European Court of Human Rights

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ANDREY RYLKOV FOUNDATION AND OTHERS

v. RUSSIA

(Applications nos. 37949/18 and 84 others - see appended list)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

18 June 2024

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Pere Pastor Vilanova, President,
 Jolien Schukking,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Darian Pavli,
 Ioannis Ktistakis,
 Andreas Zünd,
 Diana Kovatcheva, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the eighty-five applications (see application numbers in the Appendix) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by individual applicants and applicant organisations ("the applicants") on the dates listed in the Appendix;

the decision to give notice to the Russian Government ("the Government") of the complaints concerning the designation of non-governmental organisations as "undesirable" and the prosecution for engaging in the activities of such organisations, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;

the observations submitted by the applicants;

the comments submitted by the Ukrainian Government in application no. 44688/21, and by the Czech Government in application no. 32572/23;

the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the elected judges of the Court to sit as an ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule 29 § 2 of the Rules of the Court (see Kutayev v. Russia, no. 17912/15, §§ 5-8, 24 January 2023);

Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns the Russian authorities' designation of four applicant non-governmental organisations as "undesirable" and the prosecution of applicants for engaging in the activities of "undesirable" organisations.

THE FACTS

1. LEGAL REGULATION OF "UNDESIRABLE ORGANISATIONS"

2.  In 2015 Russian legislation created the novel category of "undesirable organisations" (see paragraph 56 below). The amendments conferred upon the General Prosecutor's Office ("the GPO") the power to designate any non-Russian or international non-governmental organisation (NGO) as "undesirable", following consultation with Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The designation applies if it has been determined that the organisation undermines the foundations of the Russian constitutional order, defence capabilities, or national security of Russia.

3.  Subsequent to this designation, an "undesirable organisation" is, by operation of law, prohibited from having offices or implementing projects in Russia, using accounts in Russian banks, or disseminating any content through media or the Internet. The organisation's website shall be blocked within Russia. Since 2021 an additional restriction has been imposed, prohibiting Russian nationals from participating in the activities of an "undesirable organisation", even when resident outside Russia (see paragraph 57 below).

4.  Failure to comply with these restrictions incurs administrative and criminal liabilities (see paragraphs 60 and 61 below). A first-time offence of participating in the activities of an "undesirable organisation" is punishable by a fine under Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offences ("the CAO"). Repeat offenders, and also individuals who engage in fundraising for "undesirable organisations" or who organise their operation, face a range of criminal penalties including fines, compulsory labour, and imprisonment.

5.  The authority to maintain a register of "undesirable organisations" lies with the Ministry of Justice. The list of undesirable organisations published on the Ministry's website comprised, as on 15 April 2024, over 150 organisations of the following types: major international funders of human rights organisations (Open Society Foundation, European Endowment for Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy, GlobalGiving), human rights organisations (Transparency International, European Platform for Democratic Elections, CEELI Institute, Agora-Law Sofia Foundation), think tanks (Chatham House, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), faith organisations (Falun Dafa, New Generation Church, Jehovah's Witnesses), student and academic exchange organisations (Central European University, Deutsch-Russischer Austausch, Bard College, Brīvā Universitāte), Russian-language media organisations (Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, Medusa, Project Media, The Insider, iStories, Novaja Gazeta-Europe, TV Rain), environment protection organisations (WWF, Greenpeace) and trade unions (International Transport Workers' Federation).

2. APPLICANT ORGANISATIONS DESIGNATED AS UNDESIRABLE
   1. Free Russia Foundation (application no. 26953/21)

6.  The applicant organisation, Free Russia Foundation, is a non-profit, non-stock corporation incorporated in Delaware, United States of America, in 2014, with offices in Washington DC, Kyiv, and Tbilisi. The Free Russia Foundation "informs US policymakers in real-time about events in Russia and supports the formulation of an effective and sustainable policy towards Russia in the US". It also aids the Russian diaspora, with a particular focus on those "who have recently left Russia due to significant deterioration in the political and economic situation".

7.  On 27 June 2019 the GPO designated the Free Russia Foundation as an "undesirable organisation" on the grounds, in particular, that the Foundation's board included former employees of the US State Department and USAID. The Foundation was also seen as interfering with Russia's affairs, discrediting its leaders, and influencing public opinion about the need for governmental change, including by means of "colour revolutions". In pursuance of those aims, Foundation experts prepared analytical reports to justify sanctions against Russia and increase anti-Russian rhetoric. These reports highlighted Russia's cyberattacks against the US and their allies, targeted joint Russian-EU projects, criticised Russia's socio-economic development, and exposed Russian leadership's links with organised crime. The Foundation, in partnership with the National Endowment for Democracy - another "undesirable organisation", hosted discussions supporting the democracy movement and civic initiatives in Russia. Moreover, the Foundation protested against human rights violations in Crimea and called for additional pressure brought to bear on the Russian government. Reports depicted Russia as an aggressor State that required political and military deterrence. The Foundation's initiatives in Georgia and Ukraine aimed to consolidate opposition to Russian influence and trained activists for protests. The Foundation initiated a Coalition for the Release of the Kremlin's Political Prisoners, seen as jeopardising Russia's constitutional order and national security.

8.  On 25 September 2019 the Foundation applied for a judicial review of the designation, raising objections about the absence of any advance notice of the decision and the lack of an opportunity to provide an explanation. The Foundation emphasised that neither it nor its staff had engaged in illegal activities within Russia or other states and had not faced any prosecutions or received warnings. It highlighted that the law failed to establish transparent and predictable criteria for labelling an organisation as "undesirable" and asserted that the GPO's decision lacked substantial reasoning.

9.  On 25 December 2019 the Tverskoy District Court in Moscow dismissed the complaint. It reiterated the opening passages of the prosecutor's decision and held it to be "adequately reasoned". It also made reference to a report from the Federal Security Service ("the FSB"), dated 29 May 2019, which concluded that the Foundation's activities "posed a threat to the foundations of Russia's constitutional order and national security". Ultimately, the court determined that the Foundation had been involved in political activities in Russia by openly supporting the "democratic opposition" and releasing analytical reports aimed at "weakening the incumbent President's standing' during the 2018 presidential election campaign".

10.  A letter dated 24 May 2019 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the GPO about the Foundation was presented during the District Court proceedings, but it was not mentioned in the judgment. The letter characterised the Foundation as a "Russophobic platform" in the US, engaging in "clear destructive activities" against Russia. The Ministry admitted its lack of comprehensive information to label the Foundation's activities as a threat to Russia's constitutional order, defence, or security. Nonetheless, it expressed no objections to the Foundation's inclusion in the undesirable organisations list if "other competent authorities possessed such information".

