European Court of Human Rights

 

 

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF P.H. v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 37574/19)

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

STRASBOURG

8 September 2022

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

 

In the case of P.H. v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Marko Bošnjak, President,
          Péter Paczolay,
          Alena Poláčková,
          Erik Wennerström,
          Raffaele Sabato,
          Lorraine Schembri Orland,
          Davor Derenčinović, judges,
and Renata Degener, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 37574/19) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, P.H., on 4 July 2019;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”);

the decision not to disclose the applicant’s name;

the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;

the comments submitted by (i) Harvard Law School Project on Disability and Centre For Disability Law and Policy (“the HPOD” and “the CDLP”, respectively), (ii) the European Roma Rights Centre (“the ERRC”), and (iii) Validity (Mental Disability Advocacy Centre), which were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section, and the parties’ observations in reply;

Having deliberated in private on 3 May and 5 July 2022,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  This case concerns the incident of the applicant falling out of a second‑floor window of a police station, where she was being questioned following her arrest on suspicion of theft. It focuses on the question whether the State discharged its duties to ensure the applicant’s well-being and to carry out an effective investigation into the incident.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was represented by Ms V. Durbáková, a lawyer practising in Košice.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

I.        ARREST AND TRANSPORT TO POLICE STATION

5.  On 17 January 2017, when the applicant was sixteen years and four months old, a police patrol consisting of Officers A. and B. was called to a shopping mall where she had been caught red-handed while committing petty theft. Her brother was also present.

6.  The patrol checked the applicant’s identity, she confessed to the theft, and it was established from the police database that some eight months earlier she had been found guilty of a similar minor offence.

7.  At around 3 p.m. the patrol took charge of the applicant and put her in a police car with a view to transporting her to the local county police station for further procedural steps to be taken in relation to the incident. No coercive measures were applied. The applicant’s brother was also taken to the police station by another unit and in another car.

8.  In the car, the applicant was seated in the back while Officers A. and B. sat in the front. The parties’ accounts concerning the transport diverge as follows.

9.  The applicant stated that the officers had told her that she would be put in a cage, used insulting language having to do with her Romani origin, and each of them had slapped her once. The Government on the other hand argued that no physical or verbal abuse had taken place. In support of that position, they relied on an entry in the county police logbook concerning the shift of the patrol on the given day and on a note on the record dated 17 January 2017 and drawn up by Officer A. These documents indicate that no coercive measures had been applied during the transport since the applicant was a minor who had not resisted and had cooperated, and there had been no grounds for concern that she might try to abscond.

II.     EVENTS AT THE POLICE STATION

10.  According to the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the events at the police station unfolded as follows.

11.  On arrival, (i) the applicant confessed to having committed three other similar acts of theft earlier that day, (ii) at 3.24 p.m. the case was brought to the attention of the supervising prosecutor, who instructed that the applicant should not be detained but be released after the necessary paperwork had been filled in, and (iii) Officer A. immediately informed the applicant of the prosecutor’s instructions.

12.  The applicant was then searched by a female officer. Afterwards, Officer A. began to fill in various records concerning the case, in the process of which he was alone with the applicant and continued communicating with her. As she repeatedly asked to be allowed to use the toilet, Officer A. accompanied her to the bathroom. As she was cooperative and had been informed that she would be released, there was no concern that she might attempt to flee, and no other officer was requested to go with them.

13.  As would later be noted in the minutes of an in situ inspection, carried out between 7 and 8.30 p.m. of the same day, the bathroom was situated on the second floor of the police station, at the end of a corridor ending in a wall with a window. The size of the window was 116 by 140 cm and its sill was 90 cm above the ground. It opened by tilting along the horizontal axis in its middle, providing a maximum opening of 60 by 102 cm. The door to the area with the ladies’ bathroom was situated immediately next to the window, in the right wall of the corridor leading to the window. Behind the door, there was a small room with a washbasin and another door, situated opposite the first door, leading to another small room, on the right side of which there was a glass door to a room with the toilet in.

14.  According to the above-mentioned documents, in the corridor at the door to the area with the ladies’ bathroom, Officer A. showed the applicant where the toilet was and, since he was less than a metre away from her and had seen her entering that area, he turned his back to the door, intending to wait until the applicant was ready. As he was turning, he noted in his peripheral vision a shadow in front of the door to the bathroom area. He turned towards it and saw the applicant falling out of the open window to the ground in front of the police station. As noted in the minutes of the in situ inspection, the bottom edge of the window was 770 cm above the ground, which was grass covered with snow that had been walked on. In front of the window, there was a pine tree the trunk of which was 143 cm away from the building and one branch of this tree, 260 centimetres above the ground, was not covered by snow.

15.  The above-mentioned documentation concludes that Officer A. then alerted his colleagues and an emergency ambulance was called to attend to the applicant who was lying on the ground in front of the police station making an indistinct sound.

16.  The applicant for her part submitted that she had no recollection of the events preceding and surrounding her fall from the window, but that it was likely that the type of treatment to which she had been exposed during her transport to the police station had continued there.

17.  In the course of the proceedings before the Court, the applicant submitted a written statement made on 23 March 2021 by her brother, to the effect that when the police car with the applicant had arrived at the police station on 17 January 2017, he had already been there and had witnessed the police car arriving and seen her crying intensely. At the police station, the applicant had been taken to different premises from those where her brother was but he had heard her shouting to be released because she had not done anything and he had also heard a female voice shouting threats, insults and racial slurs at the applicant. He had then seen police officers running down the stairs and shouting that his sister had jumped out of the window.

