European Court of Human Rights

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF SARKOCY v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 19303/20)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

21 September 2023

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Sarkocy v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Ivana Jelić, judges,

and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 31 August 2023,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application against Slovakia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") on 27 April 2020.

2.  The Government of the Slovak Republic ("the Government") were given notice of the application.

THE FACTS

3.  The applicant's details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table.

4.  The applicant, a Slovak national, complained of the excessive length of two sets of civil proceedings.

1. PROCEEDINGS NO. 5 C 895/2008

5.  The applicant was the defendant in civil proceedings no. 5 C 895/2008 for the payment of approximately 21,000 euros (EUR). The proceedings started on 8 January 2007 and ended on 11 March 2019, when the first-instance court's judgment became final in respect of the costs of the proceedings.

6.  During the proceedings, the applicant turned to the Constitutional Court three times with complaints about their length.

7.  On 24 October 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected his first complaint as procedurally inadmissible (I. ÚS 536/2012). Following an application lodged with the Court in that regard, the parties entered into a friendly settlement. The applicant was paid EUR 4,000 in just satisfaction and the application was struck out of the Court's list of cases (see Sarkocy v. Slovakia (dec.) [Committee], no. 80277/12, 17 September 2013).

8.  Upon the applicant's second complaint, on 12 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time (III. ÚS 45/2013). It ordered the first-instance court to proceed without unnecessary delay and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. It likewise awarded him EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damage, observing that he had somewhat contributed to the delays.

9.  Following his third complaint, on 15 January 2020 the Constitutional Court found another violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time (IV. ÚS 639/2018). Since the impugned proceedings in the part concerning the merits had already been concluded, it examined the length of the proceedings concerning the costs, which it found excessive, and ordered the first-instance court to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. As for the question of non-pecuniary damage, the Constitutional Court referred to the applicant's purposeful and borderline abusive behaviour in many proceedings before the domestic courts and considered that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation provided sufficient redress.

2. PROCEEDINGS NO. 8 C 101/2012

10.  Within the framework of the above-described proceedings, no. 5 C 895/2008, the applicant filed a counterclaim against the claimant. On 24 April 2012 the first-instance court disjoined it to a separate set of proceedings. That decision became final on 9 May 2012.

11.  The applicant's request to be exempted from the obligation to pay the court fees for his counteraction was rejected by three levels of ordinary courts. The Supreme Court dealt with the request from 21 November 2013 until 28 January 2015.

12.  Subsequently, the ordinary courts at two levels discontinued the proceedings following the applicant's failure to pay the court fees. Upon his appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeal and remitted the case to the latter.

The period during which the Supreme Court dealt with the appeal on points of law lasted from 26 September 2016 until 27 April 2017.

13.  On 5 September 2018 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, challenging the length of the proceedings. He directed the complaint's summary (petit) against the two lower courts and identified the impugned proceedings by their file number 8 C 101/2012.

14.  On 20 August 2019 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded (I. ÚS 304/2019). It considered that although the way in which the proceedings had been conducted was not optimal, it did not disclose a violation of the reasonable time requirement. It observed that the applicant had considerably contributed to the length by his procedural conduct. The decision was served on the applicant on 26 September 2019.

15.  On 14 September 2020 the first-instance court granted the applicant's request to replace him as the claimant by a private company.

THE LAW

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

16.  The applicant complained that the length of the two sets of the proceedings in question had been incompatible with the "reasonable time" requirement. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

1. Admissibility
   1. Proceedings no. 5 C 895/2008

17.  Following the Court's decision under Article 24 § 2 of the Convention, taken at the time of the notification of the present application to the respondent Government, the scope of the complaint under the Court's examination is now limited to the length of the part of the impugned proceedings following the Court's strike-out decision (see paragraph 7 above). The period to be examined is thus from 17 September 2013 to 11 March 2019 (see paragraph 5 above), that is nearly five and a half years before a single judicial instance.

18.  The Government submitted that the relevant period had been examined by the Constitutional Court in its judgment no. IV. ÚS 639/2018, with which they fully concurred. They further pointed out that the applicant had received a total of EUR 4,500 in compensation for the unnecessary delays in the impugned proceedings. As such, they considered that he could no longer be considered a "victim" of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time.

19.  The applicant contested these arguments, asserting that the Constitutional Court had failed in the above-mentioned judgment to examine the overall length of the proceedings in question.

