In the case of Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Erik Møse,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no. 31890/11)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Tajik national, Mr Nizomkhon Khaydarovich Dzhurayev (“the
applicant”), on 23 May 2011.
The applicant was represented by Ms A. Stavitskaya,
a lawyer practising in Moscow, and Ms E. Ryabinina, a programme
officer of the Human Rights Institute in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the
Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that in the
event of his extradition to Tajikistan, he risked being subjected to
ill-treatment and that the examination of his judicial appeals challenging the
lawfulness of his detention pending extradition had not been conducted speedily.
On 26 May 2011 the President of the First Section
decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government
that the applicant should not be extradited to Tajikistan until further notice,
and granted the case priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
On 4 July 2011 the application was communicated to
the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of
the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
On 14 October 2011 the President of the First
Section decided to refuse the request for intervention as a third party lodged
by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan on behalf of the Government of
Tajikistan.
On 17 April 2012 the Chamber invited the parties to submit further written observations in
respect of the applicant’s alleged abduction and transfer to Tajikistan. In
consequence, the parties provided additional information about fresh
developments in the case and further observations on the merits.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1967. The Court has no official
information about his current whereabouts.
A. The applicant’s background and his arrival in Russia
The applicant was an elected member of the Sughd Regional
Assembly in Tajikistan from an unidentified date until his departure from the
country. He was also a prominent businessman, owning several production plants,
petrol stations, buildings and other property.
According to the applicant, in 2006 he
accompanied the President of Tajikistan on an official visit to Iran and
Turkey. During the trip a relative of the President of Tajikistan demanded that
the applicant transfer title to one of his plants to him. The applicant agreed
out of fear. In August 2006 the same person again demanded on behalf of the President
that the applicant transfer title to another plant owned by him. The applicant
submits that following his refusal to do so, the authorities began to interfere
with his business and threatened him with reprisals. On 27 September 2006
the applicant survived an assassination attempt allegedly planned by the
authorities. The next day the residents of the town of Isfara in the Sughd
Region held a rally in support of the applicant, demanding that the authorities
find those involved in the assassination attempt and criticising the
authorities’ conduct.
In June 2007, fearing for his life and liberty, the
applicant fled to the United Arab Emirates.
On 30 July 2010 the applicant left the United
Arab Emirates. After travelling through Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus,
he arrived in Russia, where his partner resided, on 13 August 2010.
B. Criminal proceedings against the applicant in
Tajikistan
On 23 June 2007 the State Financial Control and Anti-Corruption
Agency of Tajikistan (“the Agency”) opened criminal proceedings against the
applicant and eight other individuals on charges of misappropriation and
embezzlement of property, money laundering, tax evasion, forgery of documents
and making threats of violence against a public official.
On 28 June 2007 the members of the Sughd Regional
Assembly granted leave for the criminal prosecution and arrest of the
applicant. On the same date an Agency investigator issued an arrest warrant in respect
of the applicant and placed him on the international wanted list. He was also officially
charged with the above-mentioned crimes on that day.
On 26 July 2007 the Sughd Regional Prosecutor
opened another criminal case against the applicant and an unspecified number of
other individuals, accusing them of forming an organised criminal group, and
joined it to the criminal case opened previously.
On 29 October 2007 the Agency opened a new criminal
case against the applicant and three other individuals accusing them of the assassination
of the Deputy Prosecutor General of Tajikistan, Mr Boboyev, in 1999.
On 14 March 2008 the applicant was indicted in
absentia on all of the above charges.
On 9 June 2009 the Supreme Court
of Tajikistan, sitting as a trial court in Khujand, convicted the applicant’s
thirty-one co-accused of various offences and sentenced them to various terms
of imprisonment ranging from ten to twenty-five years. At the trial, several of
the defendants alleged that they had been forced through torture to falsely
incriminate the applicant. The applicant submitted the following excerpts from
the transcript of the court hearing on 16 July 2008:
“[Statement of the accused O.]:
In Khujand I was brought to the 6th division of the Sughd
Region [of the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime] where I was
pressured. The reason for the pressure and acts of violence was that they
wanted me to testify that [the applicant] had been involved in the
assassination of T. Boboyev. However, [the applicant] did not have anything to
do with [it].
... I was made to sign an interview record with false
statements. In December 2007 on the order of the investigator I was doused with
cold water and tortured with electricity.
[Statement of the accused I.]:
When [certain police officers] brought me to the department’s
premises, [one of them] smashed my head against the wall. He and other people
in an office on the second floor tortured me with electricity. They burnt my
body with cigarettes to force me to testify against [the applicant].
I could no longer resist the pressure and violence, and gave the
evidence that they wanted.
... There is a forensic medical report that recorded the
torture against me.
[Statement of the accused M.R.]:
... [Certain police officers] took me to see the head of the 6th
division of the Sughd Region [Department for the Fight against Organised Crime].
Officer K ... hit me two or three times ... Then I was taken to another office
and beaten up. Afterwards I was asked about [the applicant’s] whereabouts and
questioned for about five hours. The next day I was [again] taken to see the
head of the 6th division ... [whilst] there I was also tortured and electrocuted.
Over the course of a few days they tortured me to make me show them a cache of ammunition
in Chorkukh.”
C. Witness statements submitted to the Court
In September 2010 the applicant’s
lawyer, Mr B., travelled to Tajikistan to collect information in respect of the
ill-treatment of detainees and, specifically, of those who had been questioned
in the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant and his co-accused.
Mr B. obtained a total of twelve statements, which were recorded by him on
identical forms bearing the following information:
“Pursuant to section 6(3.2) of the Federal Law “On the Activity
of Legal Counsel and Bar Associations in the Russian Federation” as well as
Articles 53 § 1 (2) and 86 § 3 (2) of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure,
with the consent of the person with information pertinent to [my client’s]
case, counsel [belonging to] the Interregional Kaluga Bar Association
interviewed:
Name
Date of birth
Place of birth
Place of recorded residence
Place of actual residence
Telephone number
ID
I agree to be interviewed (signature, date).
I have been apprised of Article 51 of the Russian Constitution,
which provides that no one can be obliged to testify against oneself, one’s
spouse and close family members (signature, date).”
Two witnesses, who alleged that
they had had first-hand experience of torture being used against them in
connection with the criminal case opened against the applicant and who were witnesses
to such treatment of others, testified as follows:
1. Mr F.R.
“In June 2007 I was arrested ... Before [that], I used to work
as a granary manager at a public company partly owned by [the applicant].
[After I was taken to a police station], the people who were in
one of the offices there started asking me about the whereabouts of [the
applicant] and my brother. [I said I did not know anything about that.] They
started punching and kicking me, aiming the blows at my kidneys and torso. They
avoided hitting my head so as to leave no bruises. Then they made me lift a
chair and hold it, standing with my legs apart. When I was in this position,
they also punched me in the kidneys.
[The deputy director of the Department for the Fight against
Organised Crime] made me lie down facing the floor with my arms along my body.
He put a foot on my waist and said that if I did not tell them the whereabouts
of [the applicant] he would step on me and crush me ... [H]e stepped on my back
and I fainted. The beatings and abuse went on for two days. They took turns
questioning me. I did not have any sleep. They also did not give me any food or
water.
...
They threatened to take me to the [premises of the] regional
Department for the Fight against Organised Crime, where they would torture me
with an electrical device ... Later I learned that such a device was used to
torture my younger brother.
...
I did not complain about the torture. When they released me,
they told me, ‘Do not complain, or we will kill you.’ ”
2. Mr M.
“I am [the applicant’s] nephew. On 29 June 2007 I was at home. Officers
working for the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime came to see me
..., got into my car with me and we went to the Isfara police station. Officers
of the regional Department for the Fight against Organised Crime were working there
in two offices.
When I entered one of the offices, I asked why they had brought
me there. They started punching me on the torso, avoiding my head so as to not
leave bruises.
[I was later taken to the premises of the Khujand Department
for the Fight against Organised Crime]. I was held there for five days. I was
asked about [the applicant’s] whereabouts. [Whilst] there they also beat me, and
did not let me sleep. I heard M.R. screaming in an office nearby. Afterwards he
told me that he had been tortured with electricity ... There I also saw [the
applicant’s former] driver. He had been beaten up badly, and was bleeding from a
wound to his head. I also saw D.R. being tortured ... Five days later, without
any record of my detention, I was released, after having been made to sign a
paper stating that I had been treated well and not abused.”
Fourteen individuals who had
been convicted as the applicant’s co-accused and who were serving prison sentences
used the assistance of their lawyers to give statements addressed to Ms
Stavitskaya, the applicant’s counsel. Four of them stated as follows:
3. Mr O.
“I ... was sentenced by a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Tajikistan of 9 June 2009 to twenty-five years’ imprisonment ... I had
been arrested in the Russian Federation and extradited to Tajikistan. On the
way there I was escorted by officers of the 6th division of the
Department for the Fight against Organised Crime. Next to me on the plane sat
the head of the Tajikistan Department for the Fight against Organised Crime. I
told him the truth about the assassination of T. Boboyev. He said, ‘We don’t
need you, we need [the applicant], tell me about him, it was him who ordered
the assassination’. I denied [the applicant’s] involvement but he did not like
it.
When I was taken into the premises of the Department for the Fight
against Organised Crime ... [my] torture began. Anyone who felt like it came in
and beat me. I was electrocuted, I was in a lot of pain ... All they wanted
from me was to testify that [the applicant] had ordered the assassination of T.
Boboyev.
I had to give false evidence; for a month I was not allowed to
see anyone, either a lawyer or my family, so that they would not see me in that
state.
... During the trial I told the court everything that had
happened during the arrest and pre-trial investigation. The court sympathised
with me but interpreted my statements as a defence of [the applicant].”
4. Mr Mi.
“... The staff members of the Department for the Fight against
Organised Crime ... imposed their views on me and demanded that I give evidence
as dictated by them.
I refused and they began to torture me. First they insulted me,
used foul language, then they started beating me ... when they could not obtain
what they wanted they took me outside, that was in December 2007, and began
pouring cold water on me, then brought me back inside and electrocuted me. They
repeated this without a break for a few days.
... After a while I gave in and started giving false evidence.
For the first few months I was not allowed to see anyone as I
was swollen, my hands bore traces of burns caused by the electrical current.
At the trial I told the court how I had been treated during the
investigation and how I had been forced to give false evidence ... I renounced [the
statements I gave during the investigation].”
5. Mr I.
“... I was arrested in May 2007. I used to work for [the applicant].
As I told them the truth, they got angry and started beating me, torturing me
with electricity and scalding me with hot water ... All this was just to make
me give false evidence against [the applicant].”
6. Mr M.R.
“On 28 June 2007 I was arrested at my job - I worked as a
security guard at a plant owned by [the applicant]. The police brought me to
the [premises of the] Sughd Region Department for the Fight against Organised
Crime where they questioned me in respect of [the applicant]. When they did not
obtain the evidence they wanted from me, they beat me up brutally, at the same
time electrocuting me, the pain was unbearable. As a result, when I urinated I
had blood in my urine. During this treatment I screamed in pain, and to muffle
the noise they put a gas mask on me.
As a result of the beatings, my appendix was ruptured and I underwent
surgery for it. All this was done to make me testify that the ammunition they
had shown me belonged to [the applicant].”
On 17 November 2010 Mr A. submitted the
following statement addressed to the Russian Prosecutor General’s office:
“... In June 2007 I arrived in Russia. In Kolomna, Moscow
Region, I was arrested by Russian and Tajik police officers ...
By a decision of the Kolomna Town Court of 25 December 2007 I
was placed on remand in SIZO 50/4 in Kolomna ... [I stayed on remand] until 29 September
2008 when I was extradited to Tajikistan pursuant to a decision of the Supreme
Court of Russia. On that date ... I was brought to the international airport in
Vnukovo where I was handed over to Tajik police officers.
[Upon arrival] the Tajik police took me from the airport to the
[premises of the] 6th division of the Department for the Fight
against Organised Crime.
As far as I know, according to the decision of the Russian
Supreme Court I should have been taken to SIZO 2 in Khujand. However, for a
long time I was kept in [one of the offices] of the 6th division of
the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime ... They beat me up and
raped me ... Late at night two of the officers undressed me, and tied up my
hands and legs. I was subjected to a brutal rape by these people ... One of
them took photographs as the other one was raping me. They made me sign some
papers, give evidence that I had committed certain crimes ...
I draw your attention to the fact that during the torture
described above there was some talk about ... [the applicant], in whose respect
the authorities had opened a criminal case in 2007. I knew that in this case a
Tajik court had convicted thirty-three people ... I was forced to testify
against [the applicant] that he had given me money in 2004 ... Despite the torture,
rape and other inhuman treatment, I refused to sign those papers and to testify
against [the applicant] and other people.
In this manner I was tortured and beaten up daily, until 3
October 2008.
On 3 October 2008 I was taken to a remand centre in Dushanbe.
[A police officer] started visiting me there in order to obtain my confessions
by using torture and psychological pressure. I could not handle this any longer
and complained to the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan ...
As a result, in October 2008 the authorities opened a criminal
case against [the two officers who had raped me]. They fled and were on the
wanted list for over two years ...”
