European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

THIRD SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF BEDNÁR v. SLOVAKIA

 

(Application no. 64023/09)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

8 October 2013

 

 

 

 

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

 




In the case of Bednár v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Luis López Guerra, President,
          Ján Šikuta,
          Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE




  The case originated in an application (no. 64023/09) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Viktor Bednár (“the applicant”), on 26 November 2009.




  The applicant was represented by Mr A. Slamka, a lawyer practising in Dolný Kubín.

The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.




  On 15 February 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE




  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Trstená.

A.  Action and counter-claim




  On 7 January 2005 the applicant lodged an action against two individuals with the Dolný Kubín District Court seeking an order for payment of an amount of money by way of compensation in respect of what he considered to have been unjustified use of his real property.




  On 1 October 2007 the District Court heard the case for the first time, but the hearing was adjourned and, on 1 January 2008, the case was transferred to the Námestovo District Court in the context of reorganisation of the judiciary.




  On 13 May 2009 the case was heard for the second time and the defendant lodged a counter-claim seeking a ruling declaring him to be the owner of the property in question.




  Subsequently, the applicant’s action was stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings on the counter-claim, which was eventually dismissed with final and binding effect as of 12 December 2011.




  Between 12 December 2011 and 16 May 2012 the District Court held four hearings, the applicant provided further and better particulars of his claim, and submitted new evidence.




  On 30 January 2013 the District Court appointed an expert to draw up a report on the market value of the compensation to be paid for the use of the property in question. On 12 April 2013 a new expert was appointed because it had turned out that the previous expert was related to the lawyer of the defendants.




  The proceedings are still pending.

B.  Complaint to the President of the District Court




  On 25 May 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the President of the Námestovo District Court about the length of the proceedings.




  In a letter of reply dated 26 June 2009 the President of the District Court observed that no procedural steps had been taken in the action in 2008 and acknowledged that this amounted to unjustified delay. However, as at that time the proceedings were lawfully stayed, ensuring their acceleration was not practicable.

C.  Constitutional complaint




  On 13 July 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court contesting the length of the proceedings in his action both before the Dolný Kubín District Court and the Námestovo District Court.




  On 29 September 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on a number of grounds. It noted first that the action had been dealt with at first instance by two different District Courts. While the applicant had not raised a complaint about any possible delays before the Dolný Kubín District Court with the President of that court at all, he had lodged his constitutional complaint too early after the response of the President of the Námestovo District Court. By doing so, the applicant had failed to allow the President of the Námestovo District Court sufficient time to ensure acceleration of the proceedings. Moreover, as the proceeding before the Dolný Kubín District Court had ended prior to the introduction of the applicant’s constitutional complaint, its part concerning the Dolný Kubín District Court was belated. Lastly, as the case had been pending before the Námestovo District Court only since 1 January 2008, the length of the proceedings before that court was not sufficient to pose any issues under the “reasonable time” requirement.

In closing, the Constitutional Court observed that nothing precluded the applicant from raising a fresh constitutional complaint later.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION




  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his action had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement and that it had been impossible for him to obtain redress at the national level in that respect, in violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, which read as follows:

Article 6 § 1:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

Article 13:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A.  Admissibility




  The Government argued that the applicant had had at his disposal effective remedies, which he had failed to exhaust. In that respect, they advanced two separate lines of argument.

First, the Government contended that, before introducing his constitutional complaint, the applicant had failed to raise the issue of the length of the proceedings before the Dolný Kubín District Court with the President of that court and to allow the President of the Námestovo District Court sufficient time to remedy the situation.

Second, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to seek redress in respect of the alleged violation of his Article 6 rights by way of an action for damages under the State Liability Act.




  Apart from that the Government accepted that the length-of-proceedings complaint was not manifestly ill-founded.




  The applicant disagreed and reiterated his complaint.




  The Court observes that in its judgments in the cases of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, §§ 52 - 55, 63 - 99 and 106, 12 June 2012) and Komanický v. Slovakia (no. 6) (no. 40437/07, §§ 51 - 54, 60 - 96 and 102, 12 June 2012) it examined at length and ultimately dismissed substantially the same objections as the Government raises in the present case. As a matter of principle, it finds no reasons for reaching a different conclusion now.




  Moreover, the Court considers that the problematic nature of the complaint to the president of the given court, as an intended requirement for the admissibility of the constitutional complaint, is highlighted in cases such as the present one where the proceedings have taken place before several different courts. In particular, this requirement in such cases implies a separation of the proceedings into segments taking place before the courts involved, which is not conducive to the covering of the overall length of such proceedings in accordance with the Court’s case-law (see Sika v. Slovakia (No. 7) [Committee], no. 1640/07, §§ 32-34, 25 June 2013).




  In addition, the Court observes that there has been a certain incongruity between the position taken by the President of the Námestovo District Court (see paragraph 13 above) and the conclusions of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 above). In particular, while the former appears to have concluded that no acceleration of the proceedings could be ensured because at that time they were stayed, the latter concluded that the applicant had failed to allow the President of the District Court sufficient time to ensure their acceleration.




  Lastly, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court also relied on further reasons for rejecting the applicant’s complaint. In particular, it divided the proceedings into two segments according to the courts involved and concluded that, as the proceedings before the Dolný Kubín had ended prior to the introduction of the constitutional complaint, the relevant part of the applicant’s constitutional complaint was belated. At the same time, it concluded that the length of the proceedings before the Námestovo District Court was not sufficient to raise any issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In doing so, the Constitutional Court did not seem to have examined the overall length of the proceedings (see, a contrario, Bako v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 60227/00, 15 March 2005).




  For reasons the Government’s objections must be dismissed.




  The period to be taken into consideration began on 7 January 2005 and has not yet ended It has thus lasted more than eight and a half years for a single level of jurisdiction involving two different District Courts, with the proceedings having been stayed for more than two and a half years pending the outcome of the defendants’ counter-claim.




  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits




  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).




  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).




  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.




  Furthermore, in view of the conclusions reached above as regards exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court finds that there has likewise been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION




  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage




  The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.




  The Government contested the claim as overstated.




  The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards award him EUR 5,500 under that head.

B.  Costs and expenses




  The applicant also claimed EUR 707.41 for legal fees and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.




  The Government referred to the Court’s case-law on the subject, in particular to its judgment in the case of Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom ((Article 50), 18 October 1982, § 15, Series A no. 55) and requested that the matter be considered accordingly.




  Under the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI). Furthermore, Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court provides that itemised particulars of any claim made under Article 41 of the Convention must be submitted, together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part.




  In the instant case, the Court observes that the applicant has not substantiated his claim with any relevant supporting documents establishing that he was under an obligation to pay the costs of legal services and administrative expenses or that he has actually paid them.

Accordingly, the Court does not award any sum under this head (see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, §§ 133-134, ECHR 2004-XI).

C.  Default interest




  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the application admissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

 

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;

 

4.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 5,500 (five thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

 

5.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 October 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

     Marialena Tsirli                                                              Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar                                                                   President