European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

THIRD SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF TOPEKHIN v. RUSSIA

 

(Application no. 78774/13)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

10 May 2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

 




In the case of Topekhin v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Luis López Guerra, President,
          Helena Jäderblom,
          Johannes Silvis,
          Dmitry Dedov,
          Branko Lubarda,
          Pere Pastor Vilanova,
          Alena Poláčková, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 19 April 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 78774/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Topekhin (“the applicant”), on 14 December 2013.

2.  The applicant was represented by Ms S. Sidorkina, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3.  The applicant alleged that he had not received adequate medical care in detention, that the conditions of his detention and transport to a correctional colony had been inhuman and unsuitable for a partly-paralysed detainee such as himself, that the length of his detention on remand had been excessive, and that his appeal against detention orders had not been examined speedily.

4.  On 2 April 2014 the Court granted priority to the application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and dismissed the applicant’s request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

5.  On 18 November 2014 the application was communicated to the Government and the priority treatment was lifted.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and until his arrest lived in Moscow.

 

A.  Criminal proceedings against the applicant

7.  On 27 February 2012 the police opened a criminal investigation into large-scale fraud. According to investigators, an unknown person had convinced a businessman to hand over 10,000,000 Russian roubles (approximately EUR 248,000) on the pretext of selling some equipment. However, the person had had no intention of selling the equipment or returning the money.

8.  On 24 January 2013 the applicant was accused of aggravated fraud. The police ordered him not to leave his place of residence, but he fled and was put on a wanted list by the police.

9.  On 16 July 2013 he was arrested and taken to a police custody facility. The next day the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) authorised his pre-trial detention until 16 September 2013, having regard to the seriousness of the charges against him and the risk of his absconding, reoffending and interfering with justice.

10.  The applicant appealed. He referred to, among other things, his poor health.

11.  On 19 August 2013 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the detention order on appeal after examining his recent medical documents, stating that his health did not preclude his detention on remand.

12.  On 13 September 2013 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 16 November 2013, citing the risk of his absconding given his previous attempt to evade prosecution and the seriousness of the charges against him. The District Court also linked that risk to the applicant’s lack of stable income or work. In the court’s view, no alternative measure, such as house arrest or bail, could have ensured that the criminal proceedings ran smoothly. Lastly, the court noted the complexity of the case and several steps in the investigation which had yet to be performed, including some which required the applicant’s presence and participation.

13.  The applicant appealed. He applied to the City Court to be released on bail because of his worsening health. He insisted that he could no longer move without assistance. In the meantime, in October 2013 he was served with the final version of the bill of indictment and was committed to stand trial before the District Court.

14.  On 13 November 2013 the City Court upheld the detention order of 13 September 2013, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. After examining medical evidence pertaining to the applicant’s health, it found that the illnesses he suffered from were not severe enough to warrant his release.

15.  On an unspecified date the police searched the applicant’s flat and found a passport with his photograph but under another name.

16.  On 14 November 2013 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 March 2014. It again cited his unemployment status and ability to abscond, in view of the seriousness of the charges and his having been on the run from January to July 2013. Noting that his state of health was compatible with the detention conditions, the court concluded that the extension of his detention was justified.

17.  On 13 January 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release on bail or under a written undertaking not to leave Moscow. It reiterated the arguments contained in the preceding detention orders and noted the discovery of the forged passport in his flat during the police search, which for the court was a clear sign of his intention to flee. It also addressed his arguments that he had become paraplegic and thus no longer posed a flight risk. It noted that according to a recent conclusion of a medical panel (see paragraph 32 below), his health did not call for his release.

18.  On the same day the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment in a correctional colony.

19.  On 20 February 2014 the City Court upheld the conviction, but reduced the sentence to four years.

B.  The applicant’s detention, transfer conditions and medical treatment in detention

1.  Police ward

20.  For about a week after his arrest on 16 July 2013 the applicant was kept in a Moscow police ward.

21.  His cell measured 12 square metres, had three sleeping places and usually housed two or three inmates. He did not complain about his health and was not seen by a doctor, save for a general check-up on admission.

2.  Remand prisons

22.  On 24 July 2013 the applicant was taken to remand prison no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow. He underwent the usual general medical check-up on arrival. Informing the resident doctor about serious back injuries he had sustained in 2008 and 2010, he did not make any specific complaints, except about his hypertension. He was considered to be in good health.

23.  According to the Government, he was placed in a cell which measured 26.96 square metres and housed four other inmates. Subsequently he was transferred between less spacious cells, which he shared with two or three inmates. The living space afforded to him varied between 3.8 and 5.7 square metres. Throughout his detention he slept on an individual prison bunk. The applicant did not dispute the above information submitted by the Government.

