European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

FIFTH SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF LAVRECHOV v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

 

(Application no. 57404/08)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

20 June 2013

 

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.




In the case of Lavrechov v. the Czech Republic,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Mark Villiger, President,
          Angelika Nußberger,
          Boštjan M. Zupančič,
          Ganna Yudkivska,
          André Potocki,
          Paul Lemmens,
          Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE




  The case originated in an application (no. 57404/08) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Evgueni Lavrechov (“the applicant”), on 18 November 2008.




  The applicant was represented by Mr R. Rozmánek, a lawyer practising in Olomouc. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Vít A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.




  The applicant alleged, in particular, that his right to property had been violated by a forfeiture of bail.




  On 27 March 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. The Government of Russia were invited to state whether they wished to submit written comments on the case (Article 36 of the Rules of Court). They did not avail themselves of that possibility.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE




  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Udomlya, Russia.




  He was a representative of a Russian company, T., which bought a share of a Czech company, S. The applicant had been a member of the Board of Directors of company S. since 8 August 1995 and its chair since 27 February 1996. He could not, however, exercise his powers between 24 September and 3 December 1996, when he was illegally dismissed from the Board of Directors by its Czech members. Company S. later became insolvent.




  On 11 June 2001 the applicant was charged with insider trading and fraud, namely with concluding contracts disadvantageous to company S., and with causing pecuniary damage of 88,000,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (3,520,000 euros (EUR)). On 20 June 2001 he was taken into pre-trial custody.




  On 8 January 2002 the applicant requested to be released on bail and offered to pay a security of CZK 4,000,000 (EUR 160,000). The request contained a declaration that he was aware of the contents of Article 73 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which set out the conditions under which the bail could be forfeited. On 17 January 2002 the Ostrava Regional Court held that the applicant could be released on payment of a security of CZK 10,000,000 (EUR 400,000). It justified the amount of the security by the exceptional gravity of the suspected offences and the significance of the reasons for taking him into custody originally, in particular the high risk that he would abscond.




  On 31 January 2002 the applicant authorised his lawyer to pay the security in the amount set by the court. He also undertook to stay at his address in the Czech Republic, to attend hearings in his case and declared that he was aware that the security would be forfeited if he did not comply. On 22 February 2002 he was released on bail. As a condition of release the applicant was ordered to stay at his address in the Czech Republic and to receive mail there.




  On 7 June 2002 the Regional Court permitted the applicant to leave the Czech Republic for Russia until 18 June 2002, on condition that he attended the first hearing, scheduled for 19 to 21 June 2002. This was the fourth time such a request by the applicant had been granted. The applicant had made three previous trips to Russia, between February and June 2002, and had always returned.




  On 17 June 2002 the applicant informed his lawyer that on 14 June 2002 his passport, with an entry visa to the Czech Republic, had been stolen in Moscow and that he was arranging for a new passport. As a result the hearing was adjourned to 7 to 9 August 2002.




  A summons to the new hearing was sent to the applicant at his address in the Czech Republic but returned as undelivered. The Regional Court also attempted to serve the summons on the applicant through his lawyer.




  On 8 July 2002 the lawyer sent certain documents to the Regional Court, including a confirmation from the Russian authorities that the applicant’s official registered address in Russia was in Udomlya.




  On 30 July 2002 the lawyer informed the Regional Court that he did not have direct contact details for the applicant in Russia and that he had sent the summons for the hearing to the address given him by one of the applicant’s co-accused.




  As the applicant still had not received a new passport and he objected to the hearing being held in his absence, the hearing planned for 7 to 9 August 2002 was cancelled.




.  On 12 March 2003 the Regional Court, having received no information from the applicant, made enquiries of Interpol and the trade representation of the Russian Federation in the Czech Republic as to whether the applicant had applied for a new passport.




.  The date the applicant received a new passport from the Russian authorities is disputed between the parties. The Government claimed that it was on 28 February 2003, but according to the applicant it was only on 2 April 2003. The applicant did not inform the Regional Court that he had obtained a new passport.




