Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

6 May 2019 (*)

(Civil service — Contract staff — Fixed-term contract — Initial rejection by the applicant of the offer of extension of contract — Resignation — Refusal of entitlement to unemployment benefits — Liability)

In Case T‑271/18,

Walter Mauritsch, former member of the contract staff of the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency, residing in Vienna (Austria), represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA), represented by I. Ramallo, acting as Agent, and by A. Duron, lawyer,

defendant,

ACTION based on Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment, firstly of the decision of the INEA of 24 January 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 4 October 2017 and, secondly, the decision of the INEA of 2 August 2017 rejecting the applicant’s request for compensation of 10 April 2017, and, second, compensation for the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of those decisions.

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of H. Kanninen, President, J. Schwarcz (Rapporteur) and C. Iliopoulos, Judges,

Registrar: E. Coulon,

gives the following

Judgment

 Background to the dispute

1        The applicant, Mr Walter Mauritsch, was recruited by the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) on 16 February 2015 as a member of the contract staff in function group IV, grade 14, step 1, for a period of 2 years.

2        On several occasions the applicant complained about his working conditions. During a meeting on 7 September 2016, the applicant orally informed his Head of Unit, Mr R., of his dissatisfaction with the organisation of his work, owing, in particular, to the predominance of administrative tasks among his project management tasks. By email of 8 September 2016, the applicant reiterated his dissatisfaction.

3        On 20 October 2016, the INEA offered the applicant a one-year extension of his contract.

4        On 25 October 2016, Ms B., an officer in the Human Resources Department of the INEA, orally invited the applicant to come to her office to sign the contract extension. By email sent the same day, the applicant requested a copy of the documents in question, in order ‘to read them carefully before signing’.

5        By email of 26 October 2016, Ms B. invited the applicant to come to her office to collect the documents. By email of the same date, the applicant answered that he would come immediately.

6        During a meeting on 28 October 2016, the applicant informed his Head of Unit that he would not accept the extension offer and explained the reasons for his decision, namely his persistent dissatisfaction with his working conditions.

7        By email dated 9 November 2016, the applicant once again informed his Head of Unit that he would not accept the offer to extend his contract for the reasons previously indicated and that his employment would therefore end on 15 February 2017.

8        On 14 November 2016, the applicant met the Head of Department, Mr H., and the Director of the INEA, Mr B., to explain his reasons for having refused the extension of his contract.

9        By email of the same date, the applicant told Ms B. that he had informed the management that he would not accept the offer to extend his contract and began asking for information about the arrangements for his departure, specifying that he would need information, or to be put in contact with someone, as regards, among other things ‘allowances (unemployment, days for moving,...)’. Immediately, Ms S., an officer in the Human Resources Department of the INEA who was copied into that email, informed the applicant that he should address an email to the Director of the INEA indicating that he did not wish to sign the contract extension and stating the date of his last day of work, and that, following this, the administrative procedures related to his departure would start. The applicant then reiterated to the Director of the INEA, by email, that he would not sign the extension of his contract and stated the date of his last day of work.

10      On the same date, the Director of the INEA duly noted, by email, the applicant’s refusal. More specifically, he indicated that he ‘accept[ed]’ that refusal.

11      On 21 November 2016, the applicant once again asked Ms B. for information regarding his departure. In particular, he asked her the following question:

‘What do I have to prepare well in advance to prevent any delay obtaining unemployment payment in Austria right after the end of my INEA contract?’

12      On 23 November 2016, Ms B. provided the applicant with information in response to his questions. As regards the unemployment allowance, she stated as follows:

‘As indicated in the departure guide, you need to go to [the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO)] within 8 days after your termination of employment in order to deal with all questions related to the severance grant and unemployment allowance. From our side, we will prepare a C4 document for you that should be used to get the unemployment allowance. Our colleagues from PMO will be able to inform you further, on how to get the unemployment allowance in Austria. We don’t know whether this is possible. However, please note that the unemployment allowance can be paid to you by the Belgian State.’

13      On 10 January 2017, the applicant requested a meeting in order to clarify certain issues regarding the end of his employment, including issues relating to the unemployment allowance.

14      On 12 January 2017, a meeting was held during which the applicant was informed that his refusal to sign the extension of his contract would be considered a resignation. He would not, therefore, be entitled to the unemployment allowance. That information was also contained in a decision signed by the Director of the INEA on 11 January 2017, with which the applicant was presented during that meeting.

15      On 23 January 2017, after receiving a new confirmation that he would not be entitled to the unemployment allowance, the applicant stated that he had reconsidered his refusal and that he accepted the offer to extend his contract. He specified that the only purpose of that acceptance was to safeguard his entitlement to the unemployment allowance.