A letter from the Prosecutor
General’s Office of Tajikistan dated 18 November 2010 (see paragraph 35 below) enclosed the statements of nine individuals who had previously given statements
to Mr B. or to Ms Stavitskaya. Some of those statements were recorded
by Mr R., an investigator from the Sughd Regional Department of Internal
Affairs, while others were handwritten, allegedly by the interviewees. Among those
statements were those allegedly given by Mr M.R., Mr O., Mr Mi. and Mr I.
quoted above. The statements given by Mr M.R. and Mr O. did not contain any
reference to, or renouncement of, their previous statements. As to the others,
the relevant part of the statement by Mr Mi. read as follows:
“I did not write the statement presented to me, nor do I know
any counsel by that name. I did not make the signature shown on the statement.”
The statement by Mr I., as far as relevant,
read:
“... I do not know any counsel by that name ..., nor did I write
any statements for her, the handwriting in the statement is not mine.”
All of the above four individuals stated that
the authorities had not carried out any unlawful actions against them - either
at the remand centres where they had been detained pending trial or at the
correctional facilities where they were serving their sentences.
The Government also submitted
written records drawn up by the heads of the correctional facilities where the
above-mentioned fourteen individuals, including Mr O., Mr Mi., Mr I. and Mr
M.R., were serving their sentences. The wording of the records is almost
identical, as they state that upon arrival at the correctional facility their
state of health was satisfactory, the detainee did not present with any
particular complaints, nor were any superficial injuries detected. It was further
submitted that the earlier medical records either had not indicated any
problems or had mentioned medical monitoring of the detainees in connection
with their chronic ailments.
The applicant’s counsel subsequently
submitted statements addressed to the Court by ten individuals who had
previously written to give an account of the use of torture against them by the
Tajik authorities. Among them were statements by Mr O., Mr Mi., Mr I. and
Mr M.R. Mr M.R.’s two statements were dated 15 April and 30 November
2011; the rest of them were undated. The authors of the statements confirmed
their previous statements collected by Mr B. and Ms Stavitskaya and reiterated
their accounts of the events. Mr O., Mr Mi, and Mr I. also averred that after
their sending their statements to Ms Stavitskaya they had been visited by staff
members of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Tajikistan, who had coerced them by
way of threats to state in writing that they had never made such statements.
D. Arrest and extradition proceedings in Russia
1. Arrest and extradition order
On 27 August 2010 the applicant was apprehended
in Moscow pursuant to an international search warrant issued by the Tajik
authorities. A record of detention of the same date contains a handwritten
statement by the applicant expressing his disagreement with the apprehension
and claiming that he was a Russian citizen being persecuted by the government
of Tajikistan for political reasons. A form (лист экспресс-опроса) of the same date
recorded the applicant’s refusal to give any statements.
On 31 August 2010 the
Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) remanded the
applicant in custody.
On 1 September 2010 the Prosecutor General’s Office
of Tajikistan requested that the applicant be extradited following his
apprehension in Moscow. The request for extradition contained the following assurances:
“...
[We] guarantee that in accordance with international law [the
applicant] will have access to all means of defence, including the assistance
of legal counsel; he will not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment ([within the meaning of] the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and pertinent treaties of the United
Nations and the Council of Europe and the protocols thereto).
Pursuant to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On a Moratorium
for Capital Punishment” of 30 April 2004, the implementation and execution of
capital punishment and related activities in the Republic of Tajikistan have
been suspended; accordingly, the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan guarantees
that ... [the applicant] would not be subjected to capital punishment.
The Prosecutor General of Tajikistan guarantees that [this]
extradition request is not aimed at prosecuting [the applicant] for political
reasons, in connection with his race, religious faith, nationality or political
affiliations.
Pursuant to Article 66 of the [Minsk] Convention [for Legal
Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters]
Tajikistan pledges to prosecute [the applicant] only on those charges for which
he would be extradited. [The applicant] will not be extradited to a third State
without the consent of the Russian Federation and will be free to leave
Tajikistan after the trial and completion of sentence.”
On the same date the extradition prosecutor at the
Moscow Prosecutor’s Office issued an opinion (заключение)
stating that there was nothing to prevent the applicant’s extradition, based on
the fact that Russian law also qualified the charges brought against him in
Tajikistan as criminal. The opinion also referred to information provided by
the Federal Migration Service to the effect that the applicant was not
registered as resident in Moscow, nor had he applied for Russian citizenship.
On 10 September 2010 Human Rights Watch’s Russian
office petitioned the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to refuse the
extradition request, referring to the deplorable human rights situation in
Tajikistan.
On 19 September and 29 November 2010 the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Office received replies to its inquiries from the Federal
Security Service (“the FSB”) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively,
stating that those authorities did not have any information preventing the
applicant’s extradition and that his extradition would not prejudice Russia’s
security and national interests.
On 27 September 2010 the applicant’s counsel
petitioned the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to refuse the extradition
request and release the applicant from detention. The petition referred to a widespread
practice of torture and poor treatment of detainees in Tajikistan, as reported
by various sources. It further quoted the statements of Mr F.R. and
Mr Mi. as conveyed above (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above), as well as those
of several other people who had experienced torture or whose family members had
been tortured at the hands of the authorities, albeit not in connection with
the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his co-accused. Reference
was made to the public statements of a defence lawyer who had taken part in the
criminal proceedings in question to the effect that both the applicant’s convicted
co-accused and witnesses had been tortured and that the convictions had been
handed down as a result of pressure from the authorities. Finally, the petition
cited the Court’s judgments concerning extradition or expulsion to Tajikistan
where a violation of Article 3 had been found.
In their letter of 7 October
2010 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office dismissed that petition, adding
that a copy of the part of the record concerning the alleged unlawful actions
of the Tajik authorities had been forwarded to the Prosecutor General’s Office of
Tajikistan for investigation.
On 17 November, 7 December 2010 and 20 January
2011 the applicant’s counsel supplemented the original petition to the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Office to refuse the applicant’s extradition with new
witness statements and excerpts from the transcripts of the trial of the
applicant’s co-accused (see paragraph 18 above).
In letters of 18 November 2010 and 4 March 2011
the Prosecutor General’s Office of Tajikistan informed its Russian counterpart
that their inquiry in respect of the alleged ill-treatment by the Tajik
authorities cited by the applicant’s counsel in her petition of 27 September
2010 had not discovered any proof thereof. They also enclosed the statements of
some of the witnesses who had previously claimed to have been tortured by the
authorities and of the records submitted by the heads of the correctional facilities
where those witnesses were serving their sentences (see paragraphs 23-26 above).
On 19 January 2011 Amnesty International
petitioned the Russian Prosecutor General not to extradite the applicant, citing
the statements obtained by the applicant’s counsel and reports in the media
concerning the allegedly political motives of the prosecution and the unfair
trial in the “Isfara case” involving the applicant (which was named after the
town where most of the criminal activities had allegedly been carried out). Amnesty
International also referred to the overall problems of unlawfulness and
impunity of State officials in Tajikistan.
In a letter of 27 December 2010 addressed to the
Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, the Special Representative of the Russian
President for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and transnational
organised crime endorsed the request for additional assurances from the Tajik
authorities in respect of the applicant, namely the opportunity for members of
the Russian diplomatic corps in Tajikistan to visit him in detention. Such assurances
were, apparently, subsequently provided by the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office
on 26 January 2011 as follows:
“The staff members of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and
the Russian embassy in Tajikistan [will be able to] visit [the applicant]
during the investigation and after conviction at any time and to see the
conditions of his detention on remand and at a correctional facility.”
On 16 February 2011 the Deputy Prosecutor
General granted the extradition request in respect of the applicant. The
decision, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:
“...
[The applicant] is charged with the following crimes committed on
the territory of the Sughd Region of the Republic of Tajikistan.
In 1998, while serving as the deputy director of Spirtzavod plc
based in Isfara, [he] created a criminal group from among his subordinates,
family members, friends and employees of law-enforcement authorities in Tajikistan
with a view to committing serious and particularly serious criminal activities.
[He] unlawfully acquired, transferred and stored large quantities of arms and
ammunitions [for the group]. In December 2008 [he] merged [this] criminal group
with another criminal group headed by A.B., thereby creating a criminal organisation
which [he], along with A.B., also unlawfully armed.
Following the establishment of the criminal organisation,
together with A.B. in Chkalovsk on 2 January 1999 [he] arranged the assassination
of the then deputy Prosecutor General of Tajikistan, T. Boboyev, by Mr O. and
Mr M. [in exchange] for 6,000 United States dollars, in the presence of his
under-age nephew S.G., with particular cruelty and in a manner that put the
lives of many people in danger.
From 2004 to 2007, with a view to arming the members of the
criminal organisation, as part of an organised group [he] unlawfully acquired,
stored and shipped large quantities of arms and ammunitions, which were
confiscated by law-enforcement authorities during an investigation on 30 June
2007.
From 31 March 2004 to 6 July 2007, in his official capacity as Director
General of Khimzavod plc, [he] committed theft by way of embezzlement and
misappropriation, in concert with a group of people, of State property of a
particularly high value totalling over 37,000,000 somoni.
From 2001 to 2004, serving as a deputy of the Sughd Regional Assembly
(Majlis) in Tajikistan and working as the Director of Spirtzavod plc, [he]
abused his power by organising theft from the State Treasury through misappropriation
and embezzlement by [certain employees] of a particularly large sum totalling
368,532 somoni.
In 2001 [the applicant] established Sharaf plc. From August to
December 2004, he laundered funds by way of unlawful property and monetary
transactions, inflicting significant damage in the sum of 262,035.50 somoni.
On 1 March 2006, in concert with a group of people, [he] forged
a deed concerning [intercompany] reconciliation between Sharaf plc and ORS
Khimzavod Limited based in Isfara.
Between April 2004 and November 2005 [the applicant], in his capacity
as the Director General of Khimzavod plc, Sharaf plc and Spirtzavod plc based
in Isfara [and acting] as part of an organised group, shipped a large amount of
wheat with a value of 2,625,745 somoni over the border of Tajikistan by forging
freight customs declarations and other documents.
In the same period, in concert with a group of people, [the
applicant] evaded customs payments in the particularly large sum of 707,544.30
somoni.
Working as Director General of Spirtzavod plc and Sharaf plc based
in Isfara and acting in concert with a group of people, in 2005 and 2006 [he]
evaded a particularly large amount of taxes and levies totalling 2,562,751.41
somoni by forging documents.
On 3 October 2006 [he] groundlessly accused M.Y., the Mayor of
the town of Isfara [and a] member of the Milli Majlis of Tajikistan, of ordering
his assassination and threatened [her] and her family with violence.
[The applicant’s] actions are punishable under Russian criminal
law ... The above-mentioned offences carry penalties of over one year’s
imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant’s] prosecution under
Russian and Tajik legislation have not expired.
...
The request for [the applicant’s] extradition should not be
granted as far as the criminal prosecution for money-laundering is concerned ...
since the amount of the funds is not qualified as large under Russian law;
therefore his actions in this regard do not constitute a corpus delicti ...
[The applicant] should also not be extradited for criminal
prosecution for forgery of an official document ... since the forged document is
not qualified as official on the territory of the Russian Federation ... [A]ccordingly,
his actions in this regard do not constitute a corpus delicti ...
[The applicant] should also not be extradited for the evasion
of customs payments ... since his actions in this regard were aimed at
smuggling goods across the Tajikistani border, for which he is to be
extradited, and do not require additional qualification.
[The applicant] should not be extradited for criminal
prosecution for violence against a public official ... since under Russian law
his actions do not constitute a corpus delicti ... as ... [the
applicant] did not threaten M.Y. in connection with her official duties.
... According to the information provided by the Department for
Citizenship Issues of the FMS, the Moscow FMS and the FMS of the Republic of
Bashkortostan, [the applicant] has not acquired Russian citizenship.
International treaties and Russian legislation do not bar [the
applicant’s] extradition.
...”
2. Challenge to the extradition order in court
The applicant and his counsel challenged the
extradition order in court, arguing in particular that his extradition would
put him at risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention. Their
submissions contained all of the information previously provided to the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Office. The Russian offices of Human Rights Watch and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as Civic Assistance (Комитет «Гражданское содействие»),
a charitable organisation, also made submissions to the Moscow City Court (“the
City Court”) against the extradition order, citing the high risk of torture in
the event of the applicant’s forced return to Tajikistan.
Following a request by the defence, on an
unidentified date the City Court heard several witnesses. Mr Ol., who had
studied the criminal case against the applicant and his co-accused as a staff
member of the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office and who had been present in the
courtroom during the trial, testified that many of the accused, and in
particular, Mr O., Mr I. and Mr Mi., had claimed that their pre-trial
statements had been obtained under duress and had renounced them, giving new testimonies.
Mr Kh., who had participated in the trial on an anonymous basis, stated
the following:
“[They] arrested 500 people and instituted criminal proceedings
against thirty-three of them. To extract false confessions in respect of [the
applicant], they were tortured with electricity, doused with cold water outside
in the winter ... In the courtroom they renounced their statements. When [Mr
M.R.] was interrogated he was kicked in the stomach [and] was taken to an intensive-care
unit following an intestinal rupture ... When they interrogated [Mr. A.] they coerced
him to testify against [the applicant] about drugs. He did not want to do it
because that had not happened, and they raped him in the office.
