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Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
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Commission v Ladbroke Racing (Competition) [1997] EUECJ C-359/95P (11 November 1997)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/1997/C35995P.html
Cite as:
[1997] EUECJ C-359/95P
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IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE -
IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE - The source of this judgment is the web site of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The information in this database has been provided free of charge and is subject to a Court of Justice of the European Communities disclaimer and a copyright notice. This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
11 November 1997(1)
(Competition - Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty - Rejection of a
complaint concerning both State measures and private conduct - Applicability of
Articles 85 and 86 to undertakings complying with national legislation)
In Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P,
Commission of the European Communities , represented by Francisco Enrique
González Díaz and Richard Lyal, of the Legal Service, acting as Agents, with an
address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, of the
Legal Service, Wagner Centre, Kirchberg,
and
French Republic, represented by Jean-François Dobelle, Deputy Director of the
Legal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, assisted by Catherine
de Salins, Head of Section in that directorate, and Jean-Marc Belorgey, Special
Adviser in that directorate, acting as Agents, with an address for service in
Luxembourg at the French Embassy, 8B Boulevard Joseph II,
appellants,
APPEALS against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities (First Chamber, Extended Composition) in Case T-548/93 Ladbroke
Racing v Commission [1995] ECR II-2565), seeking to have that judgment set aside,
the other party to the proceedings being:
Ladbroke Racing Ltd,a company incorporated under English law, represented by
Jeremy Lever QC and Christopher Vajda, Barrister, instructed by Stephen Kon,
Solicitor, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Winandy
& Err, 60 Avenue Gaston Diderich,
THE COURT,
composed of: G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias, President, C. Gulmann, H. Ragnemalm and
R. Schintgen (Presidents of Chambers), G.F. Mancini, P.J.G. Kapteyn
(Rapporteur), J.L. Murray, D.A.O. Edward, J.-P. Puissochet, G. Hirsch and P. Jann,
Judges,
Advocate General: G. Cosmas,
Registrar: H. von Holstein, Deputy Registrar,
having regard to the Report for the Hearing,
after hearing oral argument from the parties at the hearing on 21 January 1997,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 13 May 1997,
gives the following
Judgment
- By applications lodged at the Court Registry on 22 and 27 November 1995, the
Commission of the European Communities (C-359/95 P) and the French Republic
(C-379/95 P) each brought an appeal under Article 49 of the EC Statute of the
Court of Justice against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18
September 1995 in Case T-548/93 Ladbroke Racing v Commission ([1995] ECR II-2565, hereinafter 'the contested judgment') annulling the decision of the
Commission in its letter of 29 July 1993 to reject a complaint lodged by Ladbroke
Racing Ltd ('Ladbroke') under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty ('the
contested decision').
- By order of the President of the Court of Justice of 29 January 1996, Cases
C359/95 P and C-379/95 P were joined for the purposes of the written and oral
procedure and the judgment.
- The contested judgment states (paragraphs 2 to 7) that Ladbroke lodged a
complaint (No IV/33.374) with the Commission on 24 November 1989 against the
French Republic under Article 90 of the EC Treaty and against the 10 main racing
companies (sociétés de courses) in France and against the Pari Mutuel Urbain
('PMU'), an economic interest grouping created by the 10 companies in France
to manage their rights to organize off-course totalizator betting on horse racing,
under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.
- The PMU initially managed the rights of the racing companies to organize such
betting as a 'joint service' operating in the context of a decree of 11 June 1930 on
the extension of off-course totalizator betting, adopted in implementation of Article
186 of the Finance Law of 16 April 1930. Article 1 of the decree provided: 'With
the authorization of the Minister for Agriculture, totalizator betting may be
organized and operated outside racecourses by the Parisian racing companies acting
jointly with the aid of the provincial racing companies'. Under Article 13 of
Decree No 74-954 of 14 November 1974 on horse-racing companies, the PMU has,
since that date, exclusive responsibility for managing the rights of the racing
companies in relation to off-course totalizator betting, inasmuch as the article
provides that 'the racing companies authorized to organize off-course totalizator
betting ... shall entrust its management to a joint service to be called the Pari
Mutuel Urbain'. The exclusive rights thereby conferred on the PMU are also
protected by the prohibition on the placing or accepting of bets on horse-races by
anyone other than the PMU (Article 8 of the Interministerial Decree of 13
September 1985 governing the Pari Mutuel Urbain). This exclusivity extends to
bets taken abroad on races organized in France and bets taken in France on races
organized abroad, which likewise may be taken only by the authorized companies
and/or the PMU (Article 15(3) of Law No 64-1279 of 23 December 1964 on the
1965 Finance Law and Article 21 of Decree No 83-878 of 4 October 1983 on the
horse-racing companies and the PMU) (paragraph 3 of the contested judgment).
