In the case of Keller v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Chamber), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 24 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
26824/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Galina Alekseyevna Keller (“the
applicant”), on 7 July 2004.
The applicant was represented by Ms Y.L. Liptser
and Mr R.S. Karpinskiy, lawyers practising in Moscow. The Russian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin,
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The applicant alleged that the authorities were
responsible for the ill-treatment and subsequent death of her son during
his detention in police custody and that they had subsequently failed to
conduct an effective investigation into these events. The applicant also complained
that her son’s detention had been unlawful.
On 5 December 2008 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in the
city of Moscow. Her son, Mr Vasiliy Yuriyeivich Keller (V.K.), was born on
30 August 1977 and as of 1998 resided in the city of Ivanovo, in the
Ivanovo Region.
A. Theft investigation
and the arrest of V.K.
On 13 September 2000 the applicant’s son was
arrested and escorted to the Oktyabrskiy District Department of the Interior in
Ivanovo (Октябрьский районный отдел внутренних дел
города Иванова - “the ROVD”).
An arrest record was drawn up at 5.30 p.m. by
investigator A., following which the applicant’s son was questioned as a
suspect in the theft of two bicycles.
The interrogation record drawn
up on that day at 6.30 p.m. noted that the applicant’s son was a drug addict
infected with HIV, that he had been caught red-handed riding a stolen bicycle
and that during the police interview he had confessed to that theft.
After the interview the applicant’s son was detained
in the Regional Department of the Interior’s custody room (ИВС Управления внутренних дел
Ивановской области).
B. Events of 16 September 2000
On 16 September 2000 V.K. was brought from the custody
room to office no. 315, situated on the third floor of the ROVD station.
Acting in the presence of duty lawyer D.,
investigator Ya. charged V.K. with theft. The applicant’s son denied the
charges. The interview ended around 1.45 p.m., at which time D. apparently left
the office. Investigator Ya. asked her office mate, trainee investigator K., to
keep an eye on V.K. while she was away meeting with a prosecutor.
At around 3 p.m. that day V.K. was found dead in
the internal courtyard of the ROVD station.
Immediately following the
incident an emergency medical team arrived and its doctors confirmed V.K.’s death.
The authorities drew up a scene
record and sent the corpse for a forensic medical examination to establish the
cause of death.
On the same date investigator
K. wrote a report about the incident. He stated as follows:
“... At 2.30 p.m. Ya. left the office, having warned me that
she was going to see the prosecutor about the arrest of V.K. At that time V.K.
was sitting on a chair two metres away from me and two metres away from the
door. At 2.35 p.m. I was minding my own business, when V.K. quickly stood up
and ran out of the office. I ran after him and saw that he was running to the
other wing of the building. I ran after him and saw him running into the
toilet. There was no one in the corridor. I ran into [the toilet] and saw that
the window was half open and V.K. was not there. I looked out of the window and
saw that V.K. was lying on the ground and not moving...”
C. Investigation into the events of 16 September 2000
1. Institution of criminal proceedings
On 17 September 2000 the applicant asked the
prosecutor for the Ivanovo Region to institute criminal proceedings in
connection with the death of her son, blaming the police officers in charge of
the investigation and escorting V.K. for it.
On 19 September 2000 the head of the Ivanovo
City civil registry office issued death certificate I-FO no. 524264 in respect
of V.K. The certificate stated that his death had taken place on
16 September 2000 in the city of Ivanovo and that the cause of death was “traumatic
shock and multiple trauma to the head, chest and torso”.
2. Disciplinary proceedings in respect of the police
officers involved in the incident
On 20 September 2000 the Ivanovo
City Department of the Interior issued order no. 125, admitting the absence of the
escorting officers on the spot at the relevant time and the fact that the
interview had taken place in the investigator’s office rather than appropriate
designated premises. The order stated that this was in breach of Order of the
Ministry of the Interior
no. 41-96 and also admitted that some of the relevant officials had been
unaware of the requirements of Order no. 41-96. A number of the officials
involved, including the ROVD’s officer on duty, escorting officer M. and the
head of the ROVD were reprimanded in relation to this episode.
On 2 October 2000 the
senior management of the Regional Department of the Interior discussed the
incident leading to the death of V.K. The officials admitted the violation of
domestic law, but, having regard to the fact that investigators Ya. and
K. had been “inexperienced”, decided to give them a warning.
3. Decision of 7 October 2000
On 7 October 2000 an investigator
from the District Prosecutor’s Office, having examined the materials collected
as a result of the inquiry into the events of 16 September 2000, decided not to
institute criminal proceedings in connection with V.K.’s death. The decision was
reasoned as follows:
“... in the course of the check it was established that on 13
September 2000 [V.K.] was arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime set
out in ... part 2 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code of Russia, and under
Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR was detained in the Ivanovo
Regional Department of the Interior’s custody room, where he was held between
13 and 16 September 2000. On 16 September 2000 [Ya.] in view of the
considerable amount of investigative actions [to be performed] in this case
took a decision to carry them out in her office, which is why [V.K.] was
escorted from the custody room to [Ya.’s] office situated on the third floor of
the ROVD building. After carrying out the investigative actions [Ya.] ... left
the office to see the district prosecutor [in order] to decide on the measure
of restraint in respect of [V.K.], trainee investigator [K.] remained [in the
office] along with [V.K.]. Suddenly [V.K.] ran out of the office and threw
himself out of the window of the ROVD building.
[K.], questioned during the check, stated that on 16 September
2000 he was in the office with [V.K.], whilst [Ya.] was away to see the
prosecutor. Suddenly [V.K.] ran out of the office, down the corridor and
entered the toilet. Having entered the toilet in the footsteps of [V.K.], [K.]
saw the toilet window, which was partly opened. He looked out of the window and
saw that [V.K.] was lying on the ground [three floors below] without moving. [K.]
told the officer on duty and the prosecutor what had happened. It was 2.40 p.m.
During the examination of the scene of the incident it was
established that the corpse of [V.K.] was located in the courtyard of the
Oktyabrskiy ROVD [station] situated at 39 Lenin Avenue, Ivanovo. The corpse of
[V.K.] was 2.5 metres away from the wall of the ROVD building, parallel to that
wall. The corpse was lying on its back face up, with the head [facing] towards
the garages and the legs pointing towards Lenin Avenue. The face was turned to
the right side. The external examination revealed yellowish and greenish-yellow
bruises on the face and chest area. Just above the location of the body on the
third floor of the ROVD [building] in the male toilet there was a window with
two blinds left open towards the inside.
The check revealed that at the time of admission to the custody
room [V.K.] did not make any complaints about his state of health, having made
a hand-written statement in the search record: ‘generally fit’. On
14 September 2000 at
9.25 a.m. the emergency medical team was called upon to see him and the doctor
who examined [V.K.] made the following diagnosis: ‘myositis of the left side of
the chest. He may be held in the custody room.’ Subsequently, at the time of
his detention in the custody room [V.K.] did not complain about his health.
According to the record concerning the circumstances of the infliction
of the bodily injuries, [V.K.] himself explained that the bruises near his left
eye and on the right shoulder [had occurred] on 13 September 2000 [when] he had
bumped into a door. [V.K.] wrote by his own hand in that record that he had had
no complaints against the police officers in this connection.
Thus, basing itself on the results of the check, the
investigation considers the arguments made by [the applicant and blaming the
officials for the death of her son] in her application unjustified.
...
The investigation is of the view that there is no indication of
any crime as defined by the Criminal Code of Russia in the actions of the
police officers or other persons.”
4. Decision of 24 October 2000
On 24 October 2000 the Prosecutor’s
Office for the Ivanovo Region reviewed the decision dated 7 October 2000 and
quashed it as unlawful and unjustified. It was noted that:
“... the incident became possible through serious breaches by
the officers of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD of the relevant requirements concerning
the detention, protection and escort of suspects and accused. The breaches of
the rules of escort committed in respect of [V.K.] ... manifested themselves in
the non-execution or untimely execution of their duties by officials of the Oktyabrskiy
ROVD which resulted in the accidental death of a man.”