...
At the trial [Mr M.R.] showed a medical record [noting] that he
had been tortured.”
The court also heard Mr B.; Mr N., who had
provided legal assistance to Mr O. at the trial; Mr Kh.A., the brother of Mr A.
(see paragraph 22 above); and Ms Ryabinina, who worked for Civic Assistance.
The court refused to admit in evidence the written statements of the applicant’s
co-accused concerning their torture by the authorities on the grounds
that it was impossible to establish who had in fact written them or, as was the
case with the statement by Mr A., on the grounds that it had been addressed to
the Prosecutor General of Russia.
On 12 April 2011 the City Court considered the
applicant’s challenge to the extradition order. As noted in the text of the decision,
the applicant’s lawyer “argued with reference to the Court’s case-law
concerning extradition to Tajikistan that the applicant should not be
extradited because he risked being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article
3 of the Convention”. The rest of the defence’s argument was based on claims that
the criminal proceedings against the applicant were politically motivated and that
it would be impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Tajikistan.
The City Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint.
It firstly noted that the Constitution of Tajikistan enshrined the principle of
the separation of powers and held human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
highest esteem, with the prosecutor’s office overseeing compliance with the
law. It observed that Tajikistan was a member of the United Nations and party
to the most prominent international instruments for the protection of human
rights, including the Convention against Torture, the International Covenant
for Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto, and others.
It further observed that Tajikistan had established the post of national
ombudsman and a human rights commission headed by the Prime Minister, and had amended
its Code of Criminal Procedure to exclude admission by the courts of evidence
obtained under duress. On the basis of the above, the City Court concluded that
Tajikistan “had recognised the fundamental documents concerning the protection
of human rights and had taken measures to create mechanisms for their
implementation”.
In respect of the risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment faced by the applicant, the City Court reasoned as
follows:
“Assessing [the applicant’s] fear of becoming a victim of
inhuman treatment, the court takes into consideration the following
circumstances: firstly, the issue of the criminal prosecution of [the
applicant], who was a member of a representative body, was considered not only
by the law-enforcement authorities but also by the representative body itself;
secondly, being aware of the criminal charges against him, [the applicant] left
the territory of Tajikistan ...
The arguments [that the applicant must not be extradited to
Tajikistan on account of his well-founded fears of torture and ill-treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention] are unfounded since they constitute
assumptions that are in no way corroborated, having been rebutted by the
aforementioned credible assurances of the Tajik authorities in respect of [the
applicant], which the court has no reason to distrust.
The court does not consider well-founded the statements of any
of the defence witnesses, as none of them indicate that in the event of
extradition [the applicant] will personally be subjected to torture or other
unlawful methods of interrogation. On the contrary, as follows from the
assurances furnished by the Tajik authorities, in line with international legal
norms [the applicant] will be provided with all means of defence, including
legal assistance. He will not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, in compliance with the [Convention] and the
relevant treaties of the United Nations and the Council of Europe and the
protocols thereto.
...
The Republic of Tajikistan provided the Russian Federation with
... assurances which cannot be questioned in the view of the fact that the
trial of the other individuals indicted in the same criminal case was held in
public for a lengthy period of time; the accused gave their statements freely; the
witnesses heard during the examination of the present complaint also claimed
that he had not been forced to give certain statements; and it was guaranteed
that the competent representatives of the Russian authorities would have access
to [the applicant] at any time during the proceedings.
As to the documents submitted by the defence, the court notes
that the report of the United Nations Committee against Torture on the
situation in Tajikistan is dated 6-24 November 2006 and contains
information relevant for the period from 2000 to 2004; the recommendations of
the [United Nations] Committee for Human Rights, which remark on positive
developments in the observance of common human rights norms, were issued on 22
July 2004 and 13-14 July 2005; the report of the [non-governmental
organisation] on compliance by Tajikistan with the Convention against Torture
is based on information obtained in October 2006 and covers the situation
before that date.
In addition, the defence submitted the information of the
Bureau for Human Rights for 2007, 2008 and 2009, the review of the human rights
situation in Tajikistan dated June 2010 and the national review dated January
2011.
The above documents are generic and do not contain any statements
[that it would be inappropriate] for foreign states to extradite Tajikistani
nationals to the authorities of Tajikistan.
...
Contrary to the argument of the defence made with reference to
the statements of the witnesses, the reply from the Russian Prosecutor General’s
Office demonstrates that the competent Russian authorities are not in
possession of any information concerning the use of unlawful methods of interrogation
on the individuals accused of crimes committed in complicity with [the
applicant] and extradited by the Russian Federation for criminal prosecution,
including Mr O. The office of the representative of the Russian Federation at
the European Court of Human Rights is also not in possession of any such data.
...”
On 2 June 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia found
the decision of the City Court of 12 April 2011 lawful and reasoned and upheld it
on appeal, without adding any further reasoning.
E. Applications for refugee status and asylum
On 23 September
2010 the applicant applied for refugee status with the Moscow City branch of
the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”). On 8 October 2010 he was
interviewed in the presence of his counsel in respect of his application. The applicant
stated that he had arrived in Russia in search of refuge, as the authorities of
Tajikistan had persecuted him and had threatened to take his life.
On 7 December 2010 the Moscow City branch of the
FMS refused to grant the applicant refugee status, finding that the reason for
his request was his fear of criminal liability.
On 31 January 2011 the applicant applied to the
Moscow City branch of the FMS for temporary asylum, citing the same grounds as
in the refugee application. On 5 March 2011 his application was dismissed for
lack of humanitarian grounds warranting the granting of temporary asylum. On
the same date the Deputy Director of the FMS rejected an appeal lodged by the
applicant against the decision of the Moscow City branch of the FMS to refuse
him refugee status.
On 16 September 2011 the
Basmanniy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant’s appeal against the
final decision of the FMS to refuse him refugee status. The applicant averred
that in Tajikistan he had been persecuted for his political convictions and for
belonging to a certain social group. The court dismissed the appeal,
considering that the applicant had failed convincingly to demonstrate the
well-foundedness of his fears of persecution in Tajikistan and that his request
for refugee status had been prompted by his intention to escape criminal
liability in his home country. It is not clear whether that decision was appealed
against to a higher court.
F. Courts’ decisions concerning the applicant’s
detention pending extradition and his subsequent detention in connection with a
fresh criminal charge in Russia
On 3 September
2010 the applicant and his counsel submitted an appeal to the District Court against
its decision of 31 August 2010 (see paragraph 29 above). On 6 September 2010
the District Court returned the note of appeal for amendment because it had
been signed with a facsimile of counsel B.’s signature. The decision to return the
note of appeal was sent to the defence on 17 September 2010. The amended note
of appeal arrived at the District Court on 21 September 2010.
On an unspecified date the District Court submitted
the file to the City Court, which decided on 6 October 2010 to uphold the
applicant’s detention.
On 18 October 2010 the District Court further
extended the applicant’s term of detention. The applicant lodged an appeal
against that decision, which reached the District Court on 25 October 2010. On
an unspecified date the District Court submitted the file to the City Court. On
8 November 2010 the City Court upheld the District Court’s decision on
appeal.
On 21 February 2011 the District
Court again extended the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The applicant
again lodged an appeal, which arrived at the District Court on 28 February
2011. On an unspecified date the District Court submitted the file to the City
Court. A hearing of the appeal scheduled for 21 March 2011 was adjourned
to 23 March 2011 to allow for further examination of the case file. On
23 March 2011 the City Court upheld the District Court’s decision on
appeal.
The final decision to extend the applicant’s
detention was taken by the District Court on 16 August 2011 and upheld on
appeal on 8 September 2011.
The applicant’s term of detention pending
extradition expired on 27 February 2012.
On the same date, at the
premises of the Moscow Khamovnicheskiy District Prosecutor’s Office, the
applicant and his lawyer were served with a decision to change the applicant’s
custodial measure to an undertaking not to leave town. The applicant was served
immediately afterwards with a warrant to appear as a witness, signed on 24
February 2012 by investigator A. S. of the Shchelkovo Town Investigation
Division, Moscow Region (Следственный отдел по
г. Щелково ГСУ СК
РФ по Московской области, hereinafter referred to as “the Shchelkovo Investigation
Division”). The warrant stated that the applicant was wanted as a witness in a
criminal case opened on 10 March 2010 concerning two attempts to assassinate a
Mr K. in 2009 and 2012. According to the document, the applicant had been
repeatedly summoned to take part in investigative actions but had failed to
appear, and his whereabouts had not been known to the authorities.
The applicant was immediately taken
to the premises of the Shchelkovo Investigation Division, where he was
interviewed and made to take part in a confrontation with Mr K., who allegedly identified
him as a possible perpetrator. At 12.40 a.m. on 28 February 2012 the applicant
was arrested as a suspect in that criminal case.
By a fax message of 29 February 2012 the Sughd
regional prosecutor of Tajikistan, Sh.K., asked A.K., an investigator of the
Shchelkovo Investigation Department, to postpone the applicant’s release from
custody, citing the Tajik authorities’ suspicions of his involvement in planning
the assassination of another person which had allegedly taken place after the
applicant’s arrest in Moscow on 27 August 2010.
On 2 March 2012 the Shchelkovo
Town Court, Moscow Region, decided to remand the applicant in custody as a
criminal suspect until 28 April 2012.
G. The applicant’s
disappearance from SIZO-50/12 on 29 March 2012 and the underlying
context
On 25 January 2012 the Registrar
of the Court addressed a letter to the Russian Government on behalf of the
President of the Court, expressing his profound concern at the repeated
allegations of applicants’ secret transfers from Russia to Tajikistan in breach
of the interim measures issued under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Qualifying
this situation as worrying and unprecedented, the letter invited the Russian
Government to provide the Court with exhaustive information about any follow-up
given to the incidents in Russia. It also drew the authorities’ attention to
the fact that the interim measures continued to apply in twenty-five other
cases concerning extradition and expulsion, including the present case. As an
indication of the seriousness with which he viewed this turn of events, the
President asked that the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the President
of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe be informed immediately (see the full text of the letter quoted in Savriddin
Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, § 52, 25 April 2013).
According to the Government, all
bodies with competence to secure the applicant’s forcible transfer to
Tajikistan were informed of the prohibition of such an action: on 3 February
2012 the Office of the Representative of the Russian Federation at the Court
informed the Prosecutor’s General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the
FMS and the the FSB of the interim measures issued by the Court, inter alia,
in respect of the applicant.
At the 1136th meeting
of the Ministers’ Deputies held on 8 March 2012, the Committee of
Ministers adopted the following decision on that issue (CM/Del/Dec(2012)1136/19):
“The Deputies
...
4. as regards the Iskandarov case, recalled that the
violations of the Convention in this case were due to the applicant’s
kidnapping by unknown persons, whom the Court found to be Russian State agents,
and his forcible transfer to Tajikistan after his extradition had been refused
by the Russian authorities;
5. noted with profound concern the indication by the
Court that repeated incidents of this kind have recently taken place in respect
of four other applicants whose cases are pending before the Court where it
applied interim measures to prevent their extradition on account of the
imminent risk of grave violations of the Convention faced by them;
6. took note of the Russian authorities’ position
that this situation constitutes a source of great concern for them;
7. noted further that the Russian authorities are
currently addressing these incidents and are committed to present the results
of the follow-up given to them in Russia to the Court in the framework of its
examination of the cases concerned and to the Committee with regard to the
Iskandarov case;
8. urged the Russian authorities to continue to take
all necessary steps to shed light on the circumstances of Mr. Iskandarov’s kidnapping
and to ensure that similar incidents are not likely to occur in the future and
to inform the Committee of Ministers thereof.”
On 26 March 2012 members of the
Moscow Region Public Commission for Monitoring the Protection of Human Rights
in Detention («Общественная наблюдательная комиссия по осуществлению общественного контроля за обеспечением прав человека в местах принудительного содержания в Московской области»)
visited the applicant and held a conversation with him in the SIZO-50/12 remand
centre located in Zelenograd, Moscow Region. In a letter dated 8 April
2012, two members of the Commission, Mr N. D. and Mr I. Sh., stated
that the applicant had unambiguously confirmed that he had no intention of
returning to Tajikistan where he feared torture and an unlawful criminal
conviction. He had also declared that he was doing everything in his power to
remain in Russia and pursuing his fight for release.
The applicant’s nephew, Mr I. D.,
testified in writing that in his last telephone conversation with the applicant
on 27 March 2012, the latter had confirmed his intention to stay in Russia,
while voicing fears that the new charge had been brought against him with a
view to ensuring his subsequent abduction and transfer to Tajikistan. According
to both the applicant’s representative and his nephew, the fear of abduction
had prompted the applicant to arrange for them immediately to meet him at the
remand centre in case he was suddenly released.
On 29 March 2012 the applicant left
the premises of the SIZO-50/12 remand centre in Zelenograd. According to information
provided by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (“the FSIN”) and
transmitted by the Government to the Court, the applicant was released at
1 p.m., having signed an undertaking not to leave town. Neither the
applicant’s lawyer nor his next-of-kin were notified of the decision to release
him. In the morning of the same day the lawyer received a phone call from one
of the applicant’s cellmates informing her that the applicant was about to
leave the remand centre. However, by the time she reached the remand centre the
applicant had disappeared without leaving any trace.