11.  In their appeal, the Foundation primarily cited a procedural violation in designating it as an undesirable organisation. The above letter suggested that the "competent foreign-policy body" (see paragraph 2 above) lacked sufficient information to warrant the designation.

12.  On 22 July 2020 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court's judgment, without addressing the appeal's arguments. Subsequent cassation appeals were dismissed by the Second Cassation Court on 25 November 2020 and the Supreme Court of Russia on 19 February 2021.

2. Ukrainian World Congress and Vinnik (application no. 44688/21)

13.  The applicant organisation, the Ukrainian World Congress, is a not-for-profit corporation based in Toronto, Canada, with missions in Kyiv, Brussels, and New York. As the largest international coordinating body for Ukrainian communities abroad, it works to promote global solidarity and representation for Ukrainian interests. It fosters a network of over thirty member organisations supporting Ukrainian heritage and advocating for Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity, and prosperity. In 2003 the United Nations Economic and Social Council granted it special consultative status, and in 2018, it achieved participatory status as a non-governmental organisation with the Council of Europe.

14.  The applicant, Mr Vinnik, is the Regional Vice-President of the applicant organisation and its legal representative in Russia.

15.  On 24 November 2010 and 18 May 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia liquidated the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia and the Union of Ukrainians in Russia, the two principal coordinating bodies for Ukrainians in Russia. In 2013 the Ministry of Justice twice dismissed applications for the registration of a Russian organisation, the Ukrainian Congress in Russia, on ostensibly technical grounds. On 23 March 2014 a Canadian Vice-President of the applicant organisation was barred from entering Russia in retaliation for Canadian sanctions against Russia, imposed due to the unlawful occupation of Crimea. From 31 July 2018 to 24 October 2019, on six separate occasions, the Ministry of Justice rejected Mr Vinnik's applications for the registration of a Russian member organisation of the Ukrainian World Congress.

16.  On 11 July 2019 the GPO declared the applicant organisation undesirable, citing an array of alleged "anti-Russian activities". Those included advocating for a change of government in Russia and the return of Crimea to Ukraine, calls to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons and to strengthen sanctions against Russia, revising the shared history of Russia and Ukraine, undermining Orthodoxy in Ukraine, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline construction, and limiting the use of the Russian language in Ukraine's cultural domain. The organisation was accused of advancing these initiatives through multiple avenues, such as initiating discussions during the organisation President's visits, his speaking at international forums such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Commission, staging anti-Russian campaigns including the "Red Card for Putin" during the FIFA World Cup, partnering with other undesirable organisations, and promoting controversial ideas such as the return of Crimea via leadership of associated organisations.

17.  The applicant organisation, represented by Mr Vinnik, sought a judicial review of the decision, asserting that none of its peaceful, lawful activities, statements or working methods constituted a threat to Russia's constitutional order or security. It submitted that the designation was politically motivated, forming part of a broader policy by Russian authorities to suppress the Ukrainian community in Russia.

18.  On 11 March 2020 the Tverskoy District Court in Moscow dismissed the complaint. The court did not engage with the organisation's arguments, instead reiterating the contents of the GPO's decision, which it deemed lawful and sufficiently motivated. On 22 July 2020 the Moscow City Court dismissed an appeal. The final decision was given on 12 May 2021 by the Supreme Court of Russia.

19.  In parallel, administrative offence proceedings under Article 20.33 of the CAO were conducted against Mr Vinnik.

20.  By a judgment of 10 September 2020, a magistrate of the Pervomayskiy Court Circuit in Omsk fined him 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for representing an undesirable organisation in court, discussing its activities with local organisations, and maintaining contacts with the management of an undesirable organisation. On 12 October 2020 the Pervomayskiy District Court rejected Mr Vinnik's appeal against the conviction.

21.  By a judgment of 3 September 2021, upheld on appeal on 5 October 2021, a magistrate of the same court circuit fined Mr Vinnik RUB 7,000 on the basis that, by accessing the website of the Ukrainian World Congress, the police were able to document that he was listed as the Congress's Regional Vice-President and had taken part in video calls concerning its activities.

3. Association of Schools of Political Studies of the Council of Europe (application no. 53201/22)

22.  The applicant association, uniting twenty-one schools of political studies, mainly in Southern and Eastern Europe, was established as a non-profit association under French law in Strasbourg in 2008. According to its constitution, the applicant association aims to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law and has no profit-making, political or religious purpose (Article 2).

23.  On 22 December 2020 the GPO designated the applicant association undesirable. The Ministry of Justice published the decision online on 25 December 2020. The applicant association only received a copy of the GPO's decision after initiating judicial review proceedings.

24.  The GPO's decision referred to the inclusion of the Russian member of the applicant association, the Moscow Schools of Political Studies, in a register of foreign agents. The decision further stated that the applicant association had held seminars on freedom of speech and media, rule of law and civil society, at which the "domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation were critically discussed". These included characterising Russian presence in Crimea as "occupation" and "aggression". According to the decision, a "secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation was suggested". The decision criticised the support for protests expressed by a member of the Prague Civil Society Centre at one of the seminars. The decision further referred to the convictions of the participants in the applicant association's seminars for participation in unauthorised manifestations. The decision claimed that the applicant association was financed by other organisations declared "undesirable" in Russia. It concluded that the applicant association interfered with Russia's internal affairs and posed a threat to the Russian constitutional order because its alumni advocated for the "European model of democracy".

25.  The consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also obtained in the course of the judicial review proceedings, was limited to a statement that the designation as undesirable would not be contrary to the foreign policy objectives of the Russian Federation.

26.  Following the publication of the decision, the Russian telecoms regulator blocked access to the applicant association's website in Russia and unsuccessfully asked Twitter to take down its account.

27.  On 14 July 2021 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow rejected an application for a judicial review. The judgment referred to the listing of the Moscow School of Political Studies as a "foreign agent" and the financing of the applicant association by other undesirable organisations. The District Court further noted the intervention of a member of the Prague Civil Society Centre where she praised protests in Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. The District Court inferred therefrom that the applicant association encouraged protests and trained protest activists with the express aim of violating regulations on demonstrations and resisting police officers. A mention of the alleged call for the secession of Chechnya was also made, without specifying who, when and in what capacity had made that call.

28.  On 1 December 2021 the Moscow City Court dismissed an appeal. The final decision was issued by the Supreme Court of Russia on 6 July 2022.

4. Společnost svobody informace, z.s. (application no. 32572/23)

29.  The applicant association, Society for the Freedom of Information, is a non-profit association registered under the laws of the Czech Republic for promoting transparency and free access to information in public interest.

30.  On 26 June 2021 the GPO declared the applicant association undesirable. The Ministry of Justice published the decision online on 9 July 2021. The applicant association was only able to access the text of the GPO's decision after initiating judicial review proceedings.

