European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

SECOND SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF FAZLI KAYA v. TURKEY

 

(Application no. 24820/05)

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

17 September 2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.




In the case of Fazlı Kaya v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Guido Raimondi, President,
          Danutė Jočienė,
          Dragoljub Popović,
          András Sajó,
          Işıl Karakaş,
          Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
          Helen Keller, judges
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 27 August 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE




  The case originated in an application (no. 24820/05) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Fazlı Kaya (“the applicant”), on 13 June 2005.




  The applicant was represented by Mr Ö. Kılıç, a lawyer practising in Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.




  On 18 January 2011 the application was declared partly inadmissible and the complaints concerning the lack of legal assistance during the applicant’s police custody and his inability to question some of the witnesses were communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE




  The applicant was born in 1960 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Edirne.




  In June 1999, E.G. and A.S.S. were taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the TDP (Revolutionary Party of Turkey, Türkiye Devrim Partisi). In their respective police statements, both of them stated that the applicant had been providing logistical support to members in rural areas and E.G. further maintained that the applicant had been one of the leaders of the organisation. Again in 1999, İ.H., who had also been arrested for membership of the illegal organisation, identified the applicant from his photos and stated that the applicant had been providing cell phones for members of the organisation in rural areas.




  On 26 March 2001 the applicant was taken into police custody in Istanbul, on suspicion of membership the TDP. He was subsequently transferred to Giresun for interrogation.




  On 28 March 2001 the applicant participated in an identification parade and was identified by two persons, namely B.B. and İ.H., as one of the leaders of the said illegal organisation. On 1 April 2001 the applicant was questioned by the police in the absence of a lawyer and denied all the accusations against him.




  On 2 April 2001 the applicant was questioned by the Giresun public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. Later on the same day, he was further questioned by the investigating judge, still in the absence of a lawyer. Both before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the charges against him. At the end of the questioning, the judge ordered his pre-trial detention.




  On 27 April 2001 the public prosecutor at the Erzurum State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant and nine others of membership of an illegal organisation.




  During the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer, and in his defence submissions he categorically denied all the accusations against him. Although two of the co-accused, namely B.B. and İ.H., identified him as one of the leaders of the TDP, the applicant denied the allegations and stated that he had never seen them before. The applicant maintained that B.B. and İ.H. had been giving false information about him, in order to be able to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959).




  At the hearing of 5 June 2001, the police statements of A.S.S., E.G. and İ.H dated June 1999 were read out to the applicant. The applicant contested the allegations, and claimed that he was innocent.




  On 14 November 2002 the Erzurum State Security Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code. In delivering its decision, amongst other items of evidence, the trial court relied on the statements of the co-accused, and also took into consideration the statements of İ.H., E.G. and A.S.S.




  On 7 May 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court.




  The case resumed before the Erzurum State Security Court and on 6 April 2004 the court once again found the applicant guilty of membership of an illegal organisation and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the court relied on the statements of E.G., A.S.S., İ.H. and B.B. and found it established that the applicant was a member of the illegal organisation.




  On 1 December 2004 the Court of Cassation, after holding a hearing on the merits of the case, rejected the applicant’s appeal. This decision was deposited with the registry of the first instance court on 5 January 2005.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW




  A description of the relevant domestic law regarding legal assistance in police custody may be found in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC] no. 36391/02, §§ 27-31, 27 November 2008).




  Furthermore, Law no. 4959 on the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act applies to members of terrorist organisations who surrender to the authorities without armed resistance, either directly, on their own initiative, or through intermediaries, those who can be considered to have left a terrorist organisation, and those who have been arrested. The law also applies to those who, despite being aware of the aims pursued by the terrorist organisation, provided shelter, food, weapons, ammunition or any other kind of assistance. An important feature of the rehabilitation law is that it provides the possibility of reducing the sentences of those who wish to take advantage of the law by providing relevant information and documents on the structure and activities of the terrorist organisation.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION




  The applicant alleged that his defence rights had been violated as he had been denied access to a lawyer during his police custody. He further maintained that he had not been given an opportunity to question some of the witnesses. In this respect, he relied on Article 6 § 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:

“3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ...

 (c)  to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

(d)  to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...”




  The Government contested that argument.

A.  Admissibility




  The Government argued that the application had been introduced outside the six-month time-limit. In this respect, they stated that the Court of Cassation’s decision had been pronounced on 1 December 2004, whereas the application was introduced with the Court on 13 June 2005, more than six months later.




  The Court notes that the decision of the Court of Cassation was deposited with the Registry of the first-instance court on 5 January 2005. It reiterates that where an applicant is not entitled to be served ex officio with a written copy of the final domestic decision and if he or she was represented by a lawyer during the domestic proceedings, as in the present case, the date on which the final domestic decision was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court should be taken as the starting-point under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, being the latest date by which the applicant or his or her representative was definitively able to find out about the content of the final decision (see İpek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39706/98, 7 November 2000, Okul v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45358/99, 4 September 2003). Accordingly, in the present case the applicant lodged his application to the Court within the six-month time-limit, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Government’s preliminary objection should therefore be dismissed.




  The Court further notes that the remainder of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits




  The applicant stated that the restriction on his right to legal assistance during his police custody had breached his right to a fair trial. He also alleged that his right to a fair trial had been breached as he had not been given an opportunity to confront the witnesses who had testified against him.




  The Government contested the allegations. In particular, they stated that the restriction imposed on the applicant’s access to a lawyer during his police custody had not infringed his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention and that the conviction of the applicant had not been based on witness statements.




  The Court observes at the outset that, at the material time, the restriction imposed on the applicant’s right to legal assistance was systemic and applied to anyone held in custody in connection with an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts (see Salduz, cited above, §§ 56-63; Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, § 30-34, 13 October 2009). The Court has examined the present case and finds no particular circumstances which would require it to depart from its findings in the aforementioned Dayanan judgment.




  There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 in the present case.




  Having regard to its finding above and referring to paragraph 31 below, the Court, without taking a position on the remaining complaint raised by the applicant regarding the fairness of the proceedings, considers that it is unnecessary to examine it (see Geçgel and Çelik v. Turkey, nos. 8747/02 and 34509/03, § 16, 13 October 2009, Tezcan Uzunhasanoğlu v. Turkey, no. 35070/97, § 23, 20 April 2004).

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION




  The applicant claimed 8,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Referring to the Istanbul Bar Association’s scale of costs, he further claimed EUR 3,720, covering twenty-eight hours’ legal work spent in the preparation of the present case before the court. He also claimed EUR 600 for costs and expenses, without submitting an invoice.




  The Government contested the claims.




  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage and therefore, taking into account the circumstances of the present case, and ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.




  The Court further considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, should he so request (see Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003).




  As regards costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Taking into account the awards made in comparable cases (see Şaman v. Turkey, no. 35292/05, § 45, 5 April 2011; Gürova v. Turkey, no. 22088/03, § 21, 6 October 2009; Salduz, cited above, § 79), the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 1,000 under this head.




  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the remainder of the application admissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1, on account of the lack of legal assistance available to the applicant while in police custody;

 

3.  Holds that there is no need to examine the remaining complaint raised under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention;

 

4.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

 

5.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 September 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Stanley Naismith                                                                 Guido Raimondi
       Registrar                                                                              President