III.   APPLICANT’S PHYSICAL INJURIES AND TREATMENT

18.  On 17 January 2017 at 4.47 p.m. a doctor attending to the applicant at the emergency reception of a hospital ordered a full-body examination by computed tomography scan. In two reports issued on that day at 5.26 p.m. and 5.44 p.m. by that and another doctor, they noted that after her fall the applicant had been found unconscious and established that, at the time they saw her, she was analgo-sedated and there was no sign of any injury to her skull, spine, organs of the abdominal cavity or pelvis. Nevertheless, she was diagnosed with an unspecified endocranial injury, four rib fractures, four other skeletal fractures and a pneumothorax on one side.

19.  A hospital-admission report of 17 January 2017 confirmed the above injuries and noted that the applicant was analgo-sedated, in a coma, and suffering from polytrauma, and that she had contusions to both of her lungs.

20.  In the applicant’s own submission, she was in a coma for more than a month.

21.  According to a report on her discharge from hospital on 24 February 2017, the applicant was discharged in good health with no restrictions on her ability to move. The report also indicated that no surgical intervention had been required, conservative treatment being sufficient. Nevertheless, it was observed that the applicant was suffering from a “quantitative disruption of consciousness”.

22.  Another doctor saw the applicant on 3 March 2017 and recorded, in a report of that day, that she was feeling fine and could walk alone but that she became out of breath if walking for a long period. It was also noted that she was due for a check-up by a traumatologist and that outpatient rehabilitation was required.

IV.  INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT AT THE POLICE STATION

23.  On 18 January 2017 an investigator of the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Inspection Service”) opened criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s fall but the decision was quashed by the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) on the grounds that the elements of the suspected crime had not been properly defined.

24.  Meanwhile, on 23 January and 15 February 2017, the investigator had enquired as to the possibility of interviewing the applicant. On the former occasion, it was established that she was still in a medically induced sleep. On the latter occasion, while she was still hospitalised, her doctor recommended that she not be questioned.

 

26.  On 10 April 2017 the investigator again attempted to interview the applicant. However, a few minutes before the scheduled interview, he was informed that the applicant would not be coming as she had fallen ill.

27.  The applicant was then interviewed on 20 April 2017, in the presence of her mother, an expert in psychology and a social worker. The applicant’s lawyer was also present and assisted her at all times from then on.

28.  In the interview of 20 April 2017, the applicant submitted that she remembered nothing of the events at the police station but did remember having been insulted by the two officers who had arrested her and having been slapped by each of them once as described in paragraph 9 above.

29.  Later the same day, the investigator also interviewed Officers A. and B. The former described the events at the police station in the same way as in his initial deposition, except that he stated that he had been standing a metre to a metre and a half away from the door to the ladies’ bathroom area, that the applicant had entered the room with the toilet in, that he had been alerted by a scraping sound, in response to which he had noted that the window was open, that he had initially gone to check the bathroom area, and that it had been only after that that he had noticed the applicant’s body lying on the ground underneath the window. In response to questions, he stated that it might have been some twenty seconds that the applicant had been in the bathroom area, and that he thought that the window had initially been closed, but that he was unable to say whether it had been locked. Officer B. knew nothing that could elucidate the above events as he had not been present.

30.  On 26 April 2017 the PPS informed the investigator that, having reviewed the material in the case file, they had established no grounds for a criminal prosecution of any officer. There had nevertheless been a negligent failure to discharge one’s duties in relation to guarding the applicant, which could be dealt with as a disciplinary offence. However, the applicant’s allegation in her interview on 20 April 2017 that the arresting officers had physically and verbally mistreated her had to be investigated into as a separate matter under a separate file number. No copy of the letter of 26 April 2017 has been served on the applicant.

31.  On the same day, that is 26 April 2017, the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigation examine the applicant’s allegation of physical and verbal abuse, in particular with a view to establishing whether any such possible mistreatment might have been the reason for the applicant jumping out of the window. These circumstances could be clarified by interviewing the applicant’s brother and mother.

32.  In a letter of 12 May 2017, the investigator rejected the applicant’s lawyer’s request on the grounds that the applicant had witness status and that, unlike victims, witnesses had no right to ask for additional investigative measures. At the same time, he informed her that the alleged mistreatment was going to be examined in a separate set of proceedings.

33.  On the same day, that is 12 May 2017, the investigator referred the matter to the head of the local district police department to be handled as a disciplinary offence. In doing so he had regard to the depositions of the applicant and Officers A. and B. as well as the documentation referred to above. The investigator noted that as the applicant had been processed at the police station by Officer A. as the arresting officer, his responsibility in relation to her there was still governed by the regime applicable to escorting persons under the 2011 Decree. In particular, he had been under a duty to guard the applicant by continuously watching her behaviour and to be prepared to intervene so as to prevent an escape or disobedience (section 34 (a) and (b) of the 2011 Decree). Officer A. had failed to discharge these duties diligently, in particular when he had turned his back to the entrance door to the toilet area thus losing sight of it, without having taken precautions such as, for example, verifying whether the given window had been locked or ensuring the guarding of the applicant in the toilet area by another person of the same sex. The applicant had made use of this failure by attempting to escape. Nevertheless, the level of the responsibility of Officer A. was reduced by the following factors: the applicant had not been a dangerous offender; she had only been suspected of a relatively minor offence; it had been envisaged that following her interview she would be released; until the incident, her behaviour had been calm; and the offence of which she had been suspected had eventually been elucidated so that it had ultimately been possible to bring charges of theft against her on 14 March 2017. Thus, in combination with the service track record of Officer A., disciplinary action was deemed to be sufficient. The applicant was not informed of this decision.

