European Court of Human Rights

 

 

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SKLYADNEV v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 31826/14)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

14 December 2021

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Sklyadnev v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Peeter Roosma, President,
          Dmitry Dedov,
          Andreas Zünd, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 31826/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Oleg Mikhaylovich Sklyadnev (“the applicant”), on 3 April 2014;

the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning extension of the time-limits for appeal and subsequent quashing of the final judgment in the applicant’s favour and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;

Having deliberated in private on 23 November 2021,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Voronezh. He is a lawyer practicing in Russia.

2.  The Government were represented by Mr M. Galperin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov.

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4.  The applicant and other lawyers, including Mr Paul and Mr Borodin, brought proceedings against the municipal transport company of the town of Voronezh, seeking payment for the legal services provided.

5.  On 22 June 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh granted their claim and awarded them 40,020,000 Russian roubles. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. The judgment was executed at the expense of the municipal budget of the town of Voronezh before the end of the same year.

6.  On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor of the Voronezh Region applied to the district court for the extension of the time-limits for an ordinary appeal against the judgment of 22 June 2010.

7.  On 13 June 2013 the district court refused to extend the time-limits. The prosecutor appealed.

8.  On 8 August 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court quashed the decision of the district court of 13 June 2013 and extended the time-limit for an ordinary appeal. The court found that the public interest had been concerned as far as the judgment had been executed by means of the municipal budget and concluded that the prosecutor had had the right to lodge an appeal for those reasons.

9.  On 12 November 2013 the regional court granted the appeal lodged by the prosecutor, quashed the judgment of 22 June 2010 and ordered the reversal of execution.

10.  Further cassation appeals lodged by the applicant and his co-plaintiffs against the decision of 8 August 2013 and the judgment of 12 November 2013 were subsequently dismissed by the regional court and the Supreme Court of Russia.

11.  On 13 November 2018 the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in respect of Mr Paul and Mr Borodin, the applicant’s co-plaintiffs (see Paul and Borodin v. Russia [Committee], no. 28508/14, 13 November 2018). The Court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in that the regional court had extended the time-limits for appeal and had subsequently quashed the final judgment in the applicants’ favour.

12.  Relying on the Court’s judgment of 13 November 2018, Mr Paul and Mr Borodin lodged an application for the review of the judgment of 12 November 2013 in view of new circumstances, asking, inter alia, to leave without consideration the prosecutor’s request of 9 January 2013 to extend the time-limits for appeal.

13.  On 9 April 2019 the regional court granted their application, quashed the judgment of 12 November 2013, upheld the judgment of 22 June 2010 and left the prosecutor’s request of 9 January 2013 without consideration.

14.  On 4 December 2019 the First Cassation Court quashed the judgment of 9 April 2019 and remitted the case for a fresh examination by the regional court.

15.  No information was submitted to the Court regarding further progress of the proceedings.

RELEVANT domestic law

16.  The relevant domestic law governing the extension of the time-limits for appeal is summed up in the Court’s decision in the case of Samoylenko v. Russia (dec.) (no. 58068/13, §§ 27-28, 7 March 2017) and in the Court’s judgment in the case of Magomedov and Others v. Russia (nos. 33636/09 and 9 others, §§ 35-40, 28 March 2017).

THE LAW

I.        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

17.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about unlawful extension of the time-limits for appeal and subsequent quashing of the final judgment in his favour by the regional court. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A.    Admissibility

18.  The Government submitted that by the judgment of 9 April 2019 the regional court had acknowledged a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and provided appropriate redress for it. Since the matter had been resolved at the domestic level, the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention provisions. They relied on Articles 34, 35 § 3 and 37 § 1 of the Convention.

19.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

20.  The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 47, ECHR 2003‑IX, and Anatoliy Tarasov v. Russia, no. 3950/02, § 54, 18 February 2010). As to the issue of redress, the Court has not previously excluded that adequate redress would not necessarily imply monetary compensation but might take other forms, the adequacy of such redress being assessed with regard to the particular circumstances of each case (see Anatoliy Tarasov, cited above, § 54).

21.  Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that on 4 December 2019 the First Cassation Court quashed the judgment of 9 April 2019 and remitted the case for a fresh examination before the regional court. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the effect of the proceedings which formed the basis for the applicant’s complaint has been annulled (see, by contrast, Pakhomov v. Russia, no. 44917/08, § 77, 30 September 2010, and Ryabov v. Russia, no. 3896/04, § 50, 31 January 2008). Thus, the Court finds nothing to suggest that there was any decision or measure on the part of the domestic authorities which could be regarded as adequate redress for an alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

22.  In view of the foregoing the Court concludes that the applicant has not lost victim status with respect to his complaint. It further notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.    Merits

23.  The Court notes that in the present case the applicant, a private individual, was opposed to a public authority, which executed the judgment delivered in his favour long before the introduction of an out-of-time appeal. It was thus particularly important to address, given in particular a significant lapse of time between the adoption of the judgment of the district court and the introduction of an out-of-time appeal, when the intervening party became aware or “ought to have become aware” of the adoption of that judgment. The domestic courts’ failure to examine, whether the intervening party when introducing an out-of-time appeal two and half years after the judgment of the district court had been delivered, acted with sufficient diligence, constitutes in any event a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and consequently dispense the Court of any further examination, notably of the reasons justifying the quashing of the judgment delivered in the applicant’s favour (see Paul and Borodin [Committee], cited above, §§ 18‑19 and Magomedov and Others, cited above, §§ 98-99). In the light of the above, the Court does not see any reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

24.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

II.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

25.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.    Damage

26.  The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court does not award him any sum on that account.

27.  Moreover, in view of its findings in the judgment delivered in respect of the applicant’s co-plaintiffs (see Paul and Borodin [Committee], cited above, § 23), the Court considers that the finding of a violation in the present case constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non‑pecuniary damage which may have been suffered by the applicant.

B.    Costs and expenses

28.  The applicant did not submit any claim for the costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not award him any sum under that head.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Declares the application admissible;

2.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention;

3.      Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

           {signature_p_2}

Olga Chernishova                                                                  Peeter Roosma
Deputy Registrar                                                                       President