JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)
16 November 2000 (1)
(Appeal- Competition - Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC) - Liability for the infringement - Fines - Statement of reasons - Mitigating circumstances)
In Case C-297/98 P,
SCA Holding Ltd, established in Aylesford (United Kingdom), represented by J. Pheasant and N. Bromfield, solicitors, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Loesch & Wolter, 11 Rue Goethe,
appellant,
APPEAL against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 14 May 1998 in Case T-327/94 SCA Holding v Commission [1998] ECR II-1373, seeking to have that judgment set aside,
the other party to the proceedings being:
Commission of the European Communities, represented by J. Currall, Legal Adviser, and R. Lyal, of its Legal Service, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of C. Gómez de la Cruz, of the same service, Wagner Centre, Kirchberg,
defendant at first instance,
THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed of: A. La Pergola, President of the Chamber, M. Wathelet (Rapporteur), D.A.O. Edward, P. Jann and L. Sevón, Judges,
Advocate General: J. Mischo,
Registrar: R. Grass,
having regard to the report of the Judge-Rapporteur,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 18 May 2000,
gives the following
Facts
Buchmann GmbH, Cascades SA, Enso-Gutzeit Oy, Europa Carton AG, Finnboard - the Finnish Board Mills Association, Fiskeby Board AB, Gruber & Weber GmbH & Co KG, Kartonfabriek de Eendracht NV (trading as BPB de Eendracht NV), NV Koninklijke KNP BT NV (formerly Koninklijke Nederlandse Papierfabrieken NV), Laakmann Karton GmbH & Co KG, Mo Och Domsjö AB (MoDo), Mayr-Melnhof Gesellschaft mbH, Papeteries de Lancey SA, Rena Kartonfabrik A/S, Sarrió SpA, SCA Holding Ltd (formerly Reed Paper & Board (UK) Ltd), Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, Enso Española SA (formerly Tampella Española SA) and Moritz J. Weig GmbH & Co KG have infringed Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty by participating,
- in the case of Buchmann and Rena from about March 1988 until at least the end of 1990,
- in the case of Enso Española, from at least March 1988 until at least the end of April 1991,
- in the case of Gruber & Weber from at least 1988 until late 1990,
- in the other cases, from mid-1986 until at least April 1991,
in an agreement and concerted practice originating in mid-1986 whereby the suppliers of cartonboard in the Community
- met regularly in a series of secret and institutionalised meetings to discuss and agree a common industry plan to restrict competition,
- agreed regular price increases for each grade of the product in each national currency,
- planned and implemented simultaneous and uniform price increases throughout the Community,
- reached an understanding on maintaining the market shares of the major producers at constant levels, subject to modification from time to time,
- increasingly from early 1990, took concerted measures to control the supply of the product in the Community in order to ensure the implementation of the said concerted price rises,
- exchanged commercial information on deliveries, prices, plant standstills, order backlogs and machine utilisation rates in support of the above measures.
...
The following fines are hereby imposed on the undertakings named herein in respect of the infringement found in Article 1:
...
(xvi) SCA Holding Limited, a fine of ECU 2 200 000;
...
'13 According to the Decision, the infringement took place within a body known as the Product Group Paperboard (hereinafter the PG Paperboard), which comprised several groups or committees.
14 In mid-1986 a group entitled the Presidents Working Group (hereinafter the PWG) was established within that body. This group brought together senior representatives of the main suppliers of cartonboard in the Community (some eight suppliers).
15 The PWG's activities consisted, in particular, in discussion and collaboration regarding markets, market shares, prices and capacities. In particular, it took broad decisions on the timing and level of price increases to be introduced by producers.
16 The PWG reported to the President Conference (hereinafter the PC), in which almost all the managing directors of the undertakings in question participated (more or less regularly). The PC met twice each year during the period in question.
17 In late 1987 the Joint Marketing Committee (hereinafter the JMC) was set up. Its main task was, on the one hand, to determine whether, and if so how, price increases could be put into effect and, on the other, to prescribe the methods of implementation for the price initiatives decided by the PWG, country-by-country and for the major customers, in order to achieve a system of equivalent prices in Europe.
18 Lastly, the Economic Committee discussed, inter alia, price movements in national markets and order backlogs, and reported its findings to the JMC or, until the end of 1987, to the Marketing Committee, the predecessor of the JMC. The Economic Committee was made up of marketing managers of most of the undertakings in question and met several times a year.
