directors and is therefore no longer its chairman. Thus, the Council’s previous accusation that the applicant is linked to Mr Assi is unfounded and the Council’s assertion that that past link justifies the sanctions imposed on the applicant is incorrect.

99      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

 Preliminary observations

100    It should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, inter alia, that the EU judicature ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that the judicial review is not limited to the assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but focuses on whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

101    It is for the EU judicature, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

102    It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121).

103    For that purpose, there is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU judicature all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the measure sought to be annulled. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122).

104    If the competent EU authority provides relevant information or evidence, the EU judicature must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).

105    In accordance with the Court of Justice’s case-law, the assessment as to whether a listing was well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation, but in the context in which it fits (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 51, and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 50).

106    Lastly, in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime to stop the violent repression against the population and of the difficulty of obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

107    It should be borne in mind, as is apparent from paragraphs 44 and 45 above, that the listing of the applicant’s name is based on the criterion defined in Article 27(1) and Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of association with the regime).

108    It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine the applicant’s first plea and its arguments seeking, in essence, to call into question the sole reason for listing, namely that of association with the Syrian regime.

 The evidence submitted by the Council

109    In order to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council produced document WK 54/2019 INIT containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots from:

–        the website ‘The Syria Report’, which contains a first article, published on 19 April 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Samer Foz, Syria’s Most Powerful Businessman’, which states that Mr Samer Foz became one of the most powerful players in the Syrian economy; he is believed to have close ties to President Bashar Al-Assad and to have acted as intermediary between the Democratic Union Party (Syrian Kurdistan) (PYD) and the Islamic State to trade wheat; that article also states that Mr Foz is responsible for the day-to-day management of Aman Holding, which was established in 1988 by Mr Foz’s father; according to that article, Aman Holding, together with Damascus Cham Holding, established a joint venture called Aman Dimashq, with a capital of 10 thousand million Syrian pounds (SYP) (approximately USD 18.9 million and approximately EUR 16.8 million); the applicant was responsible for developing construction projects, including the ‘Basateen Al-Razi’ project in the Mazeeh neighbourhood of Damascus, which is now referred to as the ‘Marota City project’, on expropriated land that was inhabited by people who supported the opposition to the Syrian regime; in addition, the Marota City project is controversial because it is based, first, on Decree No 66/2012, which allows for the expropriation of homeowners in two districts of Damascus and, secondly, on Decree No 19/2015, which authorises governorates and municipalities to establish private joint-stock companies to manage assets within their administrative boundaries; lastly, according to that article, in September 2017, Damascus Cham Holding, which is the investment arm of the Damascus Governorate, granted the applicant the right to build 3 skyscrapers with up to 70 floors each and 5 residential buildings, valued at USD 312 million (approximately EUR 278.1 million);

–        the website ‘The Syria Report’, which contains an article of 16 January 2018 headed ‘Syrian Investor Signs Deal Over [Basateen] Al-Razi Project’, and a second article of 1 June 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Marota City, Syria’s Most Controversial Investment Project’ where it is stated that the development project for the upscale city referred to as ‘Marota City’ is a project backed by the Syrian regime under Decree No 66/2012, which allowed the expropriation and redevelopment of certain lower socio-economic tiers of land, including the Mazeeh neighbourhood, called Basateen Al-Razi, situated in Damascus; Marota City is the new name given to the neighbourhood covering 2.15 million square metres; that area is located at the south-west entrance to the capital Damascus and is close to the city centre, the embassies and the security services, which makes it attractive to real estate developers; those articles also state that private company Damascus Cham Holding is owned by the Damascus Governorate and created, with Mr Foz in July 2017, the joint venture Aman Dimashq, with a capital of SYP 10 thousand million (USD 18.9 million); those articles add that Aman Holding owns the majority share in the joint venture and has three representatives on its board of directors; in addition, it is stated that, in September 2017, Damascus Cham Holding granted the applicant the right to build 3 skyscrapers with up to 70 floors each and 5 residential buildings, valued at USD 312 million; lastly, according to those articles, Mr Foz has become one of the most powerful economic players and his ascent to the upper echelons of Syria’s business elite is attributed to his close ties to President Bashar Al-Assad;

–        the website ‘The Syria Report’, which, in a final article, includes, in a list of joint ventures created between Damascus Cham Holding and private investors, published on 17 April 2018, the applicant, which was created in September 2017 by, on the one hand, Mr Foz, as sole shareholder of the applicant through his company Aman Holding, and, on the other, the company owned by the Damascus Governorate, Damascus Cham Holding, in order to develop the Marota City project; it is stated that Mr Foz owns the majority share in that joint venture; it has a capital of USD 18.9 million, the list of projects developed by that joint venture is set out in detail and reference is made to the development of three skyscrapers and five residential buildings, with a total investment cost of SYP 150 thousand million (approximately USD 312 million);