31.  The decision alleged that the applicant association received financial support from entities deemed "undesirable" in Russia, including the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundation. It was further claimed that the association conducted its activities through two Russian entities: the Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), which had been designated as a "foreign agent", and an unregistered association of Russian lawyers and journalists known as Team 29. The decision referred to the IDFI's online projects that facilitated access to government information and archives of Soviet secret services. These projects included compiling an openness rating of governing bodies, offering a critical assessment of Russian legislation, and advocating for legislative changes. Moreover, the decision highlighted a series of publications on Team 29's website. These publications included a video that criticised the amendments to the Russian Constitution, which permitted President Putin to seek a fifth term and defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Other publications were critical of the Constitutional Court's blanket endorsement of these amendments, highlighted a lack of ambition in the programmes of Russian political parties, and provided guidance for Russian NGOs affected by new "foreign-agent" restrictions. According to the GPO's decision, these activities and publications undermined public confidence in Russia's political and judicial systems, fostered opposition to the lawful actions of State authorities, discredited the Russian leadership, and influenced public opinion towards a change in government.

32.  The applicant association initiated a judicial review of the GPO's decision at the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 18 February 2022 the District Court dismissed the complaint, essentially endorsing the GPO's reasoning and concluding that the applicant association's activities posed a threat to Russia's national security.

33.  The applicant association appealed against that judgment, arguing that the first-instance court failed to assess the publications and activities in question in the light of the criteria established in the Court's case-law. On 17 August 2022 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeal.

34.  The applicant association's further appeals on points of law were dismissed by the Second Court of Cassation on 21 December 2022 and the Supreme Court on 3 April 2023.

3. APPLICANTS CONVICTED FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH "UNDESIRABLE ORGANISATIONS"
   1. Conviction for involvement with the Open Society Foundation

35.  On 1 December 2015 the Open Society Foundation, formerly the Open Society Institute (OSI), a US-based grantmaking network that supports civil society groups around the world, along with the OSI Assistance Foundation, were among the first organisations to be designated as "undesirable".

36.  The applicant foundation, Andrey Rylkov Foundation for Health Protection and Social Justice (application no. 37949/18), is a Russian NGO, advocating for human drug policies, protecting the rights and health of drug users through strategic litigation and harm reduction programmes, and promoting the use of replacement therapy which is banned in Russia.

37.  On 11 October 2017 a prosecutor in Moscow accessed a publication titled "Pre-trial detention should not be a health hazard" on the applicant foundation's website. Uploaded on 25 June 2011, the publication had remained unchanged since that date. The prosecutor documented the presence of an active hyperlink in the publication, leading to the OSI's Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice on the OSI's website. Based on this, the applicant foundation was charged under Article 20.33 of the CAO for disseminating the materials of an undesirable organisation.

38.  On 13 November 2017 a magistrate of the Shchukino Court Circuit in Moscow found the applicant foundation guilty as charged and fined it RUB 50,000.

39.  In the grounds of appeal, the applicant foundation argued that the link in question had been published on their website four years before the OSI was declared an undesirable organisation. Consequently, the crucial element of intentionality was missing. Nor could they be held liable for a lack of due diligence since no law obligates them to go through all previously posted information and expunge references to organisations newly designated as undesirable.

40.  On 5 February 2018 the Khoroshevskiy District Court in Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The court held that the offence had occurred on 11 October 2017, on the day the prosecutor had accessed the website and consisted in "making the said hyperlink and web resources freely available to an unlimited number of users". The prosecutor's documentation constituted, in the court's view, sufficient evidence of the offence.

41.  On 24 September 2019 another applicant organisation, Young Journalists of the Altay Region (application no. 34258/20), was likewise fined for maintaining an inactive link to the OSI's webpage which had been present on its website since 1999 (see the Appendix for details).

2. Conviction for involvement with Open Russia

42.  Open Russia is a name shared by several organisations founded by Mr Mikhail Khodorkovskiy to promote democracy and human rights. The first organisation existed from 2001 to 2006. It was closed when the Russian authorities froze its bank accounts.

43.  On 12 November 2016 the organisation was relaunched as the public network movement Open Russia (Общественное сетевое движение Открытая Россия) at the inaugural conference held in Helsinki, Finland, where its manifesto and articles of association were adopted. According to the articles of association, the Open Russia movement "carries out its activities in the territory of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Russian Constitution and applicable Russian legislation" (section 1.2) and has the permanent seat of its governing body in Moscow (section 1.6). Participation in the movement is open to adult Russian nationals who support the goals of the movement (section 6.2).

44.  On 26 April 2017 the GPO expanded the list of undesirable organisations by adding two organisations identified as "Open Russia Civil Movement, Open Russia (Public Network Movement Open Russia) (Great Britain)" and "OR (Otkrytaya Rossiya) (Great Britain)".

45.  On the same day the GPO's spokesperson told the media outlet Ekho Moskvy that "the measures targeted exclusively the organisations registered in the [Great] Britain" and that the GPO "had no issues with the activities of the Russian public network movement Open Russia".

46.  A majority of the individual applicants have been prosecuted and convicted for their involvement with the Russian network movement Open Russia. The details of their cases are summarised in the Appendix.

47.  The largest single group of convictions, comprising the cases of thirty-three applicants, was issued for their participation in the Federal Forum for Independent Municipal Councillors, known as "Municipal Russia". The forum was convened on 13 March 2021 in Moscow, where elected officials from municipal, regional and city councils assembled in a hotel to engage in discussions and listen to presentations by opposition politicians on various subjects from elections to municipal governance.

48.  Shortly after the opening of the forum, during a speech by applicant Mr Royzman (no. 47495/21), the police arrived and told the attendees to disperse, threatening arrest otherwise. Subsequently, the applicants were detained, taken to a police station for interrogation, and charged with involvement in the activities of Open Russia. Following the charges, they were released. Their cases were referred to justices of the peace at their places of residence.

49.  In their defence, the applicants submitted that the forum was a peaceful political assembly which was violently disrupted by the police. The venue was arranged and paid for by applicant Ms Usmanova (no. 31236/21), a private individual, rather than by any "undesirable organisation". In any event, a Russian entity named Open Russia had not been declared undesirable, while the charges against the applicants made no reference to the "undesirable" British organisation Open Russia Civil Movement.

50.  All the courts hearing the applicants' cases found them guilty as charged, imposing fines for the amounts detailed in the Appendix. The courts held that Ms Usmanova had arranged the venue as a coordinator for the "undesirable" Open Russia Civil Movement, of which a report compiled by a police officer upon examining the organisation's social media accounts was sufficient evidence.

51.  The other convictions related to Open Russia illustrate a spectrum of activities deemed objectionable by the Russian authorities, including organisational involvement, online activities, public activism, and the spreading of information (see the Appendix for details).