34.  In a letter of 7 July 2017, the head of the district police informed the Inspection Service that, as a follow-up to the decision of 12 May 2017, a disciplinary sanction of a one-off 5% reduction of monthly salary had been imposed on Officer A. The applicant was not informed of this decision and no copy of it has been made available to the Court.

V.     INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT IN THE POLICE CAR

35.  Following the instruction by the PPS that the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment in the police car be examined in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 30 above), the Inspection Service treated the incident as a suspicion of abuse of official authority within the meaning of Article 326 § 1 (a) of the Criminal Code. As such, it obtained and examined the contents of the investigation file concerning the police-station incident and an expert report concerning the applicant’s mental condition (see paragraph 46 below), and re‑interviewed her and Officers A. and B.

36.  On 12 July 2017 the Inspection Service decided to terminate the proceedings, having concluded that there was no suspicion of any wrongdoing. Above all, the applicant’s allegations were found to be improbable as all the available evidence showed that there had been no reason to apply any coercion to her because she had not resisted and had cooperated. Officer A. had previously served as a specialist for Roma-related issues. It appeared implausible that he and Officer B., who had been sitting in the front of the police car, would slap the applicant, who had been sitting in the back of it, and that this could have occurred on the outskirts of a pedestrian zone in plain sight of random passers-by.

It was further noted that the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering, inter alia, from retrograde amnesia concerning the events preceding her injuries on 17 January 2017. If this was true, then it was excluded that she would remember practically nothing of the day, but remember the alleged physical and verbal abuse in the police car explicitly.

In sum, there was no indication of the offence under investigation having been committed.

37.  The decision of 12 July 2017 was served on the applicant on 19 July 2017. It is uncontested that she could have but did not challenge it by way of an interlocutory appeal to the PPS.

38.  Nevertheless, she repeatedly asked for it to be reviewed at all levels of the PPS, arguing that the Inspection Service had failed to establish the facts properly, contesting its factual and legal conclusions, and asserting that the reasoning behind the decision was insufficient and thus not susceptible to review. She objected that the investigators had simply endorsed the version of events as submitted by the officers under suspicion, without (i) interviewing her brother and mother, (ii) enquiring through an expert whether it was possible for her to remember some of the relevant events but not others and to regain her memory of them, and (iii) examining possible racial motives of the officers under suspicion. In her view, it was necessary to establish the cause of her fall out of the window, in particular whether it had been due to the treatment she had been exposed to in the police car or at the police station immediately before the incident. Although she had already asked for that and the authorities were under a positive duty to investigate this matter, no investigation into it had been carried out at all.

39.  The applicant’s repeated requests were all dismissed, for the final time in a communication from the Prosecutor General’s Office on 21 September 2018. The PPS had examined the contents of the case file and had fully endorsed the investigator’s decision and reasoning. Other than that, it was only noted that the subject matter of the investigation in issue was limited to the alleged ill-treatment in the police car and that the circumstances of the applicant’s fall out of the window at the police station were beyond its scope.

VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEEDINGS AND REVIEW BY OMBUDSPERSON

40.  On 20 November 2018 the applicant lodged an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court. In the body of the complaint, she alleged a violation of her rights, inter alia, under Articles 2, 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention. As to the facts, she complained that the authorities had failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard her life during her deprivation of liberty at the police station and to ensure an effective investigation into the events leading up to her fall out of the window, including into her allegation of abuse in the police car. The investigation undertaken had been deficient in that it had not been prompt, independent and adequate in that it had failed to examine the possible racial motive behind the alleged violations. Regarding the independence of the investigation, the applicant pointed out that the Inspection Service was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior as was ultimately the police, including the officers under suspicion. Moreover, the investigation had been limited to the alleged physical and verbal abuse in the police car, but had failed to examine the possible connection between her falling out of the window at the police station and the events that had immediately preceded it, all of which had in her opinion racial connotations. Furthermore, the applicant objected that the investigation had simply and arbitrarily accepted the version of events submitted by the officers suspected of having mistreated her and being responsible for her injuries.

41.  In the summary of her complaint, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form (petit), the applicant linked it to the results of the investigation concerning the alleged incident in the police car (see paragraphs 35 et seq. above).

42.  In a decision of 13 December 2018, the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.

43.  It noted that the applicant’s complaint essentially concerned an allegation that the authorities had failed to ensure an effective investigation into the alleged offences committed against her by members of the police. However, there was no standalone right guaranteed to ensure the criminal prosecution of a third party. It was true that Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention imposed a positive obligation in that respect. However, it was extremely rare for any such obligation to stem from Article 8 of the Convention.

44.  Without providing any details, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant’s complaints had been duly examined by the authorities. The fact that she disagreed with their conclusions was not capable of engaging a constitutional review since the Constitutional Court was neither a court of fact nor of appeal in matters governed by criminal law.

45.  In a letter of 15 February 2019 concerning the investigation into the alleged police-car incident, the Ombudsperson of Slovakia informed the Inspection Service that, in response to the applicant’s complaint in relation to the actions taken against her by officers of the SNV county police department, she had established no violation of the applicant’s human rights and fundamental freedoms.

VII.  THE APPLICANT’S MENTAL CONDITION AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HER

46.  In the context of the criminal proceeding against the applicant on the charges brought on 14 March 2017 (see paragraph 33 above), on 23 June 2017 a sworn expert in psychiatry drew up a report on the applicant’s condition.

47.  In her examination, the expert relied, inter alia, on the contents of the case file concerning the suspicion of theft against the applicant. This material included depositions by her brother.