- The complaint was directed principally against that method of organizing off-course
totalizator betting in France.
- As regards its complaint against the PMU and its member companies, Ladbroke
alleged that there were agreements or concerted practices between the racing
companies authorized in France and between them and the PMU the object of
which was, in breach of Article 85 of the Treaty, to grant the latter exclusive rights
in the management and organization of off-course totalizator betting on races
organized or controlled by those companies, (paragraph 5 of the contested
judgment). The complaint also alleged that the grant of such exclusive rights to the
PMU constituted an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the racing
companies, in breach of Article 86 of the Treaty (paragraph 6 of the contested
judgment).
- That part of the complaint was also directed moreover against agreements and
concerted practices whose object was to support a request for State aid to the
PMU, thereby enabling the PMU to extend its activities to Member States other
than the French Republic, in breach of Article 85 (paragraph 5 of the contested
judgment). It also requested that the breaches of Article 86 resulting from the
PMU's receipt of illegal State aid and the use of advantages procured by that aid
to meet competition be terminated. Lastly, Ladbroke notified the Commission of
other abuses of a dominant position by the PMU, consisting in the exploitation of
those placing bets, the users of its services (paragraph 6 of the contested
judgment).
- As regards its complaint against the French Republic, Ladbroke claimed that the
latter had infringed, first, Articles 3(g) [formerly Article 3(f)], 5, 52, 53, 85, 86 and
90(1) of the EC Treaty by enacting and maintaining in force legislation providing
a legal basis for the agreements between the racing companies inter se and between
them and the PMU granting the latter exclusive rights to take off-course bets and
prohibiting anyone else from placing or accepting off-course bets on horse-races
organized in France otherwise than through the PMU. Secondly, it had further
breached Articles 3(g) [formerly Article 3(f)], 52, 53, 59, 62, 85, 86 and 90(1) of the
EC Treaty by enacting and maintaining in force legislation prohibiting the placing
in France of bets on races organized abroad save through authorized companies
and/or the PMU. Lastly, it had breached Articles 90(1), 92 and 93 of the EC
Treaty by granting the PMU illegal aid (paragraph 7 of the contested judgment).
- By the contested decision the Commission rejected the complaint under Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty against the PMU and its member companies on the
grounds, first, that Articles 85 and 86 were not applicable and, secondly, the
absence of a Community interest (paragraphs 13 to 19 of the contested judgment).
- The Commission did not take a position on the aspects of the complaint directed
against the French Republic under Article 90 of the Treaty. Before the
Commission adopted the contested decision Ladbroke brought an action for failure
to act on the ground that the Commission had failed to exercise the powers
conferred on it by Article 90(3) of the Treaty, which was declared inadmissible by
the Court of First Instance in its judgment of 27 October 1994 in Case T-32/93
Ladbroke v Commission [1994] ECR II-1015, paragraph 37 (paragraph 10 of the
contested judgment).
- In the contested judgment the Court of First Instance annulled the contested
decision on the ground that, by definitively rejecting the part of the complaint
directed against the PMU and its member companies on the ground that Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty did not apply and there was no Community interest,
without first having completed its examination of the compatibility of the French
legislation with the Treaty rules on competition, the Commission had failed to fulfil
its duty to examine carefully the factual and legal issues brought to its attention by
the complainants so as to satisfy the requirement of certainty which a final decision
determining whether an infringement exists must satisfy (paragraph 50 of the
contested judgment). The Commission's reasoning was thus based on a
misinterpretation of the conditions governing the definitive determination of the
existence of alleged infringements (paragraph 51 of the contested judgment).
- For a more detailed account of the facts which gave rise to the dispute reference
may be made to paragraphs 1 to 19 of the contested judgment.
- The Commission submits that the Court should:
(1) quash the judgment in so far as it annuls the contested decision;
(2) dismiss the application under Article 173 of the EC Treaty as unfounded;
and
(3) order Ladbroke to pay the costs in the proceedings before both the Court
of First Instance and the Court of Justice.
- The French Republic submits that the Court should:
(1) set aside the judgment in so far as it annuls the contested decision; and
(2) uphold the submissions put forward by the Commission before the Court
of First Instance.
- Ladbroke submits that the Court should:
(1) dismiss the appeals in Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P;
(2) order the Commission and the French Republic to pay Ladbroke's costs;
(3) alternatively, if the Court allows the appeals, retain the case and give
judgment on the outstanding issues in Ladbroke's application in Case
T-548/93 or remit the case to the Court of First Instance for judgment on
those issues.