16      On 27 January 2017, the Director of the INEA refused the applicant and informed him, first, that his non-acceptance of the extension of his contract was considered a resignation and, second, that he stood by his original decision to accept the applicant’s resignation submitted on 14 November 2016.

17      On 10 April 2017, the applicant lodged a complaint pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, in the version applicable to the dispute (‘the Staff Regulations’), against the decision of the Director of the INEA of 11 January 2017. In the alternative, the applicant made a request for compensation in respect of the material harm suffered as a result of the alleged lack of information from the INEA regarding the effect of his decision on his entitlement to unemployment benefit.

18      By decision of 2 August 2017, the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECE’) rejected the complaint and the request for compensation.

19      On 4 October 2017, the applicant submitted a complaint, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, against the rejection of his request for compensation of 10 April 2017.

20      By decision of 24 January 2018, the AECE dismissed that complaint.

 Procedure and forms of order sought

21      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 3 May 2018, the applicant brought the present action.

22      Neither of the parties submitted a request for a hearing within the time limit laid down in Article 106(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The General Court (Fourth Chamber) decided, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure, to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure.

23      The applicant claims that the General Court should:

–        annul, first, the INEA’s decision of 24 January 2018 rejecting his complaint of 4 October 2017 and, second, the INEA’s decision of 2 August 2017 rejecting his request for compensation of 10 April 2017;

–        order the INEA to compensate him for the material damage he claims to have suffered as a result of the INEA’s alleged fault, that damage amounting to the loss of his entitlement to the unemployment allowance for a period of maximum of 3 years, increased by the relevant interest rate;

–        order the INEA to pay the costs.

24      The INEA contends that the General Court should:

–        reject the request for compensation;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

 Subject-matter of the dispute

25      In addition to compensation for the material damage he claims to have suffered, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of 24 January 2018 rejecting his complaint, and of the decision of 2 August 2017 rejecting his request for compensation.

26      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, an institution’s decision rejecting a request for compensation forms an integral part of the administrative procedure prior to the bringing of an action for liability before the General Court and, consequently, the claim for annulment of such a decision cannot be assessed in isolation from the claim for compensation. The measure setting out the position adopted by the institution during the pre-litigation stage has the sole effect of allowing the party who has suffered damage to apply to the General Court for compensation (judgments of 18 December 1997, Gill v Commission, T‑90/95, EU:T:1997:211, paragraph 45; of 6 March 2001, Ojha v Commission, T‑77/99, EU:T:2001:71, paragraph 68; and of 5 December 2002, Hoyer v Commission, T‑209/99, EU:T:2002:296, paragraph 32). As a result, there is no need to give a separate ruling on the claim for annulment brought by the applicant (judgments of 14 October 2004, Cagnato v Court of Justice, T‑390/02, not published, EU:T:2004:309, paragraph 57, and of 6 May 2009, M v EMEA, T‑12/08 P, EU:T:2009:143, paragraph 77).

27      Accordingly, in order to assess the merits of the request for compensation contained in the request of 10 April 2017, the General Court must simply verify whether the conditions for establishing the liability of the INEA, on account of the conduct complained of in that request for compensation, are met.

 The claim for compensation

28      In the first place, the applicant claims that the INEA’s conduct towards him was wrongful.

29      The applicant claims, in essence, that the INEA was fully aware of his intention not to accept the offer to extend his contract and that it should, as a result, have given him accurate information regarding his social security rights should he have refused the extension of his contract, thus allowing him to make the most informed choice possible.

30      In particular, first, the applicant complains that the INEA did not inform him that his refusal to sign the extension of his contract would be considered to be a resignation, despite the fact that such a rule is not written, as such, in the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) and stems only from the judgment of 17 April 2002, Sada v Commission (T‑325/00, EU:T:2002:101), which is an isolated and old judgment since it was handed down before the Lisbon Treaty conferred on Article 15(1) and Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) the same legal value as the Treaties.

31      In addition, he claims that the interpretation of Article 34 of the Charter proposed by the INEA is incorrect. The reference made by that provision to ‘loss of employment’ is general and thus applies to both forced loss and voluntary loss of employment. The usual meaning of the word ‘resignation’ does not cover non-renewal of contracts, either. Therefore the applicant could not have known that his refusal to extend his contract would be considered a resignation and the INEA did not take the special precaution of informing him in advance of the effect that refusal would have on his entitlement to unemployment benefit. However, the INEA did not, in its response, reply to the applicant’s argument that the judgment of 17 April 2002, Sada v Commission (T‑325/00, EU:T:2002:101), should be reconsidered in the light of the Charter.