Subsequently, the applicant’s
lawyer received a letter from the Shchelkovo Investigation Division dated 23
March 2012 informing her that the applicant would be served with new charges at
SIZO-50/12 at 9 a.m. on 29 March 2012 and inviting her to attend. The
postmark on the letter showed that it had been posted on 31 March 2012.
H. Official version of the applicant’s voluntary return
to Tajikistan
The respondent Government
submitted a letter of 6 June 2012 from the Prosecutor General’s Office of
Tajikistan to its Russian counterpart according to which the applicant had gone
to the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan on 5 April 2012 and had
been arrested. The letter stated that the applicant had been released on 9 April
2012 having signed an undertaking not to leave town.
On 7 April 2012 Tajik State television
broadcast a video of the applicant reading out a statement that immediately following
his release from the remand centre, feeling guilty and worrying about his
children and elderly mother, he had decided to return to Tajikistan and to turn
himself in to the authorities. With that goal in mind, he had walked to the
nearest market in Zelenograd, where he had borrowed 15,000 Russian roubles
(RUB) (approximately 370 Euro (EUR)) from his compatriots. Without specifying
the means of travel, he stated that he had subsequently arrived in Orenburg;
crossing the Russian-Kazakh border, he had arrived in Almaty, Kazakhstan;
crossing the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, he had arrived in Bishkek. Then he had
travelled to Osh, crossed the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and arrived in Kistakuz, a
town near the northern border of Tajikistan. From there he had travelled to Dushanbe,
the capital city of Tajikistan, where he had turned himself in to the State Committee
for National Security.
I. Requests to protect the applicant against the
imminent risk of his forcible transfer to Tajikistan
Following the applicant’s
disappearance on 29 March 2012, his representative immediately addressed the
Russian law-enforcement authorities seeking the applicant’s urgent protection. On
the same date she sent letters to the Russian Prosecutor General, the Head of
the State border service and the Representative of the Russian Federation at
the Court, asking them to take urgent measures to prevent the applicant’s forced
repatriation to Tajikistan.
On the same date the Court forwarded the
complaint about the applicant’s disappearance to the Government, asking them to
comment on the alleged risk of the applicant’s being transferred to Tajikistan
in breach of the interim measures issued by the Court.
On the next day, the applicant’s representative
addressed the prosecutor of Shchelkovo, informing him of the emergency and reporting
alleged gross irregularities in the proceedings conducted by the Shchelkovo
Investigation Division. She referred in particular to their failure to notify
her about their intention to modify the charges against the applicant. She also
referred to the Shchelkovo Investigation Division’s direct contacts with the
Prosecutor’s Office of Tajikistan, which had asked them not to release the
applicant from detention pending a new request for his extradition. She alleged
that the deputy head of the Shchelkovo Investigation Division, A.K., was
responsible for those events and asked the prosecutor to inquire into this
situation.
On 2 April 2012 the Government informed the Court
that they were not aware of the applicant’s whereabouts.
On 4 April 2012 the above complaints by the
applicant’s representative were transmitted to the Shchelkovo Prosecutor’s Office
and the Shchelkovo Investigation Division. On 17 April 2012 the Shchelkovo
Prosecutor’s Office replied to the applicant’s lawyer’s complaint, suggesting
that she ask the police to search for the applicant as the prosecutor’s office
was not competent to conduct any investigative or search activities.
The Court has received no further information
about any follow up given by the authorities to the requests seeking the
applicant’s urgent protection against his alleged abduction and forcible
transfer to Tajikistan.
J. Official inquiry in Russia and
repeated refusals to open a criminal investigation
On 3 April 2012 the applicant’s representative
wrote to the director of SIZO-50/12 in Zelenograd requesting details of the
circumstances surrounding the applicant’s release and the preservation of
footage possibly captured by closed-circuit cameras at the remand centre on 29
March 2012. She also wrote on the same date to the head of the Zelenograd Investigation
Division of Moscow (Зеленоградский следственный отдел ГСУ СК
РФ по г. Москве, hereinafter referred to as “the Zelenograd
Investigation Division”) to inform it of the applicant’s disappearance and ask for
a criminal investigation to be opened. She referred in particular to the
recurrence of similar incidents with regard to Tajikistan and to possible
involvement of the deputy head of the Shchelkovo Investigation Division, A.K.,
in the incident at issue.
On 17 April 2012 the Court put additional
questions to the Government (see paragraph 7 above), inviting them in
particular to comment on the assertion by the applicant’s representative that
Russian State agents had been involved in the applicant’s abduction and
forcible transfer to Tajikistan. They were further requested to inform the
Court of all decisions and actions taken by the investigation authorities in
response to the request for the opening of criminal proceedings, which had been
lodged by the applicant’s representative on 3 April 2012 with the Zelenograd
Investigation Division.
On 13 November 2012 the
Government submitted, without providing any decision or document, that an
investigator of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation had
conducted a preliminary inquiry under Articles 144-145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and issued several decisions refusing to open a criminal
investigation on the grounds of absence of corpus delicti. According to
the Government, all those decisions had been repeatedly quashed, inter alia,
by the Zelenograd District Prosecutor’s Office.
On 25 February 2013 the
Government submitted, again without providing any decision or document, that the
inquiry into the applicant’s abduction and transfer to Tajikistan was still
being pursued by the Zelenograd Investigation Division. On an unidentified
date, a decision was taken not to open a criminal investigation in view of the
failure to identify the offender to be prosecuted. On 14 January 2013 the deputy
head of the Zelenograd Investigation Division quashed that decision and remitted
the case for further inquiry. The State border service of the FSB was asked to
check information about the illegal crossing of the Russian State border by the
applicant or his crossing the border against his will.
The Government expressed the
view, nonetheless, that the applicant’s forcible removal from Russia to
Tajikistan was an uncorroborated assumption by the applicant’s representatives.
Referring to the version of the applicant’s voluntary surrender to the Tajik authorities
(see paragraph 69 above), they informed the Court that the Prosecutor General’s
Office of Tajikistan had made a detailed examination of the arguments submitted
by the applicant’s representatives and had found them unsubstantiated. The
Government also informed the Court that the State border service had not kept a
record of the persons crossing the border. They submitted that the CCTV footage
captured in SIZO-50/12 on 29 March 2012, which had been requested by
the applicant’s lawyer and the Court in the wake of the impugned events, had
not been preserved “due to a shortage of server memory”.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
MATERIALS
The relevant domestic and
international law is summarised in the Court’s recent judgments concerning
extradition and expulsion from Russia to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (see Abdulkhakov
v. Russia, no. 14743/11, §§ 71-98,
2 October 2012; Zokhidov v. Russia, no. 67286/10, §§ 77-106, 5 February 2013; and
Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, §§ 70-101). The reports
on the situation in Tajikistan are summarised in Khodzhayev v. Russia
(no. 52466/08, §§ 72-74, 12 May 2010),
and Gaforov v. Russia (no. 25404/09, §§ 93-100, 21 October 2010), and the most recent ones appear in Savriddin
Dzhurayev (cited above, §§ 104-07).
The latter also contains an extensive summary of Council of Europe texts on the
duty to cooperate with the Court, the right to individual petition and interim
measures (ibid., §§ 108-20), and the Committee of Ministers’
decisions under Article 46 on related cases concerning Russia (ibid., §§
121-26).
THE LAW
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
The Court observes that the parties disagree
about the events that took place between 29 March 2012 when the applicant unexpectedly
left the SIZO-50/12 remand centre in Zelenograd, and 7 April 2012 when Tajik
television showed him to be in the hands of the law-enforcement authorities in Tajikistan
(see paragraphs 67 and 70 above). They disagree in particular about how the
applicant made his way to Tajikistan.
The applicant’s representatives contended that
the applicant had been abducted and transferred to Tajikistan against his will.
Referring to the latest contacts with the applicant prior to his unexpected
release from detention on 29 March 2013 and the underlying context (see
paragraphs 62-68 above), they found it implausible that the applicant had
willingly travelled through four national borders without any identity document
and without having said a word to his lawyers and next-of-kin in Moscow. They
also argued that the Russian authorities’ conduct, both prior to and after the
applicant’s disappearance, demonstrated their knowledge of and involvement in
the applicant’s abduction and forced repatriation. They referred in particular
to the way in which the applicant had been kept in detention on what they considered
as an obviously contrived charge of attempted murder (see paragraphs 58-61 above), and the subsequent lack of any investigative actions in that respect until
the date on which that extremely serious charge had, for no apparent reason,
been replaced with a less serious one, allowing the applicant to be released
from custody. They further submitted that the authorities deliberately delayed notifying
the applicant’s lawyer that a new charge had been served on the applicant in
order to prevent her attendance at this event on the day of the applicant’s
disappearance. Lastly, the authorities had not undertaken a single
investigative action in the wake of the applicant’s disappearance, but had merely
shuffled the complaints between offices.
The Government denied any link between the
extradition proceedings and the criminal charges brought against the applicant
in Russia. They also denied having any knowledge of or responsibility for the
applicant’s fate following his release on 29 March 2012 and affirmed that the
applicant had not been handed over to Tajikistan through the extradition
procedure. For the rest, they essentially referred to the version of the
applicant’s “voluntary surrender” provided by the Tajik authorities (see
paragraphs 69 and 81 above), without providing the Court with details of the
domestic inquiries or related documents.
In view of the parties’ diverging positions, the
Court has to start its examination of the case by establishing the relevant
facts. In so doing, it is inevitably confronted with the same difficulties as
those faced by any first-instance court (see El Masri v. “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], no. 39630/09, § 151, 13 December 2012). The Court is sensitive to
the subsidiary nature of its role and must be cautious in taking on the role of
a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by
the circumstances of a particular case. Nonetheless, where allegations are made
under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a particularly
thorough scrutiny, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already
taken place (see, with further references, El Masri, cited above, §
155).
In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the
standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Orhan v. Turkey, no.
25656/94, § 264, 18 June 2002). However, it has never been its
purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that
standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on
Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its
task under Article 19 of the Convention - to ensure the observance by the
Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Convention - conditions its approach to the issues of evidence
and proof. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural
barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its
assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the
free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the
facts and the parties’ submissions. According to its established case-law,
proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover,
the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in
this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically
linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and
the Convention right at stake (see, with further references, Nachova and Others
v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005-VII;
Iskandarov v. Russia, no. 17185/05, § 107, 23 September 2010; and El Masri, cited
above, § 151).
The Court has also recognised
that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous
application of the principle affirmanti
incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that
allegation). In certain circumstances, where the events at issue lie wholly, or
in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden of
proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities
to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman
v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII; D.H.
and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 179, ECHR 2007-XII;
and Iskandarov, cited above, § 108). Where a party fails to
adduce evidence or provide information requested by the Court or to divulge
relevant information of its own motion or otherwise fails to participate
effectively in the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems
appropriate (Rule 44C § 1 of the Rules of Court).
Turning to the circumstances of
the present case, the Court has first to examine the version of events narrated
by the applicant in a video broadcast on 7 April 2012 by Tajik television. According
to that story, motivated by feelings of guilt and worrying about his children
and elderly mother, the applicant left Russia voluntarily and travelled across
several national borders to turn himself in to the Tajik authorities.
The Court finds it beyond dispute that the relevant
text was read out by the applicant and aired on Tajik television while he was
under the total control of the Tajik authorities. According to the official
information provided by the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office to its Russian
counterpart, the applicant was detained in police custody at least two days
before and two days after his statement. The applicant’s situation should thus
be viewed as extremely vulnerable, given notably the risk of ill-treatment
he was running in connection with the criminal prosecution in his home country
(see paragraphs 122-135 below). That fact alone, taken
in conjunction with the applicant’s history, compels the Court to regard that account
of events with great caution. It would not, therefore, give credence to the
information contained in the text read out by the applicant unless it were corroborated
by other evidence. Yet, the respondent Government have not provided any element
to support that account, while a wealth of material at the Court’s disposal
casts serious doubt on the veracity of the story presented on Tajik television.
In the Court’s view, both the arguments made and
the evidence provided by the applicant’s representatives contradict that
version of events. The Court has no reason to distrust the witnesses who
testified that two or three days prior to his disappearance, the applicant had
had the firm intention to do everything in his power to avoid extradition to
Tajikistan (see paragraphs 65-66). Indeed, their statements sit well with the
applicant’s previous story. The Court also observes that the respondent Government
did not refute the submissions by the applicant’s representatives that the
applicant had had ample opportunities to make a quicker and safer trip to
Tajikistan without undergoing a highly risky and clandestine journey in a
manifestly unlawful manner through four national borders without any identity
document. As they argued, nothing had prevented the applicant from asking the
Tajik Embassy in Moscow to assist him for that purpose.
