European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SOLODNIKOV v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 61582/10)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STRASBOURG

2 June 2020

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Solodnikov v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Alena Poláčková, President,
          Dmitry Dedov,
          Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Aleksandrovich Solodnikov (“the applicant”), on 19 August 2010;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Russian Government (“the Government”);

the parties’ observations;

the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;

Having deliberated in private on 28 April 2020,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

The case concerns inadequate medical aid in detention, handcuffing, conditions of detention and transport, unlawful and unjustified pre-trial detention, review of detention, length of proceedings and restricted access to a lawyer.

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lived, before his arrest, in Krasnoyarsk.

2.  The Government were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

I. Criminal proceedings against the applicant

4.  On 5 August 2007 the applicant was arrested in Krasnoyarsk on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained in Krasnoyarsk remand prison no. 1 (IZ-24/1).

5.  On an unspecified date eight individuals, including the applicant, were charged with thirteen counts of drug trafficking in an organised group.

6.  On 22 September 2008 the investigation was completed and the prosecution submitted the case for trial to the Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk (the “District Court”).

7.  Between 28 September 2008 and 2 October 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court held several hearings in the criminal case.

8.  On seven occasions (15 October 2009, 25, 26 and 30 November 2009 and 1, 2 and 3 December 2009) the applicant was transferred from the remand prison to the District Court, in order to ensure his participation in hearings.

9.  On 15 April 2010 the District Court studied the evidence collected in the criminal case. The defence asked the court to call several experts and witnesses and to order an additional chemical examination. The court rejected the requests.

10.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant was again transferred from the remand prison to the courthouse. He was not called to the courtroom. It is unclear whether a hearing took place on that date.

11.  On 4 June 2010 the District Court held a hearing.

12.  After 16 August 2010 several hearings were scheduled and then adjourned, because the applicant was ill.

13.  On 30 September 2010 proceedings against the applicant were suspended until his recovery.

14.  On 30 November 2010 the District Court held a hearing but had to interrupt it because the applicant was suffering from a hypertensive crisis. The trial was adjourned, on account of the applicant’s inability to take part in the proceedings.

15.  On 12 January 2011 the District Court found that the applicant was unfit to stand trial and decided to adjourn the trial until his state of health improved.

16.  On 21 January 2011 the District Court resumed the examination of the criminal case with reference to a medical certificate of 18 January 2011 by which the applicant was declared fit to stand trial.

17.  On 24, 26 and 28 January and 8, 10 and 28 February 2011 the hearings were adjourned because the applicant was unable to participate owing to his medical condition.

18.  On 3 March 2011 the District Court held a hearing in the applicant’s presence.

19.  On 14 March 2011 the examination of the case was adjourned because the applicant’s health had deteriorated.

20.  On 18 April 2011 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged.

21.  On 28 February 2012 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal.

22.  On 7 August 2012 the Presidium of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court quashed the conviction by way of a supervisory review at the applicant’s request. The court remitted the case to the trial court for a fresh examination and ordered the applicant’s release from detention against an undertaking not to leave the town.

23.  The applicant remained in detention from 7 to 16 August 2012 when he was released.

24.  On 21 August 2012 the applicant’s case was remitted to the trial court.

25.  On 16 March 2015 the District Court convicted the applicant of several drug offences and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. The measure of restraint in respect of the applicant was accordingly changed to detention. On the same date he was placed in remand prison IZ-24/1.

26.  On 18 June 2015 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal.

II. Compensation proceedings

27.  On 2 November 2015 the applicant claimed compensation for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him.

28.  On 25 February 2016 a single judge of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court dismissed the claim. The applicant appealed, arguing that the court had failed to assess his submissions and had incorrectly applied domestic law and the Convention.

29.  On 22 June 2016 the Administrative Chamber of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. The court established that the proceedings had begun on 5 August 2007 and ended on 18 June 2015; they had thus lasted seven years, six months and fifteen days. The case had been complex, had involved several co-accused, had concerned multiple counts of drug deals and had required the examination of numerous witnesses. Several hearings had been adjourned either owing to the applicant’s poor state of health or at the request of the defence, because the defendants or lawyers had fallen ill, they had been participating in different proceedings, or on other grounds. There had been no significant periods of inaction attributable to the authorities.

30.  On 10 October 2016 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Presidium of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court.

31.  On 8 November 2016 a judge of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court rejected the application, having found no grounds to reopen the case.

III. The applicant’s medical condition

A.    The applicant’s state of health before 4 June 2010

32.  It follows from a medical certificate of 11 October 2007 issued by the medical unit of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Department of the State Service for Drug Control that in 2004 the applicant had suffered from eye contusion. Since 2003 he had suffered from “hypertonic type neurocirculatory dystonia”. In 2004 he was diagnosed with chronic cholecystitis.

33.  In August 2007 he developed hypertonic disease in addition to the previously diagnosed illnesses.

B.     Haemorrhagic stroke and transfer to Town Clinical Hospital no. 6 (“the town hospital”)

1.    Events of 4 June 2010

34.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant attended a hearing. He was handcuffed to a steel wire. At 5.55 p.m. he lost consciousness in the courtroom and collapsed on the floor. He rapidly developed cyanosis and oedema. His pupils were fairly dilated and there was no light reflex. His heartbeat became irregular and his breathing difficult.