24.  According to the applicant, in August 2013 he fell and hurt his back. Severe back pain was accompanied by numbness in the legs and resulted in him being unable to walk unaided. He spent the major part of his day in bed being assisted by his cellmates. They took him for walks in the prison yard, carried him to the toilet and washed him with wet towels, which was their way of showing that they were annoyed with his helplessness.

25.  The applicant’s medical records show that on 8 October 2013 he complained to the resident doctor that he was suffering from a headache and back and abdomen pain. The doctor prescribed him drugs and a consultation with a neurologist.

26.  On 19 October 2013 he was taken to a medical unit in the same remand prison for inpatient treatment. The attending doctor noted that, owing to a pain syndrome, he had been unable to move unaided. After blood tests and a CAT (computerized axial tomography) scan, he was injected with painkillers, muscle relaxants, nootropics and vitamins.

27.  The applicant submitted that on 24 October 2013 during his transfer to a court hearing in a standard prison van, he had again severely hurt his back and head.

28.  On 13 November 2013 the applicant was discharged from the medical ward to be transferred to the hospital in remand prison no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow for more comprehensive treatment.

29.  The transfer occurred a week later. On admission to hospital the applicant complained of head and back pain and numbness in his legs. The hospital performed a number of medical tests, including blood and urine tests, a CAT scan and a cerebrospinal fluid analysis. As a result he was diagnosed with paraplegia of unknown origin, headaches and chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy. He received antibiotics, muscle relaxants, vitamins and other medication. His health improved, but not significantly. The paraplegia remained unchanged. He was discharged from hospital on 9 December 2013 to undergo treatment in a civilian hospital and to check whether his state of health called for his early release.

30.  From 9 to 13 December 2013 the applicant stayed in Moscow City Hospital no. 20, where he underwent a medical expert examination and received treatment. He had an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of his spinal column and spinal cord, a scintigraphy and an X-ray of his pelvis. According to a medical report dated 13 December 2013, he suffered the consequences of a reduced blood supply to the Adamkiewicz artery, including lower limb spasticity, dysfunction of the pelvic organs and bedsores developed outside the hospital. In addition, he was diagnosed with hypertension, a small hydrothorax on the right side and some residual effects of pneumonia that did not call for any treatment. The conditions did not fall within the established list of illnesses warranting early release.

31.  The applicant was taken to the intensive care unit of remand prison no. IZ-77/1, where he continued his drug regimen in line with the hospital’s recommendations. The doctors were, however, unable to ensure any improvement in his conditions. A week later he was sent back to Moscow City Hospital no. 20.

32.  A report drawn up on 31 December 2013 by a medical panel from the hospital stated that, in addition to the previous diagnosis, the applicant suffered from neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction. However, his conditions still did not reach the level of severity to warrant his release.

33.  The stay in hospital was followed by two weeks of detention in remand prison no. 77/1. There is nothing to suggest that his treatment was interrupted during that period.

34.  On 15 January 2014 the applicant was again taken to Moscow City Hospital no. 20 for a month of treatment. The hospital staff changed his drug regimen, completing it with antioxidant and neutrophil treatment, muscle relaxants, painkillers, and introducing physiotherapy, which resulted in “certain positive changes in [his] state of health”.

35.  Meanwhile, the applicant’s lawyer asked an independent medical specialist to provide an opinion on the quality of medical care afforded to the applicant in the remand prison. In a report dated 11 February 2014 the specialist stated that the applicant’s conditions required enhanced medical attention and inpatient treatment that could only be performed in a neurological medical facility. Remand prison no. 77/1 was not licensed to provide neurological treatment or perform neurosurgery. His bedsores were a sign of insufficient medical attention. The report ended with a recommendation that he be classified as disabled.

36.  On 14 February 2014 the applicant was taken to remand prison no. 77/1, where he was detained until 1 March 2014. According to the Government, he shared his cell measuring around 11.4 square metres with another inmate. As he was unable to care for himself, medical staff and inmates assisted him with his daily needs. It is apparent from the case file that he continued to receive treatment as prescribed.

37.  On 1 March 2014 he was sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony in Kostroma, over 300 kilometres away.

3.  Transfer to correctional colony

38.  In the early hours of 1 March 2014 the applicant was taken in a Gazel minivan designed to transfer the seriously ill, to a Moscow train station. The trip took two hours.

39.  At the train station he was placed on board a standard train carriage, where he had to stay for four hours awaiting departure. The journey to the destination, the town of Yaroslavl, took approximately five hours. The Government only stated that the applicant had shared his carriage with other detainees and had been accompanied by escort officers ready to assist him if necessary.