52.  In particular, online activities for which the applicants were prosecuted included the sharing, and hyperlinking to, Open Russia's website and content on various online platforms (see, e.g., Ms Malysheva, no. 40948/18, Mr Grigoryev, no. 41009/18, and North Caucasus Environment Watch and Mr Rudomakha, nos. 31967/20 and 34206/20), managing and administrating Open Russia's social media groups or pages (see, e.g., Mr Ibragimov, no. 24019/19, and Mr Zaytsev, no. 48765/19), and the reposting of videos, articles, and other materials branded with Open Russia's logo or message (see, e.g., Mr Malyavin, no. 5907/20; Mr Vernikov, no. 49203/19; Mr Glukhov, no. 17919/22; and Ms Fedotova, no. 6421/21).

53.  Membership and organisational involvement for which applicants were held liable included board membership, regional coordination, and election to committees within Open Russia (see, e.g., Mr Savvin, no. 45990/18; Ms Zaprudina, no. 8570/19; and Mr Vernikov, no. 25441/19), and also involvement in setting up, organising, or participating in forums, seminars, and meetings having an actual or presumed association with Open Russia (see, e.g., Ms Shevchenko, nos. 45567/18 and 11702/19; Mr  Klimov, no. 12170/19; Mr Shaposhnikov, no. 14731/20; and Ms Murakhtayeva, no. 15444/20), and providing venues for these gatherings (see Mr Iosilevich, no. 26953/21).

54.  Public activism and protests included staging solo and group protests linked to Open Russia, public demonstrations of dissent or support for various causes associated with the organisation (see, e.g., Mr Kravchenko, no. 43290/18; Ms Ravilova, no. 13034/20; and Mr Yarotskiy, no. 12215/20), and engaging in broader political activism and campaigning, which included satirical content and criticism of electoral processes (see, e.g., Mr Klimov, no. 35211/19, and Mr Glukhov, no. 17919/22).

55.  On 27 May 2021 the board of Open Russia decided to liquidate the organisation, closing all regional offices, and cancelling the membership of all members in order to protect them from criminal prosecution.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

1. DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
   1. Procedure for designating an NGO as an undesirable organisation

56.  Section 3.1(1) of Federal Law no. 272-FZ of 28 December 2012, introduced by Federal Law no. 129-FZ of 23 May 2015 ("the Undesirable Organisations Act") and further amended on 27 December 2018 and 28 June 2021, establishes that any activities undertaken by a foreign or international non-governmental organisation (NGO) that threaten to undermine Russia's constitutional order, national defence or State security may lead to the NGO being designated as undesirable in Russia. These activities may include actions that support or oppose candidates in an election, instigate a referendum, or aim to influence the outcome of an election or referendum.

57.  Once designated as undesirable, the organisation will be prohibited from opening new structural units in Russia, and existing structural units are liable to closure. The organisation will be restricted from using accounts in Russian banks, engaging in property transactions, producing, distributing, or storing any materials in print or online, and carrying out any programmes or projects within Russia. Since the 2021 amendments Russian nationals and legal entities have been additionally barred from involvement in the activities of undesirable organisations outside Russia (sections 3.1(3) and 3.2).

58.  The decision to designate an NGO as an undesirable organisation is made by the General Prosecutor's Office ("the GPO"), in consultation with the relevant foreign-policy government agency (section 4).

59.  The GPO's decision is then forwarded to the Ministry of Justice, for inclusion in a register of undesirable organisations and publication on the Ministry's website (sections 6 to 8).

2. Administrative and criminal sanctions

60.  Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as amended on 28 June 2021, punishes any involvement in the activities of an undesirable organisation or any violation of the restrictions on its activities by a fine ranging between RUB 5,000 to 15,000 for individuals, RUB 20,000 to 50,000 for officials, and RUB 50,000 to 100,000 for legal entities.

61.  Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code, as amended on 1 July 2021, covers three separate criminal offences. Paragraph 1 punishes any involvement in the activities of an undesirable organisation by a person convicted under Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offences with fines, compulsory labour, or imprisonment of up to four years. Paragraph 2 punishes any fundraising or provision of financial services to an undesirable organisation with fines, compulsory labour up to four years or imprisonment of up to four years. Finally, paragraph 3 punishes any organisation of activities of an undesirable organisation by fines, compulsory labour or imprisonment of up to six years.

2. COUNCIL OF EUROPE

62.  On 10-11 June 2016 the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) adopted Opinion no. 814/2015 on the compatibility with international standards on human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Law on "undesirable foreign and international organisations" (CDL-AD(2016)020).

63.  The Commission was of the opinion that "because of the lack of specific criteria/prohibitions for misconduct of NGOs and the vague and imprecise terms as to the grounds on the basis of which the activities of a foreign or international NGO may be deemed 'undesirable', the Federal Law cannot be considered as in compliance with the requirement of legality under Article 11(2) ECHR" (paragraphs 39-41).

64.  It further noted procedural shortcomings of the law in that (i) the GPO enjoyed wide discretion when making its decision on the inclusion in the list due to a lack of clarity of the concept of "undesirable activities"; (ii) there was no prior judicial review or any form of warning to the NGO concerned; and (iii) there was no explicit obligation for the General Prosecutor to give reasons for his decision, to publish the decision or to notify it to the NGO concerned (paragraphs 44-48).

65.  The new provisions on administrative and criminal offences also lacked precision because they did not specify which forms of participation in the activities of undesired NGOs would be penalised, and this absence "could qualify virtually any action as falling under the scope of this law" (paragraph 57).

66.  The severe administrative fines and in particular criminal sanctions may have a potential to deter those involved in civic activity, and the public at large from participating in an open debate on social media. The chilling effect of the severe penalties was further amplified by the vaguely-worded legislation which failed to give a precise legal definition for what constituted "participation in the activities" and what actions constituted a breach of law in case of an individual associated with the conduct of an "undesirable organisation" (paragraph 58).

3. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

67.  The report of the Special Rapporteur Mariana Katzarova on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, presented at the fifty-fourth session of the Human Rights Council on 11 September-6 October 2023 (A/HRC/54/54), addressed restrictive legislation targeting civil society including the legislation on "undesirable organisations". The report noted that "the absence of clear definitions in the law [made] it applicable to a wide range of organizations", that "the designation [did] not require a ground for the decision", and that "organizations found to be 'undesirable' learn[ed] about the decision [ex] post facto". It further observed that "over the course of eight years under the 'undesirable organizations' law, no organization has been removed from the list or successfully challenged its designation as 'undesirable'" (paragraphs 28-30).