35.  The public asked the judge to remove the handcuffs from the applicant. The judge left the courtroom without giving any instructions to the escorting officers and was absent for about twenty minutes. An ambulance was called in the meantime. A doctor sitting in the public gallery rushed to help the applicant. Throughout that time the applicant remained handcuffed.

36.  Twenty minutes later an ambulance arrived. The escorting officers did not allow the applicant to be transferred to a civilian hospital, arguing that he had to be examined first by prison doctors. After about forty minutes of negotiation with the head of the security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the applicant was placed in the ambulance.

37.  The ambulance took the applicant to the remand prison and remained at the entrance to the remand prison for about one hour. The prison authorities refused to accept the applicant on account of his serious condition and insisted on his urgent transfer to a hospital. He was then transferred to the town hospital.

2.    The applicant’s treatment in the town hospital

38.  At 8.05 p.m. on 4 June 2010 the applicant arrived at the town hospital. He had to walk from the ambulance to the admissions room. He was handcuffed to a wheel chair during examination.

39.  From 4 to 8 June 2010 the escorting officers had restricted the doctors’ and his lawyer’s access to him. On those dates he was constantly handcuffed to a radiator or a bed. The escorting officers were present during all medical examinations except for invasive procedures.

40.  On 7 June 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with a subarachnoid‑type cerebral haemorrhage.

41.  On 8 June 2010 the applicant had a meeting with his lawyer.

42.  On 10 June 2010 doctors at the town hospital examined the applicant and found that he ran a risk of suffering a repeated stroke. His condition required brain surgery. The doctors concluded that the required medical treatment could not be ensured in IZ-24/1.

43.  On 15 June 2010 the applicant underwent brain surgery. Afterwards he was placed in the hospital convalescence unit and for several hours received artificial respiration.

44.  An escorting officer was constantly present at the unit, and the applicant remained handcuffed until his discharge from the hospital. He submitted photographs depicting him handcuffed to a radiator in a hospital room.

45.  On 17 June 2010 the hospital doctors informed the applicant’s lawyer that the applicant was suffering from a cerebral aneurism. The experts described his condition as severe and specified that he would need three to four weeks of post-operational rehabilitation treatment in a specialised institution.

46.  According to an extract from the applicant’s medical record of 9 July 2010 issued by the town hospital at the request of the applicant’s lawyer, during the post-operation period the applicant suffered from complications but the doctors assessed the applicant’s state of health as “satisfactory”.

47.  On 9 July 2010 the applicant was discharged from the hospital.

3.    Transfer to and treatment in the Regional tuberculosis prison hospital (“the prison hospital”)

48.  On 9 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from the town hospital to the prison hospital in an ordinary prison van, not in an ambulance, and he was not accompanied by a doctor. He had to walk from the town hospital to the prison van and carry his belongings. He did not receive any assistance from the escorting officers.

49.  From 9 July 2010 until an unspecified date, the applicant received inpatient treatment in the prison hospital.

50.  On 28 July 2010 the applicant was additionally diagnosed with left‑side “pyramid” insufficiency.

51.  On 16 August 2010 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital and sent back to remand prison IZ-24/1.

4.    The applicant’s medical condition since 16 August 2010 till present time

52.  As from 16 August 2010 the applicant received medical treatment in the medical unit of remand prison.

53.  During a hearing on 20 September 2010 the applicant’s condition worsened. On 27 September 2010 the remand prison officers informed the District Court that the applicant was unable to attend the hearings on account of his poor state of health.

54.  From 27 September to 12 October 2010 the applicant received neurological treatment in the prison hospital.

55.  On 30 November 2010 the applicant was transferred to the courthouse to participate in a hearing. He suffered from a hypertensive crisis at the courtroom and was taken back to the remand prison.

56.  On 2 December 2010 the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital for examination and neurological treatment.

57.  On 3 December 2010 the head of the remand prison sent the trial court a certificate which read as follows:

“In view of the hypertensive crises [the applicant has had] during the court hearings despite his relatively stable state of health in the remand prison, and taking into account that there is a significant risk of his developing complications following those hypertensive crises, possibly a repeated stroke and death, [the applicant] will no longer be transferred for the hearings.”

58.  On an unspecified date a medical panel found that the applicant had a disability of an unspecified category.

59.  On 18 January 2011 the prison hospital informed the District Court that the applicant’s medical condition had stabilised as a result of inpatient treatment and that he was again able to participate in the examination of the case.

60.  On 20 January 2011 the applicant was sent back to the remand prison.

61.  By a separate decision of 3 March 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court rejected the lawyer’s request for the applicant’s specialist examination. Referring to certificates sent by the medical unit of the remand prison, it found that the applicant’s condition had “normalised”, no complaints had been received from him and his blood pressure was normal.

62.  According to the latest medical certificate issued by the remand prison medical unit dated 3 March 2011, the applicant was suffering from a cerebral aneurism and third-degree hypertension. He was able to stand trial on condition that “the duration of hearings and the psycho emotional burden on the applicant were limited”.