By the same decision it was decided to institute
criminal proceedings into the circumstances of V.K.’s death and transfer the
case to the Ivanovo City Oktyabrskiy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the District
Prosecutor’s Office”) for investigation.
On 13 November 2000 an investigator from the District
Prosecutor’s Office interviewed investigator K., who essentially confirmed his
statement of 16 September 2000.
5. First round of investigation
On 24 December 2000 an investigator from the
District Prosecutor’s Office summarised the findings made as a result of the
criminal investigation and decided to discontinue it, citing the lack of any
indication of a crime.
As a result of the investigation, some additional written statements had been
collected from the witnesses in the case, including the applicant, police
officer M. - who had escorted V.K. on 16 September 2000 to office 315,
investigator K. and officer on duty A.M. It appears that the latter three
essentially confirmed the version of the events set out in the decision of 7 October
2000. The investigator again examined the male toilet’s window on the third
floor of the ROVD building and obtained an additional forensic examination of
the corpse of V.K. dated 23 November 2000. From that forensic examination it was
established that apart from the injuries related to V.K.’s fall there were also
the following unrelated injuries: three bruises on the face, and six bruises on
the chest dating approximately 3 to 7 days before the date of death.
The decision was reasoned as follows:
“Having analysed the materials of the criminal case, the
investigation has come to the conclusion that ... there is no indication of any
crime set out in Part 2 of Article 293 of the Criminal Code [criminal
negligence] in the actions of the ROVD officers ... [V.K.] took steps himself -
ran out of the office of the investigator, tried to escape, jumped out of the
window of the toilet situated on the third floor of the building ... There was
no physical or psychological pressure [exerted] on [V.K.] by the police
officers.
The investigation is of the view that one could speak of
disciplinary liability of the ROVD officers ... who committed serious breaches
in the area of treatment of detainees escorted from the custody room ... and
indeed they were found disciplinary liable by Order no. 125 of 20 September
2000. However, there is no indication of any crime in their actions or inaction
...”
6. Second round of investigation
On 2 March 2001 the decision of 24 December 2000
was quashed by the City Prosecutor’s Office as unfounded.
On 6 March 2001 the investigation resumed.
On 14 March 2001 an
investigator interviewed V., who at the relevant time had acted as the head of
the ROVD’s investigation department. She stated that she had witnessed the
incident on 16 September 2000:
“... When I entered the office [of Ya. and K.], I saw
investigator K. and an unknown woman talking to each other about something. Ya.
should have been in that office, since [Ya. and K.] worked together... I asked
K. about the whereabouts of Ya., to which he responded that Ya. had probably gone
to see the prosecutor about the measure of restraint [to be applied in respect
of] V.K. I went out of the office and went to the office of prosecutor L. He
was alone in the office. I asked him about the whereabouts of Ya., to which he
responded that she was not there... [having then visited a duty area of the ROVD
building and failed to locate Ya., I went back to the office of Ya. and K.]
Here I met K. again. The woman was not there anymore. I started to
question him in an insistent manner regarding the whereabouts of Ya. Right
after I spoke K. got up and silently ran from the office, which surprised me
very much. I went to the corridor where I met an officer from the duty area who
asked me about the whereabouts of V.K. I told him that I did not know. At this
moment, K. approached us from where the toilets were. He was pale and scared,
all disturbed. From their conversation I understood that Ya. had brought V.K.
to her office. Then I asked K. about whereabouts of V.K., to which he did
not respond, but said at the same time that he had looked everywhere and could
not find him. After this conversation I realised that V.K. had been in [their]
office and had then somehow managed to escape. We then decided to search the
toilet [on the third floor]. I was the first to enter it. There was a window on
left side. It was neither shut nor open. I opened one of the windows,
stood up and leaned with my knee on a window sill and looked out. Down on the paved
area I saw a man lying. I had no doubts whatsoever that it was V.K. ...”
On 6 April 2001 the District Prosecutor’s Office
again discontinued the investigation for essentially the same reasons as stated
in the decision of 24 December 2000.
7. Third round of investigation
On the same date the decision to discontinue the
investigation was again quashed and the investigation resumed.
On 17 April 2001 an
investigator interviewed investigator K., who now changed his submissions. He
admitted that V.K.’s escape had initially gone unnoticed by him until the
arrival of V., following which they had seen V.K.’s body on the ground beneath
the toilet window. K. was also questioned about V.K.’s injuries, to which he
responded that V.K. “may have had a bruise or two” but that he “could not remember
exactly”.
On 20 April 2001 an
investigator questioned V.K.’s lawyer D., who stated in relation to the events
of 16 September 2000 that V.K. had had a bruise in the area of his left eye as
a result of ill-treatment by the police during his arrest but that he had made
no further complaints.
On 29 June 2001 the
District Prosecutor’s Office again discontinued the proceedings. This time the
investigator collected statements from a wider range of witnesses, such the
applicant’s other son and other members of the family, senior ROVD officers,
the District Prosecutor, all escorting officers who had been on shift on the
relevant date, the investigating officers, two private individuals, Da. and
Ko., who were apparently the victims of the crime V.K. had been accused of and who
had taken part in his arrest, and Za., a detainee who had seen V.K. on 16
September 2000. The investigator also collected statements from Zh. and S., two
police officers who had brought V.K. to the police station on 13 September
2000.
On the basis of the
evidence in the case file, the investigator essentially upheld the previous
factual conclusions but for one element. It was now argued that at 1.45 p.m. V.K.
had ceased to be a suspect in the case, as he had become an accused. Since no
measure of restraint had yet been chosen, the investigator argued that V.K. had
no longer been in custody, had been free to leave and that the police officers
had had no duty to take care of him. It was also confirmed that there had been
no evidence confirming physical coercion by the police. The latter conclusion
was made on the basis of the following pieces of evidence:
“...Da. and Ko., interviewed as witnesses, gave corroborating statements
that on 13 September 2000 they arrived at their place of work in the drug
rehabilitation centre ... by bicycle. Having noted that the bicycles had gone missing,
they started to search for them. They managed to apprehend [V.K.], who tried to
escape on Da.’s bicycle. They did not beat him while they were apprehending him.
After that they called the police...
Za., interviewed as a witness, stated that on 16 September 2000
he was brought from the custody room to the ROVD building along with [V.K.] and
that he saw a bruise on the latter’s face. He knew nothing about the
circumstances in which it had been inflicted...
The case file contains a report concerning [V.K.’s] injuries drawn
up on 13 September 2000 in the custody room, according to which [V.K.] had
bruises in the area of his left eye and on his right shoulder. In the report
there is a statement that these injuries were received by [V.K.] at [his home]
on 13 September 2000 [when he]: “bumped into a door”. [V.K.] wrote by his own
hand in that record that he had had no complaints against the police officers
in this connection.
The case file contains a certificate from the custody room [to
the effect] that during [V.K.]’s admission on 13 September 2000 he made a
hand-written statement ... [that he was] “fit”... On 14 September 2000 an
emergency medical team was called to [V.K.], which authorised his continued
detention from the medical point of view. [V.K.] did not make any further
complaints about his health during his detention.
The case file contains copies of medical records [drawn up by] the
emergency medical team... During his [examination by them] no bodily injuries
were identified and he was diagnosed with “Acute respiratory disease. Myositis
of the chest on the left side”...
[The post-mortem medical examination of [V.K.] established the
following injuries:] three bruises on the face and six bruises on the chest,
which had formed as a result of no less than nine blows from blunt and hard
objects on the aforementioned areas three to seven days prior to death, and are
unrelated to the cause of death...
Therefore, considering the evidence collected in the course of
the criminal investigation, the investigation finds that:
1. Three bruises on the face, six bruises on the chest dating
from three to seven days before death, which, according to the expert
examinations were unrelated to the cause of death ... were inflicted on [V.K.]
during his apprehension [by the victims of the theft] on 13 September 2000.