19 According to the Decision, the Commission also took the view that the activities of the PG Paperboard were supported by an information exchange organised by Fides, a secretarial company, whose registered office is in Zurich, Switzerland. The Decision states that most of the members of the PG Paperboard sent periodic reports on orders, production, sales and capacity utilisation to Fides. Under the Fides system, those reports were collated and the aggregated data were sent to the participants.
20 Throughout the period of the infringement Reed Paper & Board Ltd (Reed P&B) owned Colthrop Mill (Colthrop).
21 Until July 1988 Reed P&B was a subsidiary of Reed International plc. In July 1988, a management buy-out of several companies of the Reed Internationalgroup resulted in the formation of Reedpack Ltd (Reedpack) and the acquisition of Reed P&B by Reedpack.
22 In July 1990, the Swedish group, Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolag (SCA) acquired Reedpack and, consequently, Reed P&B and several factories, including Colthrop. Reed P&B first changed its name on 1 February 1991 to SCA Aylesford Ltd (SCA Aylesford) and then on 4 February 1992 to SCA Holding Ltd (SCA Holding).
23 In May 1991 Colthrop was sold to the Field Group Ltd, which resold it in October 1991 to Mayr-Melnhof AG. At the date of the latter transaction, Colthrop had already been incorporated as a limited company under the name Colthrop Board Mill Ltd.
24 According to the Decision, Reed P&B participated in the infringement in question, in particular by participating in certain meetings of the JMC and of the PC. Moreover, as SCA Holding is merely another name for SCA Aylesford and Reed P&B and they are therefore merely one and the same entity, the Commission considered that the Decision should be addressed to SCA Holding (point 155 et seq. of the Decision).
The contested judgment
The application for annulment of the Decision
'61 It is common ground that Colthrop was the factory at which cartonboard was manufactured and that throughout the full period of the infringement that factory was owned by Reed P&B, then by SCA Aylesford Ltd and lastly by SCA Holding.
62 Reed P&B, SCA Aylesford Ltd and SCA Holding (the applicant) are, however, the names successively adopted by one and the same legal person.
63 The circumstances of this case do not therefore give rise to any question of succession. The Court has held (in Case T-6/89 Enichem Anic v Commission [1991] ECR II-1623, paragraphs 236 to 238) that an undertaking's infringement must be attributed to the legal person responsible for the operation of that undertaking when the infringement was committed. While that legal person exists, responsibility for the undertaking's infringement follows that legal person, even though the assets and personnel which contributed to the commission of the infringement have been transferred to third persons after the period of the infringement.
64 The Commission was therefore entitled to address the Decision to the legal person which was responsible for the unlawful conduct found during the period of the infringement and which still existed when the Decision was adopted.
65 Thus, even if Colthrop could be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty and on the day when the Decision was adopted it was owned by the legal person Colthrop Board Mill Ltd, the applicant's arguments would at the very most show only that the Commission had a choice as regards the addressee of the Decision. In those circumstances, the Commission's choice cannot therefore be validly called into question.
66 Furthermore, Reed P&B appeared in the list of members of the PG Paperboard.
67 According to point 143 of the Decision, the Commission, in principle, addressed the Decision to the entity named in the membership list of the PG Paperboard, except that:
(1) where more than one company in a group participated in the infringement;
or
(2) where there is express evidence implicating the parent company of the group in the participation of the subsidiary in the cartel,
the proceedings have been addressed to the group (represented by the parent company).
68 Since the Commission did not consider that either of the two conditions for making an exception to the principle in point 143 was satisfied, it was entitled to decide not to address the Decision to the successive parent companies of Reed P&B/SCA Aylesford/SCA Holding.
69 This plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
The application for annulment or reduction of the fine
The plea that the Commission did not apply to SCA Holding/Colthrop the criteria adopted for fixing fines or did so in a discriminatory manner
'155 ... the Court observes that in its reply to the statement of objections the applicant states as follows:
SCA Holding is handicapped in its defence because no one at SCA has any knowledge of the activities of PG Paperboard or of the conduct outlined in the Statement [of objections]. Moreover, SCA has never been in the cartonboard business and has no knowledge of the industry. SCA Holding therefore cannot and does not take a position as to the existence or scope of the alleged infringement.