63.  On 20 April 2011, after in-patient treatment, the applicant was examined by a medical commission which concluded that there were no medical grounds for his release from the prison.

64.  Since then, the applicant has been subjected to various medical examinations and treatments, including, neurological treatment, blood tests and magnetic resonance imaging.

IV. Handcuffing at the public hearings

65.  The applicant was handcuffed to a steel wire in the courtroom during public hearings of his case at the Sovetskiy District Court.

V. Conditions of detention and transport

A.    Transfer to the courthouse and holding cells at the District Court

1.    The applicant’s account

66.  The applicant was usually taken out of the remand prison to attend court hearings early in the morning, before 6 a.m., and was taken back after midnight. No warm food was provided during the transfers. While the detainees were being transferred, he was kept with several other persons in a small space in a prison van. The prison vans were unsuitable for transporting prisoners because of overcrowding and the lack of artificial and natural ventilation or toilet facilities. It was extremely cold in the vans in winter. On several occasions the applicant shared the space in the van with other detainees suffering from tuberculosis.

67.  The transfers usually took about four hours a day: two for delivery of the detainees and two for collection and the return journey. The distance between remand prison IZ-24/1 and the District Court was about 7 kilometres.

68.  While waiting for a hearing, between court sessions or while waiting for other detainees after the hearing, the applicant was kept for hours in an unventilated cell in the courthouse together with up to twenty other prisoners and five to seven escorting officers. On several occasions he was detained in the same cell as Ms T., who suffered from tuberculosis. On several occasions the applicant was put in a tight cell measuring less than 2 square metres, where he had to await being called to the judge. No warm food or toilet facilities were provided in the holding cells.

2.    The Government’s account

69.  The applicant was transported to the District Court in adequately lit vans with natural ventilation. At the court he was held in a cell measuring 5.25 square metres without windows or a toilet and with artificial lighting and compulsory ventilation.

B.     Transfer to the prison hospital

1.    The applicant’s account

70.  On 9 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from the town hospital to the prison hospital.

71.  He was transported in an ordinary prison van and not in an ambulance. He was not accompanied by a doctor. He had to walk from the town hospital to the prison van and carry his belongings. He received no assistance from the escorting officers.

2.    The Government’s account

72.  The applicant’s transfer from the town hospital to the prison hospital was carried out in line with legal requirements and the applicant did not complain of any violations of his rights during the transfer.

C.    Conditions of detention in Krasnoyarsk remand prison IZ-24/1

1.    The applicant’s account

73.  Between 16 March and 6 June 2015 the applicant was detained in overcrowded cells in IZ-24/1. During that period, the inmates had only 1.5 square metres of personal space. His cell was situated near a kennel and the inmates had to listen to dogs barking twenty-four hours a day and were unable to sleep. They were allowed to take a shower once a week. Sometimes they were unable to shower, as they could not regulate the temperature of the water in the shower room. There was no ventilation or access to fresh air. There was no water at night. The food was of poor quality.

2.    The Government’s account

74.  The applicant was detained from 17 March to 6 July 2015 in IZ 24/1 in cell no. 79 measuring 19.2 square metres with one or four inmates; there was a table, benches and other furniture in the cell, artificial and natural ventilation, and adequate sanitary facilities. The applicant had daily one‑hour walks.

D.    Conditions of detention in the prison hospital

1.    The applicant’s account

75.  Between 6 July and 8 August 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment in the prison hospital. He had to share a room measuring 20 square metres with eleven inmates. Two of them were allegedly suffering from acute schizophrenia and three from epilepsy. The room, which was not equipped with a toilet, was constantly locked, and the applicant was able to leave it only two or three times a day.

76.  On 8 August 2015 the applicant was transferred to Irkutsk correctional colony no. IK-3.

2.    The Government’s account

77.  The applicant was detained together with three other inmates in the prison hospital between 6 July and 8 August 2015 in room no. 5, measuring 20.8 square metres. There were four sleeping places in the room; the room was equipped with artificial and natural ventilation, lighting and heating devices. There was a sanitary facility with five toilet bowls, which was separated from the main hospital premises. The inmates had three meals a day and access to a shower every week. The hospital premises were in line with the sanitary standards.

VI. The applicant’s pre-trial detention

78.  On 5 August 2007 the applicant was arrested and the Kirovskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk ordered his pre-trial detention pending investigation.

79.  Thereafter the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended several times. He applied for early release but his applications were dismissed by the courts. The courts used the same stereotyped formula when extending his detention, stating in particular that the applicant (1) was suspected of serious crimes, (2) might abscond, (3) might put pressure on witnesses, or (4) might interfere with the investigation.

80.  On 20 September 2010 at the request of the prosecution the Sovetskiy District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 21 December 2010. The applicant was not present, but his lawyer attended the hearing.

81.  On 14 October 2010 the applicant received a copy of the decision of 20 September 2010. On an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the extension. He argued, in particular, that the first-instance court had decided on the extension in the applicant’s absence, the applicant had not been notified of the examination of his case in a timely manner, and he had been unable to study the court decision until 14 October 2010.