The puzzling circumstances of the applicant’s
release on 29 March 2012 raise further suspicions about the veracity of
the account presented on Tajik television (see paragraph 70 above). According to
the story broadcast, the first thing the applicant did following his release was
to go to the local market in order to borrow RUB 15,000 (EUR 370) from unknown
persons without contacting his lawyers and next-of-kin in accordance with their
prearranged plan (see paragraph 66 above). That the applicant’s release was
deliberately organised without his lawyer and next-of-kin being present (see
paragraphs 67-68 above) strengthens those suspicions, and the Government have
done nothing to allay them. For example, they could have provided CCTV footage captured
in SIZO-50/12 of Zelenograd and the surrounding area to prove at least that
the applicant left the remand centre of his own free will and without any
hindrance by the authorities or third persons. The authorities were explicitly
requested shortly after the applicant’s release to preserve that valuable
evidence but failed to do so (see paragraph 81 above), thus prompting the Court
to draw further inferences against the version that the applicant left Russia for
his home country voluntarily.
Moreover, the Government chose not to refute
with any degree of substantiation other allegations made by the applicants’
representatives or to put forward their own version of events, even though they
had ample opportunities and resources to do so. On 17 April 2012 they were
explicitly asked by the Court (see paragraph 7 above) to explain how the applicant
had managed to travel to Tajikistan without his passport and without complying
with border and other formalities. They were also asked to submit a list of
investigative actions undertaken in respect of the applicant’s reported disappearance
and forced repatriation to Tajikistan, including any decision to open or not to
open criminal proceedings. The Government’s reply to those detailed questions was
belated and perfunctory (see paragraphs 79-80 above), making it
evident that no effective investigation had so far been conducted at the
domestic level (see paragraph 144 below). The Court attaches great significance
to - and draws further strong inferences from - the Government’s continuing
failure to explain or elucidate the circumstances of the grave incident at
issue in the present case.
Lastly, the Court should consider the present case
in its context, having regard in particular to the recurrent disappearances of
individuals subject to extradition from Russia to Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, and
their subsequent resurfacing in police custody in their home countries (see
paragraph 62 above). The regular recurrence of such unlawful incidents, to
which the authorities have not provided any adequate response, lends further support
for the version of facts presented to the Court by the applicant’s
representatives.
The Court finds the above elements
sufficient to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant did not
travel from Russia to Tajikistan of his own free will but was secretly and
unlawfully transferred there by unknown persons following his release from SIZO-50/12
of Zelenograd on 29 March 2012 and handed over to the Tajik authorities before
7 April 2012, when he was shown on Tajik television.
As to the allegation that the
Russian authorities were involved in the applicant’s forcible transfer to
Tajikistan, the Court considers that it closely relates to all other aspects of
his complaint under Article 3 and should be assessed in connection with other
issues arising under that provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant originally complained that, if
extradited to Tajikistan, he would run a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Following the subsequent
developments, his representatives supplemented the complaint, submitting that the
applicant was forcibly transferred from Moscow to Tajikistan in violation of
Article 3 for which the Russian authorities were responsible. The Court
consequently requested that the parties provide additional observations in that
respect, insisting in particular on the need to provide exhaustive information
on the investigation conducted by the authorities into the impugned events.
Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Submissions
by the parties
1. The Government
The Government argued that, while deciding on
the applicant’s extradition, the domestic authorities had carefully examined
the possibility of his being subjected to torture and various forms of
ill-treatment. They referred to the extradition request and the letter of 26
January 2011 from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Tajikistan, which had contained
various assurances to that effect. They further referred to the letter of
18 November 2010 rebutting the allegations of torture made by the
applicant’s co-accused. The Government emphasised Tajikistan’s various
international obligations in respect of the prevention and punishment of torture
and the fact that it had created the post of ombudsman as proof of its good faith
in making genuine efforts to protect human rights. They pointed out that the
court reviewing the extradition order had heard the applicant and his counsel,
the prosecutor and numerous witnesses. It had admitted to the case file the
opinion of Ms Ryabinina, the reports by various human-rights
organisations and the relevant case-law of the Court. The court had carefully
examined the available material and had rightfully arrived at the conclusion
that the applicant’s arguments had been ill-founded. Lastly, the Government forwarded
a statement by the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office, the relevant part of which
reads as follows:
“In the first years after Tajikistan gained independence,
starting from 1992 the country witnessed a civil war; [in that period] the law
was sometimes disregarded and violations of human rights and freedoms occurred.
In June 1997 an Agreement on National Reconciliation was signed
by the Government and the United Tajik Opposition. Gradually peace, security
and the rule of law were established in the country and all necessary
conditions for ensuring that human rights and freedoms were protected were
created. Since 2000 there have been radical developments in the protection of
human rights. In 2003 important amendments were introduced to the Constitution,
eighty per cent of which concerned human rights and freedoms.
Thus, Tajikistan has created a legal basis and important
organisational, legal and other conditions for the genuine implementation and
protection of human rights and freedoms.
...
The criminal law and criminal procedural law provide for a ban
on torture ... Four provisions of the Criminal Code recognise various forms of
torture as a crime. The provisions of the Criminal Code set down a definition
of torture (Article 117 of the Criminal Code) and establish criminal liability
for abuse of power manifested in torture (Article 316 of the Criminal Code),
extraction of confessions by way of debasing an individual, torture and other
violent actions on the part of officials of the investigative authorities (Article
354 of the Criminal Code).
...
The Code of Criminal Procedure gives no legal force to evidence
that was obtained via the use of torture, force or pressure (Article 88 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure).
...
Every allegation of the use of force or unlawful methods on the
part of law-enforcement authorities ... is thoroughly investigated and
the persons responsible are held liable. In 2010 and the first three quarters
of 2011 prosecutors’ offices received sixty-six complaints of the use of
unlawful methods of interrogation, beatings and torture by the employees of law-enforcement
authorities. In sixteen cases the allegations were confirmed, and criminal
cases were opened. Of those, twelve cases reached the courts, which convicted
the accused. Many of these instances of the use of force were of a general
character and did not purport to extract confessions to crimes.
... Since the beginning of 2011 [the issue of torture and other
breaches of the law during criminal investigations] has been raised at meetings
of the State Security Council headed by the President.
The Ombudsman may also consider [this issue] and take
preventive measures.”
Subsequently, the Government contested the
assertion that the applicant had been abducted and forcibly transferred to
Tajikistan, considering that it was not corroborated by any evidence (see
paragraph 81 above).
2. The applicant
The applicant disagreed with the assertion that
the Russian authorities had made a thorough assessment of the risk of
ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in his case, pointing
out that the authorities’ conclusions in that respect had been based on the
scant information obtained from a handful of official sources. He asserted that
both the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and the Moscow City Court had
adopted an excessively formalistic approach towards the assessment of the
evidence in his case. He referred to the general situation in Tajikistan, as
reported by numerous sources, and highlighted the testimonies of the witnesses
in support of his argument that he would undoubtedly be tortured if he were
extradited to that country. He added that the statements of the witnesses
allegedly renouncing their previous statements had been recorded by a
law-enforcement officer in the absence of a lawyer. In addition, the prison
records which the Government presented in respect of the detainees did not
refute the witness statements, but only recorded the lack of marks of torture
on the bodies of the individuals concerned in 2010, whereas the pre-trial
investigation had been carried out in 2007 and 2008. The applicant argued that
his situation had been further endangered by the Russian authorities’ decision
to divulge information to their counterparts in Tajikistan concerning his
application for refugee status and asylum, as well as the statements of the
witnesses with regard to the use of torture by Tajik investigative bodies (see
paragraph 35 above).
The applicant also questioned the value and
credibility of the assurances put forward by the Tajik authorities. In
particular, he drew attention to the fact that they had only provided for the
possibility of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs examining the conditions
of his detention but had not pointed to any specific mechanism that would allow
monitoring of the treatment received by the applicant, nor had they established
any form of responsibility on the part of the authorities of the requesting country
for a potential breach of their obligations. Furthermore, he referred to the
Court’s position in the case of Saadi v. Italy ([GC] no. 37201/06,
ECHR 2008) and the cases concerning extradition to Tajikistan: Khodzhayev,
cited above; Khaydarov v. Russia (no. 21055/09, 20 May 2010); and Gaforov,
cited above, to the effect that diplomatic assurances were not sufficient to
conclude that a State would refrain from subjecting the individual extradited
to torture when various independent sources pointed to the existence of such
practice in that State.
Following the applicant’s disappearance in
Moscow, his representatives argued that the Russian authorities had been
responsible for his forcible transfer to Tajikistan and for the failure to
conduct an effective investigation of the matter. They found it particularly unacceptable
that the complaint about the applicant’s disappearance had eventually been sent
for examination to the Shchelkovo Investigation Division, whose servicemen
could have been involved in the applicant’s abduction. They referred in this connection
to a request to postpone the applicant’s release from custody faxed directly by
the Sughd regional prosecutor of Tajikistan, Sh. K., to the investigator
of the Shchelkovo Investigation Division, A. K., on 29 February 2012.
They also doubted that the Russian border control service did not keep a record
of persons crossing State borders, citing as proof of the availability of such
information the Government’s statement in another case pending consideration by
the Court. Lastly, they cast doubt on the Government’s allegation that the
remand centre’s CCTV footage, which would have been capable of shedding light
on the circumstances of the applicant’s disappearance, had not been preserved as
a result of a shortage of server memory.
B. The
Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
The Court has already found beyond reasonable
doubt that the applicant was secretly and unlawfully transferred from Russia to
Tajikistan by unknown persons in the wake of his release from SIZO-50/12
of Zelenograd on 29 March 2012. The issue of Russia’s responsibility under
Article 3 of the Convention for the applicant’s transfer to Tajikistan is
contingent on the existence at the material time of a well-founded risk that
the applicant might be subjected to ill-treatment in that country. The parties
disagreed on the latter point. The Court will therefore start its examination
by assessing whether the applicant’s forcible return to Tajikistan exposed him
to such a risk.
(a) Whether the applicant’s
return to Tajikistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to
Article 3
(i) General principles
It is the settled case-law of the Court that
expulsion or extradition by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under
Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the
individual concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], cited above, §
125, and Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 91, Series A
no. 161).
The assessment of whether there are substantial
grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of being subjected
to treatment in breach of Article 3 inevitably requires that the Court assess
the conditions in the destination country against the standards of that
Convention provision (see Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67,
ECHR 2005-I). Those standards imply that the ill-treatment which the
applicant alleges he will face if returned must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this
is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case (see Hilal
v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, § 60, ECHR 2001-II).
In determining whether it has been shown that
the applicant runs a real risk of suffering treatment proscribed by Article 3
if extradited, the Court will examine the issue in the light of all the
material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio
motu (see Saadi,
cited above, § 128). Since in cases of this kind the nature of the
Contracting States’ responsibility under Article 3 lies in the act of exposing
an individual to the risk of ill-treatment, the existence of the risk must be
assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known, or ought to
have been known, to the Contracting State at the time of the extradition; the
Court is not precluded, however, from having regard to information which comes
to light subsequent to the extradition. This may be of value in confirming or
refuting the assessment that has been made by the Contracting Party or the well-foundedness
or otherwise of an applicant’s fears (see Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden,
20 March 1991, §§ 75-76, Series A no. 201; Vilvarajah and Others v. the
United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, § 107, Series A no. 215; and Mamatkulov
and Askarov, cited above, § 69).
It is in principle for the applicant to adduce
evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing
that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed
to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N.
v. Finland, no. 38885/02, § 167, 26 July 2005). Where such
evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it
(see Ryabikin
v. Russia, no. 8320/04, § 112, 19 June 2008).
As regards the general situation in a
particular country, the Court can attach a certain importance to the
information contained in recent reports from independent international
human-rights-protection associations or governmental sources (see Saadi,
cited above, § 131, with further references). Furthermore, in assessing whether
there is a risk of ill-treatment in the requesting country, the Court
assesses the general situation in that country, taking into account any
indications of improvement or worsening of the human-rights situation in
general or in respect of a particular group or area that might be relevant to
the applicant’s personal circumstances (see, mutatis
mutandis, Shamayev
and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 337, ECHR
2005-III).
At the same time, reference to a general
problem concerning human rights observance in a particular country cannot alone
serve as a basis for refusal of extradition (see Dzhaksybergenov v. Ukraine,
no. 12343/10, § 37, 10 February 2011). Where the sources available to
the Court describe a general situation, an applicant’s specific allegations in
a particular case require corroboration by other evidence, with reference to
the individual circumstances substantiating his fears of ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov
and Askarov, cited above, § 73, and Dzhaksybergenov, cited
above, ibid.). The Court would not require evidence of such
individual circumstances only in the most extreme cases where the general
situation of violence in the country of destination is of such intensity as to
create a real risk that any removal to that country would necessarily violate
Article 3 (see N.A. v. the United
Kingdom, no. 25904/07, §§ 115-16, 17
July 2008, and
Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, § 217, 28 June
2011).
In a
case where assurances have been provided by the receiving State, those
assurances constitute a further relevant factor which the Court will consider.
However, assurances are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate
protection against the risk of ill-treatment. There is an obligation to examine
whether assurances provide, in their practical application, a sufficient
guarantee that the applicant will be protected against the risk of ill-treatment.
The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each
case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time (see Saadi,
cited above, § 148, and Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the
United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, § 187, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).