40.  In Yaroslavl the applicant was taken from the train to a prison van. According to the written statements by escort officers submitted by the Government, he was put on a thin blanket on the floor of the van. In the next half hour he was taken to a remand prison, so that new escort officers could join the transfer team. The applicant had to wait for another hour, lying on the floor of the van, while the official procedure involving the escort officers was under way. He was then taken back to the train station in Yaroslavl.

41.  At the station the applicant was taken to a prison train carriage, which he shared with other inmates. After another two hours the train departed for Kostroma. The trip took three hours. At around midnight the train arrived at the Kostroma train station. The Government did not provide any description of the conditions in which the applicant travelled.

42.  Within the next hour a prison van took the applicant to a nearby remand prison, where he was detained from 2 to 6 March 2014.

43.  On the morning of 6 March 2014 the applicant was taken in the same prison van to correctional colony no. IK-15/1 (“the correctional colony”). The trip took around an hour.

44.  The parties disagreed whether the vehicles used to transfer the applicant, with the exception of the Gazel minivan, were equipped to accommodate ill inmates. While the Government argued that all vehicles could transport bedridden patients, the applicant stated that they had had no special equipment on board. He had been forced to lie on the floor of the prison vans on a thin blanket used as a stretcher. During the entire journey he had been in severe pain, but had not received any painkillers.

4.  Correctional colony

45.  The applicant was placed in the medical unit of the colony. He continued receiving various drugs and injections, including nootropic drugs, muscle relaxants and antioxidants and vitamins, to improve the function of the central and peripheral nervous systems. He was regularly seen by doctors. His condition remained stable.

46.  The applicant spent all his time in bed. Personal care workers provided him with bedside care, including basic nursing procedures.

47.  The applicant was examined by a panel of doctors to check whether he should be released early on health grounds. In their report dated 15 April 2014 they concluded that his conditions, in particular his lower limb spasticity and bladder and bowel dysfunction called for his early release.

48.  On the panel’s recommendation, the colony administration asked the court to authorise the applicant’s early release on health grounds.

49.  The Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma granted the request and on 3 July 2014 ordered his release. On 26 August 2014 the Kostroma Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. Two days later the applicant was released.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A.  Extension of detention

50.  The Russian legal regulations in respect of detention during judicial proceedings are explained in the judgments of Pyatkov v. Russia (no. 61767/08, §§ 48-68, 13 November 2012) and Isayev v. Russia (no. 20756/04, §§ 67-80, 22 October 2009).

B.  Health care of detainees

51.  The relevant provisions of domestic and international law on the general health care of detainees are set out in the judgments of Vasyukov v. Russia (no. 2974/05, §§ 36-50, 5 April 2011) and Khudobin v. Russia (no. 59696/00, § 56, 26 October 2006, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).

C.  Detention of disabled detainees

52.  The Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences sets out certain requirements for the detention of disabled detainees. While Article 99 § 1 provides for a minimum standard of 2 sq. m of personal space for male convicts in correctional colonies and 3 sq. m of personal space in prison health care facilities, Article 99 § 6 indicates that inmates with a category 1 or 2 disability are entitled to “improved accommodation and living conditions”. Article 88 § 6 provides that disabled detainees have a right to buy food and articles of primary necessity without any limitations. Article 90 allows ill or disabled inmates to receive additional parcels or packages, including ones containing medication, the content and quantity of which must be determined by medical specialists. Under Article 99 §§ 6 and 7 disabled inmates must be provided with food, clothing and toiletries free of charge. They are also entitled to an enriched diet.

53.  Russian law does not contain specific rules or requirements regulating the detention of wheelchair-bound detainees.

III.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

54.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006. Russia ratified the Convention on 25 September 2012. It did not ratify the Optional Protocol.

Article 1of the Convention provides:

“The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.

Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”

The relevant part of Article 14 provides:

“2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.”

The relevant part of Article 15 provides:

“2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The requirements regulating personal mobility are laid down in Article 20, which reads as follows:

“States Parties shall take effective measures to ensure personal mobility with the greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities, including by:

Facilitating the personal mobility of persons with disabilities in the manner and at the time of their choice, and at affordable cost;

Facilitating access by persons with disabilities to quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technologies and forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including by making them available at affordable cost;

Providing training in mobility skills to persons with disabilities and to specialist staff working with persons with disabilities;

Encouraging entities that produce mobility aids, devices and assistive technologies to take into account all aspects of mobility for persons with disabilities.”

55.  In Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175), the then UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred Nowak, noted as follows:

“50. ... Persons with disabilities often find themselves in [situations of powerlessness], for instance when they are deprived of their liberty in prisons or other places ... In a given context, the particular disability of an individual may render him or her more likely to be in a dependant situation and make him or her an easier target of abuse ...

...