This conclusion is confirmed in part by the ... medical examinations, in part
by [a member of [V.K.]’s family who saw him on 13 September 2000 prior to the
events], investigator Ya., investigator K. and ... by the other pieces of
evidence. At the same time, the investigation concludes that the aforementioned
injuries were inflicted on [V.K.] ... by Da. and Ko., whose statements the
investigation finds not to be credible. At around 11 a.m. on 13 September 2000 [V.K.]
left his home [with no injuries, as confirmed by one of his family members],
whilst police officers Zh. and S. who arrived at around 3 p.m. at the
rehabilitation centre ... were [able to attest that they had seen] the presence
of injuries. There was no need for them to apply force [by then], because [V.K.]
had already been apprehended [by Da. and Ko.] and was unable to escape. The
investigation is critical of [the information contained in the statement of
witness D.] that, according to [V.K.], one of the bruises on [V.K.’s] face had
been received by him through ill-treatment by the police officers, as [V.K.] did
not make any complaints in this connection, even though he could have done so.
This conclusion is confirmed by the hand-written statement of [V.K.] in the
[relevant report made in the custody room] to the effect that he had no
complaints about the police officers. The investigation does not exclude that
the injuries could partly have been received on 13 September 2000, when he “bumped
into a door”, but did not become fully apparent [until later], which is why
[his family member] failed to notice them...”
On 10 October 2001 the above decision was
essentially confirmed by the same official and repeated, in order to comply
with changes in applicable legislation.
8. Fourth round of investigation
On 28 June 2002 the General Prosecutor’s Office
quashed the decision of 10 October 2001 and sent the case for additional
investigation to the District Prosecutor’s Office. Among the reasons for the
decision, the reviewing body cited the lack of any in-depth inquiry into the
personality of V.K. and, in particular, him having been infected with HIV.
On 31 July 2002 the case was accepted for
examination by the District Prosecutor’s Office.
On 15 August 2002 the authorities
took yet another decision to discontinue the investigation and essentially
repeated their earlier reasoning.
9. Fifth round of investigation
On 22 October 2002 the decision of 15 August
2002 was quashed by the Regional Prosecutor’s Office, which took the view that
“the relevant police officers had acted with manifest negligence”.
On 17 November 2003 the
investigation was again discontinued by the District Prosecutor’s Office. This
time, the investigation obtained a new forensic examination of the corpse,
studied and presented a new theory of the possible reasons for V.K. to have
committed suicide, which it was considered was supported by the fact that he
had already had a criminal record and, as a drug addict, feared pre-trial
detention because of the difficulty of obtaining drugs in a detention centre.
Overall, it was concluded that the officers involved had committed a disciplinary
offence which did not contain any elements of a crime. The investigation
concluded that the V.K.’s attempt to escape was in itself a crime. As regards
V.K.’s injuries, the decision stated:
“... According to a [fresh] expert examination ..., there were the
following injuries on the body of [V.K.]:
1. On the face: around the left eye [there was] a bruise,
purple in the centre area and blue-greenish on the periphery, sized 6 to 9 cm;
in the area of the nose and lips on the right side of the [danger] triangle
area a similarly-sized bruise and a similarly-sized bruise in the area of the
lower jaw around the third and fourth teeth, sized 2 to 3 cm;
2. On the front surface of the chest: on the right and left
sides of the collarbone and front armpit lines [there are] similarly sized
bruises (as on the face), numbering six and sized from 2 to 4 and 4 to 6 cm ...
The blue-greenish colouring on the periphery of the bruises on
the face and front chest confirms that [these] bruises dated from three or more
days before the date of death, were inflicted by blows from blunt and hard
objects... and were not causally connected with the cause of death...”
As regards V.K.’s motives, the
investigation concluded as follows:
“On the basis of the combined collected
evidence in the case, of both a subjective and an objective character, the
investigation concludes that the death of [V.K.] took place as a result of an unsuccessful
attempted escape from the detention. Fearing that a measure of restraint would be
adopted in respect of him, which for him as a drug addict constituted a real
challenge in view of the inability to obtain drugs in the remand prison where
he would be held for a long time and using the fact that K. was looking away,
[V.K.] exited the investigator’s office... proceeded to the male toilet on the
third floor and jumped out of the window. Given, however, that he had no prior
experience of jumping from such a height, he misjudged his actions and died upon
landing...”
42. On 24 December 2003 the Ivanovo Oktyabriskiy
District Court (“the District Court”) examined the applicant’s complaint in
respect of the decision of 17 November 2003 and quashed the said decision as
unlawful and unjustified. The court ruled that many relevant circumstances,
such as the exact location of the police officers at the moment of the V.K.’s
fall, who the first officer to start looking for V.K. was, and the exact lapse
of time between the fall and the discovery of the body were still unclear and
had to be examined.
On 15 January 2004 the Ivanovo Regional Court
essentially upheld the decision of 24 December 2003.
10. Sixth round of investigation
On 19 February 2004 the
Regional Prosecutor’s Office again discontinued the case as it had failed to
establish any causal link between the death and the violation of the security
rules by the police officers. The investigation concluded that it was unclear
exactly how V.K. had gotten to the toilet, but it was clear that it had not
happened through or because of any violence. It was concluded with reference to
the way he had jumped and landed that he had done so by himself and that there
had been no coercion by the police officers in this connection.
On 20 April 2004 the
District Court quashed the decision of
19 February 2004, ruling that the investigation should have arranged for a confrontation
between all witnesses with divergent statements in the case.
The decision of 20 April
2004 was upheld by the Regional Court on appeal on 25 May 2004.
11. Seventh round of investigation
On 24 May 2004 the
District Prosecutor’s Officer took a new decision to discontinue the
investigation in the case. Having complied with the instructions of the courts,
the investigation was of the view that a confrontation would not serve any purpose,
as too much time had elapsed from the time of the incident and the witnesses could
not recall the event in the necessary detail. The investigators decided that in
any event the previous conclusions of the decision dated 19 February 2003 still
held true, irrespective of the outcome of any possible confrontation, and accordingly
decided to discontinue the case.
On 8 June 2004 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office
quashed the decision of 24 May 2004 so as to comply with the appeal decision of
25 May 2004 (see paragraphs 45-46 above).
12. Eighth round of investigation
On 6 July 2004 the case
was again discontinued for essentially the same reasons as stated previously.
On 10 September 2004 this decision was again
quashed by the higher level of the Prosecutor’s Office. It was decided that not
all the circumstances of the case were clear, in particular whether the window
was open or closed after V.K. fell out of it and whether the corpse was moved
after the fall.
13. Ninth round of investigation
By a new decision dated 13
October 2004 the investigators decided to discontinue the proceedings, having
reiterated the conclusions from all of their previous decisions and concluding that
V.K. had unsuccessfully attempted to escape. The decision reads as follows:
“The instant proceedings were instituted by the Prosecutor’s
Office for the Ivanovo Region on 24 October 2000 under Article 293 § 2 of the
Criminal Code of Russia in connection with the alleged negligence of
[policemen] resulting in [V.K.’s] death...
The investigation in the present case established that on 13
September 2000 [V.K.] was arrested on suspicion of having committed theft under
Article 158 § 2 (a) of the Criminal Code of Russia and taken to the custody room
of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD station in the city of Ivanovo.
On 16 September 2000 [V.K.] was escorted to [the police
station]. He was taken to the office of investigator Ya. - a room on the third
floor of the police station. The escorting officers left him in that office
[with two investigators, Ya. and K.].
On 16 September 2000 at 1.45 p.m. Ya. in the presence of [V.K.]’s
lawyer D., officially charged [V.K.] on suspicion of theft and questioned him.
Subsequently, Ya. went out of the office to make a decision about the measure
of restraint [to be applied] in respect of [V.K.], leaving him with K.
K. was distracted from watching [V.K.] by his work. [V.K.], taking
advantage of that situation, [V.K.] left the office aiming to escape. He went to
a toilet located on the same floor.
After a few minutes [one of the police officers] noted that [V.K.]
had disappeared from the office. K. and [two other police officers] began to
search for him. They found that the window in the toilet was half open. They
looked out and saw [V.K.]’s body lying in the internal courtyard.
