European Court of Human Rights

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF HORVÁTH AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY

(Applications nos. 12143/16and 11 others - see appended list)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

2 March 2023

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Horváth and Others v. Hungary,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

  Alena Poláčková , President ,
  Péter Paczolay,
  Gilberto Felici , judges ,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by the applicants listed in the appended table ("the applicants") on the various dates indicated therein;

the decision not to disclose the identity of the applicant in application no.   13527/20;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention to the Hungarian Government ("the Government"), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of applications nos. 12143/16and 59440/19inadmissible;

the parties' observations;

Having deliberated in private on 7 February 2023,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.     The cases concern the applicants' sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between thirty and forty years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

2.     The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

3.     The relevant domestic law is set out in Bancsók and László Magyar v.   Hungary (no. 2) (nos. 52374/15and 53364/15, §§ 15-17, 28 October 2021).

THE COURT'S ASSESSMENT

1. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

4.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

5.     The applicants complained that their sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they had served a minimum term of thirty to forty years constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

6.     The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, since they had not lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. In the applicants' view, this legal avenue did not constitute an effective remedy in respect of their alleged grievances.

7.     In Bancsók and László Magyar (cited above, §§ 21-28) the Court rejected the Government's argument as to the effectiveness of a constitutional complaint in respect of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole. The Government have not provided any reasons that could lead the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

8.     Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicants' complaints under Article 3 of the Convention cannot be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; it therefore dismisses the Government's preliminary objection in that connection.

9.     The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

10.     The automatic review of a sentence after a specified minimum term represents an important safeguard for the prisoner against the risk of detention in violation of Article 3. The relevant principles have been summarised in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592/08, §§   66-68, 17   January 2017) and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos.   66069/09and 2 others, § 44, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In Bodein v.   France (no.   40014/10, 13 November 2014) the Court examined whether the possibility of a review of life sentences after thirty years of imprisonment remained compatible with the criteria established in Vinter and Others (cited above). In finding that it did, the Court gave particular weight to the fact that the starting point for the calculation of the minimum term to be served by a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was the time of the initial deprivation of liberty, that is to say, the calculation included the period spent in pre - trial detention. Since the applicant in that case was able to apply for parole twenty - six years after his life sentence had been imposed, the Court concluded that the sentence was to be considered reducible for the purposes of Article   3 (see Bodein , cited above, §   61).

11.     Pursuant to the Hungarian Criminal Code, the minimum term to be served before an offender sentenced to life imprisonment can be released on parole must be set in the judgment convicting the offender and must range between a statutory minimum of twenty-five years and a maximum of forty years. Furthermore, the requirements which a person sentenced to a prison term must fulfil in order to be conditionally released are set out in section   188 of Act no. CCXL of 2013; satisfactory compliance with those requirements is subject to assessment by a court. National law and practice therefore afford the possibility of a dedicated judicial review of the life sentences imposed on the applicants.

12.     However, in the present case, the applicants will only be eligible to be considered for release after serving thirty to forty years of their sentences. It remains to be determined whether in their case the review mechanism satisfies the criteria set out in the Court's case-law.

13.     In that connection, the Court notes that the thirty- to forty-year period during which the applicants must wait before they can first expect to be considered for release on parole is a significantly longer period than the maximum recommended time frame for the review of a life sentence, which is twenty-five years, as established on the basis of clear support in comparative and international law (see Vinter and Others , cited above, §   120).

14.     The Court further notes the Government's position that the applicants Mr Kolompár, Mr Újfalusi, Mr Kajor, Mr O. Szabó, Mr Tintér, Mr Szurdok and Mr Szilágyi would in practice have to serve less than thirty years after the imposition of their life sentences in order to be considered for conditional release, since the period spent in pre-trial detention was included in the calculation. Indeed, these applicants will be eligible to be considered for release on parole from twenty-six to twenty-nine years after the imposition of   their life sentences.

15.     However, the Court notes that this is so only because they were kept in pre-trial detention before their conviction and sentencing and this pre-trial detention period was deducted from the thirty-year period. It does not change the fact that the term to be served before they are eligible to be considered for parole was set at thirty years, and that the review would take place more than twenty-five years after the imposition of their life sentences. Thus, even having regard to the State's margin of appreciation, in the instant case the Court cannot accept the Government's position on this point.

16.     In sum, the fact that the applicants in the present case can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served thirty to forty years of their life sentences is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicants' life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Such a long waiting period unduly delays the domestic authorities' review of "whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds" (see Vinter and Others , cited above, §   119).

17.     There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

18.     The applicants in applications nos. 12143/16, 55374/19, 57459/19, 57463/19, 59440/19, 6206/20, 10615/20, 13518/20, 13527/20, 13528/20and 14264/20claimed various amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses.

19.     The Government found those claims excessive.

20.     The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

21.     As to costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to their reimbursement only in so far as it has been shown that they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. That being so, the Court awards the sums indicated in the appended table for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the applications admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;
5. Holds

(a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on those amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 March 2023, pursuant to Rule  
77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

  Liv Tigerstedt   Alena Poláčková
  Deputy Registrar   President

APPENDIX