82.  On 23 November 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court, by a single decision, upheld the extension order in respect of the applicant and another co-accused, Mr K. The applicant’s lawyer was present at the hearing. The appellate court considered that the extension orders had been issued in accordance with law. As regards the applicant’s absence from the courtroom, the appellate court noted, with reference to medical documents, that he was unable to attend the hearing on account of his poor state of health. A copy of the decision was sent to him once his condition had improved.

83.  Appeals lodged by the applicant against the detention orders were rejected on the following dates:

 

Date of the detention order	Date on which an appeal was lodged	Date of the appeal hearing
18 March 2010	25, 26 and 30 March 2010	25 May 2010
9 June 2010	18 June 2010	Unknown
20 September 2010	8 and 21 October 2010	23 November 2010
30 November 2010	8 December 2010	22 March 2011
12 January 2011	18 January 2011	Unknown

 

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

84.  The relevant general provisions of domestic and international law governing the general healthcare of detainees are set out in Ivko v. Russia (no. 30575/08, §§ 55-62, 15 December 2015).

85.  The provisions of domestic law establishing legal avenues for complaints about the quality of medical services are cited in the following judgments: Patranin v. Russia (no. 12983/14, §§ 86-88, 23 July 2015); Reshetnyak v. Russia (no. 56027/10, §§ 35-46, 8 January 2013); Dirdizov v. Russia (no. 41461/10, §§ 47-61, 27 November); and Koryak v. Russia (no. 24677/10, §§ 46-57, 13 November 2012).

86.  According to paragraph 332 of the Instruction on Service approved by Decree No. 140-dsp of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of 7 March 2006, a senior escorting officer must remain constantly in the hospital room with the suspect or accused. He or she must escort the suspect or accused when moving about the hospital and must constantly supervise the escorted person during medical examinations and questioning.

87.  As to the provisions on handcuffing, under section 14 of the Federal Law “On Police” of 18 April 1991 no. 1026-1 and section 30 of the Federal Law “On Penal Institutions”, no. 5473-1of 21 July 1993, police and prison officers may use handcuffs in the event of resistance, in order to apprehend on the crime scene a person trying to escape if the person is threatening to harm someone’s life, health or property, or for escorting apprehended persons to the police station. Officers may also use handcuffs if there are grounds to believe that a detainee may abscond or cause damage to others or himself or resist the officers; and for the suppression of riots in prisons.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF INADEQUATE MEDICAL TREATMENT

88.  The applicant complained that he had not received timeous and adequate medical assistance immediately after the stroke that he had suffered on 4 June 2010 and in the town hospital where he had been constantly handcuffed; that he had not received adequate medical assistance while in detention; and that his state of health was incompatible with detention and he had to be released. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

89.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments.

90.  The applicant maintained his complaints.

A.    Admissibility

91.  As regards the applicant’s complaints about the authorities’ failure to release him on account of his illness and the medical assistance in detention, the Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat (see Gelfmann v. France, no. 25875/03, § 50, 14 December 2004).

92.  In the instant case, after the applicant had been discharged from the prison hospital, he received the necessary medical treatment. He returned to the prison hospital to undergo neurological treatment. According to the latest medical documents, his condition has stabilised. The applicant has not furnished any specific information (documents, detailed submissions) for the Court to conclude that the medical care he received in detention was insufficient.

93.  It follows that the applicant’s complaints about medical assistance in detention and refusal to release him on health grounds are manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

94.  As to the applicant’s complaints about his treatment for haemorrhagic stroke and the medical assistance he received in the town hospital, the Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

1.    General principles

95.  The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society, prohibiting in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, among other authorities, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 201, ECHR 2012). However, in order to come within the scope of the interdiction contained in Article 3, the treatment inflicted on or endured by the victim must reach a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is a relative one, depending on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see M.S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24527/08, § 38, 3 May 2012, and Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001-VII).

96.  Article 3 further imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical care (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000‑XI; Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 93, ECHR 2006-XII). Thus, the Court has held on many occasions that lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, M.S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 44‑46; Wenerski v. Poland, no. 44369/02, §§ 56-65, 20 January 2009; and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, §§ 210-13 and 231-37, 13 July 2006).

2.    Application to the present case

(a)    Medical assistance provided on 4 June 2010

97.  The Government submitted that the applicant had received adequate medical assistance on 4 June 2010 and had not previously complained before the domestic authorities about the quality of medical assistance he had received at the hearing on that day.

98.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

99.  The Court notes that at 6 p.m. on 4 June 2010 the applicant lost consciousness in the courtroom and collapsed. An ambulance was called and arrived about twenty minutes later. The escorting officers did not allow the applicant to be taken to a civil hospital, arguing that he had to be examined first by prison doctors. After about forty minutes, the applicant was placed in the ambulance.

100.  The applicant was then first transferred to the remand prison. He was not taken to the hospital until 8.05 p.m., two hours after the incident.

101.  The applicant’s state of health required immediate transfer to a hospital. An ambulance was called immediately after the applicant had lost consciousness and it arrived promptly. However, due to the actions of the escorting officers and prison authorities, he was transferred to the hospital belatedly. In particular, it took too much time to decide whether to take the applicant to the medical unit of the remand prison or to the hospital.