(ii) Application to the
present case
Having regard to the material in its possession
(see paragraphs 48-51 above), the Court firstly notes that the applicant
does not appear to have expressed, in a clear and unequivocal manner, his fear
of ill-treatment in his applications for refugee status and asylum. Nor
did he do so while challenging the relevant decisions before a higher FMS
authority and in court. Instead, before those authorities he chose to rely on
the allegation that the criminal proceedings against him were politically
motivated. In contrast, in the extradition proceedings the risk of
ill-treatment was one of the primary arguments put forward by the defence. The
Government submitted that the applicant’s arguments had been adequately
considered by the domestic courts and rejected.
The Court reiterates that, where domestic proceedings have taken place, as in the present
case, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts
for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts
to assess the evidence before them (see, among others, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, §§ 179-80,
24 March 2011).
This should not lead, however, to abdication of the Court’s
responsibility and a renunciation of all supervision of the result obtained
from using domestic remedies, otherwise the rights guaranteed by the Convention
would be devoid of any substance (see Open Door and
Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 29 October 1992, § 69, Series A no. 246-A,
and Scordino v. Italy (no. 1)
[GC], no. 36813/97, § 192, ECHR 2006-V). In
accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, the Court’s duty is to ensure the
observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the
Convention.
With reference to extradition or deportation,
this means that in cases where an applicant provides
reasoned grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information relied on
by the respondent Government, the Court must be satisfied that the assessment
made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently
supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other
reliable and objective sources, such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting
States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental
organisations (see Salah Sheekh v. the
Netherlands, no. 1948/04, § 136, 11 January 2007,
and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 120,
24 April 2008). Accordingly, the Court will first assess in
detail the relevant arguments raised by the applicant in the extradition
proceedings and the consideration given to them by the competent authorities.
(α) Domestic proceedings
The Court observes that
between September 2010 and January 2011 the applicant’s lawyers addressed the
Russian Prosecutor General’s Office on four occasions, setting out detailed
arguments against his extradition, supported with evidence from numerous
witness statements, trial records, reports of NGOs and United Nations agencies
and, not least, reference to the Court’s recent case-law concerning expulsion
or extradition to Tajikistan having been found to be in breach of Russia’s
obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. In addition, the Prosecutor
General’s Office received letters from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International about the applicant’s case, setting out specific reasons against his
extradition. The fact that the Prosecutor General’s Office sent the witness
statements to its Tajik counterpart for investigation and requested additional
diplomatic assurances demonstrates that the Prosecutor General’s Office took
heed of that material. Against that background, it is difficult for the Court
to understand that the extradition order signed on 16 February 2011 by the
Deputy Prosecutor General neither made an assessment of the risk of
ill-treatment faced by the applicant, nor mentioned the existing allegations of
such a risk (see paragraph 40 above). Given that no such assessment was made in
line with the requirements of the Convention, the Deputy Prosecutor General’s
conclusion that the international treaties to which the Russian Federation was
a party did not prevent the applicant’s extradition appears to be
unsubstantiated.
The Court acknowledges that in the proceedings
for judicial review of the extradition order, a more thorough approach was
adopted by the City Court. It is noted that in response to the applicant’s
allegations the City Court heard several witnesses for the defence, admitted to
the case file some of the NGO reports which had been submitted to it and did
not leave unanswered the defence’s motions for the examination of other
evidence. In addition, the Court acknowledges that in its ruling of 12 April
2011 the City Court took care to give some reasoning to its decision to reject
the evidence submitted by the defence (compare Gaforov, cited above, §§ 123-26, and Khodzhayev,
cited above, § 104, where the domestic
courts failed to mention the submissions of the defence or dismissed such
submissions without giving any reasons). Notwithstanding those positive
developments, the Court is unable to accept that the City Court conducted a
proper assessment of the risks faced by the applicant in Tajikistan, as
required by the Convention.
The Court notes at the outset that the City
Court mainly based its assessment of the general situation in Tajikistan on the
latter’s Constitution, certain domestic laws, and the fact that it was a member
of the United Nations and party to certain UN treaties, including the
Convention against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto. The court thereby reached the
conclusion that Tajikistan was a democracy abiding by the rule of law and
respectful of human rights. While the importance of the aforementioned national
texts and international instruments should not be understated, scarce attention
was paid to the question of their effectiveness and practical implementation in
Tajikistan. Indeed, the court’s conclusion that Tajikistan “had taken measures
to create mechanisms for the implementation [of the human rights instruments]”
appears to be rather vague and supported only by summary references to the
existence of the national ombudsman, a human rights commission headed by the Prime
Minister and the supervisory functions exercised by the Office of the
Prosecutor General.
The Court further notes the City Court’s failure
to take account of any information coming from independent sources, including
the reports by reputable international institutions. While the reports produced
by the UN agencies and an unidentified non-governmental organisation
covering the years before 2006 were rejected as out of date, no effort was made
to consider the available up-to-date information or to obtain further
information that might have allowed the court to verify whether the
improvements reported in the texts were reflected in reality. For example, no consideration
was given to the information contained in the recent reports by the Tajik
Republican Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, which were summarily rejected
as being “generic” (see paragraph 46 above). Nor did the City Court duly
consider the pertinent information included in the Court’s own judgments to
which the applicant had referred in the domestic proceedings. As a result, the court
ignored the consistent accounts exposing systematic violations of basic human rights
in Tajikistan, including torture in detention, and the specific examples of
such violations.
By contrast, the City Court readily accepted
the assurances provided by the Tajik authorities as a firm guarantee against
any risk of the applicant being subjected to ill-treatment after his
extradition. The Court reiterates that it is incumbent on the domestic courts to
examine whether such assurances provide, in their practical application, a
sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of
treatment prohibited by the Convention (see Saadi, cited above, § 148). Yet
the City Court did not assess the assurances from that perspective (compare
with the Court’s own assessment of those assurances in paragraphs 131-135 below).
Lastly, considering that the applicant made a prima
facie case in respect of the risk of his being subjected to ill-treatment in
Tajikistan, the Court is not satisfied that the City Court carried out an
adequate scrutiny of his personal circumstances. For example, the court did not
consider the nature and scale of the charges brought against the applicant,
which could put him in the same category as those in political opposition to
the Tajik authorities and, therefore, expose him to similar risks. The court
also limited its assessment of the witness statements to finding that “none of
them had indicated that the applicant would personally be subjected to
torture”. In so doing, the court confined itself to a formal examination of the
witness statements, failing to elaborate on one of the most critical aspects of
the case (see, mutatis mutandis, C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 1365/07,
§ 47, 24 April 2008).
Having regard to the above
and, in particular, to the lack of adequate examination of the general human-rights
situation in Tajikistan, the unqualified reliance on the assurances provided by
the Tajik authorities and the failure to give meaningful consideration to the
applicant’s personal circumstances, the Court finds that the authorities did
not carry out an independent and rigorous scrutiny of the applicant’s claim
that there existed substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 in his home country (see De Souza Ribeiro v. France
[GC], no. 22689/07,
§ 82, 13 December 2012). The Court finds nothing in
the decision of the Supreme Court of 2 June 2011 that would have cured the
above shortcomings on appeal.
(ß) The Court’s assessment of the risk to the
applicant
. The Court now has to conduct its own scrutiny of
whether, on the facts submitted to it, the applicant’s return to Tajikistan
subjected him to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court takes cognisance of the information
submitted by the respondent Government concerning the involvement of Tajikistan
in the major international instruments for the protection of human rights. According
to that information, some of which was transmitted to the Russian Government by
the Tajik authorities themselves, Tajikistan was increasing that protection, in
particular by giving priority to human-rights issues at the State level, by
setting up the post of ombudsman and by strengthening criminal sanctions
against perpetrators of torture. On the other hand, the material provided to
the Court contained little to show that the declared principles and legal norms
were being effectively implemented in practice.
By contrast, the Court notes the continued and
overwhelming criticism expressed in both domestic and international reports
which, for the past few years, have consistently demonstrated the widespread,
systematic use of torture by law-enforcement authorities of Tajikistan and the
impunity of State officials. It has already examined the situation in several
cases in which the applicants were extradited or forcibly returned to that
country, and noted that it gave rise to serious concerns (see Khodzhayev, § 97;
Gaforov, §§ 130-31; Khaydarov, § 104; and Iskandarov,
§ 129, all cited above). In deciding all those cases in 2010, the Court
concluded that at the material time the applicants had faced a serious risk of
torture or ill-treatment on account of criminal charges connected with their
political or religious views or activities in Tajikistan.
While the Tajik authorities suggested that such
human-rights violations remained in the past, the materials submitted in the
present case and those otherwise available to the Court do not hint at any tangible
progress over the last two years. The most recent reports dating from 2011 and 2012
tend to corroborate a continued practice of torture and other ill-treatment
by law-enforcement officers (see various sources cited in paragraph 82 above). The Court finds nothing in the respondent Government’s submissions to refute
those recent reports or otherwise to attest to any perceptible improvement of
the situation in Tajikistan.
However, as the Court has already stated above,
the mere reference to a general problem concerning observance of human rights
in a particular country cannot alone serve as a basis for refusal of
extradition, save in the most extreme circumstances. The applicant’s specific
allegations in a particular case require corroboration by other evidence with
reference to the individual circumstances substantiating his fears of
ill-treatment. In the Court’s view, the need for such evidence is all the
greater in a case such as the present one, given that the charges pending
against the applicant in Tajikistan appear to be of a common criminal nature
(see Sharipov v. Russia, no. 18414/10, §§ 36-37, 11 October 2011). In the
absence of any meaningful assessment of the applicant’s circumstances by the
Russian authorities, the Court has no other choice than to examine the facts
which corroborate the applicant’s account, including the statements of the witnesses
(see paragraphs 19-27 above).
The Court notes firstly that the witnesses were
consistent in their statements over time. Similarly, the way in which those
statements were reported by hearsay witnesses and the media was also consistent.
Having regard to their substance and the manner in which they were written and
collected, the Court has no reason to doubt their authenticity. It also finds the
accounts of brutality contained in those statements to be in line with the
picture painted in the above-mentioned reports on the situation in Tajikistan,
including those dating back to the time when the investigation of the “Isfara case”
took place.
The Court notes secondly that the applicant was
charged with large-scale economic crimes and organising criminal group activity,
crimes that are considered to be serious or particularly serious in the
majority of States, including Tajikistan. He was also the principal figure in a
criminal case that had already resulted in the conviction of more than thirty individuals,
many of whom had claimed in one form or another that they had been tortured to falsely
incriminate the applicant. The Court considers that risk to have been further
raised by the applicant’s exposure of the malpractice of the Tajik
investigative bodies by making public the witnesses’ accounts of torture (see Kolesnik,
cited above, § 70, and N. v.
Finland, cited above, § 165).
The Tajik authorities’ obvious stake in a
favourable outcome of the proceedings in this case heightened the risk of the applicant
being subjected to torture with a view to extracting confessions from him. The persistent
requests of the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office to keep the applicant in
detention in Russia on new grounds and the latter’s ensuing forcible transfer
to Tajikistan support the argument that the Tajik authorities had high stakes
in the applicant’s prosecution, which have put him in a particularly vulnerable
position.
Considering the above, the Court takes the view
that the applicant’s personal circumstances, coupled with the general situation
in Tajikistan, were sufficient to infer that the risk of ill-treatment faced by
him was real and comparable to the risk the Court had previously found in
respect of the applicants who were prosecuted in Tajikistan on account of their
political or religious activities (see Khodzhayev; Gaforov; Khaydarov;
and Iskandarov, all cited above; and compare Sharipov, cited
above).
It remains to be considered
whether the risk to which the applicant would have been exposed if extradited was
alleviated by the diplomatic assurances provided by the Tajik authorities to
the Russian Federation. It is noteworthy that the diplomatic assurances
contained in the letters of 1 September 2010 and 26 January 2011 (see
paragraphs 30 and 39 above) were more specific than those the Court had considered
in the previous cases regarding extradition to Tajikistan. The assurances stated
that the applicant would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and that staff members of the Russian diplomatic corps
and Prosecutor General’s Office would be able to visit him at any time during
the trial and after conviction and to see the conditions of his detention
(compare also with the more general assurances provided by other States in the
cases of Saadi, cited above, § 55, and Klein v. Russia, no. 24268/08, § 16, 1 April 2010).
The Court observes in this respect, however, that
Tajikistan is not a Contracting State to the Convention (compare, among others,
Gasayev v. Spain (dec.), no. 48514/06, 17 February 2009), nor did
its authorities demonstrate the existence of an effective system of legal protection
against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of the
Contracting States. Quite the contrary, as demonstrated above, the Tajik
authorities are reluctant to investigate allegations of torture and to punish
those responsible. The Court’s concerns about the Tajik authorities’ willingness
to abide by domestic and international law are further aggravated by the
recurrent incidents of disappearance of Tajik nationals in Russia and their
subsequent secret repatriation to Tajikistan by circumvention of the existing extradition
procedure in both those countries (see Iskandarov, cited above,
§ 113; Abdulkhakov, cited above, §§ 124-27; and Savriddin
Dzhurayev, cited above, §§ 133-38 and 203-04). The
applicant’s forcible repatriation in the present case confirms the persistence
of this manifestly unlawful pattern. In these circumstances the Tajik
authorities’ assurances that the applicant would be treated in accordance with
the Convention cannot be given any significant weight.