156 The Commission correctly considered that the applicant, by replying in that way, did not conduct itself in a manner which justified a reduction in the fine on grounds of cooperation during the administrative procedure. A reduction on that ground is justified only if the conduct enabled the Commission toestablish an infringement more easily and, where relevant, to bring it to an end (see Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021, paragraph 393).
157 An undertaking which expressly states that it is not contesting the factual allegations on which the Commission bases its objections may be regarded as having furthered the Commission's task of finding infringements of the Community competition rules and bringing them to an end. In its decisions finding infringements of those rules, the Commission is entitled to take the view that such conduct constitutes an acknowledgement of the factual allegations and thus proves that those allegations are correct. Such conduct may therefore justify a reduction in the fine.
158 The situation is different where the essential allegations made by the Commission in its statement of objections are contested by an undertaking in its reply to that statement, or where the undertaking does not reply or merely states, as the applicant did, that it is not expressing any view on the Commission's factual allegations. By adopting such an attitude during the administrative procedure the undertaking does not further the Commission's task of finding infringements of the Community competition rules and bringing them to an end.
159 Consequently, when the Commission states in the first paragraph of point 172 of the Decision that it has awarded reductions in the fines to be imposed on undertakings which did not contest the essential factual allegations upon which it relied against them, those reductions can be considered to be lawful only in so far as the undertakings concerned have expressly stated that they are not contesting those allegations.
160 Even if the Commission applied an unlawful criterion by reducing the fines imposed on undertakings which had not expressly stated that they were not contesting the factual allegations, it is necessary that respect for the principle of equal treatment be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which a person may not rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party (see, for example, Case 134/84 Williams v Court of Auditors [1985] ECR 2225, paragraph 14). For that reason, as the applicant's argument is directed specifically at establishing its right to an unlawful reduction in the fine, the first part of the plea cannot be upheld.
The plea alleging that, in view of the appellant's innocence and the aims of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the fine imposed on it was unreasonably high in absolute terms and disproportionate
'174 The first and second parts of the plea should be considered together.
175 Under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines ranging from ECU 1 000 to ECU 1 000 000, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. As is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice, the gravity of infringements falls to be determined by reference to numerous factors including, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case and the deterrent character of the fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (order in Case C-137/95 P SPO and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I-1611, paragraph 54).
176 The criteria for assessing the gravity of the infringement may include the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the market. It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or the other of those figures an importance which is disproportionate in relation to the other factors and that the fixing of an appropriate fine might not be the result of a simple calculation based on total turnover (see Joined Cases 101/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraphs 120 and 121).
177 In the present case, the Commission determined the general level of fines by taking into account the duration of the infringement (point 167 of the Decision) and the following considerations (point 168):
- collusion on pricing and market sharing are by their very nature serious restrictions on competition,
- the cartel covered virtually the whole territory of the Community,
- the Community market for cartonboard is an important industrial sector worth some ECU 2 500 million each year,
- the undertakings participating in the infringement account for virtually the whole of the market,
- the cartel was operated in the form of a system of regular institutionalised meetings which set out to regulate in explicit detail the market for cartonboard in the Community,
- elaborate steps were taken to conceal the true nature and extent of the collusion (absence of any official minutes or documentation for the PWG and JMC; discouraging the taking of notes; stage-managing the timing and order in which price increases were announced so as to be able to claim they were 'following, etc.),
- the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives.
178 Furthermore, basic levels of 9 or 7.5% were applied in order to determine the amount of the fine to be imposed on the ringleaders of the cartel and on its ordinary members respectively ... .
179 It should be pointed out, first, that when assessing the general level of fines the Commission is entitled to take account of the fact that clear infringements of the Community competition rules are still relatively frequent and that, accordingly, it may raise the level of fines in order to strengthen their deterrent effect. Consequently, the fact that in the past the Commission applied fines of a certain level to certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level, within the limits set out in Regulation No 17, if that is necessary in order to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy (see, inter alia, Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 105 to 108, and ICI v Commission, cited above, paragraph 385).