102.  The authorities did not provide any reasonable grounds for the delay in deciding whether to place the applicant in the ambulance and take him to the hospital.

103.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the failure to provide an adequate response to the emergency situation on 4 June 2010.

(b)    Medical assistance and use of handcuffs at the town hospital

104.  The Government submitted that the applicant had undergone medical tests in line with the existing standards and had received surgery in due time. Escorting officers had been present in the operating room and emergency units, but not during invasive examinations such as lumbar puncture, pan-angiography and bandaging. The applicant had not been handcuffed during or after the surgery from 15 to 16 June 2010.

105.  The applicant submitted that he had been handcuffed despite the fact that he had been in a critical condition. The escorting officers had been present at all of his medical examinations, including shaving and urinary catheterisation.

106.  The Court notes that the applicant was transferred to the town hospital in a critical condition on 4 June 2010 and remained there until 9 July 2010. There is no evidence that the applicant did not receive adequate medical aid during this period of time. However despite his critical condition he was handcuffed.

107.  In an opinion issued on 10 August 2011, the deputy head of the Krasnoyarsk Region police, referring to the medical documents in the applicant’s criminal file, stated that on 4 June 2010 the applicant “had been incapable, on account of his medical condition, of adequately perceiving the reality”. Therefore, he had not presented any danger of absconding or causing self-harm or injury to others on that day.

108.  On 15 June 2010 the applicant underwent brain surgery. It is unclear whether the applicant was in handcuffs on the day of the surgery. The photo depicting him bandaged and handcuffed in his bed, do not contain any reference to date when this photo was taken. From 17 June to 9 July 2010 the applicant was constantly chained to a radiator or his bed. It is not disputed between the parties that two escorting officers remained on guard in the room. The Government did not provide any reasonable explanation as to why the applicant, being under the constant control of two escorting officers, had had to remain handcuffed after such a serious surgery.

109.  Having regard to the applicant’s state of health, to the absence of any cause to fear that he represented a security risk and to the constant supervision by escorting officers, the Court finds that the use of handcuffs in these conditions amounted to inhuman treatment (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353/03, §§ 106-11, ECHR 2006 XV (extracts)).

110.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

111.  Having regard to the above, it is unnecessary to consider whether the escorting officers’ presence during the applicant’s catheterisation and shaving amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF LACK OF EFFECTIVE REMEDY

112.  The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy to protect his right to medical assistance. He relied on 13 of the Convention:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

113.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had effective domestic remedies and that he had made use of them by raising his grievances before the national courts.

114.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

115.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

116.  For a summary of the relevant general principles, see Litvinov v. Russia, no. 32863/13, §§ 73-77, 22 March 2016.

117.  The Court has on many occasions found there to be a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia through which to complain of the poor quality of medical treatment in detention (see, among many other authorities, Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677/10, §§ 86-93, 13 November 2012; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027/10, §§ 65-73, 8 January 2013; Gorbulya v. Russia, no. 31535/09, §§ 56-58, 6 March 2014; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, no. 76204/11, § 106, 4 December 2014; Makshakov v. Russia, no. 52526/07, §§ 86-89, 24 May 2016; and Urazov v. Russia, no. 42147/05, §§ 66-70, 14 June 2016). In the aforementioned cases the Court established that none of the legal avenues suggested by the Government, including a complaint to a court, constituted an effective remedy by means of which to prevent the alleged violations or halt their continuance, or to provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his or her complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.

118.  In the absence of any new arguments from the Government as regards the existence of effective remedies satisfying the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in the present case, the Court cannot depart from its well-established case-law on the issue. It sees no legal avenues that would constitute an effective remedy for the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF HANDCUFFING IN THE COURTROOM

119.  The applicant complained that he had been handcuffed to a steel wire during the public hearings in his case.

120.  The Government submitted that the applicant was an ex-police officer, and had not wanted to stay together with the other co-accused at the hearings because he had been in conflict with them. The applicant had threatened the co-accused, disturbed public order and demonstrated a negative attitude towards witnesses and the prosecutor. He had also disobeyed the judge, who had expelled him from the courtroom several times.

121.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

122.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

123.  The Court reiterates that handcuffing does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been imposed in connection with lawful detention and does not entail use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary. In this regard, it is important to determine, for instance, whether there is a danger that the person concerned might abscond or cause injury or damage (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, § 56, Reports 1997 VIII, and Mouisel v. France, cited above, § 47, ECHR 2002 IX).

124.  In the instant case, the Government stated that the applicant had been attached to a steel wire in the courtroom during the hearings because he had threatened the co-accused and had disturbed public order. They provided, as evidence of such behaviour, a certificate issued by the police in 2011. The fact that this certificate was issued approximately a year after the event complained of undermines its evidential value: as the Court has pointed out on many occasions, documents prepared after a considerable period of time cannot be viewed as sufficiently reliable sources, given the length of time that has elapsed (see, mutatis mutandis, Novinskiy v. Russia, no. 11982/02, § 105, 10 February 2009, and Shilbergs v. Russia, no. 20075/03, § 91, 17 December 2009).

