In the case of Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Peer Lorenzen,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
48135/06) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a non-governmental organisation based in Belgrade, Youth
Initiative for Human Rights (“the applicant”), on 29 November 2006.
The applicant was represented by Ms T. Drobnjak,
a lawyer practising in Belgrade. The Serbian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.
The applicant complained, under Articles 6 and 10
of the Convention, about a refusal of the intelligence agency of Serbia to
provide it with certain information concerning electronic surveillance, notwithstanding
a final and binding decision of the Information Commissioner in its favour.
On 15 September 2010 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant is a non-governmental organisation set
up in 2003 and based in Belgrade. It monitors the implementation of
transitional laws with a view to ensuring respect for human rights, democracy
and the rule of law.
On 31 October 2005 the applicant requested the
intelligence agency of Serbia (Bezbednosno-informativna agencija) to
inform it how many people had been subjected to electronic surveillance by that
agency in 2005.
On 4 November 2005 the agency refused the
request, relying thereby on section 9(5) of the Freedom of Information Act
2004.
On 17 November 2005 the applicant complained to
the Information Commissioner (Poverenik za informacije od javnog
značaja i zaštitu podataka о ličnosti - “the Commissioner”),
a domestic body set up under the Freedom of Information Act 2004 to ensure the
observance of that Act.
On 22 December 2005 the Commissioner found that
the intelligence agency had breached the law and ordered that the information
requested be made available to the applicant within three days. The agency
appealed, but on 19 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Serbia held that it lacked
standing and dismissed its appeal.
On 23 September 2008 the intelligence agency
notified the applicant that it did not hold the information requested.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The Freedom of Information Act 2004 (Zakon o
slobodnom pristupu informacijama od javnog značaja, published in
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 120/04, amendments published in
Official Gazette nos. 54/07, 104/09 and 36/10) has been in force since 13
November 2004. The relevant provisions of the Act read as follows:
Section 5(2)
“Everyone shall have the right to access information of public interest
by being allowed to examine a document containing that information, by being
entitled to make a copy of that document, and by being entitled to receive a
copy of that document on request, by post, fax, electronic mail or otherwise.”
Section 8
“The rights provided for in this Act may, in exceptional
circumstances, be subject to limitations set out in this Act, to the extent
necessary in a democratic society to prevent a serious violation of a
prevailing interest based on the Constitution or law.
Nothing in this Act may be interpreted so as to lead to the destruction
of any of the rights set forth herein or to their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in paragraph 1 above.”
Section 9
“Access to information of public interest may be refused, if
its disclosure would:
...
(5) Disclose information or a document formally qualified
as State, official, commercial or other secret, or as accessible to a limited
group of people, if the disclosure of that information or document could
seriously undermine a legitimate interest which has priority over freedom of
information.”
In accordance with section 22(1) of the Act, an
applicant may lodge a complaint with the Commissioner if a public authority
refuses his or her request for access to information. The decisions of the Commissioner
are final and binding (see section 28(1) of the Act).
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted under the auspices of the United Nations on 16
December 1966, entered into force in respect of Serbia on 12 March 2001.
Article 19 of that Covenant guarantees freedom of expression in similar terms
to those used in Article 10 of the Convention. In July 2011 the Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts
set up to monitor the implementation of that treaty,
reiterated in its General Comment No. 34 that Article 19 of the Covenant embraced a right of access
to information held by public bodies (document CCPR/C/GC/34 of 12
September 2011, § 18). It further stated that such information included records
held by a public body, regardless of the form in which the information was
stored, its source and the date of production (ibid.). Lastly, the Human Rights
Committee emphasised that when a State party imposed restrictions on the
exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right
itself; in other words, the relation between right and restriction and between
norm and exception must not be reversed (see § 21 of that document).
The Joint Declaration by the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression of December 2004 reads, in the relevant part, as follows:
“The right to access information held by public authorities is
a fundamental human right which should be given effect at the national level
through comprehensive legislation (for example Freedom of Information Acts)
based on the principle of maximum disclosure, establishing a presumption that
all information is accessible subject only to a narrow system of exceptions.
...
Access to information is a citizens’ right. As a result, the
procedures for accessing information should be simple, rapid and free or
low-cost.
The right of access should be subject to a narrow, carefully
tailored system of exceptions to protect overriding public and private
interests, including privacy. Exceptions should apply only where there is a
risk of substantial harm to the protected interest and where that harm is
greater than the overall public interest in having access to the information.
The burden should be on the public authority seeking to deny access to show
that the information falls within the scope of the system of exceptions.
Public authorities should be required to meet minimum record
management standards. Systems should be put in place to promote higher
standards over time.
The access to information law should, to the extent of any
inconsistency, prevail over other legislation.
Those requesting information should have the possibility to
appeal any refusals to disclose to an independent body with full powers to
investigate and resolve such complaints.