48.  The expert established that, at the time of the suspected offence, the applicant had been between sub-average intellectual ability and a mild mental retardation. However, this had not prevented her from understanding the unlawfulness of her actions and from controlling them. At the time of the examination, the applicant was suffering from an organic mental disorder, which presented as a mild cognitive impairment and retrograde amnesia, due to craniocerebral trauma. Her intellectual level was mild, or at worst moderate, mental retardation, the precise level being impossible to establish in view of the applicant’s attitude towards the examination. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the applicant was found to be unable to comprehend the reason for the criminal proceedings against her.

49.  It appears that the criminal proceedings against the applicant have been terminated, but no details have been submitted to the Court in that respect.

THE LAW

I.           PRELIMINARY REMARKS

50.  The present case concerns facts that partly took place in the police car and partly at the police station. The former allegedly concerned ill-treatment. The latter essentially involved a situation in which the applicant’s life was allegedly put at risk. The domestic authorities treated these two sets of facts in two separate sets of proceedings.

51.  The Court is of the opinion that, to the extent the alleged incident in the police car and the incident at the police station are interrelated, a holistic assessment of the applicant’s complaints in respect of each of them requires that they be examined together as follows.

II.        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION

52.  Relying on Articles 2, 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that (i) she had been verbally and physically mistreated during her transport to the police station and while being detained there, (ii) the State had failed to provide a plausible explanation of the incident at the police station and to take adequate steps to protect her health and life during her detention there, (iii) the State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into these matters, (iv) the Constitutional Court had misconceived and arbitrarily rejected her complaint, and (v) she had been denied an effective remedy in that connection.

53.  The Court finds that, on the facts of the case, these allegations fall to be examined under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which read as follows:

Article 2

“1.  Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.    Admissibility

1.     The parties’ submissions

(a)    The Government

54.  As to the applicability of Article 2, the Government pointed out that the present case did not involve loss of life and that the applicant’s injuries had not required surgery but merely a conservative treatment.

55.  The Government also alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on a multitude of grounds as follows.

56.  The applicant had failed to challenge the decisions concluding the investigation (see paragraphs 33 and 36 above) by way of an interlocutory appeal. It was true that she had sought a review of the decision concerning the alleged incident in the police car by the PPS, but this was not considered to be an effective remedy for the purposes of being allowed to have her grievances examined by the Constitutional Court.

57.  In addition, the applicant’s constitutional complaint had concerned the investigation regarding the alleged incident in the police car, mentioning the incident at the police station only very generally. As to any grievances in relation to the latter incident, she should have lodged a separate constitutional complaint or have specifically mentioned the incident at the police station as a part of the object of her constitutional complaint of 20 November 2018 in order to enable the Constitutional Court to examine both matters in context.

58.  Furthermore, the applicant could and should have asserted her rights in the civil courts by means of an action for the protection of personal integrity and claims for damages under the Police Corps Act and under the general law of tort. Such claims would have found support in the investigator’s finding that Officer A. had failed to discharge his duties when guarding the applicant.

59.  The Government also argued that, despite investigative efforts compatible with any applicable requirements, it had not been shown that the applicant had been exposed to any ill-treatment.

(b)    The applicant

60.  The applicant responded by contending that her injuries had been life‑threatening and acknowledging that she had not challenged the decisions concluding the investigation by an interlocutory appeal.

As for the incident at the police station, since she had had witness as opposed to victim status, she had never been informed of the outcome of the proceedings and had accordingly been unable to challenge it other than before the Constitutional Court, which she had done.

As to the alleged incident in the police car, the PPS review had been in substance equivalent to one carried out on an interlocutory appeal and neither the Constitutional Court nor any of the other authorities involved had ever questioned this.

61.  As to the other remedies referred to by the Government, the applicant pointed out their civil-law nature and argued that, as such, they fell short of the requirement that there be a criminal-law remedy, which in her submission applied on the facts of her case. Even if there were a choice of remedies, having chosen one that was apparently effective and sufficient, she had not been required to make use of another that was available but not more likely to be successful. Furthermore, as she had been denied the procedural standing of a victim in the proceedings concerning the incident at the police station, and having only learned of their outcome from the Government’s observations before the Court, she had been unable to bring any tort claim on the basis of the investigation’s finding of negligence on the part of Officer A. At the same time, as she had not had victim status in those proceedings, she had had no access to the relevant case file and had accordingly been unable to rely on any material therein concerning the incident at the police station. This was of particular relevance for her, as she had no recollection of her own as to what had happened at the police station.

62.  Nevertheless, referring to the submissions of her brother, the applicant argued that it was likely that her ill-treatment in the police car had continued at the police station.

63.  In addition, she contended that there was no indication that, at the time of the restriction of her liberty, she had been informed about her situation in a manner adapted to her specific needs and in the presence of a support person. Any treatment she had been exposed to at the police station had been marked by the lack of procedural accommodations called for by the special needs inherent in her particular situation. As demonstrated by the course of her subsequent questioning in the ensuing investigation, those needs were clearly discernible and identifying and responding to them had not required of the arresting officers to diagnose her mental capacity.

(c)    The third-party interveners

64.  The third-party interveners the HPOD and the CDLP argued that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities amplified the obligations enshrined in the Convention, in particular as regards the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, to investigate effectively all complaints of ill-treatment of such persons, to involve them effectively in such investigations by providing them with appropriate procedural accommodations, and not to discriminate on the basis of disability.

65.  In its third-party comments, Validity asserted that intellectual disability was associated with a number of systemic disadvantages, which was further exacerbated in the case of women and children. It argued that the refusal of appropriate accommodations to such persons might amount to ill‑treatment and that, for such persons to have access to justice, it was of particular importance (i) to have access to information and communication adapted to their specific needs, (ii) to be afforded legal aid and a support person in the proceedings, and (iii) to be heard and allowed to participate in the proceedings.

