Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

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Preliminary rulings ° Admissibility ° Questions not providing sufficient explanation of the factual and legislative context
(EC Treaty, Art. 177; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 20)

In order to reach an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court, it is essential that the national court define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based.
The information provided and the questions raised in orders for reference must not only be such as to enable the Court usefully to reply but also such as to give the Governments of the Member States and other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court.

In Case C-257/95,
REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EC Treaty by the Tribunal Administratif, Clermont-Ferrand (France), for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between
Gérard Bresle
and
Préfet de la Région Auvergne and Préfet du Puy-de-Dôme
on the interpretation of Article 95 of the EC Treaty,
THE COURT,
composed of: G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias, President, C.N. Kakouris, D.A.O. Edward, J.-P. Puissochet and G. Hirsch (Presidents of Chambers), G.F. Mancini, F.A. Schockweiler, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, P.J.G. Kapteyn, C. Gulmann, J.L. Murray, P. Jann, H. Ragnemalm, L. Sevón and M. Wathelet (Rapporteur), Judges,
Advocate General: G. Cosmas,
Registrar: R. Grass,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General,
makes the following
Order

1 By a judgment of 27 June 1995, received at the Court on 28 July 1995, the Tribunal Administratif (Administrative Court), Clermont-Ferrand, referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty a question on the interpretation of Article 95 of that Treaty.
That question was raised in the context of a dispute between Mr Bresle and the Prefect of Puy-de-Dôme concerning the latter' s refusal to reduce the power-rating for administrative purposes of Mr Bresle' s vehicle.
2 In Case 433/85 Feldain v Directeur General des Impôts [1987] ECR 3521, the Court held that a system of road tax such as the French system had a discriminatory or protective effect prohibited by Article 95 of the Treaty. The Court examined in particular the methods for determining the power rating for tax purposes introduced by Circular No 77-191 of 23 December 1977 (Journal Officiel de la République Française of 8 February 1978, p. 1052), which it held to place vehicles imported from other Member States at a disadvantage.
3 Following that judgment, the French authorities specified, in Circular No 91-71 of 20 September 1991 (Journal Officiel de la République Française of 23 June 1993, p. 8833), the circumstances in which the power-rating for administrative purposes of certain vehicles was to be amended.
4 Annex I to that Circular, entitled "Categories of vehicles whose power-rating for administrative purposes cannot be amended" provides:
"Owners of private vehicles falling under one of the categories listed below are not entitled to apply and any such request must therefore be dismissed:
a) vehicles whose power-rating for administrative purposes has been calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Circular of 28 December 1956.
The Circular of 23 December 1977 shall apply only to certain categories of private vehicles; private vehicles outside the scope of that circular and all other categories of vehicles ... shall remain subject to the provisions of the Circular of 28 December 1956 as regards the calculation of their power-rating for administrative purposes. Their power-rating for administrative purposes cannot therefore be amended.
In the case of private cars, that shall apply:
a1) to vehicles first put into circulation before 1 January 1978;
a2) to vehicles first registered after 1 January 1978 but for which type-approval was given before the entry into force of the Circular of 23 December 1977, that is before 1 January 1978.
..."
5 Annex II to Circular No 91-71 contains a list of the types of private vehicles whose power-rating for administrative purposes is amended. As regards the vehicle at issue in the present case, a Porsche type 930-19, it appears from that list that the original power-rating for administrative purposes of 19 CV is amended and reduced to 13 CV where the date of the type-approval is 16 June 1987 and it was not first put into circulation before that date.
6 Since 16 April 1986 Mr Bresle has owned a Porsche 930-19, which was given individual type-approval by the Vehicle Testing Service on 3 January 1978 and put into circulation on 21 July 1981. The power-rating for administrative purposes of that vehicle was fixed at 19 CV, pursuant to the conditions laid down by the Circular of 28 December 1956 (Journal Officiel de la République Française of 22 January 1957).
7 On the basis of Annex II to Circular No 91-71, Mr Bresle applied on two occasions to the Prefect of Puy-de-Dôme for the power-rating for administrative purposes of his Porsche motor-car to be reduced from 19 to 13 CV. Those applications were rejected by express decision of 26 May 1992 and by implied decision of 2 August 1992 respectively.
8 Mr Bresle has brought an action before the Tribunal Administratif, Clermont-Ferrand, for the annulment of those two decisions and, in consequence, for reduction of his vehicle' s power-rating for administrative purposes and an order that the State pay to him FF 4 000 and FF 5 000 respectively pursuant to Article L.8-1 of the Code des Tribunaux Administratifs et des Cours Administratives d' Appel (Administrative Courts and Appeal Courts Code).