53. States have the further obligation to ensure that treatment or conditions in detention do not directly or indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities. If such discriminatory treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it may constitute torture or other form of ill-treatment. ...

54. The Special Rapporteur notes that under article 14, paragraph 2, of the CRPD, States have the obligation to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to ‘provision of reasonable accommodation’. This implies an obligation to make appropriate modifications in the procedures and physical facilities of detention centres ... to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms as others, when such adjustments do not impose disproportionate or undue burden. The denial or lack of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities may create detention ... conditions that amount to ill-treatment and torture.”

IV.  RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIAL

56.  The relevant extracts from the 3rd General Report (CPT/Inf (93) 12; 4 June 1993) by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) read as follows:

e. Humanitarian assistance

“64. Certain specific categories of particularly vulnerable prisoners can be identified. Prison health care services should pay especial attention to their needs.”

...

iv) prisoners unsuited for continued detention

 “70. Typical examples of this kind of prisoner are those who are the subject of a short-term fatal prognosis, who are suffering from a serious disease which cannot be properly treated in prison conditions, who are severely handicapped or of advanced age. The continued detention of such persons in a prison environment can create an intolerable situation. In cases of this type, it lies with the prison doctor to draw up a report for the responsible authority, with a view to suitable alternative arrangements being made.”

...

g. Professional competence

“76. To ensure the presence of an adequate number of staff, nurses are frequently assisted by medical orderlies, some of whom are recruited from among the prison officers. At the various levels, the necessary experience should be passed on by the qualified staff and periodically updated.

Sometimes prisoners themselves are allowed to act as medical orderlies. No doubt, such an approach can have the advantage of providing a certain number of prisoners with a useful job. Nevertheless, it should be seen as a last resort. Further, prisoners should never be involved in the distribution of medicines.

77. Finally, the CPT would suggest that the specific features of the provision of health care in a prison environment may justify the introduction of a recognised professional speciality, both for doctors and for nurses, on the basis of postgraduate training and regular in-service training.”

57.  Recommendation no. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of 8 April 1998 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, provides, in so far as relevant:

III. The organisation of health care in prison with specific reference
to the management of certain common problems

C. Persons unsuited to continued detention: serious physical handicap, advanced age, short term fatal prognosis

“50. Prisoners with serious physical handicaps and those of advanced age should be accommodated in such a way as to allow as normal a life as possible and should not be segregated from the general prison population. Structural alterations should be effected to assist the wheelchair-bound and handicapped on lines similar to those in the outside environment. ...”

58.  Recommendation CM/Rec (2012) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff, provides, in particular:

IV. Guidelines for prison staff conduct

D. Care and assistance

“19. Prison staff shall be sensitive to the special needs of individuals, such ... disabled prisoners, and any prisoner who might be vulnerable for other reasons, and make every effort to provide for their needs.

20. Prison staff shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required.

21. Prison staff shall provide for the safety, hygiene and appropriate nourishment of persons in the course of their custody. They shall make every effort to ensure that conditions in prison comply with the requirements of relevant international standards, in particular the European Prison Rules.

22. Prison staff shall work towards facilitating the social reintegration of prisoners through a programme of constructive activities, individual interaction and assistance.”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

59.  The applicant complained that he had not been afforded adequate medical treatment in detention, excluding the periods when he had been treated in Moscow City Hospital no. 20, and that the conditions of his detention and transfer to the correctional colony had been degrading. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:

“ No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.  The parties’ submissions

1.  The Governments’ submissions

60.  The Government argued that their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention had been fully discharged. As regards the applicant’s medical treatment, they submitted that shortly after his very first complaint to the resident doctor in October 2013, he had been subjected to an in-depth medical examination and had received comprehensive medical treatment comprising injections, a drug regimen and physiotherapy. The authorities had used their utmost efforts to restore his health. In support of their arguments the Government submitted the applicant’s complete medical file.

61.  As regards the conditions of his detention, the Government considered that they had been in line with the requirements of the Convention. The applicant had thus had an individual sleeping place and had been afforded sufficient living space. The authorities had ensured that he had been assisted with his daily needs by personal care workers and inmates after his health had deteriorated.

62.  Lastly, the Government stated that the escort authorities had taken cognisance of the applicant’s illness when arranging for him to be transferred. The vehicles used had been suitable for transporting bedridden detainees. The Government submitted the applicant’s itinerary, the train schedule and a written statement by officers who had escorted the applicant in Yaroslavl (see paragraph 40 above).