20.  The Court observes that although the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time, it was only in relation to the part of the proceedings regarding the costs, which is at odds with the Court's established practice (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, §§ 59-60, 20 June 2006 and Čičmanec v. Slovakia, no. 65302/11, § 50, 28 June 2016). Moreover, it did not order the first-instance court to proceed without further delay, nor did it award any financial compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant, stating that the finding of a violation was sufficient redress (see paragraph 9 above).

21.  It remains to be assessed whether the above finding of a violation can be considered appropriate and sufficient redress under the circumstances of the present case (see, for example, Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470/99, 20 March 2003). In that connection the Court reiterates that there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage unless duly justified otherwise (Šedý v. Slovakia, no. 72237/01, § 89, 19 December 2006, with further references).

22.  Apart from the Constitutional Court's judgment no. IV. ÚS 639/2018, the Court must also take into account the overall context of the present case. Although it is prevented from examining the period prior to its strike-out decision (see paragraph 7 above), that part of the proceedings cannot be dissociated completely from the part which is under examination, and it should be taken into consideration (see Pavlík v. Slovakia, no. 74827/01, § 107, 30 January 2007). Likewise, the Court shall take into consideration the Constitutional Court's previous judgment no. III. ÚS 45/2013, in which a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been established and compensation of EUR 500 awarded (see paragraph 8 above). That judgment had not been subject to the Court's examination.

23.  In the light of the overall amount of just satisfaction obtained by the applicant for the length of the impugned proceedings, the stage of the proceedings at the time of lodging the third constitutional complaint and the Constitutional Court's reasoning as to why the finding of a violation had been sufficient in the specific circumstances of the case (see Šedý, cited above, § 92), the Court finds that the applicant can no longer claim to be a "victim" within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention of the alleged violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time.

24.  It follows that this complaint is inadmissible and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. Proceedings no. 8 C 101/2012

25.  The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion. They argued, namely, that the applicant had failed to direct his constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court. In addition, the Government pointed to the fact that as of 14 September 2020 the applicant was no longer party to the impugned proceedings and therefore any period after that date should not be considered. In their view, the relevant period ran from 9 May 2012 until 14 September 2020.

26.  The applicant contested that argument.

27.  The Court observes at the outset that the application was lodged on 27 April 2020, that is, seven months and one day after the Constitutional Court's decision had been served (see paragraph 14 in fine). Having regard to the fact that the six calendar months expired on 26 March 2020 and that the latter date fell within the time frame covered by the exceptional measures indicated by the President of the Court in view of the Covid-19 pandemic (16 March - 15 June 2020; see Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), nos. 6232/20 and 22394/20, § 49, 1 March 2022), the Court finds that the applicant had an additional three months - until and including 26 June 2020 - to lodge an application with the Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the application cannot be considered to have been lodged out of time, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in the very exceptional circumstances outlined above (ibid., §§ 49-59).

28.  The Court further notes that the applicant's constitutional complaint was not at all directed against the Supreme Court (see paragraph 13 above). Hence, the periods when the applicant's case was examined by that court are outside the scope of the examination by the Court due to the applicant's failure to exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with the applicable procedural rules and established practice (see Obluk, cited above, § 62). It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

29.  The Court also takes note of the fact that the applicant is no longer party to the impugned proceedings (see paragraphs 15 in fine and 25 above). Accordingly, in respect of the part of the proceedings following the first-instance court's decision of 14 September 2020, the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and shall be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

30.  The Court will thus examine the period from 9 May 2012 until 14 September 2020, excluding the parts of the proceedings when the case was dealt with by the Supreme Court. The complaint in respect of this period is not manifestly ill-founded, nor it is inadmissible on any other ground and therefore should be declared admissible.

2. Merits

31.  The applicant asserted that the Constitutional Court had failed to examine the overall length of the proceedings and that he remained a victim of the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

32.  The Government argued that the applicant's procedural conduct had been the essential factor that had contributed to the delay.

33.  The period to be examined is more than six and a half years before two levels of jurisdiction (see paragraph 30 above).

34.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

35.  In the leading case of Obluk (cited above), the Court has already found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention given an excessive length of the proceedings.

36.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings at the national level. Even assuming that the applicant contributed to the delay, the Court considers that the length of more than six and a half years before two levels of jurisdiction is excessive.

37.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of the reasonable time requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this regard.

2. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

38.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."

39.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law (see, in particular, Obluk, cited above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum indicated in the appended table.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint about the excessive length of civil proceedings no. 8 C 101/2012 conducted before the two levels of courts from 9 May 2012 until 14 September 2020 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of civil proceedings;
3. Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the amount indicated in the appended table;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 September 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Viktoriya Maradudina Krzysztof Wojtyczek

 Acting Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

(excessive length of civil proceedings)

[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.