.  The Regional Court scheduled another hearing for 6 to 8 September 2004 and, on 22 March 2004, summoned the applicant through the Ministry of Justice at an address in the city of Podolsk in Russia, which was registered in the case file as the applicant’s place of residence in Russia. It also warned the applicant that the facts that he had not applied for a Czech visa, had remained in Russia and was not in contact with the court, were incompatible with the conditions of the bail, could be qualified as avoiding the criminal proceedings and could lead to the forfeiture of the deposited bail. The applicant was also advised of the possibility that criminal proceedings against him could be conducted in absentia.




  The Russian Ministry of Justice informed the Czech authorities that the applicant was not registered and did not live at the address in Podolsk, and that his current place of residence had not been established. It was thus not possible to deliver the summons to the hearing.




  Nevertheless, the applicant found out about the scheduled hearing and obtained a short-term visa allowing him to visit the Czech Republic between 2 and 12 September 2004.




  On 2 September 2004, however, the applicant sent a fax to the Regional Court requesting adjournment of the hearing, referring to unspecified health problems and stating that he now had new lawyers, who would need time to study the case. He did not give his address in Russia. Consequently, the Regional Court was obliged to adjourn the trial once again.




  On 28 February 2005 the Regional Court asked the Ministry of Justice to request the Russian authorities to deliver a summons to the applicant to a hearing scheduled for 21 to 23 November 2005, to the address in Podolsk, or to the address in Udomlya. The summons for the trial was however served on the applicant only on 16 January 2006, in Udomlya. On 21 November 2005 the Regional Court again cancelled the hearing.




  On 6 December 2005 the Regional Court decided to conduct the criminal proceedings against the applicant in absentia. It stated that the applicant had been avoiding the criminal proceedings by staying out of the country, that he had not returned to the Czech Republic since June 2002 and that he had created serious difficulties for the conduct of the trial by staying in Russia. The court also found the applicant’s excuse for not attending the hearing on 2 September 2004, namely that he had health problems, totally inadequate. It further observed that the applicant was not respecting the bail conditions he had agreed to, namely that he would appear at hearings and that he would stay at his place of residence in the Czech Republic.




  On 27 to 29 March, 5 to 7 June, 11 September and 23 October 2006 hearings took place before the Regional Court in the proceedings against the applicant in absentia.




  On 23 October 2006 the Regional Court fully acquitted the applicant, holding that he had not committed any criminal offence but had been conducting standard and transparent business activities.




  On 28 June 2007 the Olomouc High Court upheld this judgment.




  On 1 November 2007 the Regional Court, at the applicant’s request, ruled that the bail should be returned to the applicant, as he had not been duly informed about the consequences of not complying with the conditions of bail. Moreover, none of the situations envisaged by Article 73a § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for forfeiting the bail was applicable.




  On 5 December 2007 the High Court quashed that decision and ruled that the bail was forfeited. It held that the applicant must have known about the possibility of forfeiture of the bail even though he had not been formally informed about it because his requests for release on bail had contained declarations that he had been aware of forfeiture should he break the bail conditions. It also held that it was true that for some time the applicant could not come to the Czech Republic because he had lost his passport and the Czech authorities had taken time to issue him with a new visa. However, the applicant failed to collect correspondence at the address in Podolsk, which was one of the addresses he had given to the prosecuting authorities, and thus letters from the court could not be delivered to him in time. It was also clear from the applicant’s behaviour that he was avoiding the criminal prosecution by remaining out of the country. Nor had he kept in contact with the Regional Court, even though he had known about the proceedings. The conditions for forfeiture of the bail under Article 73a § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were thus fulfilled, and in particular the applicant had been in hiding, had not informed the relevant authorities of his place of residence, and had thus frustrated delivery of an official letter.




  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against that decision, arguing that it was unjust that such a large amount of bail had been forfeited, even though he had not committed any crime. He also disputed the findings of the High Court.




  On 3 June 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill-founded.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW




  Article 73a §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that individuals in pre-trial detention may be released on bail with a minimum security of CZK 10,000, the actual amount being determined by the court, depending on the particular circumstances of the accused and the case.