180 Second, the Commission rightly argues that, on account of the specific circumstances of the present case, no direct comparison could be made betweenthe general level of fines adopted in the present decision and those adopted in the Commission's previous decisions, in particular in the Polypropylene decision, which the Commission itself considered to be the most similar to the decision in the present case. Unlike in the Polypropylene decision, no general mitigating circumstance was taken into account in the present case when determining the general level of fines. Moreover, the adoption of measures to conceal the existence of the collusion shows that the undertakings concerned were fully aware of the unlawfulness of their conduct. Accordingly, the Commission was entitled to take into account those measures when assessing the gravity of the infringement, because they constitute a particularly serious aspect of the infringement distinguishing it from infringements previously found by the Commission.
181 Third, the Court notes the lengthy duration and obviousness of the infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty which was committed despite the warning which the Commission's previous decisions, in particular the Polypropylene decision, should have provided.
182 On the basis of those factors, the criteria set out in point 168 of the Decision justify the general level of fines set by the Commission.
183 In that context, the Court must also reject the applicant's argument that no account could have been taken of Colthrop's size and economic power because its total turnover in 1990 was the same as its turnover on the Community cartonboard market in that same year.
184 First, the Commission took account of the abovementioned criteria for assessing the gravity of the infringement. Second, when it assesses the gravity of an infringement, the Commission is not obliged to take into account the relationship between the total turnover of an undertaking and the turnover produced by the goods which are the subject-matter of the infringement (judgment in Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 121, and order in SPO and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 54).
185 Furthermore, since the turnover of the undertakings implicated in the same infringement must be taken as a basis for determining the relationship between the fines to be imposed, the Commission rightly calculated the fines for each of those undertakings by applying the relevant percentage rate of the fine to an identical reference turnover for the undertakings concerned, so that the figures obtained would be as comparable as possible.
186 The first and second parts of the plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
187 The third part of the plea, which is based on the proposition that the applicant is an innocent bystander, must also be rejected. It suffices to point out thatthe Court has found that the Commission was entitled to address the Decision to the applicant.
188 This plea must therefore be rejected in its entirety.
The plea alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons in regard to the fines
'195 It is settled law that the purpose of the obligation to give reasons for an individual decision is to enable the Community judicature to review the legality of the decision and to provide the party concerned with an adequate indication as to whether the decision is well founded or whether it may be vitiated by some defect enabling its validity to be challenged; the scope of that obligation depends on the nature of the act in question and on the context in which it was adopted (see, inter alia, Case T-49/95 Van Megen Sports v Commission [1996] ECR II-1799, paragraph 51).
196 As regards a decision which, as in this case, imposes fines on several undertakings for infringement of the Community competition rules, the scope of the obligation to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the fact that the gravity of infringements falls to be determined by reference to numerous factors including, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case and the deterrent character of the fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of criteria to be applied has been drawn up (order in SPO and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 54).
197 Moreover, when fixing the amount of each fine, the Commission has a margin of discretion and cannot be considered to be obliged to apply a precise mathematical formula for that purpose (see, to the same effect, the judgment in Case T-150/89 Martinelli v Commission [1995] ECR II-1165, paragraph 59).
198 In the Decision, the criteria taken into account in order to determine the general level of fines and the amount of individual fines are set out in points 168 and 169 respectively. Moreover, as regards the individual fines, the Commission explains in point 170 that the undertakings which participated inthe meetings of the PWG were, in principle, regarded as ringleaders of the cartel, whereas the other undertakings were regarded as ordinary members. Lastly, in points 171 and 172, it states that the amounts of fines imposed on Rena and Stora must be considerably reduced in order to take account of their active cooperation with the Commission, and that eight other undertakings were also to benefit from a reduction, to a lesser extent, owing to the fact that in their replies to the statement of objections they did not contest the essential factual allegations on which the Commission based its objections.
199 As has already been observed, in the proceedings before this Court the Commission has supplied additional evidence relating to the method of calculating the fines which it applied in this case. ... It explained that it had taken account of the cooperative attitude of some undertakings during the procedure before it and that on that basis two of them had been awarded a reduction of two-thirds in the amount of their fines, whilst others had received a reduction of one-third.
200 Moreover, it is apparent from a table produced by the Commission containing information as to the fixing of the amount of each individual fine that, although those fines were not determined by applying the abovementioned figures alone in a strictly mathematical way, those figures were, nevertheless, systematically taken into account for the purposes of calculating the fines.