THE LAW

1. MATTERS OF PROCEDURE
   1. Joinder of the applications

68.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

2. Consequences of the Government's failure to participate in the proceedings

69.  The Court further notes that the respondent Government, by failing to submit any written observations, manifested an intention to abstain from participating in the examination of the case. However, the cessation of a Contracting Party's membership in the Council of Europe does not release it from its duty to cooperate with the Convention bodies. Consequently, the Government's failure to engage in the proceedings cannot constitute an obstacle to the examination of the case (see Svetova and Others v. Russia, no. 54714/17, §§ 29-31, 24 January 2023).

3. Procedural succession in application no. 15444/20

70.  Following the death of Ms Murakhtayeva during the proceedings before the Court, her husband and sole heir, Mr Aleksey Murakhtayev, expressed the wish to pursue the application she had initially filed.

71.  The Court has previously recognised the right of a deceased applicant's next-of-kin to proceed with the application provided that they express a wish to pursue the proceedings and have a legitimate interest in the matter (see, most recently, Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], no. 61435/19, §§ 133-35, 23 January 2023). In the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that Mr Murakhtayev may pursue the application.

4. Representation in cases nos. 48124/22, 53201/22 and 32572/23

72.  The Court notes that applications nos. 48124/22, 53201/22 and 32572/23 were lodged after 16 September 2022. The applicants in these cases have been represented by lawyers admitted to practise in Russia. However, once Russia ceased to be a Member State, the Russian lawyers no longer satisfied one of the criteria set out in Rule 36 § 4 (a) of the Rules of Court, namely that they be "authorised to practice in any of the Contracting Parties". Despite these circumstances, the Court considers that in the interests of administration of justice lawyers admitted to practise in Russia may continue to represent the applicants in cases lodged against that former Member State.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT ORGANISATIONS DESIGNATED AS "UNDESIRABLE"

73.  The four applicant organisations which have been designated as "undesirable" (applications nos. 26953/21, 44688/21, 53201/22, 32572/23) complained that the Russian legislation regarding "undesirable organisations" imposed unforeseeable and excessive restrictions on their freedom of expression and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

Article 10

"1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ...

2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ..."

Article 11

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom ... of association with others ...

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ..."

74.  Given that the implementation of the principle of pluralism is unachievable without an association being able to express freely its ideas and opinions, the Court has recognised that the protection of opinions and the freedom to express them within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention are objectives of freedom of association (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 91, ECHR 2004-I, and Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, no. 71251/01, § 33, ECHR 2007-II). Such a link is particularly relevant where - as here - the authorities' intervention against an association was, at least in part, in reaction to its views and statements (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 85, ECHR 2001-IX, and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, § 59, 19 January 2006). The Court will therefore examine the present complaint under Article 11 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 
10.

1. Admissibility
   1. The Court's jurisdiction

75.  The Court observes that the facts constitutive of the alleged interference with the applicants' Convention rights occurred prior to 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention. The Court therefore decides that it has jurisdiction to examine the present applications (see Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2 others, §§ 68-73, 17 January 2023, and Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, §§ 75-76, 6 June 2023).

2. Compatibility ratione personae

76.  The Court notes that, despite the absence of the Government's objection to that effect, it must ascertain that the Association of Schools of Political Studies of the Council of Europe ("ASPS") has the requisite capacity to apply to the Court under Article 34 of the Convention (see Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), no. 53984/00, § 26, ECHR 2003-X (extracts)) which reads in the relevant part as follows:

"The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation ..."

77.  On the question of whether ASPS qualifies as a "non-governmental organisation" despite carrying the words "Council of Europe" in its name and being located at the Council of Europe's headquarters in Strasbourg, the Court observes the following elements. ASPS possesses a legal personality distinct from that of the international intergovernmental organisation known as the Council of Europe. It is constituted as an "association with a non-profit aim" (association à but non lucratif) in accordance with the applicable French law, the local law of Alsace-Moselle, and operates independently of the Council of Europe, in accordance with its own governing statutes. The Russian authorities designated ASPS as "undesirable", specifically identifying it as a French non-governmental organisation. Therefore, the Court determines that ASPS qualifies as a "non-governmental organisation" within the meaning of Article 34 and possesses the requisite standing to submit an application to the Court.

3. Conclusion

78.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. Submissions by the applicants

79.  The applicant associations submitted that the Russian legislation on "undesirable" organisations lacked predictability and accountability in that it granted excessive discretion to the GPO, a flaw highlighted by the Venice Commission. Despite objections raised during the legislative process - including concerns expressed by an opposition Member of Parliament regarding the absence of clear criteria to guide the GPO's decisions - these concerns were dismissed with reference to the possibility of judicial review of such decisions. However, the judicial review mechanism was so fundamentally flawed in practice as to be ineffective; organisations labelled "undesirable" were only informed of the reasons for their designation after filing an appeal, and domestic courts had consistently refrained from scrutinising any aspect of the GPO's decisions, even in cases where the decisions were manifestly unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. Judicial decisions relied predominantly on expert opinions or reports issued by the FSB, discounting any contrary evidence. The absence of a legitimate aim in the challenged regulation was further accentuated by the list of undesirable organisations published by the Ministry of Justice. This list conspicuously omits groups that promote violence or discrimination, while predominantly targeting those entities that lawfully and peacefully exercise their Convention rights within their respective domains of interest.

2. Comments by third-party interveners

80.  The Ukrainian Government, intervening in the case of the Ukrainian World Congress ("UWC"), submitted that the Russian legislation concerning "undesirable organisations" was part of a wider set of measures aimed at suppressing dissent and opposition to the Russian Federation's current regime. This view was supported by international organisations and was consistent with the observations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine which expressed concerns over the designation and persecution of Ukrainian organisations such as the UWC. These measures formed a widespread and systematic administrative practice in Russia, targeting liberal and democratic organisations, activists, and those opposing Russia's actions against Ukraine. The UWC, among others, had been specifically targeted due to its support for the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia. The Ukrainian Government argued that such actions breached Russia's obligations under international law, particularly in relation to forced assimilation.

81.  The Czech Government, intervening in the case of Společnost svobody informace, z.s. ("SSI"), submitted that civil society is a principal driver of pro-democratic change and the primary guarantor of the sustainability of such change. The free operation of civil society and interaction between independent NGOs, coupled with respect for the freedom of expression and assembly and other human rights, constitute essential pillars of a functioning democratic system. In today's Russia, civil society regrettably faces systematic suppression through restrictive measures, including legislation on "foreign agents" and "undesirable organisations". Such measures are a distinguishing feature of a non-democratic and totalitarian regime.

3. The applicants' comments on the third-party submissions

82.  In their comments on the Czech Government's observations, the applicants agreed that the Court should adopt the approach it applied in the "foreign agents" judgment (see Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, nos. 9988/13 and 60 others, 14 June 2022) and duly consider the UN Special Rapporteur's findings summarised in paragraph 67 above.