–        Damascus Cham Holding’s website ‘Damacham.sy’, the page from which is dated 5 September 2017 and was accessed on 20 September 2018, according to which the founding general assembly of the applicant took place on 7 October 2017 at the Damascus Cham Holding headquarters, which is located on the site of the Marota City project; according to that website, the chairman of the board of directors of Damascus Cham Holding and that of the board of directors of Aman Holding, a number of senior executives from both companies and a representative from the Syrian Chamber of Commerce and Consumer Protection were present; in addition, the project carried out by the applicant is, in view of its scale, one of the most important and largest of the Marota City project and the investment value exceeds SYP 150 thousand million;

–        the Syrian Government’s website ‘66.damascus.gov.sy’, which, on a page dated 18 September 2012, reproduces the part of Decree No 66/2012 which states that the south-east neighbourhood of Mazeeh in Damascus is one of two areas designated for a residential and commercial development project;

–        the website ‘Eqtsad News’, which, in an article published on 14 January 2018 headed ‘You know them … Big businessmen are sharing a project behind Al-Razi’, describes the Marota City project as a project backed by the Syrian regime through which the regime is supporting loyal businesspersons; in addition, Damascus Cham Holding is administering the project, signs the contracts and allocates partnership interests to businesspersons, and that function was entrusted to it by the Damascus Governorate; according to that article, Mr Foz signed a contract with the Damascus province involving an investment of SYP 150 thousand million in the construction of a number of buildings;

–        the website ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, which, in an article published in April 2018, sets out the motives behind the adoption of Decree No 66/2012; that source states that, according to the Syrian authorities, Decree No 66/2012 sought to improve the living conditions of inhabitants by replacing poorly constructed properties with more modern and comfortable ones; according to that article, only two residential areas of Damascus, the inhabitants of which supported the opposition, were designated in that decree, while the decree left intact neighbourhoods of Damascus where the inhabitants lived in similar conditions, but, by contrast, supported the Syrian regime; lastly, the article states that the decree will facilitate the rapid development of major development projects as a source of enrichment for businesspersons close to the regime, while serving as a punitive instrument against sections of the population opposed to the Syrian regime;

–        the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, which, in an article published on 6 April 2018, headed ‘Alliance of Companies Monopolizes New Damascus Development Organizations’, states that businesspersons close to the Syrian regime are investing in new development projects driven by that regime in Damascus and its suburbs; according to that source, those businesspersons are selected by the Syrian regime on the basis of their obedience, loyalty and foreign business links;

–        the website ‘Brookings Institution’, which published a report dated June 2018 headed ‘Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States’ referring to the measures adopted by the Syrian regime, including Decree No 66/2012, in order to seize land and property, punish opponents, reward persons close to the Syrian regime and governors, reassert authority in the territory, tighten control over the Syrian economy and ‘alter’ Syria’s demography to achieve what Mr Bashar Al-Assad has described as a ‘healthier and more homogeneous society’; according to that report, the Syrian regime, on the basis of new and pre-existing legislation, expropriated neighbourhoods in Damascus that were known as pro-opposition areas and property belonging to displaced persons suspected of supporting the opposition in order to benefit certain businesspersons; lastly, according to that article, the development project for the luxury city ‘Marota City’ is cited in that report as the most vivid example of that policy;

–        the website ‘Open Democracy’, which, in an article published on 5 September 2017 headed ‘Militias and Crony Capitalism to Hamper Syria Reconstruction’, mentions the benefits which the Syrian regime derives from Decree No 66/2012, in particular as an investment instrument for rapid and large-scale development projects benefiting allies of the regime operating at the same time as a punitive force against populations opposed to the regime; according to that article, the development of residential projects will be carried out by holding companies owned by governorates or municipalities, but the development and management of those projects will be contracted to private sector companies owned by investors linked to the regime; in addition, that article states that, in August 2017, Aman Holding, managed by Mr Foz, who has close links to the Syrian regime, announced its contribution to the reconstruction of the Basateen Al-Razi area in the Mazeeh neighbourhood of Damascus, in partnership with the Damascus Governorate through its company Damascus Cham Holding; according to the article, the applicant, a joint venture established by Aman Holding, was created to carry out that project and has a capital of USD 18.9 million;

–        the website ‘Reuters’, which states, in an article published on a page consulted on 14 November 2013, that Aman Holding acts on behalf of the Syrian regime in grain deals; in particular, according to that article, the Aman Holding Group, run by the Foz family from the coastal city of Latakia (Syria), acts as a broker for grain deals for Hoboob, a company owned by the Syrian State;