Moreover, it has not been demonstrated
before the Court that Tajikistan’s commitment to guaranteeing access to the
applicant by Russian diplomatic staff and the staff of the Russian Prosecutor
General’s Office would lead to effective protection against torture and
ill-treatment in practical terms. Indeed, no argument was presented that the
aforementioned staff enjoyed the necessary independence and were in possession
of the expertise required for effective follow-up of the Tajik authorities’
compliance with their undertakings. Nor was there any guarantee that they would
be able to speak to the applicant without witnesses (compare Chentiev and
Ibragimov v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 21022/08 and 51946/08, 14 September
2010). In addition, their potential involvement was not supported by any
practical mechanism setting out, for instance, the procedure for lodging complaints
by the applicant or for their unfettered access to detention facilities
(compare Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, § 204).
The Russian authorities did not seek to clarify
the assurances on those points (compare Gasayev, cited above), nor did
they refer to any precedents that would have allowed the Court to establish
that Russian officials had been allowed to visit detainees in Tajikistan in
similar circumstances and that such visits had been effective in addressing any
complaints. The weakness of the assurances on those points is further demonstrated,
in the Court’s view, by the absence to date of any information that the
designated Russian officials have taken steps to visit the applicant following
his transfer to Tajikistan or otherwise to ascertain that he is being treated
in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.
In view of all those elements,
the Court cannot accept the Government’s assertion that the assurances provided
by the Tajik authorities in respect of the applicant’s treatment in Tajikistan
were sufficient to exclude the risk of his exposure to ill-treatment in that
country (compare to the conclusion reached by the Court in Othman (Abu
Qatada), cited above, § 207). The Court therefore concludes that the
applicant’s forcible return to Tajikistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
(b) Whether the Russian authorities
are responsible for a breach of Article 3 on account of the applicant’s
forcible transfer to Tajikistan
(i) General principles
The Court reiterates that the obligation on
Contracting Parties, under Article 1 of the Convention, to secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention,
taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed
to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment
administered by private individuals (see El Masri, cited above, § 198, and Mahmut Kaya v.
Turkey, no. 22535/93, § 115, ECHR 2000-III). Those measures
should provide effective protection, in particular, of vulnerable persons and
include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had
or ought to have had knowledge (see Z and Others v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001-V, and, mutatis
mutandis, Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October
1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, pp. 3159-60, § 115).
Furthermore, the above
provisions require by implication that there should be an effective official
investigation into any arguable claim of torture or ill-treatment by State
agents. Such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification
and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition
of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite
its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible
in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their
control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28
October 1998, § 102, Reports 1998-VIII, and El Masri,
cited above, § 182).
The investigation into serious
allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that
the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened
and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their
investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions (see Assenov and
Others, cited above, § 103; Batı and Others v. Turkey,
nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 136, ECHR 2004-IV (extracts); and El
Masri, cited above, § 183). They must take all reasonable steps available
to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter
alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see Tanrıkulu v. Turkey
[GC], no. 23763/94, § 104, ECHR 1999-IV; Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93,
§ 89, 14 December 2000; and El Masri, cited above, § 183). The
investigation should be independent from the executive in both institutional
and practical terms (see Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, §§ 83-84, Reports
1998-IV; Oğur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594/93, §§ 91-92,
ECHR 1999-III; and Mehmet Emin Yüksel v. Turkey, no. 40154/98, § 37,
20 July 2004) and allow the victim to participate effectively in the
investigation in one form or another (see, mutatis mutandis, Oğur,
cited above, § 92, and El Masri, cited above, §§ 184-85).
In the Court’s view, all the above principles
logically apply to the situation of an individual’s exposure to a real and
imminent risk of torture and ill-treatment through his transfer by any person
to another State. Where the authorities of a State party are informed of such a
real and immediate risk, they have an obligation under the Convention to take,
within the scope of their powers, such preventive operational measures that,
judged reasonably, might be expected to avoid that risk (see, mutatis
mutandis, Osman, cited above, § 116), and to conduct an effective
investigation into any such incident in accordance with the principles set out
in paragraphs 137-138 above.
(ii) Application to the present case
The applicant’s representatives argued that the
highly suspicious events surrounding the applicant’s disappearance in Russia
and his ensuing return to Tajikistan demonstrated that Russian State officials had
been passively or actively involved in that operation. They concluded that
Russia should be found responsible for a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention on that account.
The Court agrees with the
applicant’s representatives that the dubious grounds invoked for holding the
applicant in continuous detention after 27 February 2012, the equally
suspicious circumstances of his release in Zelenograd on 29 March 2012, which immediately
led to his forcible transfer to Tajikistan, and the authorities’ flagrant
failure to elucidate the incident may be held to infer that the applicant was transferred
to Tajikistan in accordance with a plan involving Russian State officials.
At the same time, the Court notes that the
possible involvement of State agents is not easily traceable in the circumstances
of the present case, given in particular the time that elapsed between the
applicant’s disappearance and his arrest in Tajikistan, and the lack of a specific
credible account of his forcible transfer to that country (compare Iskandarov,
Abdulkhakov and Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, in which the
applicants were forcibly transferred to Tajikistan by aircraft from Moscow or
the surrounding region). The applicant’s movements after he left the remand
centre in Zelenograd on 29 March 2012 and resurfaced in the hands of the
Tajik authorities a week later are unknown. Having found the official version
of the applicant’s return implausible (see paragraphs 89-95 above), the
Court has never been provided with an alternative credible account of how and
when he returned to Tajikistan and the role which Russian State officials might
have played in that respect. While the applicant cannot be blamed for not
providing further elements, being under the total control of the Tajik
authorities, the alleged involvement of Russian State officials in the
operation needs nonetheless to be corroborated by specific information from
other sources.
Bearing in mind its natural
limits, as an international court, when it comes to conducting effective fact-finding,
the Court reiterates that its proceedings in the present case were largely contingent
on Russia’s cooperation, in line with its undertaking, under Article 38 of the
Convention, to furnish all necessary facilities for the establishment of the
facts. The Government’s failure to comply with their obligations in that
respect (see paragraphs 162-165 below) have made it difficult for the
Court to elucidate the exact circumstances of the applicant’s forcible return
to Tajikistan. While the authorities’ attitude allows it to draw additional
inferences in favour of the assertion made by the applicants’ representatives, the
Court does not find it necessary to establish whether and by what means Russian
State agents were involved in the impugned operation, since in any event the
respondent State has to be found responsible for a breach of its positive
obligations under Article 3 for the following reasons.
First, the Court finds it
indisputable that the Russian authorities failed to protect the applicant
against the real and immediate risk of forcible transfer to Tajikistan and
ill-treatment in that country. It goes beyond any doubt that the Russian authorities
were well aware - or ought to have been aware - of such a risk when they
decided to release the applicant from SIZO-50/12 of Zelenograd. The
applicant’s background, the Tajik authorities’ behaviour in his case, and not
least the recurrent similar incidents of unlawful transfers from Russia to
Tajikistan to which the Russian authorities had been insistently alerted by both
the Court and the Committee of Ministers (see paragraphs 62 and 64 above) were worrying
enough to trigger the authorities’ special vigilance and require appropriate measures
of protection corresponding to this special situation. The Government confirmed
that the warning message mentioning, inter alia, the present case had
been duly conveyed to all competent law-enforcement authorities on 3 February 2012
(see paragraph 63 above). The authorities nonetheless failed to take any
measure to protect the applicant at the critical moment of his unexpected
release from the remand centre on 29 March 2012. Even more striking is the fact
that the authorities’ deliberate failure to inform the applicant’s
representative in due time about the sudden modification of the criminal charges
and the planned release from detention (see paragraphs 67-68 above) deprived
him of any chance of being protected by his representative and next-of-kin. Nor
did the competent authorities take any measures to protect the applicant after
having received insistent official requests to that effect by the applicant’s
representatives immediately after his disappearance on 29 March 2012 (see
paragraph 71 above). As a result, the applicant was withdrawn from the
Russian jurisdiction and the Tajik authorities’ aim of having him extradited to
Tajikistan was achieved in a manifestly unlawful manner.
Secondly, the authorities did not conduct an
effective investigation into the applicant’s disappearance and unlawful
transfer from Moscow to Tajikistan. The Government’s submissions in that
respect were limited to the information that the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation was continuing consecutive rounds of preliminary inquiries,
while repeatedly refusing to open a criminal investigation into the case for
absence of corpus delicti and quashing their own decisions time and
again. The investigation thus appears to be stalled in the Zelenograd
Investigation Division without having produced any tangible result. A year
after the incident, the only investigative measure the Court has been informed
of was a request to check the information about the illegal crossing of the
Russian State border by the applicant or his crossing the border against his
will. According to the Government, that request was sent by the Zelenograd
Investigation Division to the State Border Service of the FSB in January 2013,
that is, nine months after the impugned events (see paragraph 80 above). The
authorities also gave every appearance of wanting to withhold valuable evidence
- CCTV footage from the remand centre - satisfying themselves with an
uncorroborated reference to a technical failure (see paragraph 81 above). Given
the Government’s attitude on those points and the scarce information they provided,
the Court accepts the view of the applicants’ representatives that the
authorities made no attempt at investigating their arguable complaint as
required by Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court therefore concludes that the Russian
Federation has breached its positive obligations to protect the applicant
against his exposure to a real and immediate risk of torture and ill-treatment
in Tajikistan and to conduct an effective domestic investigation into his
unlawful and forcible transfer to that country. In the Court’s view, Russia’s
compliance with those obligations was of particular importance in the present
case, as it would have disproved an egregious situation that so far tends to reveal
a practice of deliberate circumvention of the domestic extradition procedure
and the interim measures issued by the Court (see paragraphs 62 and 64 above). The Court reiterates that the continuation of such incidents in the respondent
State amounts to a flagrant disregard for the rule of law and entails the most
serious implications for the Russian domestic legal order, the effectiveness of
the Convention system and the authority of the Court (see Savriddin
Dzhurayev, cited above, § 257).
In view of the foregoing,
there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the
applicant’s forced repatriation to Tajikistan.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 13 of
the Convention of a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia in respect of
his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. Article 13 reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”
While considering this complaint admissible,
the Court notes that it raises the same issues as those already examined under
Article 3 of the Convention. In view of its reasoning and findings made under the
latter provision (see notably paragraphs 115-121 above), the Court does
not consider it necessary to deal separately with the applicant’s complaint
under Article 13 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant’s representatives complained that
by repatriating the applicant or by aiding his repatriation to Tajikistan
despite the interim measure issued by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, Russia had failed to comply with its undertaking under Article 34 of the
Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of
individual application.
Article 34 of the Convention provides:
“The Court may receive applications from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim
of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth
in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”
Rule
39 of the Rules of Court provides:
“1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President
may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own
motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should
be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the
proceedings before it.
2. Where it is considered appropriate, immediate
notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the
Committee of Ministers.
3. The Chamber may request information from the
parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure
it has indicated.”
The Government argued that the applicant’s undertaking
not to leave town, which he had signed on 29 March 2012, had not restricted his
movement and had allowed him to make use of the right guaranteed by Article 34
of the Convention.
The applicant’s representatives maintained the
complaint.
The Court reiterates that, by virtue of Article
34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or
omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual
application, which has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the
Convention system. According to the Court’s established case-law, a respondent State’s
failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of that right (see
Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, §§ 102 and 125, and Abdulkhakov,
cited above, § 222).
The Court cannot emphasise enough the special
importance attached to interim measures in the Convention system. Their purpose
is not only to carry out an effective examination of the application but also
to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is
effective; such indications subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to
supervise execution of the final judgment. Interim measures thus enable the
State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with the final judgment
of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of the
Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, § 125; Shamayev
and Others v. Georgia and Russia, cited above, § 473; Aoulmi v. France,
no. 50278/99, § 108, ECHR 2006-I (extracts); and Ben Khemais v. Italy,
no. 246/07, § 82, 24 February 2009).
The crucial significance of
interim measures is further highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them,
as a matter of principle, in truly exceptional cases on the basis of a rigorous
examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most of these, the applicants
face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of grave,
irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. This
vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system not only
underpins their binding legal effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the
established case-law, but also commands the utmost importance to be attached to
the question of the States Parties’ compliance with the Court’s indications in
that respect (see, inter alia, the firm position on that point
expressed by the States Parties in the Izmir Declaration and by the Committee
of Ministers in its Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2010)83 in the above-mentioned case
of Ben Khemais). Any laxity on this question would unacceptably weaken
protection of the core rights in the Convention and would not be compatible
with its values and spirit (see Soering, cited above, § 88); it
would also be inconsistent with the fundamental importance of the right of
individual application and, more generally, undermine the authority and
effectiveness of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European
public order (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, §§ 100 and 125,
and, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary
objections), 23 March 1995, § 75, Series A no. 310).