National authorities should take active steps to address the
culture of secrecy that still prevails in many countries within the public
sector. This should include provision for sanctions for those who wilfully
obstruct access to information. Steps should also be taken to promote broad
public awareness of the access to information law.
Steps should be taken, including through the allocation of
necessary resources and attention, to ensure effective implementation of access
to information legislation.
Urgent steps should be taken to review and, as necessary,
repeal or amend, legislation restricting access to information to bring it into
line with international standards in this area, including as reflected in this
Joint Declaration.
...
Certain information may legitimately be secret on grounds of
national security or protection of other overriding interests. However, secrecy
laws should define national security precisely and indicate clearly the
criteria which should be used in determining whether or not information can be
declared secret, so as to prevent abuse of the label ‘secret’ for purposes of
preventing disclosure of information which is in the public interest. Secrecy
laws should set out clearly which officials are entitled to classify documents
as secret and should also set overall limits on the length of time documents
may remain secret. Such laws should be subject to public debate.”
The Joint Declaration by the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression and the ACHPR (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights)
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of December 2006 reads, in so far
as relevant, as follows:
“Public bodies, whether national or international, hold
information not for themselves but on behalf of the public and they should,
subject only to limited exceptions, provide access to that information.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained, under Article 10 of
the Convention, that the intelligence agency of Serbia had denied it access to certain
information concerning electronic surveillance, despite a final and binding
decision of the Information Commissioner in its favour. Article 10 reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
The Government argued that the application was
out of time, taking into account the dates of the decisions of the Information
Commissioner and the Supreme Court of Serbia in the applicant’s case. They
further submitted that Article 10 did not guarantee a general right of access
to information and that the application was, as a result, incompatible ratione
materiae. Lastly, they claimed that the application was incompatible ratione
personae as the applicant did not need the information sought.
The applicant disagreed.
With regard to the first objection, the Court
notes that the applicant did not complain about the decisions to which the
Government referred, as they were in its favour. On the contrary, it complained
about a refusal of the intelligence agency of Serbia to provide it with certain
information despite those decisions. Given that the
applicant filed its application with the Court while the impugned situation was
ongoing, this objection must be rejected.
. With
regard to the second and third objections, the Court recalls that the
notion of “freedom to receive information” embraces a right of access to
information (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, no. 37374/05, § 35, 14
April 2009). The Court has also held that when a
non-governmental organisation is involved in matters of public interest, such
as the present applicant, it is exercising a role as a public watchdog of
similar importance to that of the press (Animal Defenders
International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 103, 22 April 2013). The applicant’s activities thus warrant similar Convention protection to
that afforded to the press (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, cited
above, § 27). Accordingly, the Government’s
remaining objections must also be rejected.
As this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds, it must be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The applicant submitted that the refusal of the
intelligence agency to provide it with information as to the use of electronic
surveillance measures had adversely affected its ability to exercise its role as a public watchdog,
in breach of Article 10 of the Convention.
The Government claimed that the intelligence
agency did not hold the information requested (they referred to the
intelligence agency’s letter of 23 September 2008 mentioned in paragraph 10
above). They added that freedom to receive information
merely prohibited a State from restricting a person from receiving information
that others wished or might be willing to impart to him; that freedom could not
be construed as imposing on a State, in the circumstances of the present case,
positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion
(see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I).
The Court notes that the applicant requested the
intelligence agency to provide it with some factual information concerning the
use of electronic surveillance measures. The agency first refused the request,
relying thereby on the statutory provision applicable to secret information. After
an order by the Information Commissioner that the information at issue be
nevertheless disclosed, the intelligence agency notified the applicant that it
did not hold that information. As the applicant was obviously involved in the
legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the intention of
imparting that information to the public and thereby contributing to the public
debate, there has been an interference with its right to freedom of expression
(see, by analogy, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, cited above, § 28, and Kenedi
v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, § 43, 26 May 2009).
The exercise of freedom of expression may be
subject to restrictions, but any such restrictions ought to be in accordance
with domestic law. The Court finds that the restrictions imposed by the
intelligence agency in the present case did not meet that criterion. The
domestic body set up precisely to ensure the observance of the Freedom of
Information Act 2004 examined the case and decided that the information sought had
to be provided to the applicant. It is true that the intelligence agency eventually
responded that it did not hold that information, but that response is unpersuasive
in view of the nature of that information (the number of people subjected to electronic
surveillance by that agency in 2005) and the agency’s initial response.
The Court concludes that the
obstinate reluctance of the intelligence agency of Serbia to comply with the
order of the Information Commissioner was in defiance of domestic law and
tantamount to arbitrariness.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the refusal of the
intelligence agency to comply with the order of the
Information Commissioner amounted also to a violation of Article 6 of
the Convention.
The Government contested that argument.