–        the website ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, which, on a page dated 25 March 2016, describes Mr Foz as the most powerful Syrian economic player in the country; in addition, according to that article, Mr Foz invests in a company licensed exclusively to produce sugar; it is also stated that Mr Foz benefited from the sale by auction of property owned by opponents to the Syrian regime and from the acquisition of property belonging to businesspersons marginalised by the Syrian regime; it is also clear from that article that Mr Foz imports and distributes goods according to the demands of the Syrian regime; lastly, that article refers to Mr Foz as the founder of a group called ‘Military Security Shield Forces’, which fought alongside President Bashar Al-Assad in Latakia;

–        the website ‘Sasa Post’, which, in an article published on 7 April 2018, states that Mr Foz funded the Military Security Shield Forces, which is described as a paramilitary group belonging to the ‘Military Intelligence Division’.

110    At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the measure was adopted (see judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). Consequently, it is incumbent on the Court to take into account only those facts which existed at the time of the adoption of the contested measures and on which the Council relied at that date (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 127, and of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraphs 102 to 104).

111    First, it should be pointed out that the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’, dated 19 April 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Samer Foz, Syria’s Most Powerful Businessman’, which is contained in document WK 54/2019 INIT, does not correspond to any of the hyperlinks to the articles in document WK 54/2019 INIT that are listed in the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18. In response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the Council confirmed that it was not in possession of the article of 19 April 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ when the initial measures were adopted. Thus, in the light of the explanations given by the Council at the hearing, it must be inferred that that article was not part of the evidence on which it relied in order to adopt the initial measures. Therefore, that article must be disregarded when reviewing the legality of the initial measures.

112    Conversely, since the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 19 April 2018 is mentioned in document WK 54/2019 INIT and served as the basis for the adoption by the Council of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be taken into account when analysing the legality of those acts.

113    Secondly, the article from the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’, which was wrongly stated by the Council in the defence as forming part of document WK 54/2019 INIT, must be excluded from the analysis of the legality of all the contested measures.

114    That article is neither part of the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18 nor part of document WK 54/2019 INIT, with the result that, since it is not part of the evidence on which the Council relied in order to adopt the contested measures, it must be disregarded, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 110 above. In any event, even if it were accepted, as the Council states in its replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020, that that article contains only background information relating to the general situation in Syria, it should be noted that the Council did not produce it as an annex to the defence, in the body of which it is nevertheless referred to, or to the rejoinder, nor did it attach it as an annex to the said replies. Consequently, the article from the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’ cannot be admitted in the examination of the legality of the contested measures.

 The reliability of the evidence produced by the Council

115    The applicant disputes the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council in document WK 54/2019 INIT, claiming that that document is merely a compilation of screenshots of partisan websites and press articles, devoid of any probative value and not ‘seriously documented’.

116    More specifically and first, as regards the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, the applicant states, first of all, that it is a Syrian news publication company which claims to be ‘editorially and politically independent’. Next, the applicant submits that the main function of that website is to translate articles from Syrian publications into English without, however, verifying the content of those publications. That website also states that it does not endorse the viewpoints expressed in the abovementioned publications. Furthermore, according to that website, articles are selected on the basis of two criteria, namely the seriousness of the publication and the extent to which the article reflects the authors’ political positions.

117    Secondly, as regards the website ‘The Syria Report’, the applicant notes, first of all, that that Syrian news website is structured around a ‘large database of news, data and statistics, including a database of Syrian institutions’. It is primarily an economic news bulletin. Next, the applicant states that A is the founder and editor of the website ‘The Syria Report’ as well as co-founder of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’. According to the applicant, that explains why the websites ‘The Syria Report’ and ‘The Syrian Observer’ often publish the same information and opinions in different forms and in different publications. In so doing, those websites give the impression that the published information is widely shared by different media and could therefore be considered as objective. Furthermore, the applicant expresses doubts as to the integrity of A, who, according to the applicant, in his capacity as visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, works closely with the EU institutions, including the Council, on issues concerning Syria, in particular in view of the fact that he has published reports on Syria’s war economy and decentralisation during the war. In that context, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Council uses its links with A in order to obtain articles supporting the policies that it intends to apply before those articles are published on those websites, in order to use them subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. In support of that claim, the applicant produces a page taken from the website ‘News Deeply’ containing a short description of A and an article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’. Lastly, the applicant submits that the website ‘The Syria Report’ failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, since it never approached the applicant in order to verify the content of the information published on its website or to seek its views on that information.