125.  The Government did not provide any other documents, such as the transcript of the hearings, confirming that had the applicant not worn handcuffs when appearing before the court, there might have been a risk of violence or damage, or of his absconding or hindering the proper administration of justice. When the applicant lost consciousness and it became clear that he was not pretending, the escorting officers still refused to take off the handcuffs under the pretext that he might abscond or attack them or the public.

126.  Therefore, the use of handcuffs in the instant case was not intended to exercise reasonable restraint, and was disproportionate to the security requirements. Although it has not been shown that the measure had been aimed at debasing or humiliating the applicant, his appearance in handcuffs at the public hearings amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (see Gorodnitchev v. Russia, no. 52058/99, §§ 98‑109, 24 May 2007).

127.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s handcuffing in the courtroom during a public hearing.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AND TRANSFER, AND DETENTION AT THE COURT

128.  The applicant complained about the conditions in which he had been transferred from remand prison IZ 24/1 to the Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk, between the town and prison hospitals and about conditions of detention in the courthouse, the prison hospital and IZ 24/1. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention.

129.  The Government stated that the applicant had been transported and detained in adequate conditions.

130.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

1.    Conditions of detention in IZ-24/1 and the prison hospital

131.  When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812/01, 8 November 2005).

132.  The general principles concerning the establishment of facts in respect of complaints about conditions of detention are well established in the Court’s case-law and have been summarised in Fetisov and Others v. Russia (nos. 43710/07, 6023/08, 11248/08, 27668/08, 31242/08 and 52133/08, 17 January 2012).

133.  As to conditions of detention in IZ-24/1 and the prison hospital, the Government’s evidence comprised certificates prepared by the prison administration, a plan of the premises, photographs, and excerpts from the remand prison population register covering one day per month within the period of the applicant’s detention.

134.  As regards the certificates and other evidence prepared in respect of the applicant’s detention in IZ-24/1, the Court observes that they indicate the size of the cell and the number of inmates detained with the applicant. The Court is satisfied that the excerpts from the register were taken from the original documents prepared during the detention period and showed the actual number of inmates who had been present in the cell. During that period the number of detainees in the relevant cell did not exceed the number of sleeping places, affording at least 4.8 square metres of personal space per detainee.

135.  The Court observes that the certificates prepared by the prison hospital administration concerning the surface area and the number of sleeping places in the prison hospital where the applicant had been detained were not contested by the applicant. Accordingly, the Court considers the information provided by the Government in this respect as credible (see Sizov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 58104/08, § 45, 24 July 2012).

136.  Having assessed the evidence presented by the parties in its entirety, the Court lends credence to the documents produced by the Government and rejects the applicant’s allegations as unsubstantiated. It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2.    Conditions of transfer from IZ 24/1 to the Sovetskiy District Court and between the town and prison hospitals, as well as conditions of detention at the courthouse

137.  The Court notes that the complaints about the applicant’s conditions of transfers and detention at the courthouse are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

138.  The Court notes that the applicant was detained in poor conditions at the courthouse and during his transfers. It refers to the principles established in its case-law regarding cramped and defective conditions in the detention and transit of prisoners (see, for instance, Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, §§ 118-20, ECHR 2005 X (extracts), and Starokadomskiy v. Russia, no. 42239/02, §§ 53-60, 31 July 2008). It reiterates in particular that extreme lack of space in a prison cell or overcrowding weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 122-41, ECHR 2016, and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 149-59, 10 January 2012). The Court has already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case.

139.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in respect of this complaint. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the conditions of detention during the applicant’s transfers to the courthouse and at the courthouse itself were inadequate.

140.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF DETENTION WITHOUT A COURT ORDER

141.  The applicant complained that he had been detained without a court order between 7 and 16 August 2012 after the court had ordered his release, in contravention of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so”.

142.  The Government agreed that the applicant had been detained without a court decision from 7 to 16 August 2012. However, in their opinion, he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.

143.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

144.  The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to firstly use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, §§ 65‑67, Reports 1996 IV, and Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 51‑52, Reports 1996 VI).

145.  Where the Government claim non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, they bear the burden of proving that the applicant has not used a remedy that was both effective and available (see Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, § 38, Reports 1998 I, and McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, 10 September 2010).

146.  In the present case, the Government did not refer to any particular domestic remedy which could have been effective in the applicant’s case; nor did they submit any evidence that such a remedy existed.

147.  Consequently, the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies should be dismissed. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

148.  Some delay in implementing a decision to release a detainee is understandable, and often inevitable in view of practical considerations relating to the running of the courts and the observance of particular formalities. However, the national authorities must attempt to keep this to a minimum (see Quinn v. France, 22 March 1995, § 42, Series A no. 311; Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, § 25 in fine, Reports 1997-IV; K.-F. v. Germany, 27 November 1997, § 71, Reports 1997 VII; and Mancini v. Italy, no. 44955/98, § 24, ECHR 2001 IX). Administrative formalities connected with release cannot justify a delay of more than a few hours (see Nikolov v. Bulgaria, no. 38884/97, § 82, 30 January 2003). It is for the Contracting States to organise their legal system in such a way that their law-enforcement authorities can meet the obligation to avoid unjustified deprivation of liberty (see Shukhardin v. Russia, no. 65734/01, § 93, 28 June 2007, and Mokallal v. Ukraine, no. 19246/10, § 44, 10 November 2011).