2.  The applicant’s submissions

63.  The applicant maintained his complaints, arguing that in August 2013 he had lost movement in his legs and since then had been confined to bed, being assisted only by inmates. The remand prisons had not been equipped to detain seriously ill inmates, had not employed trained “assistive personnel” and had been unable to provide him with the required neurological treatment. He provided the Court with a copy of a written transcript of an interview given by an inmate to his lawyer on 17 March 2014. The inmate stated that the applicant had complained of headaches and back and leg pain from the first few days of his detention, but had still retained his ability to walk and had not required any assistance at that time. However, a fall from the upper bunk in August 2013 had resulted in the applicant’s leg becoming completely paralysed. The inmate noted that the applicant had become confined to his bed and had only received assistance from inmates who had volunteered to help.

64.  Lastly, the applicant disputed the Government’s description of the vehicles used to transfer him. He indicated that the Gazel minivan had only been equipped to transport bedridden patients.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

 

65.  The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

(a)  Medical treatment

(i)  General principles

66.  The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill-treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbinţ v. Romania, no. 7842/04, § 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).

67.  Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article 3 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).

68.  The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 208, 13 July 2006). In most of the cases concerning the detention of persons who were ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicants received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released “on compassionate grounds”, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kudła, cited above, § 94; Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 95, ECHR 2002-VI; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).

69.  The “adequacy” of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994/09, § 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833/04, § 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242/03, § 84, 21 December 2010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, § 115, 29 November 2007; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, §§ 104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649/05, § 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee’s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, §§ 109 and 114; Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, § 79, 4 October 2005; and Popov, cited above, § 211). The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment the State authorities have committed themselves to providing to the entire population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same level of treatment as is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447/05, § 66, 7 February 2012).

70.  On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be “compatible with the human dignity” of a detainee, but should also take into account “the practical demands of imprisonment” (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 140, 22 December 2008).

(ii)  Application of the above principles to the present case

71.  Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, a seriously ill person suffering from paraplegia and a number of related conditions, including serious bowel and bladder dysfunctions, was detained from 16 July 2013 to 18 August 2014. He argued that his health had significantly deteriorated in detention, as a result of the authorities’ failure to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention and to provide him with the requisite medical care.

72.  The Court has to undertake a first-hand evaluation of a significant quantity of medical evidence in order to determine whether the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected in the present case.

73.  At the outset it observes that the Government submitted extensive medical documents, including the applicant’s medical file drawn up in detention, treatment summaries, test results and medical opinions. The documents cover the entire period of the detention. The applicant did not dispute the authenticity or quality of those documents. The Court therefore has no reason to doubt their accuracy and reliability.

74.  In the light of this, the Court is unable to accept the applicant’s allegations that although he had developed a pain syndrome and had lost the ability to move in August 2013, he had remained without any medical attention for two months, until October 2013. The medical record indicated that he had applied for medical assistance for the first time in October 2013, complaining of pain in his back, head and abdomen (see paragraph 25 above). That date will be accordingly taken by the Court as the date when the authorities became aware, for the first time, of the early signs of the applicant’s paraplegia.

75.  The Court further observes that as soon as the authorities became aware of the applicant’s health problems they put him on a drug regimen, (see paragraph 25 above). Several days later he was admitted to the prison medical unit, where he underwent the necessary testing for the prompt and correct diagnoses. He was seen by various doctors, including a neurologist, and prescribed comprehensive treatment (see paragraph 26 above). Further complex examinations, such an analysis of the cerebrospinal fluid, followed. These were scheduled and performed in a timely and proper manner (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant’s drug regimen was amended when necessary and his treatment strategy went far beyond attempts aimed at mere pain relief. It was aimed at fully restoring the lost use of the applicant’s legs. There is nothing in the Court’s possession to show that the prescribed treatment was not administered properly or was interrupted. The detention authorities continued with the treatment, providing prescribed drugs and injections, irrespective of the place of the applicant’s detention, whether in hospital or a standard detention facility (see paragraphs 31, 33, 36 and 45 above). They also introduced physiotherapy for him, thus ensuring that the he had access to a key component of the rehabilitation process (see paragraph 34 above).

76.  In these circumstances the Court finds no evidence to support the applicant’s assertion that the deterioration of his health had been brought about by insufficient or poor treatment. The Court cannot disregard others factors, which he himself did not exclude, such as the steady development of his back disorders rooted in the injuries sustained in 2008 and 2010 (see paragraph 22 above) and aggravated by a new injury received in detention (see paragraph 24 above). The Court also attributes particular weight to the fact that the independent medical specialist, who had assessed the quality of the applicant’s treatment at his lawyer’s request, did not identify any serious defects in the treatment, merely accentuating the general need to treat him in a neurological hospital (see paragraph 35 above). The specialist noted the applicant’s bedsores. However, the Court considers that they are not so much a matter of the quality of medical treatment but rather of the general care and conditions of the applicant’s detention, which will be addressed by the Court under a separate heading.