9 By interlocutory judgment of 8 September 1994 the Tribunal Administratif, first, ordered the joinder of the two applications for annulment and dismissed as inadmissible the application directed against the implied rejection of 2 August 1992 as seeking the annulment of a confirmatory decision. Secondly, it dismissed the plea that Circular 77-191 applied to the present case and asked the parties for their observations on the plea concerning the alignment of national law with Community law by means of circulars and the plea concerning compliance of the Circular of 28 December 1956 with Article 95 of the Treaty after the entry into force of the Treaty.
10 In the decision making the reference, the Tribunal Administratif dismissed the first of those pleas on the ground that the Circular of 28 December 1956 was among the provisions on which Article 35.-I of Law No 93/859 of 22 June 1993 (Journal Officiel de la République Française of 23 June 1993, p. 8815) retrospectively conferred legislative status.
11 As regards the second plea, the Tribunal Administratif pointed out that, pursuant to Circular No 91-71, vehicles first registered after 1 January 1978 but for which type-approval was given before that date, in particular, remain subject to the provisions of the Circular of 28 December 1956 and their power-rating for administrative purposes cannot therefore be amended.
12 According to the Tribunal Administratif, Mr Bresle' s vehicle falls within that latter category since it was registered on 21 July 1981 and, notwithstanding the fact that it had been granted individual type-approval by the Vehicle Testing Service on 3 January 1978, approval had been given for that vehicle type before 1 January 1978 under the criteria laid down by the Circular of 28 December 1956. Pursuant to Annex I to Circular No 91-71, Mr Bresle' s vehicle cannot therefore benefit from the reduction in power-rating for administrative purposes provided for in Annex II to that circular.
13 The Tribunal Administratif stated, however, that since the Porsche 930-19 vehicle type had been given approval after the entry into force of the EEC Treaty, having regard to the power generated at that time by vehicles produced in France and by vehicles manufactured in the other Member States, the method of calculation laid down by the Circular with legislative status of 28 December 1956 may, after the entry into force of the Treaty, be discriminatory within the meaning of Article 95.
14 In the circumstances the Tribunal Administratif referred the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
"Can the method of calculating the power-rating for administrative purposes of vehicles under the Circular with retrospective legislative status of the Secretary of State for Public Works, Transport and Tourism of 28 December 1956 be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community in relation to vehicles for which type-approval was given after the Treaty entered into force and before 1 January 1978?"
15 It should be recalled, in limine, that, in order to reach an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court, it is essential that the national court define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases C-320/90, C-321/90 and C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others v Circostel [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 6, and the orders in Case C-157/92 Pretore di Genova v Banchero [1993] ECR I-1085, paragraph 4, Case C-458/93 Saddik [1995] ECR I-511, paragraph 12, Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis and Others [1995] ECR I-1023, paragraph 8 and Case C-307/95 Max Mara v Ufficio del Registro [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 6).
16 The judgment making the reference does not contain sufficient information to meet those requirements. The national court merely mentions the text of a circular which has retrospectively been given legislative status by law, as a result of which a vehicle such as that of Mr Bresle does not meet the conditions for a reduction in its power-rating for administrative purposes and states that the method of calculating the power-rating for administrative purposes of vehicles under another Circular which has also retrospectively been given legislative status by law may be incompatible with Article 95 of the Treaty. It does not specify which provisions of the latter Circular are relevant when determining the method of calculating the power-rating for administrative purposes or indicate their content; nor does it set out the precise reasons which led it to question their compatibility with Community law and to consider it necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice; nor does it even mention the technical characteristics of the Porsche 930-19. Without such information no objective comparison can be made with similar vehicles produced in France, having regard to Article 95 of the Treaty.
17 In those circumstances, because the judgment making the reference is too vague as to the legal and factual situations envisaged by the national court, the Court is unable usefully to provide an interpretation of Community law.
18 It should also be stressed that the information provided and the questions raised in orders for reference must not only be such as to enable the Court usefully to reply but also such as to give the Governments of the Member States and other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court (order in Max Mara, paragraph 7).
19 It must therefore be held, pursuant to Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure, that the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible.

Costs
20 The costs incurred by the French Government and the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.

On those grounds,
THE COURT
hereby orders:
The reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Tribunal Administratif de Clermont-Ferrand by judgment of 27 June 1995 is inadmissible.
Luxembourg, 2 February 1996.