149.  In the present case, on 7 August 2012 the Presidium of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court quashed the applicant’s conviction and ordered his release from prison under an undertaking not to leave the town. As from that date, there ceased to exist any grounds for his detention. However, his release was delayed for many days.

150.  The Court also takes into account the Government’s acknowledgement that the applicant’s detention during the period indicated was not in compliance with the requirements set out in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

151.  Therefore, the applicant’s continued detention between 7 and 16 August 2012 was clearly not covered by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 and did not fall within the scope of any other of the sub‑paragraphs of that provision. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 5 § 1 in this respect.

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

152.  The applicant complained that the duration of his pre-trial detention had been excessive and therefore in breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

153.  The Government submitted that there had been reasonable and sufficient grounds for the applicant’s pre-trial detention.

154.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

155.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

156.  The Court has already, on a large number of occasions, examined applications against Russia raising similar complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and found a violation of that Article on the grounds that the domestic courts had extended an applicant’s detention, relying essentially on the gravity of the charges and using stereotyped formulae without addressing his or her specific situation or considering alternative preventive measures (see, among many other examples, Shukhardin v. Russia, cited above, 28 June 2007; Belov v. Russia, no. 22053/02, 3 July 2008; Lamazhyk v. Russia, no. 20571/04, 30 July 2009; Makarenko v. Russia, no. 5962/03, 22 December 2009; Gultyayeva v. Russia, no. 67413/01, 1 April 2010; Logvinenko v. Russia, no. 44511/04, 17 June 2010; Sutyagin v. Russia, no. 30024/02, 3 May 2011; Romanova v. Russia, no. 23215/02, 11 October 2011; and Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541/09, 24 January 2012).

157.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that there is no reason to arrive at a different finding in the present case. The applicant was in pre-trial detention from 5 August 2007 to 18 April 2011, that is three years, eight months and thirteen days. The domestic courts resorted to abstract and stereotyped grounds and did not consider seriously the possibility of alternatives for detention. Although “relevant”, such grounds cannot be regarded as “sufficient”. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with “special diligence”.

158.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

159.  The applicant complained that he had not been present at the detention hearing on 20 September 2010 and that his appeals against the detention orders of 18 March, 9 June, 20 September and 30 November 2010 and 12 January 2011 had not been considered speedily. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

160.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not attended the hearing on 20 September 2010 because he had been ill. However, he had been represented by his lawyer. As to the delayed examination of his appeals against the detention orders, the Government acknowledged that there had been a breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

161.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

A.    Admissibility

162.  As regards the complaint about the applicant’s absence from the hearing on 20 September 2010, the Court reiterates that as a general rule, a detainee should have the right to participate personally in a hearing at which his detention is to be discussed. Possible exceptions to this rule are conceivable: in order to determine whether a set of proceedings provides adequate guarantees, regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in which such proceedings take place. The detainee’s personal presence is always required when the court has to assess his personality, the risk of his absconding or his predisposition to further offences, when the court changes the basis for the detention or when it extends the detention after a significant lapse of time (see Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493/04, § 113, 25 October 2007).

163.  In the present case, on 20 September 2010 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention. The hearing was attended by the prosecutor and counsel for the applicant, but not the applicant himself. The Court must examine whether the applicant’s personal presence was required in the circumstances of the case.

164.  In the material before it, the Court discerns nothing to show that the applicant’s circumstances had materially changed since the previous detention hearing. Nor does it appear from the content of the decision that the court discussed any new issues or changed the basis for the applicant’s detention (see Sorokin v. Russia, no. 7739/06, § 82, 30 July 2009, and Bulin v. Russia [Committee], no. 8681/06, § 35, 29 March 2016). The applicant was represented by his lawyer at the hearings at the first‑instance and the appellate courts.

165.  Accordingly, against that background the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s personal attendance was not required at the hearing and that counsel’s presence was sufficient to ensure that the proceedings were adversarial and the principle of equality of arms was respected (see, by contrast, Graužinis v. Lithuania, no. 37975/97, § 34, 10 October 2000, and Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, § 91, 1 June 2006).

166.  It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

167.  The Court notes that the complaint relating to the speedy review of the applicant’s detention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

168.  The Court will examine the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the light of the applicable general principles set out in, among others, the case of Idalov v. Russia ([GC] no. 5826/03, §§ 154-55 and 161, 22 May 2012, with further references).

169.  The Court notes that it took the domestic courts between one month and more than three months to consider appeals against the above‑mentioned detention orders. It seems that two of the applicant’s appeals were ignored and it is unclear whether they were considered by the court or not.

170.  The issues before the appellate courts were not overly complex. Nor is there anything in the material before the Court to suggest that either the applicant or his counsel contributed to the length of the appeal proceedings. Moreover, the Government acknowledged that the appellate courts had examined the applicant’s appeals against the detention orders of 18 March, 20 September and 30 November 2010 with substantial delay.