[The applicant] in her statements alleged that her son could
not have voluntarily jumped out of the window. She referred to the statement of
[one of the police officers] who had found that the window was not fully opened.
However that police officer in her statements and during the cross-examination
stated that the window had been half open... This gives a basis to conclude
that [V.K.] attempted to close the window before he jumped out.
That finding is based, among other things, on the results of
the forensic expert examinations. According to the experts’ findings, [V.K.]
controlled his motions during the fall as he landed on his feet. There is no
evidence which could prove that [V.K.] had been pushed out of the window.
[Examination of the scene of the incident showed] no traces of [his]
body having been dragged. Greenish-yellow and yellowish bruises were found on
[V.K.]’s face and yellowish bruises were found on his chest during the forensic
examinations. No other injuries were registered on the opened parts of his
body.
The validity of the record, drawn up at the scene of the
incident, is confirmed by the statements of [two attesting witnesses, the
expert and the prosecutor] who presented [themselves] there at the relevant
time.
B. an ambulance doctor, who had examined [V.K.]’s body on 16
September 2000 at the scene of the incident, stated that he did not change the
position of [V.K.]’s body. Referring to the police explanations he noted in a
medical record that [V.K.] had died before his arrival because of a fall from a
third floor window. The position of the body was typical for a body which had fallen
from a height.
According to the additional examination of the scene of the
incident of 16 May 2001, the distance between the window and the
ground level is eight meters and thirty centimetres.
From the [applicant]’s statements it would appear that she saw
two “fresh” bruises above [V.K.]’s lips and on his chin. These claims were groundless
since she had no medical education which would allow her to assess these
injuries. From the expert reports it is evident that the bruises were inflicted
from three to seven days before the death.
[The victims who had caught V.K.] stated that they could not
remember the incident in detail. They did not exclude that [V.K.] could have offered
resistance or had fallen off the bicycle. [The victims] did not beat him. [V.K.]
apologised for the theft of the bicycles. He also told them that he had been
seeking money for drugs. The policemen arrested him and took him to the police
station.
In the course of the present case the prosecutor’s office
questioned [V.K.]’s relatives, including his mother, his brother, his partner
and K. These witnesses stated that they had been informed of [V.K.]’s arrest. [V.K.]’s
brother and [V.K.]’s partner went to visit him on 16 September 2000. On arrival,
they found that [V.K.] had died...
The investigating authority questioned two investigators
involved in the incident: Ya. and K., two escorting police officers: M. and P.,
[three police officers] who found V.K.’s body, his lawyer D. and [the
prosecutor], who [had been] in the building at the relevant time. The
aforementioned witnesses stated that on 16 September 2000 [V.K.] had been
arrested and taken to the police station. P. and M. escorted [V.K.] to the
office and left him with Ya. and K. D. stated that [V.K.] had made no complaints
of pressure [being put] on him. [V.K.] had allegedly explained that the bruises
on his body had occurred during his arrest. M. and P. also stated that [V.K.]
had not complained of ill-treatment. According to them, [V.K.] had received
food and clothes provided by his relatives. At the initial stage of the
investigation [V.K.] emphasised that he suffered from HIV. Therefore he was
treated with special care. Subsequently [V.K.] became nervous. He was probably concerned
about his detention. Ya. informed [V.K.] that she would make a decision about
the measure of restraint [to be applied in his respect] after meeting with the
prosecutor. [V.K.] was left with K., who was distracted from watching [V.K.] by
his work. [V.K.], taking advantage of that situation, left the office.
After several minutes his disappearance was noted, [and] K. and
[two other police officers] began searching for him. They noted that the toilet
window was half open. They looked out of the window and saw [V.K.]’s body lying
in the in the internal courtyard. Shortly thereafter they called an ambulance
and informed the Prosecutor’s Office for the Ivanovo Region.
From the witnesses statements it is apparent that [V.K.]’s
disappearance was noted shortly afterwards. There were no sounds of a fight, blows
and falls which could indicate beatings or [his] body having been dragged. The
toilet door was the only unlocked door on that floor. During [V.K.]’s detention
from 1 to 4 p.m. he visited the toilet several times. He was aware that the
door was not locked. No traces of a fight were found in the toilet...
In the present case the investigating authority ordered two
medical examinations of [V.K.]’s body. The examinations were performed by
[competent experts]. Later upon the [applicant]’s request the Prosecutor’s
Office ordered an additional expert examination, performed by a [panel composed
of three experts].
Taking into account the fact that [the applicant] put into
question the experts’ conclusions, the investigative authority granted her
request, providing her with certified copies of the experts’ reports...
On 16 January 2003 the Prosecutor’s Office ordered a new expert
examination of [V.K.]’s body...
Following the court order of 25 May 2004 the investigating
authority interrogated [one of the experts] who had performed the expert
examination of 22 June 2001... He stated that the insignificant differences in
the description of [V.K.]’s injuries could be explained by differences in lighting
between the bright morgue room and the scene of the incident, which had been
examined on a cloudy day. In any event the differences in question could not
affect the overall conclusions of the experts about the mechanism, the nature
and the alleged time of the infliction of the injuries...
All of the forensic medical examinations established the same
cause of [V.K.]’s death. There are no contradictions between the experts’
conclusions. The expert reports are valid and reasoned. No additional expert
examination of the exhumed body is required.
[The applicant] stated that the experts had found that [V.K.]
fell on his right side and did not move. According to her, the police’s
statements confirmed that [V.K.] was found lying on his back. It gave her a basis
to allege that [his body had been moved]. That allegation was groundless
because she misinterpreted the expert reports, which had clearly established
that [V.K.] landed on his left foot [and shortly thereafter] fell to his right
side on his back. The mechanism of injuries demonstrates that [V.K.]’s body was
found lying on its back in a result of its own inertial motion from his right
side.
In the light of materials in its possession the investigative
authority concludes that [V.K.]’s death was a result of his own deliberate
actions. Being concerned about his possible detention, drug-addict [V.K.] took
advantage of K. having been distracted, left the interrogation room and went to
the toilet. In an attempt to escape from the police [station] he jumped out of
the window. [V.K.] misjudged the height. He died because of the unsuccessful
landing. This conclusion is confirmed by the witnesses’ statements, examination
of the scene of the incident and the expert reports. Additional expert
examination disproves the allegation of [V.K.]’s ill-treatment. His fall was
coordinated, as he landed on his feet. According to the statements of one of
his relatives, [V.K.], being in a state of drug intoxication, once wanted to
jump off a balcony. There is no indication of the criminal offences prohibited
by Articles 105 [murder], 110 [forced suicide] and 111 § 4 [infliction of
serious injuries leading, owing to negligence, to the victim’s death] of the
Criminal Code of Russia in the actions of the policemen. They did not overstep
their competence and did not breach Article 286 [abuse of authority] of the
Criminal Code of Russia...
There is no direct or indirect evidence that [V.K.]’s death is
a result of unlawful actions of the police officers who were involved in the
operative actions in respect of him, or who escorted him, or those staff
members who were present in the police station on the day of the incident. The
case file materials indicate that his death was the result of an unsuccessful
attempt to escape from the police, i.e. it is a result of his actions aimed at
evading detention. There is no evidence that [V.K.] was forced to commit suicide
during the pre-trial stage of the investigation. In this connection the
investigation concludes that there is no evidence of the criminal offences
prohibited by Articles 105 [murder], Article 110 [forced suicide],
Article 111 § 4 [infliction of serious injuries leading, owing to negligence,
to the victim’s death] and Article 286 [abuse of authority] of the Criminal
Code of Russia in the policemen’s actions ... The materials of the present case
show that [V.K.]’s rights were not breached by the police officers... There was
no causal link between the [police actions] and [V.K.]’s death. Accordingly,
the actions of the police officers do not constitute the crime [of criminal
negligence leading to the victim’s death or grave injury] under Article 293 § 2
of the Criminal Code of Russia. ”
On 18 March 2005 the District
Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 13 October
2004. The decision was reasoned as follows:
“In accordance with Article 7 of the Code of the Criminal
Procedure of Russia, a decision of an investigator should be lawful and
reasoned. The court concludes that the impugned decision of the investigator satisfies
these requirements. It contains a description of the circumstances of the case [and
makes] reference to the evidence.