118    In the reply to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 23 July 2020, the Council maintains that it has no information concerning the sources of information on which it relied other than what can be inferred from document WK 54/2019 INIT. Next, it reproduces information that is publicly available on the internet concerning the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Reuters’, ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, ‘The Syrian Observer’, ‘Brookings Institution’, ‘Eqtsad News’, ‘Open Democracy’ and ‘Zaman al-Wasl’. At the hearing, in its observations on the second statement of modification, the Council contested the applicant’s arguments and argued that the applicant’s assertions do not call into question the reliability of those sources.

119    It should be borne in mind, first, that in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to stop the violent repression against the population, and of the difficulty in obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

120    Secondly, pursuant to settled case-law, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before them which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains, and in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 224, and of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 107 (not published)).

121    In the present case, as regards the applicant’s argument that most of the press articles are not ‘seriously documented’, it should be pointed out that the state of war in Syria makes it difficult, if not impossible, in practice, to gather evidence from persons who are prepared to be identified and the ensuing difficulties of investigation and the danger to which those providing information are exposed constitute a barrier to the production of precise sources of personal conduct in support of the regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, point 204).

122    Furthermore, it should be observed, first of all, that the evidence in document WK 54/2019 INIT, the probative value of which is disputed by the applicant, comes from digital information sources of various origins, not only local but also foreign. Thus, the local information sources include ‘The Syria Report’, the leading source of economic, business and financial information on Syria, which is independent and not connected with any religious, social or political organisation; ‘The Syrian Observer’, an online news service which essentially collects and translates into English news content produced by the official Syrian press, opposition groups to the regime or civil society and which is financed by donors, including, inter alia, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, a Syrian news website; ‘Eqtsad News’, a press body forming part of ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, which belongs to the largest media group independent of the Syrian regime. The foreign information sources include ‘Reuters’, a reputable press agency; ‘Open Democracy’, a website that examines social and political issues whose founders are active in established media and in political activism and whose contributors include internationally known figures; ‘Brookings Institution’, a leading US think tank, and ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, an independent not-for-profit organisation recognised in France as a public benefit foundation. In addition, the Council produced pages from the websites of Damascus Cham Holding and the Syrian Government. Those various sources relay corroborating information, with the result that the applicant cannot rely solely on the fact that they are screenshots of websites and press articles in order to challenge their soundness and reliability.

123    Moreover, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, it should be noted, first of all, that the description of that source of information contains nothing to cast doubt on its reliability. On the contrary, by indicating in a transparent manner that the content of the articles published on that website is not systematically verified, that source informs its readers that it may be necessary to cross-reference the information communicated by the published articles in order to assess its veracity. That is why it is also useful that that website publishes articles from various sources, some close to the Syrian regime and others opposing it. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected.

124    The same applies to the applicant’s arguments concerning the website ‘The Syria Report’. More specifically, as regards the claim that that publication failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, it is clear that, first of all, the applicant does not specify the rules under which it should have been approached by that website. Furthermore, there is nothing in the file to indicate that the applicant reacted to that alleged failure to comply with such rules, in particular by bringing an action for defamation. Lastly, and in any event, the fact that the applicant was not contacted in order to verify the information relayed, even if that were true, is not, in itself, sufficient to refute the reliability of the information published on that website. That argument must therefore be rejected.

125    Next, as regards, first, the applicant’s claim that the websites ‘The Syrian Observer’ and ‘The Syria Report’ essentially publish the same information in order to make it appear objective, it is clear, first of all, that the applicant has adduced no evidence demonstrating this alleged collusion. Nor does it follow from document WK 54/2019 INIT that the information published on those two websites is so similar as to attest to any such collusion. At the hearing, in support of its claim, the applicant argued that the articles whose reliability is disputed were cross-referenced and overlapped because they come from a single source of information. In that regard, it should be noted that, irrespective of the fact that A is the editor of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’ and co-founder of the website ‘The Syria Report’, the fact that two sources publish the same information cannot be sufficient to call into question the reliability of that information, since it is commonplace, in journalism, for different newspapers or news sites to relay the same facts. Lastly, at the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that some of the information reported on Damascus Cham Holding’s website, which also appears in the article from ‘The Syria Report’, is correct, with the result that, even if it was presented subjectively by the author, it is nonetheless reliable. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected.

126    As regards, secondly, the doubts expressed by the applicant as to A’s integrity, it is clear that the applicant has not put forward any evidence in support of that claim. The applicant’s brief description of A does not mention the existence of relations between A and the Council. Nor can that circumstance be inferred from the article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’ of which A is the author. Lastly, the applicant also fails to explain what interest A would have in publishing articles supporting the policies which the Council intends to apply, in order for those articles to be used subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. That argument must therefore be rejected.

127    In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds, in the absence of any material in the file capable of calling into question the reliability of the sources used by the Council, that they must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 120 above.