4. Existence of interference

83.  The Court observes that the designation of an organisation as "undesirable" triggers an extensive range of legal and practical consequences, enacted automatically by operation of law. Upon such a designation, all of the organisation's Russian structural units became subject to closure, and the organisation itself is prohibited from running any programmes or projects within Russia (see paragraph 57 above). Additionally, the organisation is barred from producing, distributing, or storing any print materials or online publications. Cumulatively, these measures constitute a blanket prohibition on the organisation's activities and also restrict its capacity for expressive conduct. These measures accordingly amount to a form of interference with the applicant organisations' right to freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article 10 (see Ecodefence and Others, cited above, § 87).

5. Justification for the interference

84.  The Court reiterates that any interference with the rights guaranteed under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention must be, first and foremost, "prescribed by law". This requirement not only refers to a statutory basis in domestic law, but also requires that the law be both adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to foresee the consequences which a given action may entail. In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise (see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000-XI).

85.  On the facts, the Court notes that the four applicant organisations - Free Russia Foundation ("FRF"), UWC, ASPS and SSI - have been sanctioned for a broad spectrum of activities, which the Russian authorities deemed to be reprehensible (see paragraphs 7, 16, 24 and 31 above).

86.  These activities included, firstly, association or partnership with foreign officials or organisations previously designated as "undesirable" or "foreign agents", such as the FRF having former employees of the US State Department as board members, both the FRF and SSI receiving support from the "undesirable organisation" National Endowment for Democracy, and ASPS and SSI closely working with entities declared as "foreign agents". Secondly, the organisations were held responsible for engaging in actions perceived as attempting to influence governmental policies or promoting alternative political and social models considered contrary to Russian interests. Examples include the ASPS's support for the "European model of democracy", seminars hosted by the FRF and ASPS on civic initiatives and freedom of speech and rule of law, and advocacy by the FRF, UWC and SSI for legislative and political changes in Russia. Another example of such activities was the preparation and dissemination of reports or narratives critical of Russian authorities. Thus, the FRF's reports highlighted their involvement in cyberattacks and connections with organised crime, ASPS critically analysed Russia's domestic and foreign policy, and SSI evaluated the transparency of State bodies and criticised the constitutional amendments that allowed the President to run for a fifth term. Furthermore, international campaigning and participation in international forums, including the FRF's and UWC's calling for strengthening sanctions and UWC's instigation of discussions at major European institutions and sports events, were also cited as activities undermining Russia's national security. The involvement in organising, training, or supporting opposition activities and movements was likewise considered a proscribed activity that included, in particular, SSI's guidance to Russian NGOs affected by new "foreign-agent" restrictions, the conviction of activists who participated in ASPS's seminars for engaging in unauthorised rallies, and FRF's initiatives to train activists in Georgia and Ukraine.

87.  Importantly, the domestic authorities put forward no evidence to suggest that those activities contravened any legal prohibitions or a breach of any law. Thus, for instance, there existed no explicit prohibition on the employment of "foreign agents" or foreign officials, the production of reports and analyses concerning domestic and foreign policies, regardless of their critical nature towards the incumbent authorities, advocacy for legislative and social reforms, the raising of contentious issues in international forums, or the offering of legal advice to, and training of, human rights activists.

88.  Moreover, no accusations of inciting violence, undermining democratic principles or interfering with the integrity of elections have been levelled at the applicant organisations. Nor has it been claimed that the statements made at seminars and other events hosted by the applicant organisations contained calls or incitement to violence, hatred, or discrimination (compare Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, nos. 32401/10 and 19 others, §§ 157-59, 7 June 2022). The Court reiterates that, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of assembly as well as by other lawful means (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 97).

89.  The Court notes that the Undesirable Organisations Act does not define the specific types of activities or misconduct that could result in an organisation being designated as "undesirable". It merely indicates that such activities should be deemed capable of undermining Russia's constitutional order, national defence, or State security (see paragraph 56 above). However, this indication identifies the legitimate aims of the regulation rather than specifying the conduct that could lead to such a designation.

90.  The Venice Commission has strongly criticised the absence of specific criteria for the misconduct of NGOs, alongside the use of vague and imprecise terms to describe the grounds on which the activities of a foreign or international NGO may be designated as "undesirable". It has expressed the opinion that, given the serious implications for NGOs and the individuals engaged in their operations, this absence represented a particularly problematic omission within the legislation, rendering its application unforeseeable (see paragraph 60 above).

91.  In these circumstances, the Court finds that the Undesirable Organisations Act was not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant organisations to foresee that their otherwise lawful actions, including the exercise of their Convention right to freedom of expression, would result in their designation as "undesirable" and a prohibition on their activities in Russia (compare with Ecodefence and Others, §§ 112 and 117, and Taganrog LRO and Others, § 158, both cited above).

92.  In addition to the absence of explicit criteria for classifying the activities of NGOs as "undesirable", the domestic legislation also dispenses with the requirement for the authorities to disclose the grounds for applying the designation to the organisation concerned, thereby introducing a further element of legal uncertainty. The assessment of "undesirability" is conducted by the GPO in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An organisation designated as "undesirable" becomes aware of its designation ex post facto, through a publication on the Ministry of Justice's website. The Undesirable Organisations Act does not contain any requirement for communicating the designation decision or the grounds for such a designation to the organisation. Nor does it afford the organisation an opportunity to refute the findings or outcome of the assessment, prior to the enactment of prohibitions on its activities that ensue as an automatic consequence of such a designation (compare, on this aspect, with Ecodefence and Others, cited above, § 111).

93.  Lastly, the facts of the present case demonstrate that a judicial review initiated by the applicant organisations to challenge their designation did not provide adequate and effective safeguards against the essentially unrestricted discretion afforded to the executive authorities. In considering the charges, the courts failed to examine the matter in the light of the principles established in the Court's case-law, while the absence of explicit legislative criteria for defining misconduct left them without a concrete standard to judge whether the GPO's use of discretion in designating organisations as "undesirable" was reasonable. As a result, judicial review in this context transformed into a procedural formality, limited to verifying that the GPO had acted within the scope of discretion allowed by the legislation. There was no indication that the domestic courts subjected the grounds for designating organisations as "undesirable" to rigorous substantive scrutiny or made efforts to balance the competing interests, especially in considering the necessity of banning the activities of the applicant organisations in Russia. The Court reiterates that a Convention-compliant review should have also assessed, among other considerations, the severe effects of such measures on the applicant organisations' rights to freedom of expression and association (compare with Taganrog LRO and Others, cited above, § 188).

