In Case T-476/93,
Fédération Régionale des Syndicats d' Exploitants Agricoles (FRSEA), an association governed by French law, established at Laxou, France, and
Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d' Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), an association governed by French law, established in Paris,
represented by Stéphane Massé, of the Nancy Bar, and Jean Kopf, of the Épinal Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Claude Wassenich, 6 Rue Dicks,
applicants,
v
Council of the European Communities, represented by Jean-Paul Jacqué, Director in its Legal Service, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Bruno Eynard, Manager of the Legal Directorate of the European Investment Bank, 100 Boulevard Konrad Adenauer,
defendant,
APPLICATION for the annulment of Council Regulation (EEC) No 125/93 of 18 January 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (OJ 1993 L 18, p. 1),
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Second Chamber),
composed of: J.L. Cruz Vilaça, President, C.P. Briët, D.P.M. Barrington, A. Saggio and J. Biancarelli, Judges,
Registrar: H. Jung,
makes the following
Order
Facts, legal background and procedure
1 The applicants are two associations of agricultural trade organizations representing the interests of French farmers.
2 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1357/80 of 5 June 1980 introducing a system of premiums for maintaining suckler cows (OJ 1980 L 140, p. 1) gave producers selling no milk or milk products originating on their own holdings the right to claim a suckler-cow premium. It appears from the preamble to that regulation that the aim of the measure was, in the light of the unfavourable market situation for beef and veal, to guarantee a fair income for producers not selling milk, by maintaining suckler cows.
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1187/90 of 7 May 1990 amending Regulation No 1357/80 introducing a system of premiums for maintaining suckler cows (OJ 1990 L 119, p. 34) extended eligibility for that premium to milk producers "whose actual available individual reference quantity ... is less than, or equal to, 60 000 kg for the 12-month period during which the premium application is lodged ... In this case, the premium shall be limited to 10 animals per application and per holding" (Article 1(3)). The aim of that extension was to enable small milk producers to diversify their production by keeping a "dairy herd" and a "suckler herd".
4 Those arrangements were initially maintained under the reform of the common agricultural policy. That reform, however, involved a reduction of the intervention price for beef and veal, offset by compensation for producers. The suckler cow premium was therefore increased by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2066/92 of 30 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 468/87 laying down general rules applying to the special premium for beef producers and Regulation (EEC) No 1357/80 introducing a system of premiums for maintaining suckler cows (OJ 1992 L 215, p. 49).
5 However, it became apparent to the Community authorities that the maintenance of the specific arrangements for small producers created a difficult situation for certain other milk producers also keeping suckler cows, whose reference quantities exceeded 60 000 kg, with the result that they were not eligible for the premium yet still did not qualify for the compensation paid to specialized producers.
6 It was in order to remedy that situation that Council Regulation (EEC) No 125/93 of 18 January 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (OJ 1993 L 18, p. 1) was adopted. That regulation increases the 60 000-kilogram limit for milk producers to 120 000 kg (first subparagraph of Article 1(3)) and the reasons for that change are stated as follows in its preamble: "Whereas, to date, eligibility for the suckler-cow premium has been restricted, in the case of holdings with a dairy herd and a suckler herd, to small producers with an individual reference quantity of 60 000 kg of milk or less; whereas small or medium-sized producers with a reference quantity of more than 60 000 kg who keep suckler cows but are not eligible for the premium will face price reductions from 1993; whereas the reference quantity for milk production should therefore be increased".
7 By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 9 April 1993, the applicants brought an action under the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, seeking the annulment of Regulation No 125/93. By document lodged at the Registry on 13 May 1993, the applicants rectified their application.
8 By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 10 June 1993, the Council raised an objection of inadmissibility under Article 91(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. The applicants were duly asked whether they wished to submit any observations on that objection, but did not do so.
9 By order of 27 September 1993, pursuant to Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 amending Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21), the Court of Justice transferred the case to the Court of First Instance.
10 It is claimed in the application that the Court should:
° annul the measure dated 10 January 1993 (Regulation No 125/93);
° order the defendant to pay all the costs.
11 The Council contends that the Court should:
° dismiss the application as inadmissible;
° order the applicants to pay the costs.
12 Under Article 114(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the remainder of the proceedings on an objection of inadmissibility are oral, unless the Court decides otherwise. The Court (Second Chamber) considers that it has sufficient information in the present case and that there is no need to open the oral procedure.
Admissibility
Arguments of the parties
13 In its objection the Council claims that the application is inadmissible on three grounds: first, the contested regulation affects producers by reason of an objective situation and cannot be considered to be of direct concern to them; secondly, the action is brought by agricultural trade organizations, which cannot be considered to be directly and individually concerned by the contested regulation; and, thirdly, the application does not comply with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure requiring a summary of the subject-matter of the proceedings and the pleas in law.
14 The Council submits, in the first regard, that in order to establish that a measure concerns them, not only must the producers affiliated to the applicant associations be affected by the regulation in a specific way, distinct from that in which it affects other persons, even if it is possible to identify those to whom it will apply, but the authority adopting the measure must also have been in a position to know that it would affect exclusively the interests and legal position of those persons. The Council refers to Joined Cases 106/63 and 107/63 Toepfer v Commission [1965] ECR 405, Case 6/68 Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v Council [1968] ECR 409, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission [1985] ECR 207 and Joined Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 Buckl and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-6061.