 Association with the Syrian regime

128    It should be borne in mind that, according to the sole reason for listing, the applicant benefits from the Syrian regime and supports it by virtue of its participation in the development of the Marota City project, a luxury development project backed by the Syrian regime, and its status as a joint venture between Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding.

129    It is necessary to ascertain whether all of the evidence submitted by the Council discharges the burden of proof incumbent on it under the case-law referred to in paragraph 102 above and thus constitutes a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia to support the sole reason for listing.

130    As a preliminary point, the applicant’s argument that it no longer has any link with Mr Assi, referred in paragraph 98 above, must be rejected as ineffective, since it is not apparent from the reasons for listing that the Council relied on that link in order to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

131    Next, it should be noted that, first, the applicant admits, in the application, that it is a joint venture formed by the companies Foz Trading, Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding, which are shareholders of the applicant. Article 8 of its articles of association, dated 5 October 2018 and produced by the applicant, confirms the identity of its shareholders. In that respect, Foz Trading owns 11% of the shares, Aman Holding owns 40% and Damascus Cham Holding owns 49%. It is also apparent from that article that the total capital value of the joint venture is USD 18.9 million, as stated in the reasons for listing. In the contested measures, the Council identified the applicant as having its headquarters in Damascus, which the applicant also confirmed in the application.

132    Secondly, the applicant acknowledges in the application that its company objects consist in the development of new residential, commercial and leisure buildings on a portion (approximately 3.1% of the size) of the plots of the Marota City project contributed in kind in the capital of Damascus Cham Holding, which oversees the rights to 30% of the plots of the Marota City project. In addition, the applicant confirms its involvement in the Marota City project by providing, as an annex to the reply, a presentation of that project in which its role is described. Thus, the applicant acknowledges that it is involved in the Marota City project.

133    However, the applicant denies that it has any link to the Syrian regime as a result of its participation in the development of the Marota City project. In that regard, it submits, in a first complaint, that it is not a joint venture that is supported by the Syrian regime and, on that basis, is neither personally nor in any way linked to the Syrian regime. In a second complaint, it submits that, in the context of the Marota City project, it did not develop expropriated land belonging to persons that were displaced because of the conflict in Syria, which prevented them from returning to their homes. Furthermore, the land on which the Marota City project will be developed has not been the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and the neighbourhoods of Damascus in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria.

134    In the first place, in order to analyse the first complaint, it is necessary to ascertain whether the applicant has links to the Syrian regime. For that purpose, it is necessary to turn to its shareholders.

135    First, as regards Aman Holding, it is apparent from numerous items of evidence taken from, inter alia, the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Eqtsad News’ and ‘Open Democracy’, that Mr Foz is the director of that company. As is apparent from the websites ‘Open Democracy’, ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, ‘Sasa post’ and ‘Reuters’, Mr Foz became one of the most powerful economic players in Syria and his ascent to the upper echelons of Syria’s business elite is attributed to his close links to the Syrian president. Furthermore, in the analysis of the legality of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it is apparent from the article of 19 April 2018, taken from the website ‘The Syria Report’, that Mr Foz is responsible for the day-to-day management of Aman Holding, including its subsidiaries such as Foz Trading, which is also a shareholder of the applicant. As is clear from that article, Aman Holding was established in 1988 by Mr Foz’s father. The applicant did not dispute the evidence produced by the Council on that point.

136    Secondly, as regards Damascus Cham Holding, the articles from the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Open Democracy’ and ‘Eqtsad News’ show that that company was created by the Damascus Governorate. The articles from ‘The Syria Report’, published on 17 April and 1 June 2018, state that Damascus Cham Holding is owned by the Damascus Governorate. This is confirmed by the company’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in the replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020. The website ‘Open Democracy’ mentions a partnership between Aman Holding and the Syrian regime, through its company Damascus Cham Holding, for the development of the project at Basateen Al-Razi. Furthermore, Damascus Cham Holding’s website states that, at the applicant’s founding general assembly, a representative of the Syrian Chamber of Commerce and Consumer Protection was present. In addition, Damascus Cham Holding’s function relating to the administration of the Marota City project, the signing of contracts and the allocation of stakes to businesspersons was entrusted to it by the Damascus Governorate, as is apparent from the website ‘Eqtsad News’. Thus, the website ‘Open Democracy’ states that the development of residential projects under Decree No 66/2012 will be carried out by holding companies owned by governorates or municipalities, but that the development and organisation of those projects will be allocated to private sector undertakings owned by investors linked to the regime. Lastly, in the analysis of the legality of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be noted that the article ‘The Syria Report’, published on 19 April 2018, identifies Damascus Cham Holding as the investment arm of the Damascus Governorate.