32      Second, the applicant claims, first of all, that, by failing to provide clear and proper information about the social security rights he would be entitled to if he refused to sign the contract extension, the INEA infringed its duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff, as well as the principle of good administration. It also infringed its duty to provide correct, comprehensive and timely information.

33      Next, the INEA’s reply to the applicant’s questions, including the reference made in the email of 23 November 2016 to the preparation of the C4 document, was misleading and led the applicant to believe that he would in fact be entitled to the unemployment allowance. That is confirmed by the Paymaster’s Office (PMO) Termination of service of temporary and contract staff — Practical Guide 2013.

34      In addition, the INEA’s argument that the email of 23 November contained only standard formulation is incorrect. Rather, it was a personalised answer specifically addressed to the applicant in response to his own email, which was precise and specific.

35      Lastly, the INEA knew that the applicant would move back to Austria and that he would have to apply from Austria for the unemployment allowance. Therefore, the question asked by the applicant in his email of 21 November 2016 was clear and, in the case of doubt, it was the INEA’s duty to ask the applicant for clarification or to tell him that he was not eligible for that allowance.

36      Third, in the applicant’s view, although the INEA submits that the applicant was informed orally on several occasions about the loss of his unemployment benefits if he refused the extension of his contract, it did not provide any evidence in that respect. As a result, the uncertainty regarding the alleged oral information given to the applicant must be construed against the INEA. Moreover, if the applicant had already been provided with this information on 26 October 2016, as the INEA contends, it would be strange that he asked again for information related to the unemployment allowance on 14 and 21 November 2016 and on 10 January 2017. It is therefore clear that the applicant was not aware that he was not entitled to the unemployment allowance when he announced his decision not to sign the renewal of his contract.

37      In the second place, the applicant claims that the conditions as regards the existence of damage and of a direct causal link are satisfied.

38      The INEA disputes the applicant’s arguments.

39      In that regard, as a preliminary remark, it should be noted that according to settled case-law, in the context of an action for compensation brought by an official, the European Union may be held liable for damages only if a number of conditions are satisfied as regards the illegality of the allegedly wrongful act committed by the institutions, the actual harm suffered and the existence of a causal link between the act and the damage alleged to have been suffered (judgments of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 42, and of 26 May 1998, Bieber v Parliament, T‑205/96, EU:T:1998:110, paragraph 48). In addition, in so far as those three conditions must be cumulatively satisfied, one of them not being satisfied is sufficient for an action for damages to be dismissed (judgment of 9 September 1999, Lucaccioni v Commission, C‑257/98 P, EU:C:1999:402, paragraph 14).

40      In the present case, the Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the condition relating to the unlawful conduct alleged against the INEA.

41      In that regard, it is well established that disputes involving the civil service under Article 270 TFEU and Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, including those seeking compensation for damage caused to an official or other member of staff, are governed by particular and special rules that differ from those arising from the general principles on the non-contractual liability of the Union under Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. It is clear from the Staff Regulations in particular that, unlike any other individual, an official or other member of the Union’s staff is connected to the institution to which he belongs by a legal relationship of employment involving a balance of specific reciprocal rights and obligations, which is reflected in the institution’s duty to have regard for the welfare of the person concerned. That balance is essentially intended to preserve the relationship of trust that must exist between the institutions and their officials in order to guarantee to the public that tasks in the public interest entrusted to the institutions are performed effectively. It follows that where the Union acts as employer it is subject to increased liability, in the form of the duty to make reparation for damage caused to its staff by any unlawful act committed in its role as employer (see judgment of 16 December 2010, Commission v Petrilli, T‑143/09 P, EU:T:2010:531, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 12 July 2012, Commission v Nanopoulos, T‑308/10 P, EU:T:2012:370, paragraph 103).

42      Therefore, where it is put in issue under the provisions of Article 270 TFEU, the non-contractual liability of the Union may be incurred on the ground solely of the illegality of an act adversely affecting an official (or of non-decision-making conduct), without there being any need to consider whether it is a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals (judgment of 14 June 2018, Spagnolli and Others v Commission, T‑568/16 and T‑599/16, EU:T:2018:347, paragraph 196).

43      According to settled case-law, while not mentioned in the Staff Regulations, the administration’s duty to have regard to the welfare of its staff reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations in the relationship between a public authority and its staff. That duty, together with the principle of good administration, implies in particular that when the competent authority takes a decision concerning the position of an official, it should take into consideration all the factors that may affect its decision and, when doing so, it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned (judgments of 23 October 1986, Schwiering v Court of Auditors, 321/85, EU:C:1986:408, paragraph 18; of 20 June 1990, Burban v Parliament, T‑133/89, EU:T:1990:36, paragraph 27; and of 14 November 2006, Neirinck v Commission, T‑494/04, EU:T:2006:344, paragraph 162).

