FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF
JEZNIK v. SLOVENIA
(Application no.
32238/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 June 2013
This judgment is final but
it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Jeznik v. Slovenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Angelika Nußberger, President,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Helena Jäderblom, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 32238/08) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovenian national, Ms Marija Jeznik (“the applicant”), on 1 July 2008.
The applicant was
represented by Odvetniška Družba Marčič in Ostali, O.P., D.N.O., a law firm from Slovenj Gradec. The Slovenian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent.
On 27 April 2012 the application was communicated
to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14 the application was
assigned to a committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Vuzenica.
In 1994 the applicant began investing in commercial
papers of the company Kompas Consulting d.d. via the company Kompas Maribor
D.O.O. At the end of 1994 such trading was prohibited by the Securities Market
Act however the applicant continued with the activity until 1996.
In 1996 the applicant instituted enforcement
proceedings against the company Kompas Maribor D.O.O. before the Maribor
District Court seeking the payment of lost investments from Kompas Maribor for
not informing her of the legislative amendments and continuing with the trading
of commercial papers. She further complained before the domestic courts that as
the company Kompas Consulting d.d. was bankrupt, she could only receive back a small
proportion of her investments in bankruptcy proceedings.
On 14 October 1996 the Maribor District Court
issued a writ of execution.
On 12 November 1996 following an objection the case
was referred to contentious proceedings.
On 4 February 1998 the Maribor District Court
rendered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s request. She appealed.
On 24 November 1998 the Maribor Higher Court
upheld the appeal and remitted the case for re-examination. The second-instance
court found that as the applicant had clarified that she was seeking
compensation for damages only in the appeal phase, this constituted a new fact
that the first-instance court would have to deliberate upon.
On 24 October 2001 the Maribor District Court
rendered a judgment. The court found that given the contractual arrangements
the company Kompas Maribor D.O.O. could not be held responsible for the damages
sustained. The applicant appealed.
On 15 September 2004 the Maribor Higher Court
upheld the first-instance judgment and rejected the appeal. The applicant
lodged an appeal on points of law.
On 25 January 2007 the Supreme Court rejected
her appeal. She lodged a constitutional appeal.
On 10 December 2007 the Constitutional Court
rejected her appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
For relevant domestic law see Tomažič v.
Slovenia (no. 38350/02, 13 December 2007).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF
THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal ...”
In substance, the applicant further complained
that the remedies available for excessive legal proceedings in Slovenia were ineffective. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The Government offered a settlement proposal
made by reference to section 25 of the 2006 Act to the applicant in the form of
a written statement pursuant to section 15 of the said act acknowledging the
violation of the right to a trial in a reasonable time. The applicant did not
accept the offer.
The Court observes that the transitional
provision of the 2006 Act, namely section 25, provides for the procedure to be
followed in respect of applications where the violation of the “reasonable time”
requirement has already ceased to exist and which were lodged with the Court
before 1 January 2007. Notwithstanding the fact that the settlement
proposal was made by reference to section 25, as the proceedings to which the
applicant was a party continued before the Supreme Court after the new
legislation became operational, that provision did not give a remedy in the
applicant’s case.
20. As regards the application
of other provisions of the 2006 Act, in particular its section 19, the Court notes that the proceedings in the present case had been finally resolved before the
2006 Act became operational and have subsequently continued before the Supreme
Court. Having regard to the 2006 Act as in force at the material time (see by
contrast, Žurej v. Slovenia, (dec.), no. 24342/04, 18 October 2007, § 17), the applicant had no
possibility to claim compensation for the delays incurred in the proceedings
(see mutatis mutandis, Tomažič v. Slovenia, no. 38350/02, 13 December 2007, §§ 41-45 and Lesjak v. Slovenia (no. 33946/03, 21 July 2009, §§ 54-55).
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 6
The period to be taken into consideration began
on 14 October 1996, the date when the writ
of execution was issued, and ended on 10 December 2007, when the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. The proceedings thus lasted eleven
years and two months at four levels of jurisdiction.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of
the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of
the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at
stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court has frequently found violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the
present case (see Bedi v. Slovenia, no. 24901/02, §§ 18-20, 13 April 2006; Schliederer v. Germany, no. 2651/07, §§ 26-31, 21 October 2010; Nitschke
v. Sweden, no. 6301/05, §§ 61-66, 27 September 2007; and FPK GROSS, OOO v. Ukraine, no. 18608/05, §§ 20-23, 16 February 2012).
Having examined all the material submitted to
it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
1. Article 13
The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees
an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the
requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI).
In the present case the Court is not persuaded
that the applicant could have had access to the compensation claim and finds
the remedies of the 2006 Act ineffective (see paragraphs 18-21 above). As
regards the remedies available prior to the implementation of the 2006 Act, the
Court sees no reason to take a different approach from that taken in earlier
cases in which those remedies were considered ineffective (see Lukenda v. Slovenia,
no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005).
Accordingly, the Court considers that in the
present case there has been a violation of Article 13 on account of the lack of
a remedy under domestic law whereby the applicant could have obtained a ruling
upholding her right to have her case heard within a reasonable time, as set
forth in Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly, the applicant complained about the
alleged unfairness of the proceedings.
Having examined the above complaints, the Court
finds, in the light of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, that they do not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the Articles relied on by the applicants. It
follows that the remaining complaints concerning the first set of proceedings
is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant company claimed 10,000 euros (EUR)
in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested the claim.
The Court does not discern any causal link
between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 3,200 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant company also claimed EUR 3,017 for
the costs and expenses incurred before the Court and the domestic courts.
The Government contested the claim.
The Court notes that although the applicant was
reminded by the Court of the requirements she has had not itemised or explained
her claims. The Court therefore makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the
excessive length of the proceedings and the lack of an effective remedy admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months EUR 3,200 (three thousand two hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 June 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Angelika
Nußberger
Deputy Registrar President