137    Furthermore, it is apparent from Decree No 19/2015 that Syrian legislation authorises the establishment by governorates of private joint stock companies, such as Damascus Cham Holding, which is a shareholder of the applicant.

138    It follows from the foregoing that the shareholders of the applicant, namely Aman Holding and Foz Trading, on the one hand, and Damascus Cham Holding, on the other, have links to the Syrian regime because of the involvement within them of, respectively, Mr Foz and the Damascus Governorate, which means that the applicant itself has such links. Furthermore, in view of the background to the applicant’s creation, it must be concluded that it is a joint venture supported by the Syrian regime. The applicant’s first complaint must therefore be rejected.

139    That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

140    First of all, the applicant claims that the Damascus Governorate, which formed Damascus Cham Holding, is an entity that is separate from the Syrian State. Given the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime, the Council was entitled to regard as a matter of common experience the fact that the activities of the Damascus Governorate could not have prospered had it not received favours from that regime and provided it with a degree of support in return (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Anbouba v Council, T‑592/11, not published, EU:T:2013:427, paragraph 48). Moreover, the applicant’s argument is a general assertion, which is not substantiated by any specific evidence illustrating, for example, the decentralised institutional organisation of the Syrian regime within which governorates enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis the President or the Syrian regime. That argument must therefore be rejected.

141    Next, the applicant submits that Decree No 66/2012 merely enjoined the Damascus Governorate to allow the creation of private companies. However, it should be noted that, in support of that submission, the applicant does not substantiate its claim, citing, for example, the article of the decree which contains the alleged order, nor does it explain how that would call into question the existence of a link between the applicant and the Syrian regime. Moreover, the existence of such an order is evidence that the Marota City project and the involvement in the project of Damascus Cham Holding and, consequently, the applicant, are clearly supported by the Syrian regime.

142    In addition, the applicant claims that the Damascus Governorate merely authorised the formation of Damascus Cham Holding but does not participate in the company’s activities. However, that claim is contradicted by the statement in the application that Damascus Cham Holding was formed ‘in order to centralise and coordinate the involvement of real estate developers interested in participating in the development of the 30% of the shares owned by the [Damascus] Governorate in the [Marota City] project, “by entering into partnerships with them”’. In addition, paragraph (D) of Article 2, headed ‘Purpose of the Company (Objectives)’, of Damascus Cham Holding’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020, states that Damascus Cham Holding carries out various tasks in favour of the Damascus Governorate and under its supervision. Consequently, the Damascus Governorate cannot be regarded as having merely formed Damascus Cham Holding and as being wholly unrelated to its activities. On the contrary, by the evidence adduced and the arguments put forward, the applicant confirms what is apparent from the evidence produced by the Council, namely that Damascus Cham Holding is the company of the Damascus Governorate through which it participates in partnerships with private undertakings. This is confirmed by that company’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in its replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 23 July 2020. It is also apparent from those articles that, of the eight members who, in addition to the Governor of Damascus, make up that company’s board of directors, four must be experts in trade, law and finance, not forming part of the Damascus Governorate, but appointed by it. The articles of association also state that the Damascus Governorate, as chairman of the company’s board of directors, has a casting vote. Thus, it follows from all of those factors that Damascus Cham Holding was created by the Damascus Governorate and is an instrument controlled by the latter for the purpose of participating in the Marota City project. That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the fact that that company is governed by private law.

143    The applicant’s argument that no public entity holds shares in its capital must therefore also be rejected. Through Damascus Cham Holding, the Damascus Governorate, which is a public entity, indirectly holds shares in its capital.

144    Lastly, the applicant submits that Damascus Cham Holding does not have the majority on its board of directors, which, it is argued, clearly means that the legal and operational procedures conducted by the applicant originate from the private sector and not the public sector.

145    It is true that, within the applicant, Aman Holding is the applicant’s majority shareholder, since Damascus Cham Holding has only two members on the board of directors, whereas Aman Holding has three representatives on the board, according to the articles published on 17 April and 1 June 2018 on the website ‘The Syria Report’. That composition of the applicant’s board of directors is confirmed by Article 13 of its articles of association.

146    However, in arguing that Damascus Cham Holding does not have the majority, and therefore the decision-making power, on its board of directors, the applicant nevertheless acknowledges that Damascus Cham Holding has privileged access to its board of directors. Furthermore, it is apparent from the content of the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 1 June 2018, that it is Damascus Cham Holding which granted the applicant the right to construct 3 skyscrapers, each with up to 70 floors, and 5 residential buildings as part of the Marota City project, which the applicant does not dispute. Thus, in addition to holding shares in the applicant, Damascus Cham Holding does have a certain decision-making power on the applicant’s board of directors.