First of all, the investigating authority examined the expert
reports issued by the expert of the Ivanovo Region Bureau of Forensic Medical
Examination, by the expert panel of the Ivanovo Region Bureau of Forensic
Medical Examination, by the expert panel of the Ministry of Health’s National Centre
of Forensic Medical Examination and the expert examination of the body
performed by the expert from the Ivanovo Region Bureau of Forensic Medical
Examination.
The aforementioned expert examinations proved that [V.K.]’s
death and his injuries were caused by his fall. The experts found that [V.K.]
had landed on his feet, i.e. [V.K.] had controlled his motions. [V.K.] suffered
all of the injuries in a short time interval, almost simultaneously. He died
immediately after the fall.
The alleged contradictions in the experts’ findings given in
connection with the injuries on [V.K.]’s face and the time of his death were
resolved. The expert from the Ivanovo Region Bureau of Forensic Medical
Examination explained why there had been certain differences in the description
of the facial injuries. He stated that the differences had been insignificant
and could not have affected the overall conclusions about the nature of these
injuries, their seriousness and the alleged time of their infliction. He
explained that the conclusions of the experts had not been contradictory. These
results had supplemented each other. The conclusions about the origin of the
injuries also lacked contradictions, they were reasoned and valid. No
additional expert examination of the exhumed body was required.
In the court’s view the experts’ reports are sufficiently
consistent. They are based on the case file materials, including the record of
examination of the scene of the incident. The experts who carried out the
examinations were competent. They were informed of [the potential] criminal
liability for deliberately false reporting. There are no reasons why the court
should depart from their conclusions.
The circumstances of the death were examined by the court in
its decision of
24 December 2003, which has entered into legal force. The [applicant’s]
arguments were declared unfounded. The investigator’s refusal to order an examination
of the exhumed body of 6 November 2003 was upheld by the courts.
The investigator did not examine the expert opinion [which had
been submitted by the applicant] because it essentially repeated the previous
conclusions of the experts.
The investigator took certain steps towards the reconciliation of
certain differences in the statements of the witnesses by ordering cross-examinations
between them. During these cross-examinations he established the circumstances [of
V.K.’s death]. The description of the events presented by the investigator is
sufficiently detailed. Only several insignificant details remained unclear owing
to the lapse of time. However, this could not affect the general assessment of
the circumstances of [V.K.’s death] and the overall findings of the
investigating authorities.
The statements of the witnesses were examined and compared with
the expert reports and other pieces of evidence. The court agrees with the
investigator’s conclusion that [V.K.] was not ill-treated and was not forced to
commit suicide.
The investigator responded to [the applicant’s allegation] that
the crime had not occurred in the place where the body had been found.
Referring to the expert examination reports the investigator explained why [V.K.]
had been found lying on his back. The investigator took into account the
mechanism of [V.K.’s] injuries. There is no evidence which could prove that [V.K.]’s
body had been moved.
The investigator established all the circumstances of [V.K.]’s
death. He gave an assessment of the actions of the policemen in light of the provisions
of the Criminal Code of Russia, including its Article 293 § 2. He concluded
that the police officers had breached certain rules of legislation; however there
had been no causal link between their [unlawful] actions and [V.K.’s] death.
The court has no reason to call the investigator’s conclusions
into question. All required investigative actions aimed at gathering of additional
evidence and settling the contradictions were carried out. There is no reason
to order additional expert examinations.
The court concludes that the decision of 13 October 2004 issued
by the [investigative authorities] in connection with [V.K.]’s death is
reasoned and lawful.”
On 15 April 2005 the Ivanovo
Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court on appeal, reiterating
its reasoning and conclusions.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Constitution of the Russian Federation
Articles 20, 21 and 20 of the Constitution
provide that everyone has the right to life and the right to liberty and
personal security, which are guaranteed and protected by the State. No one
shall be subjected to cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.
Articles 45 and 46 of the Constitution guarantee
the judicial protection of Constitutional rights.
Articles 52 and 53 of the Constitution protect
the rights of victims of crimes. The State guarantees victims access to justice
and compensation of damages. Everyone is entitled to compensation of damages
caused by unlawful actions of State officials.
B. Russian Criminal Code
Article 105 of the Code provides that murder is
punishable by six to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Article 110 of the Code makes incitement to
suicide liable to a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment.
Article 111 § 4 of the Code provides that serious
bodily harm causing the death of the victim is punishable by to five to fifteen
years’ imprisonment.
Article 286 § 3 of the Code provides that
actions of a public official which clearly exceed his authority and entail a
substantial violation of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, committed
with violence or the threat of violence, are punishable by three to ten years’
imprisonment, with a prohibition on occupying certain posts or engaging in
certain activities for a period of three years.
Article 293 § 2 of the Code provides that
criminal negligence leading to the victim’s death or grave injury is punishable
by up to five years’ imprisonment.
C. Russian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960
Article 53 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1960, in force until 1 July 2002, provided that where a
victim had died as a result of a crime, his or her close relatives should be
granted victim status. During the investigation any such victim was entitled to
submit evidence and file motions. Once the investigation was complete a victim
had full access to the case file.
. Article
108 of the Code provided that criminal proceedings could be instituted on the
basis of letters and complaints from citizens, public or private bodies,
articles in the press or the discovery by an investigating body, prosecutor or
court of evidence that a crime had been committed.
. Article
109 of the Code provided that the investigating body was to take one of the
following decisions within a maximum period of ten days after notification of a
crime: open or refuse to open a criminal investigation, or transmit the
information to the appropriate body. The informants were to be informed of any
decision.
. Article
113 of the Code provided that, where an investigating body refused to open a
criminal investigation, a reasoned decision was to be provided. The informant
was to be made aware of the decision and could appeal to a higher-ranking
prosecutor or to a court.
. Articles
208 and 209 of the Code contained information relating to the closure of a
criminal investigation. Reasons for closing a criminal case included the
absence of corpus delicti. Such decisions could be appealed to a
higher-ranking prosecutor or to a court.
D. Russian Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001
. Article
140 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure in force as of 1 July 2002
provides that criminal proceedings should be instituted if there is
sufficient information which indicates signs of a criminal offence.
Article 144 of the Code provides that
prosecutors, investigators and inquiry bodies must consider applications and
information about any crime committed or in preparation, and take a decision on
that information within three days. In exceptional cases, that time-limit can
be extended to ten days. The decision should be one of the following: (a) to
institute criminal proceedings; (b) to refuse to institute criminal proceedings;
or (c) to transmit the information to another competent authority (Article 145
of the Code).
Article 125 of the Code provides that the
decision of an investigator or a prosecutor to dispense with or terminate
criminal proceedings, and other decisions and acts or omissions which are
liable to infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of the parties to
criminal proceedings or to impede citizens’ access to justice, may be appealed
against to a District Court, which is empowered to check the lawfulness and
grounds of the impugned decisions.
Article 213 of the Code provides that, in order
to terminate the proceedings, the investigator should adopt a reasoned decision
with a statement of the substance of the case and the reasons for its
termination. A copy of the decision to terminate the proceedings should be
forwarded by the investigator to the prosecutor’s office. The investigator
should also notify the victim and the complainant in writing of the termination
of the proceedings.
Under Article 221 of the Code, the prosecutor’s
office is responsible for general supervision of the investigation. In
particular, the prosecutor’s office may order that specific investigative measures
be carried out, transfer the case from one investigator to another, or reverse
unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions taken by investigators and inquiry
bodies.
E. Legal provisions applicable to escort and
supervision of detainees
. Article
17 of Law no. 103-FZ dated 15 July 1995 “On detention of suspects” provides
that the State guarantees personal inviolability to suspects and accused taken into
State custody.