44      As regards the principle of good administration, it should be added that it follows from Article 41 of the Charter that that principle grants every person, including officials of the Union, the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time. That right includes the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure that would affect him or her adversely is taken, the right of every person to have access to his or her file while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy, the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions, and the right to have the Union make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. It is apparent from the case-law that this principle requires the institutions of the Union to apply legislation correctly (judgment of 14 June 1988, Christianos v Court of Justice, 33/87, EU:C:1988:300, paragraph 23).

45      In the present case, first, the applicant cannot claim that the INEA was well aware that he was going to refuse the offer to extend his contract. On 25 October 2016, when invited by Ms B. to come and sign his contract extension, the applicant requested a copy of the documents to be signed, in order to be able to read them first. In doing so, the applicant indicated to the INEA that he was examining that offer and in no way led it to believe that he was likely to refuse that offer. It is only later, that is, on 28 October 2016 at the latest, when the applicant informed his Head of Unit of his decision not to accept the offer to extend his contract (see paragraph 6 above), that the applicant’s superiors became aware of his rejection of the offer.

46      Second, it is apparent from the case file that the administration could not predict that the applicant’s decision as regards the offer to extend his contract would be conditional on his eligibility for the unemployment allowance after expiry of that contract. His oral and written declarations reveal unequivocally that his decision to reject the offer of a contract extension was taken in the light of his persistent dissatisfaction at work. Moreover, the applicant did not question the administration in advance in order to clarify the consequences of rejecting the offer in question as regards his entitlement to the unemployment allowance.

47      It must be borne in mind that the applicant informed the management of his decision to reject the offer of a contract extension at the latest on 28 October 2016. He then confirmed it by email on 9 November 2016 and orally during the meeting of 14 November 2016 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). It was by an email also dated 14 November 2016 that the applicant announced to Ms B. that he had informed the management of his decision to refuse the offer to extend his contract and that he began asking for information on arrangements for departure, specifying that he would need information, or to be put in contact with someone, as regards, among other things ‘allowances (unemployment, days for moving,...)’ (see paragraph 9 above). Ms S., who was copied into the latter email, informed the applicant that he should address an email to the Director of the INEA indicating that he did not wish to sign the extension of his contract and stating the date of his last day of work, and that, following this, the administrative procedures related to his departure would start. It was immediately following receipt of that response and without waiting for any explanations concerning the unemployment allowance that the applicant reiterated by email to the Director of the INEA that he rejected the offer to extend his contract and indicated the date of his last day of work, namely 15 February 2017. By return email, the Director formally accepted that refusal.

48      Accordingly, the applicant cannot criticise the INEA for not having informed him of the effect that his refusal to sign the extension of his contract would have on his entitlement to the unemployment allowance or claim that his refusal was vitiated.

49      It is true that the INEA has provided no evidence that it orally informed the applicant as early as 26 October 2016 that he would not be entitled to the unemployment allowance, pursuant to Article 96 of the CEOS, if he decided not to accept the extension of his contract. However, it should be borne in mind that, although the duty of care requires the INEA to take account, inter alia, of the applicant’s interest, that obligation cannot go as far as to require it to advise him of the possible consequences in the event that he were to refuse the offer made to him to extend his contract. This is all the more so since the INEA could not know that the applicant’s decision depended on factors other than those submitted by the latter, namely his persistent dissatisfaction at work. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it has already been held that, save in cases where there are special circumstances, in particular where the person concerned is in an extremely vulnerable position and where the administration could be required to fulfil enhanced obligations as regards the duty of care and of good administration, the INEA is not, in principle, subject to a broad positive obligation to assist officials or other staff members of the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2018, SH v Commission, T‑283/17, EU:T:2018:917, paragraphs 105 and 106 and the case-law cited).

50      In addition, the INEA discharged its duty of care, in accordance with the principle of good administration, by organising several meetings during which the applicant was free to ask the management and the administration of the INEA about his social security rights, even after his initial refusals to accept the offer.

51      Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, any official or other member of staff of normal diligence is deemed to be familiar with the Staff Regulations (see judgment of 19 May 1999, Connolly v Commission, T‑34/96 and T‑163/96, EU:T:1999:102, paragraph 168 and the case-law cited) and, in particular, the rules governing his remuneration or, as in the present case, the unemployment allowance (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 1989, Stempels v Commission, 310/87, EU:C:1989:9, paragraph 10, and of 5 November 2002, Ronsse v Commission, T‑205/01, EU:T:2002:269, paragraph 46).