147    Moreover, even if it is accepted that the applicant’s legal and operational procedures originate from the private sector and not the public sector, as the applicant submits, that would have no bearing on the fact that the applicant has links to the Syrian regime.

148    In the second place, as regards the second complaint concerning, in essence, the Marota City project as referred to in paragraph 133 above, the following should be noted.

149    First, it must be borne in mind that the applicant has acknowledged participating in the development of the Marota City project. In that regard, the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’, published on 16 January and 1 June 2018, even mention that the applicant was created, in particular, in order to carry out the Marota City project. In addition, it is apparent from the articles of 16 January, 17 April and 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ and from Damascus Cham Holding’s website that that project is a large-scale project. That was confirmed by the applicant through the presentation of the Marota City project which it produced in the present action and from which it is apparent that the project for which it is responsible relates to, inter alia, the development of commercial complexes, residential buildings and leisure buildings on an area representing a portion (approximately 3.1% of the size) of the plots contributed in kind in the capital of Damascus Cham Holding, which oversees the rights to 30% of the plots in the Marota City project, the total size of which covers 2.15 million square metres.

150    In addition, the evidence produced by the Council, in particular the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 1 June 2018, and the list of joint ventures created by Damascus Cham Holding, published on 17 April 2018, detail the projects developed by the applicant, namely the construction of 3 skyscrapers, each with up to 70 floors, and 5 residential buildings. According to the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’ published on 16 January, 17 April and 1 June 2018, and Damascus Cham Holding’s website, that investment had a value of USD 312 million, which is equivalent to SYP 150 thousand million. Damascus Cham Holding’s website describes the project carried out by the applicant as being, in view of its scale, one of the most important and largest of the Marota City project. Lastly, the ‘Brookings Institution’ report describes the general Marota City project as a luxury construction project. It is thus apparent from the evidence produced by the Council that, by reason of both its scale and investment value, the portion of the Marota City project entrusted to the applicant is significant.

151    Secondly, the precise location of the Marota City project provides some evidence as to its link to the Syrian regime. The Marota City project is situated in the Basateen Al-Razi neighbourhood in Mazeeh, at the south-west entrance to Damascus, as is apparent from a combined reading of the website ‘Open Democracy’ and the articles published on 16 January and 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’. According to the latter article, published on 1 June 2018, that area is close to the city centre, the embassies and the security services. That location makes it attractive to real estate developers. In the application, the applicant confirms that location and adduces, as annexes to the reply, a series of maps and satellite photographs confirming the geographical location of the Marota City project.

152    In that regard, it is apparent from a reading of all the information produced by the Council and taken from the websites of Damascus Cham Holding, the Syrian Government, ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, ‘Brookings Institution’ and the article published on 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ that the Syrian regime adopted Decree No 66/2012 in order to develop large-scale real estate projects, including the Marota City Project, on expropriated land. More specifically, the websites of the Syrian Government and ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’ indicate that the south-east neighbourhood of Mazeeh in Damascus is one of two areas designated by Decree No 66/2012 for carrying out residential and commercial redevelopment.

153    It follows from the foregoing that, by participating in the Marota City project, the applicant benefits from the Syrian regime, but also supports it. First, it benefits from a partnership the investment value of which has been estimated at USD 312 million, which represents a significant sum and, secondly, it contributes to the implementation of the policies which the Syrian regime seeks to put in place through large-scale reconstruction projects.

154    That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

155    First of all, the applicant submits that the Marota City project is not built on expropriated land that belonged to persons displaced by the conflict in Syria. It submits, to that effect, that the land on which the Marota City project is built was never subject to compulsory expropriation, but rather was the subject of negotiation with the owners of unregulated housing situated on that land. In addition, it adds, in essence, that a rent allowance was paid to owners of unregulated housing who did not wish to sell their property. It should be noted that those arguments are irrelevant, since they do not affect the benefit which the applicant derives from the Syrian regime or the support provided by that regime to the Marota City project.

156    Next, the applicant’s line of argument that the land on which the Marota City project is to be built was not the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and that the neighbourhoods of Damascus in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria is ineffective, since the Council has not submitted that that land was the scene of such conflicts.

157    Lastly, the applicant disputes the significance of its participation in the Marota City project. In that regard, the applicant submits that it did not make significant investments. According to the applicant, the percentage it holds in the Marota City project represents only 0.00445% of the project. However, that argument must be rejected. The Syrian regime’s backing of the Marota City project has been proved. Therefore, the applicant’s degree of participation in the Marota City project is not, in itself, decisive for assessing the link to the Syrian regime which it has and maintains. The applicant’s argument does not deprive of any factual basis the reason for including and maintaining its name on the lists at issue, namely that it supports and benefits from the Syrian regime.

