European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

 

THIRD SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF TURYEV v. RUSSIA

 

(Application no. 20758/04)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

11 October 2016

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.




In the case of Turyev v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Luis López Guerra, President,
          Helena Jäderblom,
          Helen Keller,
          Dmitry Dedov,
          Pere Pastor Vilanova,
          Alena Poláčková,
          Georgios A. Serghides, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 20758/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Anatolyevich Turyev (“the applicant”), on 23 April 2004.

2.  The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms O. Preobrazhenskaya, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Matyushkin.

3.  The applicant complained, in particular, about the prejudicial impact of a prosecutor’s media appearance.

4.  On 17 October 2008 the application was communicated to the Government. The Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and the merits, but the Court dismissed the objection.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and until his conviction lived in Ivdel, a town in the Sverdlovsk Region.

6.  In April 2000 the applicant was arrested on charges of murder and arson.

7.  On 24 July 2000, as the investigation unfolded, the local official newspaper the North Star printed an interview with a deputy town prosecutor about a spike in murder rates. The prosecutor said:

“In the first half of 2000 our town reported fourteen murders - a historic high, it seems. Twelve of them have already been solved, thanks to the industry of the police department and the investigators from the prosecutor’s office....

The fingerprint identification of ex-convict [N.B.] (whose body was found in [a river]) has allowed to discover his enemies and to prove that he was beaten by three inhabitants of Ivdel seeking [...] to settle scores for his murder of [another man] for which [he] had served almost nine years. It has been established that [N.B.’s] two murderers - [the applicant’s codefendant] and S. Turyev, both ex-convicts - were complicit in the early-March murder of [L.R.] who had dared to report them to the police for past wrongs. [Her] body was dumped in a wood near the airport and was found only in May. As those crimes were not solved in time, [the applicant’s codefendant] rampaged on and on 20 April killed [another woman] who had witnessed the night-time arson at Vizhayskaya Street that had killed five.

By the way, both [L.R.] and [the other woman] (whose body was found in a well next to the sports centre) had been garrotted with a wire. All three persons arrested in this multicount case will undergo forensic psychiatric observation because of the gravity of the crimes committed, which carry up to twenty years or life in prison. But even after these downright senseless murders, the crime wave in the town continued.”

8.  When the case came to trial before the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, the applicant moved to disqualify the prosecutor for the prejudice apparent in that interview. On 4 October 2002 the court refused the motion because the prosecutor had only cited facts from the investigative file, had affirmed the applicant’s complicity but not his guilt, and was not personally interested in the outcome of the trial.

9.  On 22 January 2003 the court sentenced the applicant to twenty years’ imprisonment for arson and the murders of N.B. and L.R. On 23 October 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the sentence, leaving unanswered the applicant’s complaint about the press interview.

10.  In reply to a post-conviction complaint brought by the applicant, in December 2004 the Sverdovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office found that the interview had breached the agency’s ethics policy as it had preceded the trial without, however, tangibly redressing the applicant.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

11.  Article 49 § 1 of the Constitution reads:

“Everyone charged with a crime shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is proved according to federal law and established by a final court judgment.”

12.  Section 1 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office reads:

“The Prosecutor’s Office ... shall exercise on behalf of the Russian Federation supervision over compliance with the Constitution ... and ... laws....”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

13.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that by pronouncing him guilty before the trial, the prosecutor’s newspaper interview had predestined him to be convicted. This Article reads:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

A.  Admissibility

1.  The Government

14.  The Government rejected this complaint as manifestly ill-founded. In his interview the prosecutor had not asserted that the applicant had been or would be found guilty. He had spoken only about the applicant’s complicity in the crimes. Article 10 of the Convention guarantees the freedom of speech, and newspapers carry only authors’ personal opinions, which the courts can choose to ignore. Article 6 § 2 may not stop the authorities from reporting on ongoing criminal investigations (see Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 38, Series A no. 308). The prosecutor had told the interviewer merely about facts found by the investigation. The article had not been an official statement; it merely continued a series of the newspaper’s own reports on crime in the town. The prosecutor had been discreet and tactful. Such interviews had proven successful against violent crime.

15.  The prosecutor was not personally interested in the outcome of the trial. The judgment lay with the court, he was only a party. The court realised that it had to be wary of an article that had earlier prompted the disqualification motion.

2.  The applicant

16.  The applicant maintained his complaint. Pretrial condemnation by officials could lead the public to believe the suspect guilty too soon (see Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, § 41). Certain pretrial publicity might be proper (see Pullicino v. Malta (dec.), no. 45441/99, 15 June 2000) especially since Article 10 secures the public’s right to information. But officials who talk to the media needed to be discreet and circumspect. The prosecutor had been convinced of the applicant’s guilt as he had used statements of fact in his speech. There had been employed no phrase in the interview which could have made the readers question at least to some extent the applicant’s guilt. The prosecutor’s superiors had admitted that his comments had been unethical. It would have sufficed not to mention the names of the applicant and other persons in the interview, for instance by reducing them to their initials, just like it had been done in the first part of the same article. This measure would not have violated the right of the public to receive important information on crime in the region, but would also respect the right to presumtion of innocence, in particular, of the applicant.

17.  The article must have influenced the court: the same prosecutor had appeared at the trial, the court had known about the article and had handed down the twenty-year sentence foretold by the prosecutor.

3.  The Court

18.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

19.  Article 6 § 2 bars officials from declaring a person guilty before conviction by a court. The officials may tell the public about criminal investigations by, for example, reporting suspicions, arrests, and confessions, if they do it discreetly and circumspectly (see Krause v. Switzerland, no. 7986/77, Commission decision of 3 October 1978, Decisions and Reports 13, p. 73 and Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, § 38). Choice of words matters (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98, § 41, ECHR 2000-X).

20.  The prosecutor’s words printed in the North Star were far from discreet or circumspect. He identified the applicant by his first initial and full second name and labelled him the “murderer” of one victim and “complicit in the murder” of the other victim. This is more than, as the Government say, mere facts found by the investigation, this is an unqualified declaration of guilt.

21.  The parties also argue whether the adverse pretrial publicity had biased the court, but this argument belongs under Article 6 § 1 (see Arrigo and Vella v. Malta (dec.), no. 6569/04, 10 May 2005). The applicant does not complain under that provision, and under Article 6 § 2 the prosecutor’s comment is an issue in itself. As the Government point out, prosecutors do not lose their freedom of speech by being prosecutors, the more so since their silence could create an information vacuum that might be filled by irresponsible sources. However, a prosecutor’s words come from an authority and are particularly persuasive in the public’s eye. The prosecutor’s outspoken comments were clearly a declaration of the applicant’s guilt which, firstly, encouraged the public to believe him guilty and, secondly, prejudged the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.

22.  The Court also notes that the prosecutor’s own superior found the interview unethical.

23.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 2.

II.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

24.  The applicant also complained under Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by policemen after his arrest, that his pretrial detention had been unlawful, and that his trial had been unfair. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

25.  Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

26.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

27.  The applicant claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage without specifying the sum or asking the Court to determine it. Accordingly, the Court makes no award.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the breach of the presumption of innocence admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;

 

3.  Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

  Stephen Phillips                                                                 Luis López Guerra
       Registrar                                                                              President