171.  The Court reiterates that where an individual’s personal liberty is at stake, it has very strict standards concerning the State’s compliance with the requirement of review of the lawfulness of detention (see, for example, Kadem v. Malta, no. 55263/00, §§ 44-45, 9 January 2003, where the Court considered a time-period of seventeen days in deciding on the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention to be excessive, and Mamedova, cited above, § 96, where the length of the appeal proceedings lasting, inter alia, twenty-six days was found to be in breach of the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention).

172.  Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the appeal proceedings for the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s pre-trial detention cannot be considered compatible with Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of that provision.

VIII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

173.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, about the length of the criminal proceedings against him and the lack of access to his lawyer at the hospital. The relevant parts of Article 6 read:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

...”

A.    Length of proceedings

174.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s case had been complex: it had been joined with twenty-one other cases, 122 witnesses and eight defendants had been examined, several expert examinations had been carried out, and the case file comprised thirty-nine volumes. Moreover, many hearings had been postponed on account of the applicant’s illness. They concluded that the proceedings had lasted for a reasonable period of time.

175.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

176.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II). In addition, only delays attributable to the State may justify the finding of a failure to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement (see Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, no. 49017/99, § 44, 19 June 2003).

177.  In the present case the proceedings comprised two rounds and lasted about seven and a half years. The Court finds from the material before it that the length of the proceedings does not appear to be unreasonable, given the complexity of the case and the fact that the applicant was seriously ill and the proceedings were postponed several times because of his illness (see Sergey Denisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 1985/05 and 4 others, § 141, 19 April 2016).

178.  Having examined all the material before it, the Court considers that the length of the criminal proceedings in the present case cannot be considered unreasonable. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B.     Access to the lawyer while in hospital

179.  The Government submitted that on 4 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer had not been allowed to see the applicant at the town hospital owing to the applicant’s medical condition. However, as from 5 June 2010 the applicant’s access to his lawyer had not been restricted. On 9 July 2010 the applicant had been transferred to the prison hospital and had remained there until 16 August 2010. Between those dates the applicant’s lawyer had not asked for visits.

180.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He stated that he had not been allowed to meet his lawyer from 4 June to 16 August 2010.

181.  The Court reiterates that restrictions on access to legal advice may be permitted only in exceptional circumstances where there are “compelling reasons” for doing so. They must be of a temporary nature and must be based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. Where a respondent Government have convincingly demonstrated the existence of an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity in a given case, this can amount to compelling reasons to restrict access to legal advice for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. When assessing whether compelling reasons have been demonstrated, it is important to ascertain whether the decision to restrict legal advice had a basis in domestic law and whether the scope and content of any restrictions on legal advice were sufficiently circumscribed by law so as to guide operational decision-making by those responsible for applying them. Moreover, in assessing whether there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial, it is necessary to view the proceedings as a whole (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, §§ 258, 259 and 262, 13 September 2016).

182.  In the present case, the Government acknowledged that the applicant had been denied access to a lawyer and a lay defender for medical reasons on 4 June 2010. It seems that after that date the applicant could have met his lawyer. As far as the period after 9 July 2010 is concerned, it seems that the applicant’s lawyer did not ask for permission to see him. The investigation in the applicant’s criminal case was completed and no investigative activities took place on the dates in question.

183.  There is no indication that the refusal to allow the applicant to meet his lawyer had an adverse effect on the preparation of his defence (see, by contrast, Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025/04, §§ 65-92, 24 September 2009).

184.  It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

IX. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

185.  The Court has also examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as those complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

X. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

186.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.    Damage

187.  The applicant claimed 540,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of pecuniary damage (loss of earnings and losses relating to his apartment) and RUB 10,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

188.  The Government stated that the applicant had failed to prove the amount of pecuniary damage. As to non-pecuniary damage, they left it to the Court’s discretion but stated that if the Court were to make an award, the sum should be decreased.

189.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant 26,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B.     Costs and expenses

190.  The applicant also claimed RUB 8,660 for postal expenses, RUB 30,996 for transport costs, RUB 260,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and RUB 120,000 for those incurred before the Court.

191.  The Government stated that the applicant had failed to prove that those costs had been necessarily incurred and had been reasonable as to quantum.

192.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums of EUR 103 for postal expenses and EUR 2,787 covering legal costs.

C.    Default interest

193.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Declares the complaints concerning insufficient medical assistance on 4 June 2010 and lack of effective remedy thereof, poor conditions of transport and detention at the courthouse, handcuffing under Article 3 and 13 of the Convention, unlawful and unjustified detention, and delayed review of detention under Article 5 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the medical assistance provided to the applicant on 4 June 2010 and handcuffing in the town hospital;

3.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s handcuffing at the courtroom during public hearings;

4.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of transport and detention at the courthouse;

5.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention without a court order between 7 and 16 August 2012;

6.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s unjustified and lengthy pre-trial detention;

7.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the delayed review of the applicant’s pre-trial detention;

8.      Holds

(a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)         EUR 26,000 (twenty-six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)       EUR 2,890 (two thousand eight hundred and ninety euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9.      Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 June 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Olga Chernishova                                                                 Alena Poláčková
Deputy Registrar                                                                       President