. Order no. 41-96 dated 26 January 1996 of the Ministry
of the Interior of Russia sets out the rules for detention, protection and
escort of the accused and suspects. Article 2.32 expressly forbids carrying out
investigative actions with suspects and accused in the offices of investigators
not specifically designed for these purposes. Article 3.33 provides that
suspects and accused are always to be escorted to places where investigative
actions take place. Article 3.117 obliges the escorting officers to always be
present during investigative actions and to follow the suspects and accused in
all of their movements, depending on the character of the investigative action
in question. Inside buildings the escorting officers are to stand by the
windows, whilst the senior escorting officer is to stand guard by the door.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 2 of the
Convention that the authorities had been responsible for the death of her son V.K.
and that they had subsequently failed in their obligation to conduct a proper investigation
into the circumstances surrounding his death. Article 2 of the Convention
provides as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by
law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as
inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent
the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of
quelling a riot or insurrection.”
A. The parties’ submissions
According to the applicant, a very plausible
explanation of V.K.’s fall was that he had been pushed out of the window by the
police officers with a view to concealing his previous ill-treatment. She took
the view that no reasonable person could jump from a very elevated height of 8.3
metres and expect to escape successfully. The applicant considered that the injuries
on V.K.’s face subsequent to the fall were capable of confirming this explanation.
In the alternative, the applicant argued that the incident had only become possible
through the manifest negligence of the officials in charge of the investigation
and escort, who had failed properly to supervise V.K.
According to the applicant, the investigation
into the circumstances surrounding V.K.’s death had been superficial. She was
dissatisfied that not all of the participants of the incident had been properly
questioned and cross-examined at once after the events and that the
investigation had failed to examine the toilet and to take samples from V.K.’s body
for analysis. The presence of various defects in the investigation had been confirmed
by the decisions of supervising prosecution bodies, which had pointed to numerous
flaws in the investigation.
The Government submitted that V.K.s’ death had resulted
solely from his unfortunate attempt to escape from custody through the toilet
window. With reference to the conclusions of the investigating authorities that
V.K. had jumped out voluntarily, they declined to accept responsibility for his
death. The Government did not dispute that the officers in question had acted
negligently, but denied a causal link between their conduct and V.K.’s jumping to
his death.
The Government stated that the ensuing
investigation had been sufficiently thorough. The authorities had made a
serious attempt to shed light on the circumstances of V.K.’s death, and the
necessary investigative actions had been promptly performed. The authorities had
questioned all of the witnesses to the event, ordered several examinations of V.K.’s
body and responded to all of the allegations made by the applicant concerning the
circumstances of V.K.’s death.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Alleged violation of V.K.’s right to life
(i) General principles
. The
Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right
to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention.
Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic
societies making up the Council of Europe. The first sentence of Article 2
enjoins the Contracting States not only to refrain from the taking of life
“intentionally” or by the “use of force” disproportionate to the legitimate
aims referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of the second paragraph of that
provision, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those
within its jurisdiction (see, inter alia, L.C.B. v. the United
Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III,
and Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 89, ECHR 2001-III).
The Court further emphasises that persons in
custody are in a particularly vulnerable position and the authorities are under
an obligation to account for their treatment. As a general rule, the mere fact
that an individual dies in suspicious circumstances while in custody should
raise an issue as to whether the State has complied with its obligation to
protect that person’s right to life (see Slimani v. France, no.
57671/00, § 27, ECHR 2004-IX (extracts)). Such an obligation must be
interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate
burden on the authorities, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in
policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the
operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources.
Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail a Convention requirement
for the authorities to take operational measures to prevent that risk from
materialising.
A positive obligation will arise, the Court has
held, where it has been established that the authorities knew or ought to have
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of
an identified individual by a third party or himself and that they failed to
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might
have been expected to avoid that risk (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, § 90; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no.
46477/99, § 55, ECHR 2002-III). However, even where it is not established that
the authorities knew or ought to have known about any such risk, there are
certain basic precautions which police officers and prison officers should be
expected to take in all cases in order to minimise any potential risk to
protect the health and well-being of the arrested person (Mižigárová v. Slovakia,
no. 74832/01, § 89, 14 December 2010).
. In
assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable
doubt”. However, such proof may follow from the co-existence of
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part,
within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons
within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in
respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the
burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (see, among many other authorities, Anguelova
v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, §§ 109-11, ECHR 2002-IV).
(ii) Application of those principles to the present
case
The Court observes that the applicant submitted
two different narratives in connection with the substantive limb of Article 2
of the Convention. She alleged that either the police officers had thrown V.K. out
of the window or that the manifest negligence of the relevant officials who had
insufficiently supervised V.K. had resulted in him attempting to escape and
eventually in his death. In any event, the applicant regarded the State as liable
for V.K.’s death.
As regards the first allegation, the Court
reiterates that the applicable standard of proof under Article 2 is that of
“beyond reasonable doubt”. In the instant case it finds no serious evidence in
support of the hypothesis of the intentional taking of V.K.’s life. The
applicant’s assertion that V.K. could not have been so reckless as to jump from
the window does not satisfy this standard and is in itself insufficient to
shift the burden of proof on to the respondent Government.
The Court observes that the applicant’s
arguments were refuted by the investigative authorities and the courts at two levels
of jurisdiction, which concluded that “[V.K.] was not ill-treated and was not
forced to commit suicide” (see paragraphs 51 and 52 above), and the Court finds no need to depart from these findings. They are corroborated by the expert
reports concluding that “V.K. controlled his motions during the fall as he
landed on his feet” and backed up by the statements of various witnesses (see
paragraphs 44 and 51 above), all of whom confirmed the absence of any signs of
coercion in respect of V.K. on the date in question. In this connection, the
Court also notes that the injuries on V.K.’s head and chest discovered by the post-mortem
examinations of his body pre-dated the incident by at least three days (see
paragraphs 25 and 40 above). This being so, they cannot be interpreted as a
sufficient indication that V.K. was coerced into jumping or tried to escape in
order to flee ill-treatment by police officers.
In the light of the
above, the Court considers that there is an insufficient factual and
evidentiary basis on which to conclude that V.K. was thrown out of the window
by the police officers, was coerced into jumping or tried to escape in order to
flee ill-treatment by police officers (compare Erikan Bulut v. Turkey, no. 51480/99, § 30, 2 March 2006; Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia,
no. 40657/04, § 43-50, 3 May
2012; and Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617/01, § 22, 26 January 2006).
Having regard to the case file and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds
that the authorities reached a valid conclusion that V.K.’s death was the
result of an unfortunate attempt to escape from police detention.
Turning to the applicant’s second allegation
concerning the State’s failure to protect V.K.’s life, the Court reiterates
that the obligation to protect the health and well-being of
persons in detention clearly encompasses an obligation to protect the life of
arrested and detained persons from a foreseeable danger (see Eremiášová
and Pechová v. the Czech Republic, no. 23944/04, § 117, 16 February 2012, and Mižigárová v. Slovakia, cited above, § 89).
Although there is insufficient evidence to show that the authorities
knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that V.K. might attempt to
escape by jumping out of a third floor window, there were certain basic
precautions which police officers should be expected to take in respect of the
persons held in detention in order to minimise any potential risk of attempts
to escape.
In this connection, the Court finds that the escort
and supervision arrangements for V.K.’s detention on 16 September 2000 were
seriously deficient. It takes note of the absence of escorting officers on the
spot before and during V.K.’s attempt to escape (see paragraphs 18, 19 and 51
above), as well as the fact that the interview had taken place in an
investigator’s office rather than appropriate designated premises, both
omissions clearly having been in breach of the applicable domestic rules (see
paragraphs 18, 19, 25 and 73 above). Moreover, even
though the investigator in charge of the case had knowledge of V.K.’s drug
addiction and, as confirmed by police officers M. and P., V.K. displayed
noticeable anxiety on 16 September 2000 (see paragraphs 8 and 51 above), the
police did not adopt any safety measures in this connection. Finally, as
admitted by investigator K. and his superior V. in their statements to the
investigation (see paragraphs 28 and 31 above), after investigator Ya. left the
office, V.K. remained without any effective supervision in an unlocked office for
quite some time, which made it possible for him to slip out of the investigator’s
office unnoticed and remain undisturbed when heading for the toilet on the
third floor of the building and jumping out of the window.