77.  To sum up, the Court considers that the authorities provided the applicant with the requisite medical assistance in detention. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.

(b)  Conditions of detention

(i)  General principles

78.  The Court further reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method in which the measure is enforced do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła, cited above, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Melnītis v. Latvia, no. 30779/05, § 69, 28 February 2012).

79.  Moreover, the Court has considered that where the authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability (see Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28937/11, § 29, 8 November 2012; Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, § 59, 21 December 2010; and Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672/02, § 56, 2 December 2004).

80.  In the above-cited case of Farbtuhs, the Court noted that the prison authorities had permitted family members to stay with the applicant for twenty-four hours at a time and that this had taken place on a regular basis. In addition to being cared for by his family, the applicant, who had a physical disability, was assisted by the medical staff during working hours and was helped by other inmates outside working hours on a voluntary basis. The Court expressed its concerns in the following terms (§ 60):

“ The Court doubts the appropriateness of such a solution, leaving as it did the bulk of responsibility for a man with such a severe disability in the hands of unqualified prisoners, even if only for a limited period. It is true that the applicant did not report having suffered any incident or particular difficulty as a result of the impugned situation; he merely stated that the prisoners in question sometimes ‘refused to cooperate’, without mentioning any specific case in which they had refused. However, the anxiety and unease which such a severely disabled person could be expected to feel, knowing that he would receive no professional assistance in the event of an emergency, in themselves raise a serious issue from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention.”

81.  The Court has also held that detaining a disabled person in a prison where he cannot move around and, in particular, cannot leave his cell independently, amounts to degrading treatment (see Vincent v. France, no. 6253/03, § 103, 24 October 2006). Similarly, the Court has found that leaving a person with a serious physical disability to rely on his cellmates for assistance with using the toilet, bathing and getting dressed or undressed contributes to its finding that the conditions of detention amount to degrading treatment (see Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857/06, §§ 27 and 30, 20 May 2010).

(ii)  Application of the above principles to the present case

82.  Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the parties submitted conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prisons nos. 77/1 and 77/2 (see paragraphs 61 and 63). The Government argued that he had been assisted by personal care workers and detainees, while he stated that assistance had only been provided by inmates as the facilities had not employed staff to assist him with his daily needs.

83.  The Court has previously held that in certain instances the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of firmly corroborating or refuting allegations under Article 3 of the Convention and that failure on a Government’s part to submit such information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations (see, for example, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, § 426, 6 April 2004).

84.  In this respect, the Court considers that it was for the Government in the present case to demonstrate that the detention authorities had arranged the necessary general care and assistance for the applicant, who had been clearly unable to care for himself independently owing to serious leg impairment. The Government however failed to submit any evidence, such as staff registration logs or employment certificates, statements by attending doctors, by the medical staff who had allegedly cared for him or, at least, by the applicant’s inmates, confirming that the detention facilities accommodating him had employed a sufficient number of personal care workers and that the staff had provided him with the necessary assistance with his daily needs. The applicant, on the other hand, not only gave a detailed and consistent description of the circumstances, but provided the Court with statements by his inmate confirming his allegations (see paragraph 63 above). In these circumstances the Court concludes that the applicant was left received no assistance from trained staff, but was forced to rely entirely on the help of his inmates.

85.  The Court has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in cases in which prison staff felt that they had been relieved of their duty to provide security and care to more vulnerable detainees by making their cellmates responsible for providing them with daily assistance or, if necessary, first aid (see, Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689/12, § 85, 6 February 2014, and, mutatis mutandis, Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052/05, § 74, 3 February 2009). The circumstances of the present case are even more acute because the applicant’s need for bedside assistance was exceptionally high. It is evident that his inmates were unable to provide such enhanced assistance, which requires special skills and knowledge. This fact is accentuated by the presence of bedsores, developed outside the hospital, which were recorded by the resident doctor and noted by the independent medical expert as a sign of neglect on the part of the authorities (see paragraphs 30 and 35 above). The Court is prepared to conclude that the developed bedsores indicated that the applicant was not repositioned regularly, was forced to spend much time in bed in one position, and was not regularly bathed or his skin was not kept clean. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the applicant suffered from bladder and bowel dysfunction (see paragraph 32 above). The absence of proper general care and assistance could have also contributed to development of the bedsores, through the delay in notifying the prison doctors of their appearance, given that the inmates assisting the applicant were not trained to duly recognise the early signs of bedsores or offer treatment to prevent them developing further.

86.  In addition, the Court finds that the applicant’s inevitable dependence on his inmates and the need to ask for their help with intimate hygiene procedures put him in a very uncomfortable position and adversely affected his emotional well-being, impeding his communication with the cellmates who could have been dissatisfied with the burdensome work they had to perform involuntarily.