  Under § 4 (§ 3 at the relevant time) of that provision the bail will be forfeited, inter alia, if the accused absconds, goes into hiding or does not inform the relevant authorities of a change of their place of residence, and thus frustrates delivery of an official letter. Under § 9 (§ 6 at the relevant time) the accused must be informed in advance of the conditions under which bail may be forfeited.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1




  The applicant complained that the forfeiture of bail after he had been acquitted violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

A.  Admissibility




  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  Submissions of the parties




  The applicant first maintained that the forfeiture of bail had been illegal, because he had not been properly advised as to the possibility of forfeiture. He argued that he had not been in hiding and that it had not been his fault that the Regional Court had not been delivering the correspondence to his correct address in Russia, which was in Udomlya. There had been objective reasons for him not appearing at the trial, including the loss of his passport, the non-issuance of a visa, and illness.




  The applicant further maintained that the decision of the High Court to forfeit bail of such a high amount had been disproportionate. Generally, the purpose of bail was to prevent an offender from avoiding punishment and to make sure that the purpose of the criminal proceedings would be attained. In his view the criminal proceedings had been carried out properly despite his absence, and their purpose had been attained. Thus, the forfeiture of the bail had been an inappropriate interference with his property, even assuming that he had broken the bail conditions.




  Lastly, the applicant stated that forfeiture of bail when a person has been acquitted and is thus innocent was unjust and against common sense.




  The Government, for their part, considered the complaint manifestly ill-founded. They argued that the interference had to be assessed in light of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which concerns control of the use of property. They further maintained that the forfeiture had been legal, as decided by the domestic courts.




  They noted that the Regional Court had made intensive efforts for nearly four years to summon the applicant to a hearing. Throughout this time the applicant had delivered a number of documents to the court, but none of them had contained any information about a change of the address to which court documents should be sent. Even though the applicant’s absence from the first hearing on 19 June 2002 had been duly authorised, his subsequent attitude to the criminal proceedings had clearly showed his intention to avoid it by staying out of the country, in which he had indeed been successful, as the Regional Court had been obliged to try him in absentia. The applicant had had the opportunity for several years to contact the Regional Court directly, notify it of the address for service of process in Russia, and suggest a date on which he would be able to travel to the Czech Republic to attend a hearing, but he had failed to do so.




  The Government further argued that there was no direct connection between forfeiture of bail and acquittal. The purpose of bail was to replace custody and at the same time to discourage a person being prosecuted from frustrating or avoiding criminal prosecution. If the prosecuted person did not comply with the conditions of bail, the logical consequence of such behaviour was the forfeiture of the bail, and it was therefore a legitimate deprivation of property in this respect. The fact that the prosecuted person was later acquitted did not affect in any way the lawfulness of the custody. The purpose of bail and the purpose of punishment were very different. If the conditions provided for by law were fulfilled, the bail was returned. Bail was not punishment for an offence committed, but was a form of security.




  The amount of the bail had been commensurate with the applicant’s property situation, as was also clear from the fact that he had been able to pay it. Bail as a means of securing an accused person’s cooperation with the criminal authorities was intentionally set at such a level that its loss would constitute a significant interference with the property situation of the person who had deposited the bail. Otherwise it would not fulfil its purpose.




  Lastly, the Government noted that the applicant had not specified in what exactly consisted the excessive financial burden on him which would result from forfeiture of the bail. He had not documented in any way that he had found himself in a state of financial distress as the result of the forfeiture of the bail.

2.  The Court’s assessment




  The Court first considers that the forfeiture of the bail constituted interference by the State with the applicant’s property rights. The Court does not consider it necessary to decide whether the interference should be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as argued by the Government because in any event the three rules of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 are connected and the applicable principles are similar (see James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 37, Series A no. 98). It will therefore examine the situation complained of in the light of the general rule set forth in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 136, ECHR 2004-V and Gladysheva v. Russia, no. 7097/10, § 71, 6 December 2011).




  The Court reiterates that in order for an interference to be compatible with that provision it must be lawful, be in the general interest and must be proportionate, that is it must strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (see, among many other authorities, Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 107, ECHR 2000-I and Gladysheva v. Russia, cited above, § 65). In assessing the proportionality of interference, the Court must take into account on one hand the importance of the aim pursued, and on the other the burden imposed on the applicant, including the nature of the interference, the behaviour of the applicant, and that of the State authorities (see Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), no. 38602/02, 10 April 2003, and Forminster Enterprises Limited v. the Czech Republic, no. 38238/04, § 75, 9 October 2008).




