Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 180
December 2014
Peter Armstrong v. the United Kingdom - 65282/09
Judgment 9.12.2014 [Section IV] See: [2014] ECHR 1368
Article 6
Criminal proceedings
Article 6-1
Impartial tribunal
Police officers’ participation on jury in case where police evidence was undisputed: no violation
Facts - The applicant was convicted of murder by a jury which contained one retired police officer and one serving police officer. Both officers had informed the court of their status. The retired officer explained that he had been retired for many years and did not recognise the names of any of the police officers in the case. The serving officer mentioned that he recognised a man sitting at the back of the court as a police officer, but prosecuting counsel explained that the man would not be called as a witness. After being given an opportunity to make inquiries, defence counsel did not object to the participation of either officer on the jury.
Law - Article 6 § 1: The personal impartiality of a jury member is presumed until there is proof to the contrary. There being no evidence of actual partiality, the Court went on to examine whether there were sufficient guarantees to exclude any objectively justified doubts as to the police officers’ impartiality.
Both jurors had drawn the trial judge’s attention at an early stage of the trial to the fact that they were, or had been, police officers. The serving officer had also indicated that he recognised a police officer sitting in the courtroom. The trial judge had promptly invited submissions from counsel and appropriate investigations were made. A list of questions was put to the serving officer in order to identify the nature and extent of his knowledge of the officer in the courtroom and the police officer witnesses in the case. The applicant was fully involved in these proceedings and was informed of the proposed questions before they were put. Defence counsel had been given the opportunity to investigate and clarify the police officers’ connections with the case and had not challenged the continued presence of the juror throughout the proceedings. It was clear from the transparent inquiries into the two officers that the defence had every opportunity to object to their continued presence on the jury but chose not to do so.
As to the nature of the connection between the jurors and other participants at the trial, unlike Hanif and Khan v. the United Kingdom, this was not a case where a police officer who was personally acquainted with a police officer witness giving relevant evidence was a member of the jury. Nor did the applicant’s defence depend to any significant extent - if at all - upon a challenge to the evidence of the police officer witnesses in his case. He admitted killing the victim and the only question for the jury was whether he had acted in self-defence. In these circumstances, and again in contrast to the position in Hanif and Khan, it could not be said that there was an important conflict or a clear dispute regarding police evidence in the case.
Accordingly, the safeguards present at the applicant’s trial were sufficient to ensure the impartiality of the jury which tried the applicant’s case.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(See Hanif and Khan v. the United Kingdom, 52999/08 and 61779/08, 20 December 2011, Information Note 147)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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