94.  In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the interference arising from the designation of the applicant organisations as "undesirable" failed to satisfy the "prescribed by law" criterion, being both unforeseeable and arbitrary. The domestic law did not provide the applicant organisations with adequate and effective safeguards against the abusive use of the unchecked discretion granted to the executive, leaving them vulnerable to arbitrary designation without the means for a pre-emptive or meaningful challenge (compare Ecodefence and Others, cited above, § 118).

95.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article 10 in respect of the four application organisations which were designated as "undesirable".

3. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANTS PROSECUTED FOR ENGAGING WITH "UNDESIRABLE ORGANISATIONS"

96.  The remaining applicants - other than the four organisations listed in paragraph 73 above - which have been prosecuted under Article 20.33 of the CAO for engaging with "undesirable organisations" complained that their conviction of that charge breached their rights to freedom of expression and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

1. Admissibility
   1. The Court's jurisdiction

97.  The Court observes that the facts constitutive of the alleged interference with the applicants' Convention rights occurred prior to 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention. The Court therefore decides that it has jurisdiction to examine the present application (see Fedotova and Others, §§ 68-73, and Pivkina and Others, §§ 75-76, both cited above).

2. Compliance with the six-month time-limit

98.  The Court further needs to ensure that the applications were lodged within the time-limit established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, even where the Government have not made an objection to that effect. The application of the time-limit is a public policy rule which the Court has jurisdiction to consider of its own motion (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, §§ 28-31 and 40, 29 June 2012). The relevant parts of Article 35, as worded at the relevant time, provided:

"1.  The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted ... and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.

...

4.  The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this Article. It may do so at any stage of the proceedings."

99.  In application no. 44688/21, the first decision against Mr Vinnik which the Court considers "final" in Russian administrative proceedings (see Smadikov v. Russia (dec.), no. 10810/15, 31 January 2017) was given on 12 October 2020 (see paragraph 20 above). This is more than six months before the application was lodged on 26 August 2021. Accordingly, this part of the complaints concerning Mr Vinnik has been introduced out of time and must be rejected as belated in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

100.  Complaints about the first three sets of proceedings in application no. 10068/19 and a complaint about the first set of proceedings in application no. 47641/19 were likewise introduced more than six months after the respective proceedings had ended. Accordingly, this part of the applications has also been introduced out of time and must be rejected as belated in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

101.  In application no. 8940/20, the application form was signed within six months of the final domestic decision but despatched after the end of the six-month period. The date of introduction of an application being the date of the postmark when the applicant dispatched a duly completed application form to the Court (Rule 47 § 6 (a) of the Rules of Court), this application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected as belated in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

102.  Finally, the Court notes that in applications nos. 31967/20 and 34258/20, the calendar six months after the final domestic decisions expired during the COVID-related extension period (16 March to 15 June 2020). The applicants therefore had an additional three months to lodge their applications with the Court (see Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), nos. 6232/20 and 22394/20, § 59, 1 March 2022). Having been lodged, as they were, on 15 June 2020, these applications were not belated.

3. Conclusion

103.  The Court notes that the remaining part of this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. Submissions by the applicants

104.  The applicants argued that the legislation concerning undesirable organisations was both unforeseeable and imprecise, granting authorities unchecked powers that resulted in arbitrary enforcement and infringed upon their rights. Mr Galitskiy (no. 7131/22), fearing sanctions, compiled software to monitor his past internet publications to remove any mention of the newly declared undesirable organisations. Mr Grekov (no. 14667/20) highlighted the domestic courts' disregard for the content, context, and intent of expression, as evidenced by his prosecution for posting a factually accurate video on Facebook concerning a matter of public interest and social significance. Furthermore, the application of the law demonstrated a lack of proportionality and legal certainty, as exemplified by Mr Glukhov's (no. 17919/22) conviction for social media posts made a few years prior, the Andrey Rylkov Foundation's (no. 37949/18) sanctioning for a ten-year-old hyperlink, and Mr Lebedev's prosecution for peaceful petitioning (nos. 32720/21, 41866/21 and 44565/21). Ms Shaposhnikov, Ms Murakhtayeva, Mr Iosilevich (nos. 14731/20, 15444/20, 6421/21) pointed out that they faced penalties for a peaceful assembly discussing socio-political issues. The broad interpretation of the legislation allowed authorities to suppress legitimate political discussion, exemplified by the detention of municipal deputies at a forum unrelated to "undesirable" organisations, violating their rights to freedom of expression and association. The applicants contended that the primary aim of the legislation on undesirable organisations was to intimidate and deter Russian citizens genuinely interested in political discourse. The legislation sought to deter those wishing to contribute to democratic development, thus creating a chilling effect not only on those directly subject to its enforcement but also on other individuals and legal entities engaged in civic and public activities, including NGOs. This legislation dissuaded them from participating in an open dialogue between the authorities and society. It was not only discriminatory and stigmatising in nature but also fell short of providing legal safeguards against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by the Convention.

2. Existence of interference

105.  The Court finds that the prosecution and conviction of the applicants for their involvement in the activities of organisations designated as "undesirable" constituted an interference with their right to freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention. To the extent that the sanctions were imposed for their participation in public events and forums, such as the "Free People Forum" and "Municipal Russia", they also impinged upon their right to freedom of assembly under the same provision. Insofar as the sanctions stemmed from their activities on social media, publications, satirical expression, and other modes of expressive conduct, there was interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.

3. Justification for the interference

106.  The Court has found above that the Undesirable Organisations Act failed to define the specific types of activities or misconduct that could result in an organisation being designated as "undesirable". Similarly, both the Undesirable Organisations Act and Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offences, under which the applicants were convicted, fail to specify what constitutes "involvement" in the activities of "undesirable organisations" that could result in a conviction. In this regard, the Venice Commission expressed concern that this lack of specification could potentially classify any action as falling within the scope of the law (see paragraph 65 above).

107.  On the facts, the Court notes that the applicants did not engage in any conduct that would have been otherwise prohibited under domestic law, were it not for its alleged association with an organisation designated as "undesirable". Rather, they exercised their legitimate Convention rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association by sharing content on social media, campaigning for social and political causes, and participating in events and forums (see paragraphs 46 to 54 above).

108.  In these circumstances, the Court finds that the Undesirable Organisations Act and Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offences did not meet the "quality of law" requirement. They did not define with sufficient precision the types of conduct that could lead to the applicants being prosecuted and convicted, even though their actions were otherwise lawful and included the exercise of their Convention rights.

109.  In addition to the absence of explicit criteria for classifying the applicant's conduct as prosecutable, the Court considers that the domestic courts failed to adduce "relevant and sufficient" reasons to support their finding that the applicants did indeed participate in the activities of an "undesirable organisation".