  Turning to the requirement of “lawfulness”, the Court first notes that nothing in the present case indicates that the High Court applied the legal provisions in question, namely Article 73a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, manifestly erroneously or so as to reach arbitrary conclusions. Further, there is no suggestion that the relevant provisions were not accessible, precise and foreseeable (see Beyeler, cited above, §§ 108-109). Consequently, the forfeiture of the bail complied with the requirement of lawfulness.




.  The Court further considers that the forfeiture pursued the legitimate aim of proper conduct of criminal proceedings and, more generally, of fighting crime and crime prevention, which undoubtedly falls within the general interest as envisaged in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Yildirim, cited above, and Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, no. 16903/03, § 58, 1 April 2010). It also considers this interest particularly important.




  Turning to the proportionality test, the Court first notes that the bail of approximately EUR 400,000 is a substantial amount of money. However, the place for a discussion of the proportionality of the amount of security for bail is at the moment the bail is set (as in Mangouras v. Spain [GC], no. 12050/04, §§ 78 and 80, ECHR 2010), rather than when it is forfeited. In the present case, the applicant does not contend that the initial amount of bail was unreasonable, and indeed the Court notes that he was apparently able to provide the security swiftly and without undue hardship.




  The main issue in the case is whether acquittal should play a role in a decision that bail should be forfeited. In this context it observes that the purpose of the bail is to ensure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, and in particular to ensure that the accused appears at the hearing (see, in the context of the initial fixing of security for bail, Mangouras v. Spain [GC], cited above, § 78).




  However, the conduct of the criminal proceedings was significantly hampered by the applicant’s non-compliance with the conditions of the bail. The applicant failed to appear at any of the scheduled hearings, and failed to assist the court in any way, even though he must have been aware that he was in breach of his bail conditions. Hearings had to be cancelled several times, which resulted in the length of the proceedings being considerably extended and the Regional Court being faced with serious difficulties in its attempts to serve the applicant with documents.




  It must further be noted that the fact that the applicant was acquitted does not in itself mean that his prosecution was illegal or otherwise tainted in the first place. Different standards of proof are required for a person to be convicted, usually described as proof beyond reasonable doubt, and for a person to be prosecuted, usually described as reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime. Therefore there may well be cases of reasonable suspicion which at trial do not result in a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in these situations there is still a legitimate interest of the State in the proper conduct of the proceedings and in ensuring that individuals in respect of whom there exists a reasonable suspicion that they have committed a crime do not try to evade justice or undermine the smooth conduct of the proceedings in which their guilt or otherwise is to be assessed.




  Therefore, the outcome of the proceedings has no direct relevance to the question of forfeiture of the bail. The question is rather whether forfeiture was proportionate given the breach of bail conditions during the proceedings.




  The Court observes that the bail in the present case was not forfeited because of the impossibility of delivering a single document to the applicant. The High Court concluded that the applicant had been avoiding criminal prosecution by staying out of the country for several years. The Court considers that even though originally the applicant may have had objective reasons for not attending the hearings, this cannot be said of the period after he acquired a new passport.




  The applicant was given ample opportunity to appear at the trial. The hearings were rescheduled several times. The applicant received his passport, according to his version of the events, in April 2003, and the decision to hold the trial in absentia was taken only in December 2005. He had thus had at least two years and eight months to enter into contact with the Regional Court so that it could set a date for a hearing for which he could travel to the Czech Republic. In these circumstances the High Court’s finding that the applicant’s own behaviour had showed that he had been avoiding his criminal prosecution does not seem unreasonable.




  In these circumstances - that is, where the applicant must have been aware of the fact that he was in breach of his bail conditions for a substantial period of time - it was incumbent on him to inform the Regional Court clearly and unequivocally of his address in Russia and to remain in regular contact with it in order to counterbalance the difficulties with delivery of official documents to Russia, which needed to be considered under the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The applicant failed to do so. The letter from the applicant’s lawyer of 8 July 2002 cannot be considered sufficient in these circumstances. The letter only noted where the applicant had his official registered address in Russia, but it did not in any way indicate where he wanted to receive his correspondence. Furthermore, on 2 September 2004 the applicant informed the court that he was unable to attend a hearing because he had health problems and new lawyers, but still failed to give an address for service in Russia.