2.     The Court’s assessment

(a)    Alleged ill-treatment and the associated investigation seen under Article 3 of the Convention

66.  The Court is of the opinion that, in relation to the allegations of ill‑treatment, seen under Article 3 of the Convention, it is unnecessary to examine separately the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since the compliant is in any event inadmissible on the following grounds.

67.  As to any ill-treatment in the police car, the applicant’s allegations have not been supported by any evidence at all, medical or other. This assessment is consonant with that made by the Ombudsperson (see paragraph 45 above). Moreover, in view of the absence of any recollection on the part of the applicant as to what happened at the police station, no support can be found in it for her suggestion of a continuation of the alleged ill-treatment there.

68.  To the extent she sought to base her complaint on a statement by her brother made for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 17 above), the Court notes that no such statement was offered or made at the national level although the applicant’s brother was interviewed in the investigation against the applicant (see paragraph 47 above), the applicant herself was involved in various proceedings concerning this matter and at all stages she was represented by a lawyer. In so far as the applicant sought for her brother to be heard in the investigation concerning the police‑station incident and complained of his not having been heard in connection with the alleged police-car incident, her submissions were blank with no indication as to any content that his deposition would have contained (see paragraphs 31 and 38 above).

69.  As far as the applicant may be understood as wishing to complain of ill-treatment consisting of the authorities’ not having due regard for her mental condition, the Court notes first of all that no complaints at all to that effect were advanced at the national level. Although the Government have raised no separate objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in that respect, the Court is not prevented from taking this into account in the assessment of the nature and quality of the applicant’s allegations before the Court. Furthermore, there appears to have been no note regarding any mental-health diagnosis in the applicant’s medical records prior to the events of 17 January 2017, no such diagnosis was referred to by the applicant’s brother who took part in some of the events of that day, and also the fact that the applicant had previously been convicted for a minor offence (established by the arresting officers prior to the applicant’s arrest) could have indicated to the officers that she had unrestricted legal capacity.

70.  In these circumstances, the Court finds the allegations of ill-treatment manifestly ill-founded and not sufficiently credible to require an effective official investigation separate from that possibly needed in relation to her complaints under Article 2 of the Convention.

(b)    The police-station incident and applicability of Article 2 of the Convention

71.  The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention may also be applicable when there has been no loss of life, in particular if the circumstances of the case and the nature of the injuries inflicted indicate that the applicant’s life was in serious danger (see, for example, Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 22737/04, § 42, 12 January 2012). Where the victim was not killed but survived and where he or she does not allege any intent to kill, the criteria for a complaint to be examined under this aspect of Article 2 are, firstly, whether the person was the victim of an activity, whether public or private, which by its very nature put his or her life at real and imminent risk and, secondly, whether he or she has suffered injuries that appear life‑threatening as they occur. Other factors, such as whether escaping death was purely fortuitous or whether the victim was infected with a potentially fatal disease may also come into play. The Court’s assessment depends on the circumstances (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 140, 25 June 2019, with further references).

72.  In the present case, it is uncontested that the injuries the applicant sustained on 17 January 2017 were due to a fall from a second-floor window being at least 770 cm above the ground and were of a polytraumatic nature. There has not been any suggestion that there was any intention to kill or put the applicant’s life at risk and neither there been any indication of her injuries having originated in any activity putting life at risk by its very nature.

73.  As to the injuries themselves, they consisted of an endocranial injury, multiple fractures, a pneumothorax on one side and contusions of both lungs. As a result, the applicant lost consciousness and was then put to medically induced sleep (see paragraphs 18, 19 and 24 above), which lasted about a month. The applicant in fact submitted that her coma had lasted more than a month. However, a letter on file at the Court dated 15 February 2017 suggests that on that day the applicant was no longer in that condition (see paragraph 24 above).

74.  The applicant did not require surgical intervention and conservative treatment was sufficient. Although on her discharged from hospital on 24 February 2017 she was considered to be “good health”, the applicant continued needing physiotherapy (see paragraph 21 above) and suffering from “a quantitative disruption of consciousness”, and a sworn expert in psychiatry noted that her craniocerebral trauma had also resulted in a mild cognitive impairment and retrograde amnesia (see paragraph 46 above).

75.  As regards the circumstances in which the applicant sustained her injuries, the Court notes that she was an unaccompanied minor in the custody of the State’s agents and that the gravity of her injuries appears to have been reduced by the purely fortuitous facts that the surface on which she landed happened to be grass covered with snow and that a tree happened to stand opposite the window, a slide on one of the branches of which appearing to have slowed down her fall (see paragraph 14 above). By contrast, similar situations resulted in the death in cases such as Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria (no. 46317/99, § 8, 23 February 2006, involving a fall from a window on third floor); Eremiášová and Pechová v. the Czech Republic (no. 23944/04, § 8, 16 February 2012, involving a fall from a window on a mezzanine between the first and second floors); Keller v. Russia (no. 26824/04, § 25, 17 October 2013, involving a fall from a window on a third floor); and Fanziyeva v. Russia (no. 41675/08, §§ 9-11, 18 June 2015, involving a fall from a window on a second floor).

76.  In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant’s injuries were such as to bring the police-station incident within the material scope of application of Article 2 of the Convention (see also Krivova v. Ukraine, no. 25732/05, § 45, 9 November 2010; Igor Shevchenko, cited above, § 43; Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, no. 3648/04, § 68, 2 February 2016; Kotelnikov v. Russia, no. 45104/05, § 98, 12 July 2016; and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase, cited above, § 149).