52      The normal diligence that may be expected of an official or other member of staff is to be assessed in the light of his training, grade and professional experience and the degree of clarity of the applicable Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 1994, White v Commission, T‑107/92, EU:T:1994:17, paragraph 47; of 5 November 2002, Ronsse v Commission, T‑205/01, EU:T:2002:269, paragraph 52; and of 14 December 2017, Trautmann v EEAS, T‑611/16, not published, EU:T:2017:917, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited). In the present case, first, it is apparent from Article 82(2)(c) of the CEOS that the recruitment of a member of the contractual staff in function group IV requires at least a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies of at least 3 years attested by a diploma, or, where justified in the interest of the service, professional training of an equivalent level. Second, the applicant was recruited in function group IV, grade 14, step 1, which corresponds, according to Article 80 of the CEOS, inter alia, to administrative and advisory tasks, which he performed as a Project Manager. Third, he had been employed for 56 months as a member of staff of the Union. Accordingly, the applicant cannot claim ignorance as to the interpretation of Article 96 of the CEOS. Fourth, the fact remains that the purpose — in the light of which the provisions of the staff regulations concerning unemployment benefits, including Articles 28a and 96 of the CEOS, must be interpreted — is clear in that it is to provide financial assistance to a staff member who becomes unemployed when his service is terminated not by his choice or because of his misconduct, with the result that refusal of an extension of a fixed-term contract is considered to be a resignation, following which that staff member is not entitled to unemployment benefits (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2002, Sada v Commission, T‑325/00, EU:T:2002:101, paragraphs 32 to 36).

53      Indeed, the applicant submits that that judgment pre-dates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, under which the Charter, including Article 15(1) and 34 thereof, acquired the same legal value as the Treaties. However, the applicant fails to draw from this any legal conclusions. He in no way explains how those provisions are relevant in the present case and sets out no legal arguments in that regard. The applicant’s claims as regards Articles 15(1) and 34 of the Charter must therefore be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. However, even if these allegations are to be interpreted as seeking to challenge the validity of the approach adopted in the judgment of 17 April 2002, Sada v Commission (T‑325/00, EU:T:2002:101), it is sufficient to note that the applicant had every opportunity to contest the application of that approach to his case by means of a complaint and, where relevant, an action for annulment. If, by contrast, those allegations are to be interpreted as seeking to demonstrate that the applicant could not have been aware of that judgment, they should be dismissed as unfounded. Such allegations would be tantamount to considering that, simply because of the new binding nature of Articles 15(1) and 34 of the Charter, officials and staff members of the Union are no longer expected to be aware of the rules governing the unemployment benefit that were established before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and have not been expressly amended subsequently.

54      Therefore, even if the INEA did fail to advise the applicant in good time of the effect his refusal would have on his entitlement to the unemployment allowance, the applicant should, at the very least, have made advance enquiries to the administration for information on that issue.

55      Third, even though the applicant claims, in essence, that the information sent to him by the INEA on 23 November 2016 concerning the preparation of a C4 form misled him inasmuch as it made him believe that he would be entitled to the unemployment allowance, that argument cannot succeed. In its email of 23 November 2016, the INEA merely answered the applicant’s email which asked what he should ‘prepare well in advance to prevent any delay obtaining unemployment payment in Austria right after the end of [his] INEA contract’. The INEA, (i) suggested that the applicant contact the PMO as regards all questions concerning the unemployment allowance, (ii) indicated that it did not know whether the applicant could get the unemployment allowance in Austria, and (iii) informed the applicant that it would prepare a C4 form that ‘should be used to get the unemployment allowance’. In doing so, the INEA in no way indicated to the applicant that he would be entitled to the unemployment allowance in Austria. Rather, it refrained from taking a position on that issue.

56      In any event, it must be noted that the INEA’s response of 23 November 2016 came after the applicant’s decision of 28 October 2016, repeated subsequently on several occasions, to refuse the offer made to him. Therefore, the applicant cannot claim to have been ‘misled’ by that response, which cannot have had any influence on his decision.

57      It follows that the applicant has not established fault on the part of the INEA.

58      In the light of the foregoing, the claim for damages must be rejected without any need to examine the two other conditions for engaging the liability of the Union, namely the reality of the alleged damage and the existence of a causal link.

59      It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed.

 Costs

60      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must, having regard to the form of order sought by the INEA, be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Mr Walter Mauritsch to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 May 2019.

*      Language of the case: English.

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