- The Commission puts forward three pleas in support of its appeal. The first is that
the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding that where both Article 90 and
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty may be relevant to a case, the Commission must
complete its investigation under Article 90 of the Treaty before ruling on either the
applicability of Articles 85 and 86 or the existence of a Community interest in
investigating the complaint. The Court of First Instance has thereby established an
order of priority as between the procedure provided for in Regulation No 17 of the
Council of 6 February 1962, the first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87) and the procedure
against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations, which is incompatible
with the Commission's discretion to decide what aspect of a complaint should be
considered first and against whom (the undertakings or the State) proceedings
should be first initiated.
- The second plea is that the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding that this
general principle must apply even where a finding on Article 90 is not logically
necessary for a ruling on the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.
The Court has thus overlooked the Commission's finding that, regardless of the
compatibility of the French legislation with the Treaty, certain prior conditions
necessary for the application of Articles 85 and 86 were not satisfied and, in any
event, there was insufficient interest in investigating the complaint under Articles
85 and 86.
- The third plea is based on lack of reasoning, inasmuch as the Court of First
Instance failed, first, to explain why the Commission was bound to examine the
French legislation in the light of Article 90 before rejecting the requests made in
the complaint relating to Articles 85 and 86 and, secondly, failed to state why the
Commission was not entitled to take into account the Community interest in order
to determine the priority to be given to different aspects of the complaint, or in
what way the Commission's appraisal of the Community interest in this case was
manifestly wrong.
- The French Government also relies on three pleas in support of its appeal. The
first is that the Court of First Instance erred in law by failing to take into account
the Court's case-law to the effect that, where State measures leave no freedom of
action to undertakings, as was the position in this case from 1974 onwards, Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty cannot be applied to such undertakings as long as those
measures remain in force.
- In response to that plea, however, the Commission submits that it is necessary to
distinguish between State measures requiring undertakings to engage in conduct
contrary to Articles 85 and 86 and measures that do not require any conduct
contrary to those rules but simply create a legal framework that itself restricts
competition. In the first case, the Commission considers that Article 85 remains
applicable to undertakings' conduct despite the existence of national statutory
obligations and irrespective of the possible application of Articles 3(g), 5 and 85 of
the Treaty with regard to those State measures. In fact, the Commission argues
that an undertaking can and, by virtue of the primacy of Community law and the
direct effect of Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty, must refuse to comply with a
State measure that requires conduct contrary to those provisions.
- In the second case, by contrast, Article 85 may in certain circumstances not apply.
That is the case here, since the 1974 legislation does not require the conclusion of
an agreement between the main racing companies but itself grants the PMU the
exclusive right to organize off-course totalizator betting. The restriction of
competition thus flowed directly from the national legislation, without any action
on the part of undertakings being necessary.
- The second plea relied on by the French Government is that the Court of First
Instance erred in law in failing to take into account well-established case-law to the
effect that a complainant under Regulation No 17 is not entitled to a final decision
as to the existence of an alleged infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.
In particular, the Court of First Instance overlooked the Commission's reasoning
as to the lack of Community interest in investigating the complaint, based on the
fact that since 1974 the absence of competition on the French market for taking
bets resulted directly from the legislation. Accordingly, a finding that the racing
companies and the PMU had infringed Articles 85 and 86 would have had no effect
on competition after that date; as regards the period prior to 1974, the finding of
an infringement of the Treaty rules could lead only to an award of damages and
interest, which the Commission has no power to order.
- The third plea relied on by the French Government is that the Court of First
Instance erred in law by calling in question the Commission's discretion as to
whether to take action against a Member State in respect of legislation which is
allegedly contrary to the Treaty.
- It is to be noted that in their pleas the Commission and the French Republic
challenge, albeit in different terms and for different purposes, the Court of First
Instance's reasoning that it was necessary for the Commission to complete its
examination of the compatibility of the French legislation with the Treaty rules on
competition before it could definitively reject the complaint concerning Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty.
- Accordingly, it is necessary to consider that finding and the reasoning on which it
is based.
- In paragraph 46 of the contested judgment the Court of First Instance found that
the Commission had 'initiated the procedure for examining the applicant's
complaint under Article 90 of the Treaty in order to assess the compatibility of the
French legislation with the other Treaty provisions; that procedure is still in
progress'. The Court stated that 'consequently, the question to be considered is
whether the Commission could definitively reject the applicant's complaint under
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty and Regulation No 17 without having previously
completed its examination of the complaint under Article 90 of the Treaty'.
