European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

SECOND SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF İHSAN AY v. TURKEY

 

(Application no. 34288/04)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

STRASBOURG

 

21 January 2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

 

 

 




In the case of İhsan Ay v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Guido Raimondi, President,
          Işıl Karakaş,
          Peer Lorenzen,
          Dragoljub Popović,
          András Sajó,
          Nebojša Vučinić,
          Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 December 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 34288/04) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr İhsan Ay (“the applicant”), on 9 July 2004.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr S. Güzel, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

3.  On 17 March 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbakır.

5.  On 10 December 1985 he began working as a biology teacher at a private tutoring centre (dershane) in Diyarbakır. Between December 1985 and July 1999 he worked there on a contractual basis. The renewal of his contracts was subject to the approval of the Director of the National Education Department attached to the Diyarbakır Governor’s Office.

6.  On 13 July 1999 the Governor’s Office decided not to renew the applicant’s contract, on the strength of a security investigation conducted into him.

7.  On 21 July 1999 he was informed by the head of the tutoring centre that his contract was being terminated.

8.  On 1 September 1999 the applicant lodged a claim with the Diyarbakır Administrative Court, challenging the termination of his contract. In his application, he stated, inter alia, that he had not been informed of the reasons for his dismissal and that the administrative authorities had failed to respect the established case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, according to which security investigations could not be used as the sole basis of an administrative decision, as their content was confidential. The applicant submitted that he had been working at the private tutoring centre since its establishment in 1985 and that his right to work was breached on account of this unlawful administrative decision. The applicant claimed that he was deprived of his livelihood as he did not have any other work and that the administrative authorities’ decisions had irreversible consequences for his life.

9.  On 30 December 1999 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court annulled the Governor’s Office’s decision. In its judgment, the court noted that the Governor’s Office had decided to terminate the applicant’s contract on the basis of a security investigation conducted by the office of the Regional Governor of the state-of-emergency (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği). The court further noted that the administrative authorities had been requested to provide information on the reasons for the termination of his contract. In a document sent to the court by the Governor’s Office, it was stated that the applicant had been involved in a number of ideological activities before 1980; that the Karşıyaka police had instituted proceedings against him for having committed an offence against the “national legal personality of the State”; that he had been sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment; and that he had been the representative of the Diyarbakır branch of Eğit-Sen (a trade union) in 1991. The court considered that the applicant had worked in State schools for a number of years and had been known to the administrative authorities when he began working at the private tutoring centre. It therefore concluded that the decision to terminate his contract, which had been taken on the basis of intelligence information known to the authorities from the outset, had been unlawful.

10.  On 20 March 2000 the Diyarbakır Governor’s Office appealed against the judgment of 30 December 1999. In the appeal, it was noted that the applicant had been involved in illegal activities and therefore did not possess the right qualities to be a teacher. It was also stated that the administrative authorities, taking into consideration the particularities of the country and the region concerned, as well as the nature and the sensitivity of the post, had found that there was no public interest in keeping him employed in his post.

11.  On 17 September 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first-instance court’s judgment. It noted that the Regional Governor of the state-of-emergency had conducted a security investigation into the applicant. That investigation had revealed that he had been involved in several ideological activities before 1980; that a criminal investigation had been initiated against him for having committed an offence against the “national legal personality of the State”; and that he had been sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. These were the reasons for which he had been dismissed from his post. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the decision dismissing the applicant following the security investigation had been lawful, since he had been sentenced to imprisonment for having committed a crime against the State and there was information to suggest that he had been involved in ideological activities for illegal organisations. The Supreme Administrative Court also had regard to the particularities of the region where he had worked.

12.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s representative applied to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting rectification of its decision of 17 September 2001. In his request, he maintained that the applicant had been charged with being a member of an organisation whose aim was to establish the domination of a particular social class and for disseminating propaganda, under Articles 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) respectively, and had been sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment for his activities before 1980. He further contended that the Articles in question had been repealed in 1991, and that on 22 August of the same year the trial court had decided to overturn the applicant’s criminal conviction and erase his criminal record. He argued that dismissing the applicant on the basis of his erased criminal record and the findings of a security investigation which were not publicly accessible had been unlawful and in breach of his right to a fair trial under the Convention.

13.  On 8 May 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his request holding that his submissions could not be the basis of a rectification of decision.

14.  On 31 December 2002 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case, taking into account the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision and referring to the reasoning in the latter’s judgment.