(c)    Exhaustion of domestic remedies in relation to the Article 2 complaint

77.  The Court notes that the investigation into the alleged incident in the police car and the incident at the police station was conducted in two separate sets of proceedings. The latter was concluded by a decision of 12 May 2017 that has never been served on the applicant (see paragraph33 above). It has neither been explained by the Government nor established otherwise how she could have appealed against it in such circumstances. Although it is true that the applicant has not challenged the decision of 12 July 2017 concluding the investigation into the alleged incident in the police car (see paragraph 36 above) by way of an interlocutory appeal to the PPS, the same service did review it upon her requests. There is nothing to show that this review was in substance in any way lacking compared to a review on an interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, contrary to what the Government appear to argue, in response to the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court did not deny review of the contested decisions on account of non-exhaustion of an interlocutory appeal.

78.  As to the next part of the Government’s objection, the applicant clearly also included in her constitutional complaint objections concerning the incident at the police station (see paragraph 40 above). It is true that in its summary she only linked her complaint to the investigation concerning the alleged incident in the police car (see paragraph 41 above). However, this was not the reason for which the Constitutional Court declared any part of her complaint inadmissible. The general tone of its conclusions and lack of any genuine reasoning may rather be understood as an indiscriminate rejection of the applicant’s allegations as manifestly ill-founded as a whole.

79.  Moreover, and more importantly, while being aware of the national practice according to which the scope of the Constitutional Court’s review of individual complaints is in principle limited by their summary, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form by the complainant (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 48, 20 June 2006), the Court considers that in cases raising issues concerning the effectiveness of an investigation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention this requirement must be interpreted with due regard for the essential attribute of such an investigation, in particular for it to be conducted by the authorities of their own motion (see Adam v. Slovakia, no. 68066/12, § 78, 26 July 2016).

80.  Having regard to the above, as well as the Convention’s aim to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory but that are practical and effective, the Court finds that the way in which the applicant asserted her grievances before the Constitutional Court cannot be considered as falling short of the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

81.  The first two parts of the Government’s non-exhaustion objection are accordingly dismissed.

82.  The Court finds that the remainder of the Government’s non‑exhaustion objection, which concerns an action for the protection of personal integrity and claims for damages under the Police Corps Act and under the general law of tort, raises issues which are closely related to the merits of the complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is to be joined to the merits of that complaint.

(d)    Conclusion

83.  The applicant’s complaints in relation to the alleged ill-treatment, characterised under Article 3 of the Convention, are inadmissible and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4.

84.  The Government’s non-exhaustion objection concerning an action for the protection of personal integrity and claims for damages under the Police Corps Act and under the general law of tort in relation to the complaints about the State’s alleged responsibility for the applicant’s injuries and the alleged lack of an effective investigation in that connection, seen under Article 2 of the Convention, is joined to the merits of the complaint under the procedural limb of that Article.

85.  The applicant’s complaints in relation to the State’s alleged responsibility for the applicant’s injuries and the alleged lack of an effective investigation in that connection, seen under Article 2 of the Convention, are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.    Merits

1.     The parties’ submissions

(a)    The applicant

86.  The applicant contended that since she had no recollection of the circumstances of her fall out of the police-station window, it was unclear whether she had fallen out by herself. Assuming that that was the case, there must have been a very good reason for her to try to escape in such a way and the State had failed to prevent it. As it was possible that the treatment she had been exposed to in the police car had continued at the police station, it was likewise possible that such treatment was the reason for her attempt to escape.

87.  All of the submissions by the Government and the findings of the domestic authorities had been based solely on the statements of the implicated police officers, which had simply been endorsed, and the applicant’s own submissions had been treated as being of less value. No independent evidence had been obtained and the authorities had never had any genuine intention to find out what had in fact happened.

88.  Negligence on the part of Officer A. in relation to guarding her had been established at the domestic level and had in fact been accepted by the Government. However, no redress at all had been provided to her.

89.  The applicant also pointed out that in the investigation concerning the police-station incident, she had been denied the procedural status of a victim, procedural decisions had not been served on her and she had been unable to adduce evidence. Moreover, the investigation had not been independent in that it had been carried out by the Inspection Service, which was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior, as were ultimately also the officers under investigation.

(b)    The Government

90.  In the Government’s view, there was no doubt that it had been the applicant herself who had caused her injuries and that the only point for debate was whether the State had fulfilled its positive obligations with a view to preventing that.

91.  Referring to the submissions of Officer A. and the findings of the investigation, the Government pointed out that the applicant had previously been cooperative and had been informed that she would be released after the questioning, in view of which there had been no objective grounds to presume that she would seek to escape. Her doing so in such circumstances could not have been anticipated and had been inexplicable.

92.  Owing to the speed with which the events concerning the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had unfolded, it had not been possible to ensure the presence of her mother at her initial questioning. Moreover, the officers attending to her could not have known or presumed that her mental capacity was impaired; not even in her medical records had there been any reference to that fact.

93.  It was true that Officer A. had been neglectful in the discharge of his duties in relation to the guarding of the applicant. However, in view of all the circumstances, disciplinary action had been sufficient.

94.  Immediately after the accident, the applicant had been provided first aid and the authorities had urgently taken any steps that had been needed.

95.  The Government pointed to the chronology of the relevant events and argued that the investigation under review had been prompt, efficient and conducted by the authorities of their own motion. The applicant’s brother and parents had been interviewed in the context of the proceedings against the applicant on the charge of theft. This had been taken into account in the investigation under review and there had been no need to re-examine them in that investigation. Any other measure of investigation had been taken as necessary. The applicant’s mother had been present during the applicant’s subsequent questionings and both sets of investigation had been completed within two to three months, with the final outcome having ultimately been reviewed and endorsed by the Constitutional Court. The latter’s decision had been neither arbitrary nor unjustified, with the review of facts being limited by the scope of the applicant’s complaint, which had not comprised the incident at the police station.