110.  As regards Open Russia, two British organisations by that name falling within the scope of the Undesirable Organisations Act were declared "undesirable". Despite the Act applying solely to foreign and international entities, the designation has been extended to the eponymous Russian movement, which was founded and operated as an association of Russian nationals, within Russian territory, with its permanent seat in Moscow and in accordance with Russian law, thus qualifying it as a Russian entity (see paragraphs 43-44 and 56 above). This occurred even after an official statement asserted that the designation would not affect the Russian movement (see paragraph 45 above). The fact that the domain of the Russian movement's website was registered outside Russia, or that its name was identical to that of the British organisation, do not appear for the Court to be relevant or sufficient grounds for the domestic courts' finding that the Russian movement and the foreign "undesirable organisation" were the same entity (see the cases of Ms Malysheva and Mr Grigoryev in the Appendix, nos. 40948/18 and 41009/18). Nor does the coverage of an event organised by the Russian movement on the British organisation's social media appear to be adequate evidence of their identity (see paragraph 50 above and the cases of Ms Shevchenko, nos. 45567/18 and 11702/19). It follows that the domestic courts failed to provide "relevant and sufficient" reasons for establishing the crucial fact necessary for determining the applicants' guilt, namely the fact of cooperation with any "undesirable organisation".

111.  The Court notes with particular concern that some applicant associations were found guilty of having shared hyperlinks to the OSI's and Open Russia's websites many years before these organisations were designated as "undesirable" and even before the enactment of the Undesirable Organisations Act (see paragraphs 36 to 41 and 52 above). The retrospective application of the law and the expectation placed upon the applicants to anticipate legal categorisations not yet in existence at the time of their actions presents a fundamental problem for the Court. The applicants' actions, specifically the posting of a hyperlink, were not in violation of any law at the material time, given that the organisations in question had not yet been categorised as "undesirable". This fact fundamentally undermines the assertion that they acted with intent or negligence - elements required to establish their guilt of the offence with which they were charged. The Court considers that imposing a responsibility on the applicants to foresee future designations constitutes an impossible and unreasonable burden. Expecting the applicants to continuously monitor the register of undesirable organisations and review their websites to ensure that previously shared material has not been retrospectively classified as linking to an "undesirable" organisation constitutes a disproportionate "chilling effect" on their freedom of expression. On these grounds alone, the Court concludes that the application of Article 20.33 of the CAO by the domestic courts was not based on "relevant and sufficient" grounds, as the applicants were subjected to a retrospective application of the law in a manner that was unforeseeable and imposed an unreasonable burden upon them.

112.  Lastly, the Court notes that the applicants were sanctioned on purely formal grounds, an alleged connection with an "undesirable organisation" being sufficient to secure their conviction. However, as previously established by the Court in a similar context, merely finding that the applicants reproduced materials from organisations banned under domestic law is not sufficient to justify the necessity of an interference (see Gözel and Özer v. Turkey, nos. 43453/04 and 31098/05, §§ 51-56, 6 July 2010). The domestic authorities are expected to analyse the content and context of publications, or the nature of assemblies in which the applicants took part, in light of the criteria formulated by the Court in cases relating to freedom of expression and assembly. As they failed to do so because the law did not mandate any such assessment, the interference cannot be considered "necessary in a democratic society".

113.  There has accordingly been a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention in respect of the applicants who have been convicted for their involvement with "undesirable organisations".

4. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

114.  In light of its findings under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, to the effect that the impugned legislation was unforeseeable in its wording and manner of application, the Court takes the view that it is not required to give a separate ruling on the admissibility or merits of the remaining complaints deriving from the application of that legal act.

5. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION

115.  Articles 41 and 46 of the Convention provide as follows:

Article 41

"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."

Article 46

"1.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2.  The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution ..."

116.  The applicants' claims for damages and costs are itemised in the Appendix. Their claims in respect of pecuniary damage represent the amount of fines they paid, converted into euros on the dates of the final judgment.

117.  Regard being had to the supporting documents and its case-law in similar cases, the Court awards the amounts claimed as per the Appendix in respect of pecuniary damage, 7,500 euros (EUR) each or such smaller amount as was actually claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 850 each or such smaller amount as was actually claimed, per applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants (see, for a similar approach, Taganrog LRO and Others, cited above, § 300).

118.  The applicants further invited the Court to indicate, under Article 46 of the Convention, that the respondent Government is under the obligation to repeal all legislation on "undesirable organisations", since the violations of the Convention in the present case followed specifically and only from the text of the law on its face incompatible with the Convention. The Court's judgments are, however, essentially declaratory in nature, and it does not have authority to mandate legislative changes.

119.  Lastly, in view of the respondent Government's persistent refusal to pay just satisfaction to the successful applicants, the applicants invited the Court to indicate, under Article 46 of the Convention, that the Committee of Ministers should, in collaboration with the applicants' representatives, elaborate effective ways to ensure that the Court's awards are paid pending a change in the respondent Government's stance.

120.  The Court reiterates that cessation of a Contracting Party's membership of the Council of Europe does not release it from its duty to cooperate with the Convention bodies. Article 46 of the Convention requires that the Committee of Ministers sets forth an effective mechanism for the implementation of the Court's judgments also in cases against a State which has ceased to be party to the Convention. The Committee of Ministers continues to supervise the execution of the Court's judgments against the Russian Federation, and the Russian Federation is required, pursuant to Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, to implement them, despite the cessation of its membership of the Council of Europe (see Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC] (just satisfaction), no. 38263/08, § 46, 28 April 2023; see also Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2022)254 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, adopted on 22 September 2022, on the execution of the Court's judgment in Georgia v. Russia (I)).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Holds that the Government's failure to participate in the proceedings presents no obstacles for the examination of the case and that it has jurisdiction to deal with the applications;
3. Declares application no. 8940/20 inadmissible, the complaints about the initial proceedings in applications nos. 10068/19, 47641/19 and 44688/21 inadmissible, and the remainder admissible;
4. Decides that Mr Murakhtayev may pursue application no. 15444/20 initially lodged by Ms Murakhtayeva;
5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in respect of the Free Russia Foundation, the Ukrainian World Congress, the Association of Schools of Political Studies, and Společnost svobody informace, z.s. (applications nos. 26953/21, 44688/21, 53201/22, 32572/23);
6. Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention in respect of the other applicants which have been convicted for their involvement with "undesirable organisations";
7. Holds that there is no need to examine the remainder of the complaints;
8. Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  the amounts claimed as per the Appendix in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(ii)  EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros) or such smaller amount as was actually claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(iii)  EUR 850 (eight hundred and fifty euros) or such smaller amount as was actually claimed, per applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 June 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Pere Pastor Vilanova
 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applications :

[1] All amounts are expressed in euros.

[2] TBD - the amount to be determined by the Court.