158    In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the Council has demonstrated that the applicant is an undertaking which was created jointly by Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding and has a capital of USD 18.9 million. In addition, it is involved in the Marota City project, that is to say, a large-scale development project backed by the Syrian regime for the purpose of implementing its policies in the neighbourhoods which were politically opposed to it, while allowing certain entities as well as businesspersons close to it to benefit from it.

159    Thus, it must be concluded that the Council has adduced a set of specific, precise and consistent indicia capable of demonstrating that the applicant supports the Syrian regime and/or benefits from it. Therefore, the sole reason for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue owing to its association with the Syrian regime is sufficiently substantiated, with the result that that listing is well founded.

160    Accordingly, the first plea must be rejected as unfounded.

 The fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of power’

161    In support of its plea, the applicant argues that the Council adopted the contested measures in order to target not the Syrian regime but the applicant itself, although it has at all times, first, complied with the sanctions ordered by the European Union and the international community and, secondly, remained independent of the Syrian regime. Thus, the applicant claims that it is excluded from the market in order to favour other business operators. In submitting that argument, the applicant must be regarded as pleading a misuse of powers.

162    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

163    It should be borne in mind that a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

164    In the present case, the applicant merely raises suspicions as to the existence of an ‘abuse of power’ and does not explain how the Council pursued an objective other than that of exerting pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to change its policies of repression. The applicant has in no way substantiated that claim or adduced any evidence or argument in support of it.

165    In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected.

 The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity

166    First, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures concerning it are disproportionate. The applicant submits that, in view of the fact that a substantial part of its business is conducted with European and international suppliers and customers and that it is therefore excluded from international trade, some of the numerous contracts which it has concluded are null and void, which renders it liable to its customers and contractual partners.

167    Secondly, it takes the view, in essence, that the contested measures infringe its right to property and its freedom to pursue an economic activity, which also constitutes an infringement of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

168    Thirdly, the applicant submits, in the first and second statements of modification, that the extension of the restrictive measures concerning it under, respectively, the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for it.

169    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

170    It should be borne in mind that it is apparent from case-law that the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, namely the right to property, enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, and the freedom to pursue an economic activity, enshrined in Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter, are not absolute rights and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity of the person or entity subject to that measure, so causing harm to that person or entity. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is, however, such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the persons or entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 115).

171    Furthermore, while respect for fundamental rights is a condition for the legality of EU acts, according to established case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection under EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society. Consequently, restrictions may be placed on the use of those rights, provided that they actually correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in the light of the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which would undermine the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).

172    Moreover, it is clear from settled case-law that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is referred to in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122; of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 60 (not published); and of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 149).

173    As regards the applicant’s right to property and freedom to pursue an economic activity, it is true that those rights are restricted by the restrictive measures concerning it, since it cannot, inter alia, make use of any of its funds which may be situated in the territory of the European Union, nor transfer them to the European Union, unless given special authorisation.

174    However, in the present case, the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant is appropriate, since it is compatible with an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as the protection of civilian populations. The freezing of funds, financial assets and other economic resources cannot, in themselves, be regarded as inappropriate (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

175    As regards the allegedly disproportionate nature of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it should be borne in mind that Article 28(6) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 16 of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provide for the possibility, first, to authorise the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, secondly, to grant specific authorisation for the release of certain funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 364, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 127).

176    It follows that, given the overriding importance of the protection of civilian populations in Syria, any restrictions on the applicant’s rights caused by the contested measures are justified by an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate to the aims pursued.

177    Lastly, as regards the extension of the temporal application of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant, pursuant to the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, which, according to the applicant, exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for it, it should be pointed out that, in the context of such restrictive measures, the Council is required to carry out a periodic re-examination, in accordance with the second and third sentences of Article 34 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and with Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, which entails each time the possibility for the person or entity concerned to put forward arguments and submit facts supporting its assertions (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraphs 106 and 107).

178    Accordingly, the Council was entitled, on the basis of a re-examination of whether to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, to decide to extend those restrictive measures until 1 June 2020, and then until 1 June 2021.

179    In the light of all of the foregoing, the second and third pleas, taken together, must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

180    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

181    In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Aman Dimashq JSC to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 November 2021.

Table of contents

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

Procedure and forms of order sought

Law

The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to a fair trial and the right to effective judicial protection

The first plea, alleging an error of assessment

Preliminary observations

The evidence submitted by the Council

The reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council

Association with the Syrian regime

The fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of power’

The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity

Costs

*      Language of the case: English.

1      This judgment is published in extract form.

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