Having regard to the finding relating to Article
10 of the Convention, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine
the admissibility or the merits of the same complaint under Article 6 (see, by
analogy, Lepojić v. Serbia, no. 13909/05, § 79, 6 November
2007, and Filipović v. Serbia, no. 27935/05, § 60, 20 November 2007).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
The relevant part of Article 46 of the
Convention reads as follows:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the
final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to
the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. ...”
Before examining the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention and in view of the
circumstances of the instant case, the Court wishes to consider what
consequences may be drawn for the respondent State from Article 46. It
reiterates that by virtue of Article 46 the High Contracting Parties have
undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which
they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe. It follows, among other things, that a judgment in which
the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not
just to pay those concerned any sums awarded under Article 41, but also to select,
subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if
appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to
put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as
possible the effects (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC],
nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII). The aim is to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the
position he would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not been
disregarded (restitutio in integrum) (see Emre v. Switzerland
(no. 2), no. 5056/10, § 69, 11 October
2011). Although it is in principle not for the Court to determine
what remedial measures may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent State’s
obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, the violation found in this
case, by its very nature, does not leave any real choice as to the measures
required to remedy it (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01,
§ 202, ECHR 2004-II, and Karanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 39462/03, § 29, 20 November 2007).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that
the most natural execution of its judgment, and that which would best
correspond to the principle of restitutio in integrum, would have been
to secure that the intelligence agency of Serbia provide the applicant with the
information requested (namely, how many people were subjected to electronic
surveillance by that agency in the course of 2005).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
The applicant claimed 8,000 euros (EUR) for
non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of the fact
that, because of the refusal of the intelligence agency to provide it
with the information requested, it had been unable to
generate, and contribute to, an open and well-informed public debate on the use
of electronic surveillance measures in Serbia.
The Government contested that claim.
. The
Court considers that the finding of a breach and the order made in paragraph 32
above constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage
which the applicant may have suffered (see Társaság a
Szabadságjogokért, cited above, § 43).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 10 of
the Convention admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 6 of the Convention;
4. Holds that the respondent State must
ensure, within three months from
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, that the intelligence
agency of Serbia provide the applicant with the information requested;
5. Holds that the
finding of a violation and the order made under point 4 constitute sufficient
just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 June 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and
Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Sajó and
Vučinić is annexed to this judgment.
G.R.A.
S.H.N.
JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES SAJÓ AND VUČINIĆ
We are in full agreement with the conclusions and reasoning of
this judgment. It is of particular importance for those countries where, even
today, long lasting habits make it difficult to have access to data which, in
the days of totalitarianism, were used for oppressive purposes by secret
services. However, we write this concurring opinion in particular to highlight
the general need to interpret Article 10 in conformity with developments in
international law regarding freedom of information, which entails access to
information held by public bodies. We refer, in particular, to Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 34 (document CCPR/C/GC/34 of 12 September
2011, § 18).
The Court has recently (in its Gillberg v. Sweden [GC]
judgment, (no. 41723/06, § 74, 3 April 2012) restated that “the right
to receive and impart information explicitly forms part of the right to freedom
of expression under Article 10. That right basically prohibits a Government
from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be
willing to impart to him (see, for example, Leander v. Sweden, 26 March
1987, § 74, Series A no. 116, and Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 7 July
1989, § 52, Series A no. 160).”
The Grand Chamber did not quote the continuation of paragraph
74 of the Leander judgment: “Article 10 (art. 10) does not, in circumstances
such as those of the present case, confer on the individual a right of access
to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does it
embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the
individual.”
In view of the legal developments summarized in the judgment,
and the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (2009, not
yet in force), and in particular, in view of the demands of democracy in the
information society, we find it appropriate to highlight certain implications
of the present judgment in light of Gillberg that the Court should
address in due course:
1. In the world of the Internet the difference between
journalists and other members of the public is rapidly disappearing. There can
be no robust democracy without transparency, which should be served and used by
all citizens.
2. The case raises the issue of the positive obligations of
the State, which arise in respect of the accessibility of data controlled by
Government. The authorities are responsible for storing such information and
loss of data cannot be an excuse, as the domestic authorities erroneously claimed
in the present case. The difference between the State’s negative and positive
obligations is difficult to determine in the context of access to information.
Given the complexity of modern data management the simple lack of a prohibition
of access may not suffice for the effective enjoyment of the right to
information.
3. Without prejudice to the specific circumstances of the Leander
case, to grant the citizen more restricted access to important information
that concerns him or her and is generated or is used by the authorities than to
the general public on public information may seem illogical, at least in
certain circumstances. An artificial distinction between public data and data
of personal interest may even hamper access to public information. Of course,
access to information under Article 10 must respect, in particular,
informational self-determination and the considerations referred to in Klass
and Others v. Germany (6 September 1978, § 81, Series A no. 28).