15.  The applicant appealed. In his appeal, his representative repeated the submissions put forward in his request for rectification of the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision.

16.  On 20 January 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 31 December 2002, holding that the latter was in accordance with the law.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

17.  Articles 141 and 142, which were repealed on 12 April 1991, were contained in a Chapter of the former Criminal Code (Law no. 765) entitled “Offences against the International Legal Personality of the State” under the general heading “Offences against the Legal Personality of the State”. Law no. 765 was also repealed on 1 June 2005 when a new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) entered into force.

Articles 141 and 142 read as follows:

Article 141

“It shall be an offence, punishable by eight to fifteen years’ imprisonment, to attempt to establish the domination of one social class over the others; to attempt to bring about the disappearance of any social class; or to attempt to set up associations in any manner and under any name whatsoever with the aim of overthrowing the country’s fundamental social or economic order; or to set up, organise, lead or manage such associations or guide their activities. Anyone organising, leading or managing several or all of the associations of this type shall be liable to the death penalty.

...”

Article 142

“It shall be an offence, punishable by five to ten years’ imprisonment, to disseminate propaganda, in any manner and under any name whatsoever, with the aim of establishing the domination of one social class over the others, bringing about the disappearance of any social class, overthrowing the country’s fundamental social or economic order, or totally destroying the State’s political or legal system.

...

It shall be an offence, punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment, to disseminate propaganda in any manner whatsoever for racist reasons or with the intention of wholly or partly abolishing the rights secured by the Constitution, or with the aim of weakening national sentiment.

It shall be an offence to publicly defend the acts set out in the preceding two paragraphs, punishable by not more than five years’ imprisonment in the case of those set out in the first and second paragraphs and by six months’ to two years’ imprisonment in the case of those set out in the third paragraph.

Where a person has committed the acts set out in the preceding paragraphs as a member of one or more of the organisations referred to in the sixth paragraph of Article 141 or with the persons referred to therein, his sentence shall be increased by not more than one-third. Where the acts set out in the preceding paragraphs have been committed through publications, the sentence shall be increased by one-half.”

18.  At the material time section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants and section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres read, in so far as relevant, as follows:

Section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657

“Persons who become civil servants must satisfy the following general and specific conditions:

A)  General conditions:

...

5.  Not to be convicted of ... offences against the legal personality of the State ... even if an amnesty was granted...”

Section 39(1) of Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres

Conditions for appointment

“Persons to be appointed as teachers in all kinds and levels of institutions must satisfy the requirements applicable to persons to be appointed to posts in state-run educational institutions.”

19.  On 23 January 2008 section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 was amended. It currently reads as follows:

“Persons who become civil servants must satisfy the following general and specific conditions:

A)  General conditions:

...

5.  Even after the periods mentioned in Article 53 of the Criminal Code ... not to be convicted of ... offences against State security ...”

20.  On 1 June 2005 the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) entered into force, which does not contain a category of offences entitled “Offences against the Legal Personality of the State” but contains a category entitled “Offences against State Security” under the heading “Offences against the Nation and the State”.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

21.  The applicant complained under Article 7 of the Convention that he had been dismissed from his post on the basis of his criminal conviction for having disseminated communist propaganda under the provisions of the former Criminal Code, which had been repealed in 1991, and despite the fact that his criminal record had been erased following the repeal of the Articles in question. The applicant submitted that both the administrative authorities and the courts had failed to take into account the fact that his criminal record had been erased. He further noted that he was a fully qualified teacher and had been able to practise his profession between 1985 and 1999 without any problems. The applicant maintained that he had been prevented from practising his profession and had sustained psychological damage.

22.  The Court, as the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, no. 21794/08, § 43, 26 March 2013, and Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005) and having regard to the circumstances of the present case, considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.

Article 8 of the Convention provides:

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A.  Admissibility

23.  The Government submitted that the applicant had neither claimed before the national authorities that his past activities had complied with the requirements of the teaching profession, nor brought any complaints under Articles 7 or 8 of the Convention. The Government contended that he had therefore failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him.

24.  The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must be applied “with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism”; it is sufficient that the complaints intended to be made subsequently in Strasbourg should have been raised “at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law” before the national authorities (see, among many other authorities, Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, §§ 36-39, ECHR 1999-I).