15 However, the Council argues, the contested regulation affects in a general way all milk producers having a reference quantity not exceeding 120 000 kg provided that they keep, for at least six consecutive months from the day on which the application for a premium is lodged, a number of suckler cows at least equal to the number for which the premium is requested. The contested regulation therefore affects producers only by reason of an objective situation relevant to its purpose and cannot be of direct concern to them.
16 Secondly, the Council submits that, since the action is brought by agricultural trade organizations, the consistent case-law of the Court of Justice to the effect that such actions cannot be declared admissible should therefore be applied. It refers to Case 117/86 UFADE v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 3255. The Council concludes that the regulation cannot be of direct and individual concern to the applicants.
17 Thirdly, and lastly, the Council argues that although the ° highly laconic ° application refers to a breach of the EEC Treaty and a number of general legal principles, it does not contain the arguments necessary to assess the substance of the pleas in law. In particular, the application does not show in what way the regulation is alleged to run counter to the requirement that a fair standard of living is to be ensured for producers; furthermore, although it refers to an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, it does not in any way, in the Council' s view, explain how discrimination could arise as between milk producers and other farmers who, by their very nature, do not form a homogenous category. The application therefore fails to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Procedure, since it does not contain any precise indication of the subject-matter of the proceedings or summary of the pleas in law on which it is based.
18 The applicants, who have not responded to that objection of inadmissibility, merely submit, in their application: "As regards the applicants' interest in bringing proceedings, it is obvious that the contested measure affects them directly and individually ... That measure directly and individually affects dairy farmers, who will be deprived of premiums which they were previously able to claim. FNSEA ... which represents practically all the farmers concerned, is properly entitled to challenge the regulation in question on the basis of the damage caused to its members."
Findings of the Court
19 According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty allows individuals to challenge any decision which, although in the form of a regulation, is of direct and individual concern to them. As the Court of Justice held in Joined Cases 789/79 and 790/79 Calpak v Commission [1980] ECR 1949, the objective of that provision is in particular to prevent the Community institutions from being able, merely by choosing the form of a regulation, to preclude an individual from bringing an action against a decision which concerns him directly and individually and thus to make it clear that the nature of a measure cannot be changed by the form chosen. The fact that it is possible to determine the number or even the identity of the persons to whom a measure applies at any given time is not sufficient to call into question the legislative nature of the measure, as long as it is established that it applies to them by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question in relation to its purpose (see, most recently, Buckl).
20 The Court of Justice has further held that in order for a measure to be regarded as of individual concern to economic operators seeking its annulment, it must affect their legal position because of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as a person to whom it is addressed (see, most recently, the order of 21 June 1993 in Case C-288/93 Comaco v Council, not published in the ECR).
21 In the present case, it must first of all be noted that Regulation No 125/93, which the applicants contest in its entirety, concerns not merely entitlements under the suckler-cow premium system but also the creation of other rights in addition to that premium, the protection of the environment by the Member States in the context of beef and veal production and a transitional derogation for producers in the new German Laender. The applicants have not specified the scope of their claim for the annulment of the contested regulation.
22 The Court must consider to what extent the contested regulation is capable of being of direct and individual concern to, first, the economic operators who are members of the applicant associations and, secondly, those associations themselves.
23 First, in so far as the application may be understood as challenging, essentially, the first subparagraph of Article 1(3) of the contested regulation, it must be borne in mind that the aim of that provision is to avoid a situation in which small or medium-sized producers with a reference quantity of more than 60 000 kg who keep suckler cows but are not eligible for the premium would face price reductions from 1993 (see paragraph 6, above). Such provisions therefore apply to objectively defined situations and affect the legal position of persons referred to in general and abstract terms.
24 The contested regulation therefore concerns the milk producers affiliated to the applicant associations only in their objective capacity as economic operators in the beef and veal sector, in the same way as any other economic operator in the same situation.
25 Secondly, as the Council rightly submits, since the contested regulation is not of direct and individual concern to the applicants themselves, which are agricultural trade organizations, they have no locus standi to bring an action for its annulment. According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, it is not possible to accept the principle that an association, in its capacity as representative of a category of operators, is individually concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that category (see Joined Cases 16/62 and 17/62 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes v Council [1962] ECR 471, Case 282/85 DEFI v Commission [1986] ECR 2469, and UFADE, cited above).
26 It follows from all the foregoing that the Council' s objection of inadmissibility should be upheld, and the application dismissed as inadmissible, without there being any need to consider the plea alleging that the application does not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance, particularly in the light of Case T-85/92 De Hoe v Commission [1993] ECR II-523, in which it was held that a mere abstract statement of the pleas in law in the application does not alone satisfy the requirements of the Statute of the Court and the Rules of Procedure and that the words "summary of the pleas in law" used in those texts mean that the application must specify the nature of the pleas on which the application is based.
Costs
27 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party' s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The action is dismissed as inadmissible.
2. The applicants shall pay the costs.
Luxembourg, 28 October 1993.