87.  In addition, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were further exacerbated by the failure to provide him with, as is apparent from the documents submitted by the parties, a hospital bed or any other equipment, such as a special pressure-relieving mattress, which could have afforded him at the very least a minimum level of comfort during more than a year of detention.

88.  To conclude, the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the remand prisons were such as to qualify as inhuman and degrading treatment. There has thus been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.

(c)  Conditions of transfer

89.  The Court reiterates that the applicant complained about the conditions of his transfer to the correctional colony from the first train station to the final destination. He gave a sufficiently detailed and consistent description of the conditions in which he was transferred. The respondent Government provided the Court with an itinerary of the trip. They also contended that the conditions of the transfer corresponded to the needs of bedridden patients. They did not however submit any information as to the special adjustments made or equipment installed on the trains or prison van in which the applicant travelled. The only items of evidence lodged by the Government which could have shed at least some light on the conditions of the applicant’s transfer were the written statements by two escort officers. They noted that the applicant had spent about two hours lying on a thin blanket on the hard floor of the prison van while being taken to and from the remand prison in Yaroslavl the only reason being for, it appears, a change in the escort crew (see paragraph 40 above). The Court notes that the escort officers’ statements supported the applicant’s statements that in Yaroslavl he had been transported lying on the floor of a prison vehicle.

90.  In these circumstances, the Court accepts the veracity of the applicant’s description of the conditions of his transfer and will base on it the examination of his complaint in this respect (see Yevgeniy Bogdanov v. Russia, no. 22405/04, § 103, 26 February 2015, and Igor Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000/02, §§ 34-35, 7 June 2007).

91.  The Court observes that the applicant was transported to the correctional colony in standard train carriages and prison vans with no special equipment installed to meet the needs of a bedridden person suffering from a serious back condition and bladder problems. The first part of the trip took nine hours, during which he was confined to a bunk in the train carriage. The trip, which could have presented no serious issues for a healthy inmate, had an evident detrimental effect on the applicant.

92.  The Court has established that during the following part of the trip he spent at least two hours being driven in a prison van to and from a detention facility in Yaroslavl. The Court is concerned that the authorities failed to take any corrective measures to meet the applicant’s needs during the transfer, treating with indifference his complaints of acute pain when he was lying on the hard floor of the prison van or being carried around on a blanket used as a stretcher. His being placed directly on the floor of the van exposed him to vibrations from the road during the journey and resulted in him suffering additional pain. Given his fragile condition, the Court is mindful of the possible negative impact such treatment could have had for his back and legs.

93.  The applicant’s trip to the correctional colony was completed after a further five hours on a train and a journey in a prison van. The Court does not find any evidence that the conditions on the train or in the van were in any way different from those during the first part of his trip.

94.  In these circumstances, the Court takes the view that the cumulative effect of the material conditions of the applicant’s transfer, and the duration of the trip, were serious enough to qualify as inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353/03, §§ 112-117, ECHR 2006-XV (extracts)).

95.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s transfer to the correctional colony.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

96.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time and alleged that the orders for his detention had not been based on sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

A.  The parties’ submissions

97.  The Government argued that the Russian courts had authorised the applicant’s arrest because they had had sufficient reasons to believe that he had committed a serious criminal offence. When authorising or extending his detention, they had taken into account the seriousness of the charges, the nature of the criminal offences in question, and the risk of him absconding if released. Given that the applicant had been on the run from January to July 2013, and a forged passport had been discovered in his flat during a search, the courts had correctly considered this to be a real risk. Moreover, they had duly considered the applicant’s state of health and examined the possibility of applying other, less strict preventive measures, but had found them insufficient to offset the above-mentioned risks.

98.  The applicant argued that the authorities had known of his serious illness, and that his state of health had warranted his release. His diagnosis had diminished the risk of him absconding or reoffending. However, the courts had continued extending his detention on far-fetched grounds. The detention orders had been issued as a mere formality.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

99.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

(a)  General principles

100.  The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of his or her continued detention, whatever other grounds may exist. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are found to have been “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are “relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify his or her continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393/05, §§ 30 and 32, 13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006-X; Jabłoński v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8). Article 5 § 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97, § 66, ECHR 2003-I).

101.  It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071/00, § 67, 7 April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 84-85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is not the Court’s task to establish such facts and take the place of the national authorities which ruled on the applicant’s detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts’ decisions and of the established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 72, 8 June 2006; Ilijkov, cited above, § 86; and Labita, cited above, § 152). When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, § 140, 22 May 2012, and Suslov v. Russia, no. 2366/07, § 86, 29 May 2012, with further references).