- In paragraph 47 of the judgment it stated that 'the Commission has submitted,
both in its pleadings and at the hearing, that the competition issue raised by the
applicant's complaint could be resolved only by examining the compatibility of the
French legislation concerning the PMU's statutory monopoly with the Treaty rules
and by taking action, if appropriate, under Article 90 of the Treaty and that,
accordingly, that examination was a priority, since the result of it would hold good
for any prior or future agreements between the sociétés de courses (defence, point
46)'. The Court of First Instance concluded that 'the conduct of the sociétés de
courses and the PMU, impugned by Ladbroke in its complaint, could not have been
fully assessed under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty without a prior evaluation of
the national legislation in the light of the provisions of the Treaty'.
- The Court of First Instance stated that if the Commission were to find that the
national legislation was consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, then conduct
of the racing companies and the PMU complying with that national legislation
would likewise have to be regarded as compatible with Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, whereas if their conduct was not in compliance with the national legislation,
it would remain to be determined whether it infringed Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty (paragraph 48 of the contested judgment). If, however, the Commission
were to find that the legislation infringed the Treaty, it would then have to consider
whether or not the fact that the companies and the PMU were complying with that
legislation could lead to the adoption of measures against them in order to
terminate infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (paragraph 49 of the
contested judgment).
- The Court of First Instance therefore concluded, in paragraph 50 of the contested
judgment, that 'by deciding to definitively reject the applicant's complaint under
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty without first completing its examination of the
compatibility of the French legislation with the provisions of the Treaty, the
Commission cannot be regarded as having carried out its duty to examine carefully
the factual and legal issues brought to its attention by the complainants ... so as to
satisfy the requirement of certainty which a final decision determining whether or
not an infringement exists must [satisfy] ... It was not therefore entitled to conclude
at that stage that the abovementioned provisions of the Treaty were inapplicable
to the conduct of the main sociétés de courses and the PMU to which the applicant
had objected and then that there was no Community interest in finding that the
matters alleged by the applicant were infringements on the ground that they
involved past infringements of the competition rules'.
- That reasoning is thus based on the premiss that the lawfulness, in terms of Articles
85 and 86, of conduct of undertakings complying with national legislation, and the
action which should be taken against them, depends on whether that legislation is
compatible with the Treaty.
- However, the compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty rules on
competition cannot be regarded as decisive in the context of an examination of the
applicability of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to the conduct of undertakings
which are complying with that legislation.
- Although an assessment of the conduct of the racing companies and the PMU in
the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty requires a prior evaluation of the
French legislation, the sole purpose of that evaluation is to determine what effect
that legislation may have on such conduct.
- Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in
by undertakings on their own initiative (see to that effect, as regards Article 86 of
the Treaty, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 18 to 20;
Case C-202/88 France v Commission - the so-called 'telecommunications terminals'
judgment - [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 55; and Case C-18/88 GB-Inno-BM
[1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 20). If anti-competitive conduct is required of
undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which
itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles 85 and
86 do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not
attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of
the undertakings (see also Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73,
111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663,
paragraphs 36 to 72, and more particularly paragraphs 65, 66, 71 and 72).
- Articles 85 and 86 may apply, however, if it is found that the national legislation
does not preclude undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which
prevents, restricts or distorts competition (Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78
Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125; Joined Cases 240/82
to 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82 and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and Others
v Commission [1985] ECR 3831; and Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission
[1997] ECR I-0000).
- When the Commission is considering the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty to the conduct of undertakings, a prior evaluation of national legislation
affecting such conduct should therefore be directed solely to ascertaining whether
that legislation prevents undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which
prevents, restricts or distorts competition.
- The Court of First Instance therefore erred in law in holding that by definitively
rejecting the complaint on the ground that Articles 85 and 86 did not apply, and
that there was no Community interest, before having completed its examination of
the compatibility of the French legislation with the Treaty rules on competition, the
Commission was relying on an interpretation of the conditions governing the
definitive determination of the existence of alleged infringements which was wrong
in law.
- Consequently, the contested judgment should be set aside, without its being
necessary to examine the other arguments relied on by the appellants.
Referral of the case to the Court of First Instance
- According to the first paragraph of Article 54 of the EC Statute of the Court of
Justice, if the appeal is well founded the Court of Justice is to quash the decision
of the Court of First Instance. It may itself give final judgment in the matter,
where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the Court
of First Instance for judgment.
- Since it is not possible at this stage to give final judgment because the Court of
First Instance ruled on only one of the complaints raised by Ladbroke, it is
necessary to refer the case back to that Court.
On those grounds,THE COURT
hereby:
- Sets aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18 September
1995 in Case T-548/93 Ladbroke Racing v Commission.
- Refers the case back to the Court of First Instance.
- Reserves costs.
Rodríguez Iglesias Gulmann Ragnemalm Schintgen Mancini Kapteyn Murray Edward Puissochet Hirsch Jann
|
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 11 November 1997.
R. Grass
G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias
Registrar
President
1: Language of the case: English.