On 26 May 2011 the Court asked the respondent
Government, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the
proceedings before the Court, not to extradite the applicant to Tajikistan
until further notice. On 3 February 2012 the Office of the Representative
of the Russian Federation at the Court informed the Prosecutor’s General’s
Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the FMS and the FSB of the interim
measures issued by the Court, inter alia, in respect of the applicant
(see paragraph 63 above). Notwithstanding that request, the applicant was
forcibly repatriated to Tajikistan between 29 March and 7 April 2012.
As a result, the Tajik authorities’ aim of extraditing the applicant, which the
interim measure had sought to prevent pending the Court proceedings, was fully achieved.
Although that was done by circumvention of the domestic extradition procedure,
the applicant’s forced repatriation to Tajikistan nonetheless frustrated both
the spirit and the purpose of the interim measure indicated in the present case
(see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806/05, § 91, 10 March 2009, and Zokhidov
v. Russia, cited above, § 205).
The Court has already found the Russian
authorities responsible for their failure to protect the applicant against his
exposure to a real and immediate risk of torture and ill-treatment in Tajikistan,
which made possible his forced repatriation (paragraphs 144-147 above). This
brings the Court to conclude that the responsibility for the breach of the
interim measure also lies with the Russian authorities. Indeed, the Court
cannot conceive of allowing the respondent State to circumvent an interim
measure such as the one indicated in the present case by using another domestic
procedure for the applicant’s removal to the country of destination or, even
more alarmingly, by allowing him to be arbitrarily removed to that country in a
manifestly unlawful manner (see Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above,
§ 217). By failing to comply with their positive obligation to protect the
applicant, the Russian authorities rendered themselves responsible for his
exposure to a real risk of ill-treatment in Tajikistan and for preventing
the Court from securing to him the practical and effective benefit of his right
under Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court therefore concludes that Russia is
responsible for the breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court in the
present case. Accordingly, there has been a breach of Article 34 of the
Convention.
V. OBSERVANCE OF ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION
When requesting new factual information and observations
on the applicant’s disappearance and forced repatriation to Tajikistan (see
paragraph 7 above), the Court asked the Government of its own motion whether
they considered that a lack of conclusive investigation of - and effective
reaction to - the incidents at issue in the present case and other similar
cases (see paragraphs 62 and 64 above) amounted to a failure on the part of Russia
to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention. Article 38 of
the Convention provides:
“The Court shall examine the case together with the
representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for
the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall
furnish all necessary facilities.”
The Government provided no specific answer to
that question beyond some limited information about the on-going domestic
inquiries (see paragraphs 79-80 above).
The Court reiterates that under
Article 38 of the Convention the Contracting States undertake to furnish all
necessary facilities to the Court to make possible a proper and effective
examination of applications. The Convention organs have repeatedly emphasised
that obligation as being of fundamental importance for the proper and effective
functioning of the Convention system (see, among others, Tanrıkulu,
cited above, § 70, and Committee of Ministers’ Resolutions ResDH(2001)66 and
ResDH(2006)45). This obligation requires the Contracting States to furnish all necessary
facilities to the Court, whether it is conducting a fact-finding
investigation or performing its general duties as regards the examination of
applications. A failure on a Government’s part to submit such information which
is in their hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to
the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicants’
allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a
respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention (see Medova
v. Russia, no. 25385/04, § 76, 15 January 2009, and Timurtaş
v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, §§ 66 and 70, ECHR 2000-VI).
The Court has already noted that the present case
involved controversial factual questions which could only be elucidated through
the genuine cooperation of the respondent Government in line with Article 38
of the Convention (see paragraphs 89-96 and 141-143 above). On
17 April 2012 the Court put a number of detailed factual questions
and requested the relevant domestic documents, including the decisions to open
or refuse to open criminal proceedings on account of the applicant’s disappearance
and alleged forcible transfer to Tajikistan. However, the Government submitted only
cursory answers referring to pending inquiries and containing virtually no
element of substance. They also failed to provide the Court with any of the domestic
decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation or quashing such decisions by
a higher authority. Moreover, they failed to advance before the Court any
reasons for not sending the information requested.
The Court reiterates that Article 38 commands
the respondent State to submit the requested
material in its entirety, if the Court so requests, and properly to account for
any missing elements (see Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia,
no. 25091/07, §§ 299-300, 26 April, and Davydov and Others
v. Ukraine, nos. 17674/02 and 39081/02, § 167 et seq., 1 July 2010). The Government did not comply with that
obligation, thus further complicating the examination of the present case by
the Court. In the Court’s view, the Government’s failure to cooperate on such a
crucial point, viewed in the context of their evasive answers to specific
factual questions and coupled with the severe investigative shortcomings at the
domestic level, highlighted the authorities’ unwillingness to uncover
the truth regarding the circumstances of the case (see El Masri, cited
above, §§ 191-93).
The Court concludes that the Russian
Federation’s failure to provide it with the relevant information and documents amounts
to a disregard for its duty to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the
Convention.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the appeal court,
which had reviewed the first three decisions of the Khamovnicheskiy District
Court to detain him and to extend the term of his detention, had not been
sufficiently prompt in examining his complaints. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention
is not lawful.”
The Government contested that argument.
The applicant maintained his complaint. He
added that the delay in the examination of his appeal against the decision of
31 August 2010 had not been justified, as the Russian Code of Criminal
Procedure did not prohibit using facsimile signatures on notes of appeal (see
paragraph 52 above).
A. Admissibility
The above complaint was first raised in
substance before the Court on 23 May 2011. Bearing in mind the six-month
requirement laid down in Article 35 § 1, the Court considers
that it is not competent to examine the complaint concerning the extension
orders upheld on 6 October and 8 November 2010.
At the same time, the Court observes that the
applicant complied with the six-month rule in respect of his complaint relating
to the appeal proceedings concerning the detention order of 21 February 2011,
which was upheld on 23 March 2011. The Court considers that the complaint in
that respect is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35
§ 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it
inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention proclaims the right to a speedy judicial decision concerning the
lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful (see
Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, § 68, ECHR 2000-III).
Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second
level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention.
However, where domestic law provides for appeal, the appellate body must also
comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 4, for
instance as concerns the speediness of the review in appeal proceedings. At the
same time, the standard of “speediness” is less stringent when it comes to proceedings
before a court of appeal (see Lebedev
v. Russia, no. 4493/04, § 96, 25 October 2007, and Abdulkhakov,
cited above, § 198).
Although the number of days taken by the
relevant proceedings is obviously an important element, it is not necessarily
in itself decisive for the question of whether a decision has been given with
the requisite speed (see Merie
v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 664/05, 20 September 2007). What is
taken into account is the diligence shown by the authorities, the delay
attributable to the applicant and any factors causing delay for which the State
cannot be held responsible (see Jablonski
v. Poland, no. 33492/96, §§ 91-94, 21 December 2000,
and G.B.
v. Switzerland, no. 27426/95, §§ 34-39,
30 November 2000). The question whether the right to a speedy decision has
been respected must thus be determined in the light of the circumstances of
each case (see Rehbock
v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, § 84, ECHR 2000-XII, and Abdulkhakov,
cited above, § 199).
Turning to the present case, the Court observes
that the note of appeal of the extension order of 21 February 2011 arrived at
the District Court on 28 February 2011 and was examined by the City Court after
two hearings on 23 March 2011, that is, twenty-three days after its receipt by
the District Court (see paragraph 55 above).
The Court notes at the outset that the impugned
delay is very close to those which it has already found to be in violation of
the “speediness” requirement in similar cases against Russia (see, among the
most recent authorities, Niyazov v. Russia, no. 27843/11, §§ 155-64, 16
October 2012, and K. v. Russia, no. 69235/11, §§ 100-01, 23 May 2013). It further
notes that neither the applicant nor his counsel
contributed to the length of the appeal proceedings (contrast Lebedev,
cited above, §§ 99-100, and Fedorenko v. Russia, no.
39602/05, § 81, 20 September 2011).
It appears, to the contrary, that the major
part of the delay - some twenty-one days - related to the period of time in
which the case file was being transferred from the first-instance court to the
appeal court. It therefore follows that the entire
length of the appeal proceedings is attributable to the domestic authorities,
for which the Government did not provide any explanation. The Court notes in that respect that the District Court
and the City Court were geographically very close, which should, in principle, have
contributed to swifter communication between them - in particular, as far as
the transfer of the case materials or the scheduling of appeal hearings were
concerned.
176. It
does not appear, furthermore, that any complex issues were involved in the
determination of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention by the appeal
court (compare Lebedev, cited above, § 102). Nor was it argued that
proper review of the applicant’s detention had required, for instance, the
collection of additional observations and documents.
. Having
regard to the above circumstances and to its case-law mentioned above,
the Court considers that the delay of twenty-three
days in examining the applicant’s appeal against the detention order of 21
February 2011 was incompatible with the “speediness” requirement of
Article 5 § 4.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
VII. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant also complained under Article 5 §
1 of unlawful detention and under Article 6 § 1 about the City Court’s refusal
to admit certain evidence in the proceedings for judicial review of the
extradition order.
. However,
in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out
in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that the application in this
part is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of
the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
In his claim for just satisfaction submitted
before his repatriation to Tajikistan, the applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR)
in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued that he had suffered severe
distress as a result of being held in detention and facing a real risk of being
extradited to Tajikistan once the extradition order had been upheld by the
courts. After the applicant’s repatriation to Tajikistan that claim was
supplemented by his representatives, who requested that the award be raised to
EUR 50,000 to include compensation for the breach of the applicant’s
rights under Articles 3 and 34 of the Convention.
The Government disputed the initial claim for
EUR 25,000 as excessive and suggested that in the event of finding a
violation, such a finding would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
The Court reiterates that Article 41 empowers
it to afford the injured party such just satisfaction as appears to be
appropriate. It observes that it has found several violations of the Convention
in the present case, most of which should be viewed as extremely serious. As a
result, the applicant undeniably suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be
made good by the mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an
equitable basis, the Court grants the applicant’s claim in part and awards him
EUR 30,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on that amount.
Noting the attempts made by the applicant’s
representatives to resume contact with the applicant and having regard to his
extremely vulnerable situation in Tajikistan, the Court considers it
appropriate that the amount awarded to him by way of just satisfaction be held
for him in trust by his representatives.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed 600,000 Russian
roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 15,000 at the material time) for
representation in the domestic proceedings and before the Court by Ms Stavitskaya
and EUR 1,900 for the costs and expenses arising from his representation
by Ms Ryabinina before the Court. In support of the claim, the applicant
submitted an agreement for legal assistance with Ms Stavitskaya for the
above amount dated 31 August 2010 and a lawyer’s bill for EUR 1,900 signed
by Ms Ryabinina on 6 December 2011, representing nineteen hours of work at
an hourly rate of EUR 100.
The Government contested the claim as
unsubstantiated. In particular, they submitted that there was no proof in the
case file that the expenses had indeed been paid by the applicant.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum (see, among many other authorities, Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI).
It also observes that costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings
with a view to preventing the alleged violations of the Convention from
occurring are also recoverable under Article 41 (see, for example, I.J.L.
and Others v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction),
nos. 29522/95, 30056/96 and 30574/96, § 18, 25 September 2001).
The Court observes that the applicant was
represented by Ms Stavitskaya at every stage in the domestic proceedings,
including those determining his refugee status and right to asylum, and the
extradition proceedings. He was also represented by Ms Stavitskaya and
Ms Ryabinina before the Court. It further notes that the case involved a
great amount of work by the legal representatives, including the collection of
evidence and, subsequently, several rounds of observations before the Court
following the applicant’s disappearance and forcible repatriation to
Tajikistan. At the same time, the Court has not received an itemised bill of
costs for the applicant’s representation by Ms Stavitskaya, making it difficult
to ascertain the necessity and reasonableness of the expenditure in that
respect. It also notes that certain complaints have been declared inadmissible.
Having regard to its case-law and deciding on
an equitable basis, the Court considers it appropriate to award EUR 12,000 to cover
the cost of the applicant’s representation by Ms Stavitskaya and EUR 1,900
to cover the cost of his representation by Ms Ryabinina, together with any
value-added tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on those amounts.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares
the complaints concerning the applicant’s exposure to the real and immediate
risk of torture and ill-treatment in Tajikistan, the lack of an effective
domestic remedy in this respect and the lack of speedy judicial review in
respect of the detention order of 21 February 2011 admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has
been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the
applicant’s forced repatriation to Tajikistan;
3. Holds
that there is no need for separate examination of the complaint under Article 13
of the Convention;
Holds that the respondent
State has breached its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention on
account of its failure to comply with the interim measures issued by the Court;
Holds that the
respondent State failed to comply with its duty under Article 38 of the
Convention to furnish all necessary facilities for effective examination of the
application by the Court;
Holds that there has been a
violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the delay
in examining the applicant’s appeals against the detention order of 21 February
2011;
7. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros), plus
any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, which sum
is to be held by the applicant’s representatives before the Court in trust for
the applicant;
(ii) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros) and EUR
1,900 (one thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicant on those amounts, in respect of the costs and expenses, to be
converted into the currency of the respondent State
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement and paid
to the bank accounts of the applicant’s representatives, Ms Stavitskaya
and Ms Ryabinina, respectively;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 October 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle
Berro Lefèvre
Registrar President