(b)  Application to the present case

102.  The applicant was arrested on 16 July 2013 and convicted on 13 January 2014. The period to be taken into consideration is therefore slightly less than six months.

103.  It is not disputed by the parties that the applicant’s detention was initially warranted by a reasonable suspicion that he had committed large-scale fraud and presented a flight risk. It remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities gave “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds to justify his continued detention and whether they displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.

104.  The seriousness of the charges was one of the factors for assessing the applicant’s potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice (see paragraphs 9, 12, 16 and 17 above). However, the Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in assessing the risk of an accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral v. Poland, no. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; Ilijkov, cited above, § 81; and Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, § 51, Series A no. 207). The Court will therefore examine whether the other grounds referred to by the domestic courts were sufficient to justify the applicant’s detention.

105.  The Court observes that while extending the applicant’s detention, the Russian court attached particular weight to the risk of him absconding. The evaluation of that risk was based on his previous behaviour, namely his attempt to abscond and his being on the run from January to July 2013; his being unemployed and thus having no ties with his place of residence in Moscow, and the discovery by the police of a forged passport (see paragraphs 9, 12, 16 and 17 above).

106.  The Court accepts the reasonableness of the Russian courts’ concerns that the applicant was likely to abscond. The evidence before them convincingly demonstrated that such a risk existed. The applicant had previously attempted to escape (see paragraph 8 above) and had again demonstrated to the authorities his determination to go on the run when they discovered the false passport (see paragraph 15 above). His unemployment could not, on its own, warrant his detention, but was capable of adding weight to the Russian courts’ finding that he posed a flight risk.

107.  The Court also finds it significant that when deciding whether it was necessary to continue the applicant’s detention, the Russian courts took into account his condition after hearing from the attending doctors or examining other medical evidence. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant’s state of health drastically changed in October 2013 when he lost the ability to move unaided. In November 2013 it appears he entirely lost the use of his legs. While the Court accepts that those developments decreased the risk of him absconding, the risk was not entirely eliminated given his resourcefulness both when it came to his financial situation and his ability to organise his escape, including through the forgery of official documents. The Court therefore accepts that the Russian courts thoroughly evaluated and balanced the risk in question (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, § 108, 27 November 2014, in which no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention was found on account of the continued detention on remand of a wheelchair-bound inmate with a need for constant medical supervision).

108.  The Court concludes that there were relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant’s detention pending investigation and trial. The assessment of these reasons, however, cannot be detached from the actual length of detention on remand. Accordingly, it remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.

109.  In the present case, the applicant was held in detention on remand for less than six months. The domestic courts assessed the diligence of the investigative authorities and concluded that the length of the investigation was justified by the complex nature of the case. The Court notes that there is nothing in the material submitted to show any significant period of inactivity on the part of the prosecution or the court (see, for similar reasoning, Amirov, cited above; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108/11, 5 February 2013; Sopin v. Russia, no. 57319/10, 18 December 2012; Arutyunyan v. Russia, no. 48977/09, 10 January 2012; and Buldashev v. Russia, no. 46793/06, 18 October 2011). In such circumstances, the competent domestic authorities cannot be said to have not displayed special diligence in handling the applicant’s case.

110.  There has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

111.  The applicant complained that his appeals against the detention orders of 17 July and 13 September 2013 had not been examined speedily. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

A. Submissions by the parties

112.  The Government acknowledged that there had been a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, since his appeals against the detention orders of 17 July and 13 September 2013 had not been examined speedily.

113.  The applicant maintained his complaint and took note of the Government’s admission.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

114.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

115.  The Court takes note of the Government’s acknowledgment of the violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It notes that the applicant’s appeals against the detention orders dated 16 July and 13 September 2013 were examined by the domestic courts in thirty-four and sixty days respectively (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above). In these circumstances, and having regard to its case-law (see, for example, Idalov, cited above, §§ 154-158), the Court finds no reason to hold otherwise. It therefore concludes that there has been a violation of that provision.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

116.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

117.  The applicant claimed 35,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

118.  The Government argued that the amount claimed was excessive.

119.  The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 19,500 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

B.  Costs and expenses

120.  The applicant also claimed EUR 500 for legal services.

121.  The Government argued that the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of his claim to show that those expenses had indeed been incurred.

122.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the lack of relevant documents and the above criteria, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses.

C.  Default interest

123.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the application admissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the quality of medical treatment provided to the applicant in detention;

 

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the remand prisons;

 

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s transfer to the correctional colony;

 

5.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

 

6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;

 

7.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amount, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

EUR 19,500 (nineteen thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

 

8.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 May 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

  Stephen Phillips                                                                 Luis López Guerra
       Registrar                                                                              President