96.  As to the applicant’s own participation in the proceedings, she had only been interviewed to an extent that corresponded to her age, and her interviews had always taken place in the presence of a psychologist, a social worker, and the applicant’s mother and lawyer. The investigation had examined all relevant aspects of the case.

97.  In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s substantive claims had been unfounded and that the safeguards and remedies available to her had been compatible with any applicable procedural requirements.

(c)    The third-party interveners

98.  The ERRC argued that the Inspection Service lacked the institutional guarantees of independence required for an investigation to be compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.

2.     The Court’s assessment

(a)    Procedural limb of Article 2

99.  In Fanziyeva (cited above, §§ 46 and 50, with further references), the Court reiterated the applicable general principles as follows:

- Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The first sentence of Article 2 enjoins the Contracting States not only to refrain from the taking of life “intentionally” or by the “use of force” disproportionate to the legitimate aims referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of the second paragraph of that provision, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.

- The obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention requires by implication that there should be some form of adequate and effective official investigation when individuals have died in suspicious circumstances. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to ensure effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life. The investigation must be capable, firstly, of ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and, secondly, of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of the required standard of effectiveness.

100.  In the present case the domestic authorities treated the incident at the police station as a separate matter, independent of the allegation of ill‑treatment in the police car. In neither of the separate investigations was the other actual or alleged incident taken into account for context. Even though the allegation of ill-treatment has not been made out for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, it cannot be said to be irrelevant for the assessment of the police-station incident as an aspect of the events that preceded it and might have given it a cause. However, rather than looking into this aspect, and despite the applicant’s request to that effect, the authorities appear to have consciously ignored it.

101.  In fact, the investigation and its conclusions relied purely on the statements and records produced by the implicated officers, with no attempt to look for and take into account any elements of external provenance (for example, by hearing the applicant’s brother, the crew of the patrol car that took him to the police station, the female officer who searched the applicant on arrival at the police station or any other personnel possibly present there during the impugned events).

102.  Furthermore, the Court notes that no attempt has been made (for example, by an investigative reconstruction of the events) to clarify matters such as what appears to be a fundamental incongruity between the initial version provided by Officer A. and his later version (see paragraphs 14 and 29 above) as to whether he saw the applicant falling out of the window or went first to search the ladies’ toilet area and only then noticed the applicant lying on the ground underneath the window.

103.  To the extent the authorities relied in their dismissal of the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment in the police car on what they considered to be the improbability that she would remember nothing of the day but would remember extremely clearly the circumstances of the incident in the police car, the Court notes that this finding had no direct support in the expert evidence available (see paragraph 46 above) and that, despite the applicant’s specific request to that effect (see paragraph 38 above), no further evidence was taken. In this connection, however, the Court also notes that, despite having legal representation, at no point domestically does the applicant appear to have claimed or complained of the lack of any procedural accommodations in view of her level of mental capacity.

104.  The investigation concerned an offence of negligently frustrating the fulfilment of an official duty, one of the considerations being that despite the failure of Officer A. to carry out his duties, it had not prevented the bringing of charges against the applicant. In their examination, the authorities focused on Officer A. and paid no attention at all to the fact that his failure to act had had as a consequence the applicant’s fall and injuries and that the applicant was a minor. In other words, in relation to that offence, the applicant was not given the status of victim and this translated into her being given witness status, thus preventing her from actively participating in the proceedings. In this context, the Court finds it noteworthy that no possibility appears to have been explored of treating the matter as an offence in relation to which the substantive and procedural position of the applicant would have been different.

105.  The ultimate decision in respect of the disciplinary liability of Officer A. was neither served on the applicant nor made available to the Court. That being the case, the Court is able to assess the sanction imposed (a one-off reduction in monthly salary of 5%) only in the abstract, from which perspective it appears negligible.

106.  Responding to the incident in this way creates the impression of seeking to give it administrative closure rather than genuinely attempting to establish the facts and draw consequences. The Constitutional Court’s part in that response is consonant with that impression, in particular in so far as it failed to address a substantial part of the applicant’s claims and relied in its assessment of their remainder on Article 8 of the Convention, which had not been invoked by the applicant and cannot be accepted as playing a significant role on the facts of this case.

107.  The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the investigation into the events of 17 January 2017 was not effective for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.

108.  As to the part of the Government’s non-exhaustion objection, which has been joined to the merits of this complaint (see paragraph 84 above), the Court notes first of all that it concerns civil-law remedies of a purely preventive and compensatory nature, but with no punitive potential. In that respect, it reiterates that civil proceedings, which are not undertaken on the initiative of the authorities, and which do not involve the identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator, cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the State’s compliance with its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. Moreover, the procedural obligation of the State under Article 2 cannot be satisfied merely by awarding damages (see Al‑Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 165, ECHR 2011, with further references). In addition, in so far as the Government have argued that the said civil-law claims would have found support in the investigator’s finding that Officer A. had failed to discharge his duties when guarding the applicant (see paragraph 58 above), the Court refers to its above conclusion as to the investigation’s having been ineffective. Accordingly, as a matter of principle, the prospects of success of any further remedies based on the outcome of that investigation were limited. Furthermore, as also already noted above, the ultimate decision in respect of the disciplinary liability of Officer A. was neither served on the applicant nor made available to the Court. To pursue the remedies in question in these circumstances is beyond the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The remainder of the Government’s non‑exhaustion plea must therefore be rejected.

109.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect.