25.  Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court observes that in the proceedings before the administrative courts, the applicant submitted that his dismissal on the basis of his erased criminal record and the findings of a security investigation which were not publicly accessible had been unlawful. He further maintained that due to this unlawful dismissal, he had been deprived of his right to work and of his livelihood and that he was victimised (see paragraphs 8 and 12 above). Thus, in the Court’s view, the applicant raised the substance of his grievances before the domestic courts and gave them the opportunity to conduct an assessment of his dismissal, taking into account the consequences of the administrative decision for the applicant’s private life. In these circumstances, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection.

26.  The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  The parties’ submissions

27.  The Government submitted that there had not been an interference with the applicant’s rights under the Convention. They maintained in particular that the termination of his contract had not been an interference with his right to respect for his private life.

28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been necessary in a democratic society in the circumstances of the case.

29.  The applicant reiterated his complaints.

2.  The Court’s assessment

(a)  Whether there was an interference

30.  In the case of Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (no. 21722/11, § 165, 9 January 2013), the Court stated as follows:

“... [The Court] notes that private life “encompasses the right for an individual to form and develop relationships with other human beings, including relationships of a professional or business nature” (see C. v. Belgium, 7 August 1996, § 25, Reports 1996-III). Article 8 of the Convention “protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world” (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-III). The notion of “private life” does not exclude in principle activities of a professional or business nature. It is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251-B). Therefore, restrictions imposed on access to profession have been found to affect “private life” (see Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, § 47, ECHR 2004-VIII, and Bigaeva v. Greece, no. 26713/05, §§ 22-25, 28 May 2009). Likewise, dismissal from office has been found to interfere with the right to respect for private life (see Özpınar v. Turkey, no. 20999/04, §§ 43-48, 19 October 2010). Finally, Article 8 deals with the issues of protection of honour and reputation as part of the right to respect for private life (see Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, § 35, 15 November 2007 and A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, §§ 63 and 64, 9 April 2009).”

31.  In the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the applicant was dismissed from his post as a result of a security investigation concerning his past. Besides, the termination of the applicant’s contract as a teacher affected a wide range of his relationships with other people, including those of a professional nature and his ability to practise a profession which corresponded to his professional qualifications. Moreover, the reasons for the termination of his contract certainly affected his reputation. Specifically in respect of the protection of an individual’s reputation, the Court notes that it has been acknowledged as an interest guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see Taliadorou and Stylianou v. Cyprus, no. 39627/05 and 39631/05, § 45, 16 October 2008). In sum, the Court considers that Article 8 is applicable to the applicant’s complaints.

32.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the administrative and judicial decisions constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.

(b)  Whether the interference was “in accordance with the law” and pursued a legitimate aim

33.  The Court must next consider whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”. In this connection, the Court reiterates that this expression requires primarily that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law (see Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, § 27, Series A no. 176-A, and Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, § 26, Series A no. 176-B).

34.  In the present case, the Court observes at the outset that one of the provisions that the Government refer to, namely section 48(A)(5) as amended in 2008, that is to say several years after the events giving rise to the present application, does not concern the applicant’s case, as it requires persons to be appointed as civil servants not to be convicted of offences against State security, whereas the text of section 48(A)(5) at the material time referred to “offences against the legal personality of the State”. As a matter of fact, the domestic courts also referred to “offences against the legal personality of the State”.

35.  If the Government’s reference to section 48(A)(5) is to be taken as referring to the former version of this provision (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), the Court can accept that the national courts’ decisions had a basis in domestic law. Having regard to its findings below with regard to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society (see paragraphs 40 and 41 below), the Court does not find it necessary to consider whether the law and the way in which it was applied in the present case complied with the requirements of accessibility, foreseeability and compatibility with the rule of law.

36.  Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that in the present case the national authorities may be considered to have pursued the legitimate aims of public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, namely the students of the private tutoring centre where the applicant worked.

(c)  Whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”

37.  In determining whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the interference were relevant and sufficient and the measures were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The fairness of the proceedings and the procedural guarantees afforded are factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference with the right to private life under Article 8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 95, ECHR 2005-II and Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, no. 28255/07, § 59, 8 October 2013).

