European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF PUŠKÁŠOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 5011/20)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

20 May 2021

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Puškášová v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Péter Paczolay, President,
          Alena Poláčková,
          Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 22 April 2021,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application against Slovakia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13 January 2020.

2.  The applicant, a Slovak national, was represented by Mr R. Bauer, a lawyer practising in Košice.

3.  The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were given notice of the application.

THE FACTS

4.  The applicant’s details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table.

5.  The applicant has been residing in the United States since 2005. In Slovakia, the police charged her, on 30 May 2006, with a criminal offence of favouring a creditor. The case file includes proof of delivery (doručenka) dated 12 June 2006 of the decision on the charges, signed in the applicant’s maiden name. She claimed to have never received it and to have learned about it from her acquaintances.

6.  The police sought unsuccessfully to determine the applicant’s whereabouts by visiting her last known address in Slovakia and by interviewing her mother-in-law on several occasions, as well as by requesting assistance from the Sady nad Torysou municipal office and from Interpol in 2011 and 2015. From the first interview with her mother-in-law in 2010 the police learned that the applicant resided in the United States; however, the United States refused to disclose her address due to the data protection laws.

7.  The criminal proceedings were stayed three times, namely from 28 July 2006 to 21 December 2006, from 20 February 2007 to 7 November 2008 and from 6 February 2012 to 23 July 2015 because the applicant’s place of residence was unknown.

8.  Twice in 2015, the domestic authorities asked the United States for international cooperation with a view to interrogating the applicant. The latter was questioned by the United States authorities on 6 October 2017.

9.  On 17 September 2018 the police lodged a request for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings to which the prosecution service acceded. The decision was served on the applicant on 26 October 2018 and became final on 3 November 2018.

10.  Meanwhile, on 9 August 2018, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, challenging the excessive length of the criminal proceedings.

11.  By decision no. II. ÚS 79/2019 of 23 May 2019, the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It found that the criminal proceedings were no longer pending at the time of its decision and that certain delays that had occurred were either not sufficiently serious or not attributable to the investigative authorities. While noting that the overall length in question could appear as excessive, the Constitutional Court pointed to those periods during which the applicant’s address had been unknown or during which the proceedings had been stayed. It concluded that the applicant had obstructed the proceedings and that her behaviour had substantially contributed to the delays.

Lastly, noting that the applicant had not complained about the length earlier, it indicated that the complaint may have been of a self-serving nature.

THE LAW

I.         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

12.  The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

13.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to cooperate with the authorities and was therefore responsible for the delays. Moreover, she had not complained about the length earlier; hence the application was manifestly ill-founded.

14.  The applicant argued that the proceedings had been excessively lengthy and that the domestic authorities had been ineffective in requesting international cooperation. She contended that the authorities had known her address since at least 2008 and that the fact that she was freely residing in the United States cannot be interpreted to her disadvantage.

15.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999‑II, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII).

16.  The Court observes that the charges were brought against the applicant on 30 May 2006, a decision which she was allegedly served on 12 June 2006 (see paragraph 5 above). The proceedings were stayed three times on the ground that the applicant’s address was unknown (see paragraph 7 above). The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings was declared final on 3 November 2018 (see paragraph 9 above). Hence the period to be taken into consideration in the present case began on 12 June 2006 and ended on 3 November 2018, excluding the periods during which the criminal proceedings were stayed. The Court will thus examine the length of six years, nine months and twenty-nine days, during which the investigation was carried out at the pre-trial stage.

17.  In the leading case of Pavlík v. Slovakia (no. 74827/01, 30 April 2007) the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case.

18.  Even assuming that the applicant was partially responsible for the delays due to her alleged lack of cooperation with the domestic authorities by not providing them with her address, the Court notes that the fact that her address was unknown was the principal reason for the stays in the criminal proceedings, the periods of which are not taken into account in the Court’s examination (see paragraphs 7 and 16 above). Furthermore, it is unclear why the domestic authorities had not sought the applicant’s extradition and had only resorted to international cooperation (with a view to interviewing her) in 2015, although they had known that she had been residing in the United States at least since 2011 (see paragraph 6 above). Finally, as the criminal proceedings against the applicant never reached the trial stage, a possibility of trial in absentia could not have been employed.

19.  As per the Government’s argument that the applicant did not complain about the length of the proceedings earlier, the Court notes that she lodged her complaint in line with the Constitutional Court’s established practice while the impugned proceedings were pending before the authority liable for the alleged violation (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 61, 20 June 2006), prior to the police request to discontinue them (see paragraphs 9-10).

20.  Having examined all the material submitted to it and having considered the arguments presented by both parties, the Court does not find the impugned length of the proceedings to be in line with the “reasonable time” requirement.

21.  Accordingly, the application is therefore admissible and discloses a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II.      APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

22.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

23.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Pavlík v. Slovakia, no. 74827/01, 30 April 2007), the Court finds it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.

24.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Declares the application admissible;

2.      Holds that this application discloses a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of criminal proceedings;

3.      Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 May 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Viktoriya Maradudina                                                          Péter Paczolay

Acting Deputy Registrar                                                            President

APPENDIX

Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

(excessive length of criminal proceedings)