110.  In view of the above findings the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately on the merits the remaining facet of the applicant’s complaint under the procedural aspect of that provision, that is the independence of the investigation. In that regard, it notes that in so far as this aspect of the case concerns the status of the Inspection Service, the applicant’s complaints were purely abstract, addressing only the institutional aspect of the investigative arrangement in place (see M.B. and Others, cited above, §§ 90 and 92).

(b)    Substantive limb of Article 2

111.  In Fanziyeva (cited above, §§ 47-49, with further references), the Court also reiterated that:

- Persons in custody are in a particularly vulnerable position and the authorities are under an obligation to account for their treatment. As a general rule, the mere fact that an individual dies in suspicious circumstances while in custody should raise an issue as to whether the State has complied with its obligation to protect that person’s right to life. Such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources.

- A positive obligation will arise where it has been established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual by a third party or himself and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. However, even where it is not established that the authorities knew or ought to have known about any such risk, there are certain basic precautions which police officers and prison officers should be expected to take in all cases in order to minimise any potential risk to protect the health and well-being of the arrested person.

- In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, such proof may follow from the co‑existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.

112.  As to the facts of the present case, the Court notes first of all that it is undisputed that the applicant’s injuries were caused by her fall from the police-station window. While she herself has no recollection of how the fall came about, there has not been any allegation of any direct involvement of any third party in it. Moreover, an allegation of ill-treatment that should have preceded the fall and in fact have given a cause to it has not been found established to the requisite standard.

113.  However, even assuming that the applicant’s fall was due to an unfortunate attempt to escape from police detention, this of itself does not absolve the respondent State from responsibility for her injuries. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the health and well-being of persons in detention clearly encompasses an obligation to protect the life of arrested and detained persons from a foreseeable danger. Although there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to show that the authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that the applicant might attempt to escape by jumping out of a second floor window, there were certain basic precautions which should have been taken in respect of the applicant as a person held in detention in order to minimise any potential risk (see Keller, cited above, § 88; Mižigárová, cited above, § 89; and Eremiášová and Pechová, cited above, §§ 110 and 117).

114.  In the present case, as established by the domestic authorities (see paragraphs 25 and 33 above), Officer A. was responsible for guarding the applicant under the rules for escorting persons embodied in the 2011 Decree. While this decree is of an internal nature and as such not accessible to the public, from the contents of the investigator’s decision of 12 May 2017 the Court understands that these rules included a duty continuously to watch the applicant’s behaviour so as to prevent an escape. The domestic authorities likewise concluded that Officer A. had failed in the discharge of this duty and that this failure had enabled the applicant to attempt to escape. In particular, in violation of the applicable rules, Officer A. had turned his back to the entrance of the toilet area without verifying whether the given window had been locked or ensuring the guarding of the applicant in the toilet area by another person of the same sex. The Government have not disputed these findings and the applicability and content of the said rules (see paragraph 93 above). Neither have they summitted anything leading to a different conclusion than that the omission in question in itself runs contrary to the authorities’ duty to protect physical well-being of persons in custody (see also, Fanziyeva, cited above, §§ 21 and 58). The respondent State is thus responsible for the applicant’s injuries.

115.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 in its substantive aspect.

III.   OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

116.  The applicant also complained that she had been discriminated against in violation of her rights under Article 14 of the Convention on account of her ethnic origin and the fact that at the relevant time she had been a minor with a mental disability in that (a) her treatment in the police car had been racially motivated, (b) the authorities had failed to investigate its alleged racial overtones, and (c) the alleged failure to conduct an effective investigation into that alleged ill-treatment and the incident at the police station had been due to her ethnicity and being a minor with a disability.

117.  The Government argued that, despite investigative efforts compatible with any applicable requirements, it had not been shown that the applicant had been exposed to any racially motivated remarks.

118.  Intervening as a third party, the ERRC argued that police services in Slovakia were contaminated by institutional “anti-Gypsyism”, and that Romani women with mental disabilities were a particularly easy target for abuse by the police.

119.  The Court finds that, as no ill-treatment in the police car has been established, no question of discrimination in that treatment arises. The case is accordingly different from those where the respondent Government is required to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination, failing which it is liable to be found to be in violation of Article 14 of the Convention (see M.B. and Others, cited above, § 104).

120.  Moreover, the Court finds that the material in its possession discloses no appearance that discrimination on the basis of origin or mental disability played any role in the ensuing investigation being ineffective.

121.  The remainder of the application is accordingly manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

122.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.    Damage

123.  The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

124.  The Government considered the amount of the claim excessive, referring to the awards made in the case of M.B. and Others (cited above, § 113).

125.  The Court notes that the present case differs from that in M.B. and Others, inter alia, in that it involves a violation of Article 2. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 30,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

B.     Costs and expenses

126.  The applicant also claimed EUR 902.92 in respect of the legal fees incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 3,900 in respect of those incurred before the Court, plus EUR 273 for administrative expenses.

127.  The Government submitted that any award be made under the criteria stemming from the Court’s case-law.

128.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31007/96, §§ 54-55, ECHR 2000-XI, with further references).

129.  In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,750 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

C.    Default interest

130.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Decides to join to the merits of the complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion, concerning an action for the protection of personal integrity and claims for damages under the Police Corps Act and under the general law of tort, and dismisses it;

2.      Declares the complaints under Article 2 of the Convention in relation to the State’s alleged responsibility for the applicant’s injuries and the alleged lack of an effective investigation in that respect admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible,

3.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect;

4.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive aspect;

5.      Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

(i) EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 3,750 (three thousand seven hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.      Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 September 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

                       

           Renata Degener                                                  Marko Bošnjak
                 Registrar                                                             President