38.  The Court observes at the outset that the applicant was dismissed from his post on the basis of a security investigation conducted by the office of the Regional Governor of the State of Emergency on account of his involvement in a number of ideological activities before 1980 and his conviction of an offence against the legal personality of the State. The Governor’s office further noted that the applicant had been the representative of the Diyarbakır branch of Eğit-Sen (a trade union) in 1991 (see paragraph 9 above). The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative decision considering that the applicant had committed a crime against the State and that there was information to suggest that he had been involved in ideological activities for illegal organisations. The Supreme Administrative Court also took into account the particularities of the region (south-east of Turkey) where he had worked (see paragraphs 11, 14 and 16 above). In this connection, the Court cannot but notice the ambiguity in the domestic authorities’ decisions (both administrative and judicial) and in the Government’s observations, as there is no precision in either as to the specific offence of which the applicant had been convicted. Besides, neither section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 nor Section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres allowed for dismissal of teachers from their posts on the basis of involvement in ideological activities of illegal organisations and in trade unions or taking into account the particularities of a specific region.

39.  Given that neither the domestic decisions nor the Government’s observations contain information regarding the specific offence of which the applicant had been convicted before 1980, the Court accepts the applicant’s submissions that he had been convicted under Articles 141 and 142 of the former Criminal Code and his dismissal was primarily based on his conviction under these provisions. In this connection, the Court observes that these provisions were repealed on 12 April 1991 (see paragraph 17 above) and that the applicant’s criminal conviction on the basis of these articles was erased by a court order on 22 August 1991 (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above). The Court further observes that the applicant put these facts before the domestic courts, in particular, the Supreme Administrative Court, which failed to give any reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claims. The Court reiterates in this regard that the obligation to provide reasons for a decision is an essential procedural safeguard, as it demonstrates to the parties that their arguments have been heard, affords them the possibility of objecting to or appealing against the decision, and also serves to justify the reasons for a judicial decision to the public (see, mutatis mutandis, Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others, cited above, § 67, and Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, §§ 36-37, 1 July 2003). In the Court’s view, this obligation would require the domestic courts to specify in their decisions the offence of which the applicant had been convicted and the reasons for dismissing the applicant’s arguments.

40.  As a result, the Court finds that the domestic courts, in particular the Supreme Administrative Court, failed to adduce an adequate justification for the use of an erased criminal conviction for acts no longer considered to be criminal offences and which had been committed more than twenty years earlier, for the applicant’s dismissal. The Court therefore considers that the interference in question was not proportionate to the aims pursued and was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.

41.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

42.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings before the administrative courts had exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement.

The Court considers that this complaint should be examined from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 alone, which, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A.  Admissibility

43.  The Court observes that a new domestic remedy has been established in Turkey after the application of the pilot judgment procedure in the case of Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey (no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012). The Court recalls that in its decision in the case of Turgut and Others v. Turkey (no. 4860/09, 26 March 2013), it declared a new application inadmissible on the ground that the applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as a new domestic remedy had been envisaged. In so doing, the Court in particular considered that this new remedy was, a priori, accessible and capable of offering a reasonable prospect of redress for complaints concerning the length of proceedings.

44.  The Court further recalls that that in its decision in the case of Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey (cited above, § 77) it stressed that it could pursue the examination of applications of this type which were already communicated to the Government. It further notes that in the present case the Government did not raise an objection in respect of the new domestic remedy. In light of the above, the Court decides to pursue the examination of the present application (see Rifat Demir v. Turkey, no. 24267/07, §§ 34-36, 4 June 2013).

45.  The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

46.  The Government contended that the length of the proceedings could not be considered to be unreasonable in view of the complexity of the case.

47.  The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 1 September 1999 and ended on 20 January 2004. It thus lasted over four years and four months for two levels of jurisdiction and the case was pending before the Supreme Administrative Court for approximately three years and three months of this total period.

48.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Mete v. Turkey, no. 39327/02, §§ 21-28, 25 October 2005). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

49.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

50.  The applicant claimed 22,000 Turkish Liras (TRY; approximately 11,280 euros (EUR)) and EUR 10,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage respectively.

51.  The Government contested these claims, submitting that the requested amounts were unsubstantiated and excessive.

52.  The Court observes that the applicant did not submit any relevant documents to substantiate his claim for pecuniary damage. It therefore rejects this claim. The Court however finds that he must have suffered pain and distress which cannot be compensated for solely by the Court’s finding of a violation. Having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court finds it appropriate to award him EUR 8,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

53.  The applicant also claimed TRY 6,150 (approximately EUR 3,150) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court. The applicant submitted a breakdown of his lawyer’s work, which included three hours of interviews, completion of the application form, work done in domestic proceedings and translation costs.

54.  The Government contested this claim.

55.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.

C.  Default interest

56.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the application admissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;

 

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

 

4.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 8,600 (eight thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

 

5.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 January 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Stanley Naismith                                                                 Guido Raimondi
       Registrar                                                                              President