  Lastly, the Court adds that the forfeiture, that is the interference in question, was the result of fully adversarial proceedings at which the applicant was able to present his arguments. The domestic courts carefully scrutinised the pertinent issues and reasoned their decisions comprehensively (see G. v. Germany (dec.), no. 10577/83, 6 May 1985). The procedural requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, 24 October 1986, § 55, Series A no. 108) were thus complied with.




  Having regard to the above considerations, the Court considers that the decision to forfeit the applicant’s bail did strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the applicant’s rights in the circumstances of the case.




  There has accordingly been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION




  Under Article 6 of the Convention the applicant disagreed with the domestic decisions about the bail and complained that they had been insufficiently reasoned.




.  In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Declares unanimously the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

 

2.  Holds by six votes to one that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 June 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Claudia Westerdiek                                                                Mark Villiger
       Registrar                                                                              President

 

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Pejchal is annexed to this judgment.

M.V.
C.W.




PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PEJCHAL

 

I am in full agreement with my colleagues’ conclusion that the complaint alleging a violation of Article 6 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the Convention. I also fully agree with my colleagues’ decision to declare the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible.

However, to my regret I have to dissent regarding the finding of no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. I voted that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

I consider that the crux of the case is rather whether an acquittal should play a role in deciding whether to forfeit bail. In this context I observe that the applicant was finally acquitted, with a finding that he had not committed any criminal offence but had been conducting standard and transparent business activities, and further that his bail was forfeited. It is material that the decision to forfeit the applicant’s bail was taken after the acquittal had become final, that is, when the courts knew that the applicant had not committed any crime.

I note that under domestic law acquitted persons are entitled to compensation for the time spent in pre-trial detention: section 9(1) of Law no. 82/1998 on State liability for damage caused in the exercise of public authority by an irregularity in a decision or the conduct of proceedings provides that a person who has been in pre-trial detention has a right to compensation if he or she is acquitted. I note further that the applicant’s bail conditions were in lieu of his pre-trial detention. Moreover, under the domestic case-law a decision on bail is a decision concerning pre-trial detention (see, for example, the opinion of the Supreme Court no. 4/97 of 11 June 1998). On the facts of the present case it is inconsistent for the State to, on the one hand, grant the applicant a right to compensation for the time spent in pre-trial detention (although the applicant did not apparently apply for such compensation in the present case, he cannot be criticised for that as it is a right and not an obligation) and on the other hand forfeit his bail security, which, moreover, represents an amount far in excess of any compensation he could have claimed. The applicant should not, in principle, suffer any negative consequences of the criminal proceedings against him.

I further observe that there was some confusion as to the applicant’s address in Russia. On 8 July 2002 the lawyer sent certain documents to the Regional Court, including confirmation from the Russian authorities that the applicant’s official registered address in Russia was in Udomlya. However, the Regional Court continued to send the correspondence to a different address which resulted in the applicant not receiving it or receiving it too late.

On 1 November 2007 the Regional Court ruled, at the applicant’s request, that the security should be returned to the applicant as he had not been informed duly and in advance of the consequences of not complying with the conditions of bail. Moreover, none of the situations envisaged by Article 73a § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for forfeiting the bail was applicable. Like the Regional Court, I have doubts whether the applicant was duly informed about the consequences of not complying with the conditions of bail. Despite the arguments of the High Court, the fact remains that the applicant was never formally informed as required by Article 73a § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the relevant time. The applicant’s statement, relied on by the High Court, says that he was aware of forfeiture should the conditions of bail be breached. However, the content of the statement is not clear and it is not even certain whether the applicant understood what he was signing.

Lastly, it does not seem that the applicant’s failure to appear at the trial disrupted the proceedings in any way. The proceedings were conducted and completed in the absence of the applicant. His absence had no substantive influence on the outcome of the proceedings.

Having regard to the above considerations, I am of the opinion that the decision to forfeit the applicant’s bail, in the circumstances of the case, did not strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the applicant’s fundamental rights. Accordingly, there has, in my view, been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

I consider that it would be more logical for the majority to conclude that the complaint alleging a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the Convention, rather than to declare the complaint admissible and rule, at the same time, that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1. For my part, I find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. in this particular case.