201 However, the Decision does not state that the fines were calculated on the basis of the turnover of each undertaking on the Community cartonboard market in 1990. Furthermore, the basic rates of 9 and 7.5% applied to calculate the fines imposed on the undertakings considered to be ringleaders and those considered to be ordinary members do not appear in the Decision. Nor does it set out the rates of reduction granted to Rena and Stora, on the one hand, and to eight other undertakings, on the other.
202 In the present case, first, points 169 to 172 of the Decision, interpreted in the light of the detailed statement in the Decision of the allegations of fact against each of its addressees, contain a relevant and sufficient statement of the criteria taken into account in order to determine the gravity and duration of the infringement committed by each of the undertakings in question (see, to the same effect, Case T-2/89 Petrofina v Commission [1991] ECR II-1087, paragraph 264).
203 Second, where, as in the present case, the amount of each fine is determined on the basis of the systematic application of certain precise figures, the indication in the Decision of each of those factors would permit undertakings better to assess whether the Commission erred when fixing the amount of the individual fine and also whether the amount of each individual fine is justified by reference to the general criteria applied. In the present case, the indication in the Decision of the factors in question, namely the reference turnover, thereference year, the basic rates adopted, and the rates of reduction in the amount of fines would not have involved any implicit disclosure of the specific turnover of the addressee undertakings, a disclosure which might have constituted an infringement of Article 214 of the Treaty. As the Commission has itself stated, the final amount of each individual fine is not the result of a strictly mathematical application of those factors.
204 The Commission also accepted at the hearing that nothing prevented it from indicating in the Decision the factors which had been systematically taken into account and which had been divulged at a press conference held on the day on which that decision was adopted. In that regard, it is settled law that the reasons for a decision must appear in the actual body of the decision and that, save in exceptional circumstances, explanations given ex post facto cannot be taken into account (see Case T-61/89 Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening v Commission [1992] ECR II-1931, paragraph 131, and, to the same effect, Hilti v Commission, cited above, paragraph 136).
205 Despite those findings, the reasons explaining the setting of the amount of fines stated in points 167 to 172 of the Decision are at least as detailed as those provided in the Commission's previous decisions on similar infringements. Although a plea alleging insufficient reasons concerns a matter of public interest, there had been no criticism by the Community judicature, at the moment when the Decision was adopted, as regards the Commission's practice concerning the statement of reasons for fines imposed. It was only in the judgment of 6 April 1995 in Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, paragraph 142, and in two other judgments given on the same day (T-147/89 Société Métallurgique de Normandie v Commission [1995] ECR II-1057, summary publication, and Case T-151/89 Société des Treillis et Panneaux Soudés v Commission [1995] ECR II-1191, summary publication) that this Court stressed for the first time that it is desirable for undertakings to be able to ascertain in detail the method used for calculating the fine imposed without having to bring court proceedings against the Commission's decision in order to do so.
206 It follows that, when it finds in a decision that there has been an infringement of the competition rules and imposes fines on the undertakings participating in it, the Commission must, if it systematically took into account certain basic factors in order to fix the amount of fines, set out those factors in the body of the decision in order to enable the addressees of the decision to verify that the level of the fine is correct and to assess whether there has been any discrimination.
207 In the specific circumstances set out in paragraph 205 above, and having regard to the fact that in the procedure before the Court the Commission showed itself to be willing to supply any relevant information relating to the method ofcalculating the fines, the absence of specific grounds in the Decision regarding the method of calculation of the fines should not, in the present case, be regarded as constituting an infringement of the duty to state reasons such as would justify annulment in whole or in part of the fines imposed.
208 This plea cannot therefore be upheld.
The appeal
The first plea
The second plea
The first part of the second plea
The second part of the second plea
'points 169 to 172 of the Decision, interpreted in the light of the detailed statement in the Decision of the allegations of fact against each of its addressees, contain a relevant and sufficient statement of the criteria taken into account in order to determine the gravity and duration of the infringement committed by each of the undertakings in question.
The third part of the second plea
Costs
71. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeals by virtue of Article 118, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been asked for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the Commission has asked for costs to be awarded against the appellant and the latter has been unsuccessful in all its pleas, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the appeal;
2. Orders SCA Holding Ltd to pay the costs.
La Pergola
JannSevón
|
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 November 2000.
R. Grass A. La Pergola
Registrar President of the Fifth Chamber
1: Language of the case: English.