The Court would reiterate its view that it would
be excessive to request the States to put bars on every window at a police
station in order to prevent tragic events like the one in the instant case (see
Eremiášová and Pechová, cited above, § 117). However, this does not relieve the States of their duty
under Article 2 of the Convention to protect the life of arrested and detained
persons from a foreseeable danger.
In the circumstances of the present case, the
Court cannot but conclude that the State authorities failed to provide V.K.
with sufficient and reasonable protection as required by Article 2 of the
Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 under its
substantive limb.
(b) Alleged failure to carry out an adequate
investigation into V.K.’s death
(i) General principles
The Court reiterates that where a State or its
agents potentially bear responsibility for a loss of a life, the events in
question should be subject to an effective investigation or scrutiny which
enables the facts to become known to the public and in particular to the
relatives of any victims (see Sieminska v. Poland (dec.), no. 37602/97,
29 March 2001; see also McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September
1995, § 161, Series A no. 324; and Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, §
82, Reports 1998-IV).
The investigation must be capable of
establishing the cause of the injuries and the identification of those
responsible with a view to their punishment. Where death results, the
investigation assumes even greater importance, having regard to the fact that
the essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective
implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life. The Court
has also held in the past that the authorities must take any and all reasonable
steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, among
other things, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence and, where
appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of any injuries
and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. (Nachova
and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 113, ECHR 2005-VII;
Anguelova v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 139 and; Kelly and Others v.
the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 96, 4 May 2001).
Such investigation must be initiated promptly
and conducted with reasonable expedition (e.g. Hugh Jordan v. the United
Kingdom, no. 24746/94,
§ 108, ECHR 2001-III (extracts)). There must be a sufficient element of
public scrutiny, although it may vary from case to case, and the relatives of
the victim must be involved in the proceedings to the extent necessary to
safeguard their legitimate interests (see Hugh Jordan, cited above, § 109,
and Kelly and Others, cited above, § 98)
The Court reiterates that for an investigation
into a death in custody to be effective, it may generally be regarded as
necessary for the persons responsible for carrying out the investigation to be
independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of
hierarchical or institutional connection but also practical independence (see Güleç
v. Turkey, 27 July 1998, §§ 81-82, Reports 1998-IV; Ergi
v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 83-84; Nachova, cited above, § 112; Hugh
Jordan, cited above, § 106; and Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 325, ECHR 2007-II).
(ii) Application of those principles to the present
case
The Court notes at the
outset that the investigation of V.K.’s death was carried out in the course of
a criminal case instituted by the Prosecutor’s office for the Ivanovo Region in
this connection. Having lasted for slightly over four years, it resulted in the
decision of 13 October 2004 which concluded that there “was no causal link
between the [police actions] and [V.K.]’s death” and that “accordingly, the
actions of the police officers [did] not constitute the crime [of criminal
negligence leading to the victim’s death or grave injury]” (see paragraph 51 above). The reasonableness and lawfulness of the conclusions reached and the
measures taken were subsequently examined and accepted by the domestic courts
at two levels of jurisdiction (see paragraphs 52 and 53 above).
It is clear to the Court that the initial reaction
of the relevant authorities was reasonably prompt, as some investigatory
measures took place at once after the incident (see paragraphs 13-14 and 20 above) and that the entire investigation was conducted by the prosecutor’s office,
an authority which was institutionally independent from the police officers
involved in the relevant events (see paragraphs 20-51 above). It remains to be
examined whether the investigation conducted was effective in the sense of
being capable of ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident had taken
place and identifying the person or persons responsible for the death in
question.
As regards the investigation of the question of
possible suspicion of coercion or ill-treatment of V.K. prior to his death, the
Court would reiterate its earlier conclusion (see paragraph 87 above) that V.K.’s
death did not result from him having been thrown out of the window, coerced
into jumping or following him having fled ill-treatment at the hand of
police officials. Therefore, it endorses the conclusions reached by the
domestic authorities and courts in their decisions in so far as they excluded
any suspicion of coercion or ill-treatment of V.K. during the events preceding
his jumping to his death (see paragraphs 51-53 above).
Turning to the quality of investigation of the question
of the alleged negligence of the relevant police officials, the Court notes
that to some extent the investigation was crippled at the initial stages of the
proceedings by an apparent lack of effort to find out the exact sequence of
events and the location and movements of the key actors on
16 September 2000. This led to certain unfortunate delays.
. Nevertheless,
despite these delays in the proceedings, the Court observes that the
investigation authorities eventually addressed and corrected the shortcomings (see
paragraphs 33, 34, 38, 44, 47, 49 and 51 above). In the course of the domestic
investigation and subsequent court proceedings, the authorities identified all
of the actors who could give evidence in respect of the circumstances of V.K.’s
death and conducted multiple interviews with these people and
cross-examinations between them with a view to establishing the exact
circumstances of the incident. They also examined the scene of the incident and
conducted multiple expert examinations of V.K.’s body.
On the basis of these materials, the
authorities concluded that there was "no direct or indirect evidence that
[V.K.]’s death is a result of unlawful actions of the police officers who ...
escorted him, to those staff members who were present in the police station on
the day of the incident" and that "his death the result of an
unsuccessful attempt to escape from the police, i.e. it is a result of his
actions aimed at evading detention" (see paragraph 51 above).
Thus, the Court does not see any reason to
depart from the findings of the domestic courts on this aspect of the case and concludes
that the investigation into the death of V.K. conducted by the authorities and
taken as a whole was in compliance with the requirements of the procedural
aspect of Article 2 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 3 of the
Convention that V.K. had been ill-treated before his death and that the subsequent
investigation had been unable to explain the origin of the bruises registered
on her son’s body. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. The parties’ submissions
The applicant claimed that V.K. had been
ill-treated in police custody with the purpose of extracting a confession. She
relied on the forensic report which had established three bruises on his face
and six bruises on his chest unrelated to his fall from the window. The
applicant alleged that the Government had not provided a satisfactory and
convincing explanation in respect of these injuries.
Denying the applicant’s allegations, the
Government stated that V.K.’s injuries had been inflicted on him either by the
owners of the stolen bicycles who had caught him red-handed or by V.K. himself
when he had bumped into a door on 13 September 2000 prior to his arrest.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) The alleged breach of Article 3 under its
procedural limb
The Court reiterates its settled case-law to
the effect that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been
seriously ill-treated in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction
with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the]
Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official
investigation. An obligation to investigate “is not an obligation of result but
of means”: not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to
a conclusion which coincides with the claimant’s account of events; however, it
should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of
the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and
punishment of those responsible.
The investigation of arguable allegations of
ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always
make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty
or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis
of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to
secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, among other things, a
detailed statement concerning the allegations from the alleged victim,
eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, additional
medical certificates apt to provide a full and accurate record of the injuries
and an objective analysis of the medical findings, in particular as regards the
cause of the injuries. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its
ability to establish the cause of the injuries or the identity of the persons
responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. The investigation into the
alleged ill-treatment must be prompt. Lastly, there must be a sufficient
element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results; in particular,
in all cases, the complainant must be afforded effective access to the
investigatory process (see, among many other authorities, Assenov and Others
v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, §§ 102 et seq., Reports 1998-VIII; Mikheyev,
cited above, §§ 107-08; and Petropoulou-Tsakiris v. Greece, no. 44803/04,
§ 50, 6 December 2007).
Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that that
the investigation authorities were aware of the injuries on the body of V.K.
unrelated to his fall shortly after the incident of 16 September 2000. The
forensic examination of the corpse was ordered at once (see paragraph 14 above)
and the first decision refusing to investigate the incident dated 7 October
2000 mentions “the yellowish and greenish-yellow bruises on the face and chest area”
(see paragraph 20 above). The Court considers that these indications, together
with the applicant’s complaint of 17 September 2000 blaming the
police for the death of V.K., constituted an “arguable claim” of ill-treatment
at the hands of the police and warranted an investigation by the domestic
authorities in conformity with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court notes,
however, that the relevant authorities did not begin to investigate the origin
of these injuries until quite late in the proceedings. The first time the
investigation recognised this as an issue and tried to address it was in its
decision of 29 June 2001, more than nine months after the events (see paragraph
34 above), and even then the authority merely collected and deferred to the
statements of the police officers without making any critical analysis in this
connection or arranging for confrontations between witnesses with conflicting statements.
On 25 May 2004, which is two years and eleven months later, the domestic
courts acknowledged this failure as a defect, but by then this shortcoming
could not be addressed and corrected due to the lapse of time (see paragraph 47
above).
It is clear to the
Court that as a result of these delays the authorities missed an opportunity to
collect relevant material evidence, to identify and question all possible
witnesses and to order a medical examination of the police officers or private individuals
allegedly involved in the matter. In fact, the aforementioned delays constituted
such a serious omission that the Court doubts that any subsequent investigation
would have been able to remedy the resulting damage. Overall, it concludes that
the inquiry into the circumstances in which V.K.’s injuries had been inflicted
was not thorough and effective.
Having regard to the
foregoing, the Court does not consider that the authorities have conducted an
effective investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment of
V.K. and holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
under its procedural limb.
(b) The alleged breach of Article 3 under its
substantive limb
As the Court has stated on many occasions,
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies.
Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism
and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive
clauses of the Convention and its Protocols, Article 3 makes no provision for
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even
in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni
v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and Assenov and Others,
cited above, § 93).
Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported
by appropriate evidence (see, mutatis mutandis, Klaas v. Germany,
22 September 1993, § 30, Series A no. 269). To assess this evidence, the
Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” but adds that such
proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland
v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 161, Series A no. 25).
Turning to the case at hand, the Court has
regard to its findings concerning the deficiencies in the domestic investigation
into the alleged ill-treatment of V.K. during his arrest on 13 September
2000 and, in particular, serious delays in investigation of these events which
impaired the quality of the investigation (see paragraphs 109-112 above).
Having regard to
the parties’ submissions and all the material in its possession, the Court
considers that the evidence before it does not enable it to find beyond all
reasonable doubt that V.K. was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 by
policemen, as alleged by the applicant. In particular, the Court notes that
V.K. was initially apprehended by two private individuals, Da. and Ko.,
apparently after V.K.’s unsuccessful attempt to steal a bicycle (see paragraph 8
above), and was only then handed over to policemen Zh. and S., who brought V.K.
to the police station (see paragraph 33 above). The factual question to be
resolved is, therefore, whether V.K. received the aforementioned injuries prior
to the episode involving Da. and Ko., during his encounter with Da. and Ko., or
after his arrest by Zh. and S.
Clearly, nothing in the case file confirms that
all of V.K.’s injuries could have been received prior to his encounter with Da.
and Ko. In this connection, the Court is sceptical of the explanations
contained in the report of 13 September 2000 and allegedly made by V.K. to the
effect that he had “bumped into a door”, the admission records from the custody
room with V.K.’s own hand-written comments to the effect that he was “fit”, and
the entry made by the emergency medical team on 14 September 2000 (see
paragraphs 20, 34 and 51 above). These pieces of evidence remained uncorroborated
during the subsequent investigation and are inconsistent with the extent and
gravity of the injuries described in the second post-mortem examination
of V.K.’s body (see paragraphs 34 and 40 above) and the statements by one of
his family members mentioned in the decision of 29 June 2001 (see paragraph 34
above).
At the same time, the claim that V.K. had been
beaten up by Da. and Ko. relies solely on the statements of Zh. and S. and was denied
by Da. and Ko. (see paragraphs 34 and 51 above). As already stated by the Court
in paragraphs 110 and 111, the investigation failed to verify the statements by
conducting a confrontation among the private individuals and the policemen and,
more generally, assessing them in a critical light, which makes it difficult to
assess their credibility. Likewise, the allegation that V.K. was beaten by the
policemen, based on lawyer D.’s alleged conversation with V.K. (see paragraph 32
above), remains uncorroborated by any other piece of evidence and is difficult
to be accepted as sufficiently credible.
The Court notes, however, that its inability to
reach any conclusions as to whether there has been treatment prohibited by
Article 3 of the Convention at the hands of the police derives in considerable
part from the failure of the domestic authorities to react effectively to the
applicant’s complaints at the relevant time (compare Gharibashvili v. Georgia,
no. 11830/03, § 57, 29 July 2008, with further references, and see Khashiyev
and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, § 178, 24 February 2005,
again with further references, and Lopata v. Russia, no. 72250/01, §§ 124-126, 13 July 2010).
Thus, the Court cannot establish a substantive
violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s alleged
ill-treatment while in police custody.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 5 of the
Convention that her son had been detained in breach of domestic law between 13
and 16 September 2000. This complaint falls to be examined under Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected
for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after
having done so...”
The Government argued that V.K. had been
detained lawfully. They also submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies available to her. In particular, she had not challenged the actions
of the investigative authorities before a prosecutor or in court.
The applicant disagreed and maintained her
complaints. She stated that there had been no effective remedies against the
unlawful detention of her son.
The Court reiterates that,
pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter
within a period of six months from the final decision in the process of
exhaustion of domestic remedies. If no remedies are available, or if they are
judged to be ineffective, the six-month period in principle runs from the
date of the act complained of (see Hazar and Others v. Turkey (dec.),
nos. 62566/00 et seq., 10 January 2002).
The Court notes that the alleged violation of
the rights of V.K. guaranteed by Article 5 occurred between 13 and 16 September
2000. Having examined the case file materials and the parties’ submissions, the
Court notes that the applicant failed to raise this issue before the competent authorities
at the domestic level. Even assuming that there were no domestic remedies to
exhaust in this connection, the application was lodged on 7 July 2004,
outside the six-month time-limit set out by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
This part of the case should accordingly be
dismissed as belated, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant further complained under Article
13 of the Convention of a lack of proper investigation into the death of her
son.
The Court observes that this complaint concerns
the same issues as those examined above under the procedural limb of Article 2
of the Convention. Therefore, the complaints should be declared admissible.
However, having regard to its conclusions above under Article 2 of the
Convention, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine those issues
separately under Article 13 of the Convention (see, for example, Bekos and
Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250/02, § 57, ECHR 2005-XIII
(extracts); Polonskiy v. Russia, no. 30033/05, § 127, 19 March 2009; Sherstobitov
v. Russia, no. 16266/03, § 94, 10 June 2010; and Suleymanov v.
Russia, no. 32501/11, § 157, 22 January 2013).
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 1,000,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government stated that the finding of a
violation in itself would constitute just satisfaction in the applicant’s case.
The Court considers that the applicant must
have sustained stress and frustration as a result of the violations found.
Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 11,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be
chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 10,000 for costs
and expenses incurred before the Court. The applicant submitted a contract for
legal representation entered into with her lawyer and a receipt for an advance
fee in the amount of EUR 6,000.
The Government contested the claim, noting that
the applicant was entitled to reimbursement of her costs and expenses only in
so far as it had been shown that these had been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.
The Court notes that the costs claimed by the
applicant were necessarily incurred. However, it considers that the sums
claimed are not reasonable as to quantum. Regard being had to the information
in its possession and to the sums awarded in comparable cases, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 5,000 covering costs under all
heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the applicant’s complaints under
Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 2 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to safeguard
the right to life of V.K.;
3. Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 2 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to conduct
an effective investigation into the circumstances of V.K.’s death;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention under its procedural limb on account of the authorities’ failure
to conduct an effective investigation into the origin of V.K.’s injuries;
5. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3
of the Convention under its substantive limb on account of V.K.’s injuries;
6. Holds that it is unnecessary to examine
the applicant’s complaint about the quality of the investigation into the death
of V.K. under Article 13 of the Convention;
7. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final,
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 11,000 (eleven thousand euros), plus any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amount, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant on the above amount, in respect of
costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;
8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 October 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André
Wampach Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre
Deputy Registrar President