FIRST SECTION
CASE OF
VYATKIN v. RUSSIA
(Application no.
18813/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 April 2013
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Vyatkin v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Erik Møse,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
18813/06) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Semen Viktorovich Vyatkin (“the
applicant”), on 10 April 2006.
The applicant was represented by Mr D. Agranovskiy,
a lawyer practising in the Moscow region. The Russian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr G.
Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The applicant alleged that
he had been detained in inhuman conditions and that his detention had been
excessively long.
On 17 September 2010 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Yekaterinburg.
A. Background information
The applicant was a member of the National
Bolsheviks Party.
On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty
members of the National Bolsheviks Party occupied the waiting area of the Presidential
Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the
ground floor.
They asked for a meeting with the President, the
deputy head of the Presidential Administration and the President’s economic
advisor. Through the windows they distributed leaflets with a printed letter to
the President that listed his ten alleged failures to comply with the
Constitution and contained a call for his resignation.
The intruders stayed in the office for one-and-a-half
hours until the police broke down the blocked door and arrested them. They did
not offer any resistance to the authorities.
B. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District
Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention, relying on the gravity of
the charges, the circumstances in which the offences imputed to him had been
committed, the methods employed by the offenders, the applicant’s lack of residence
registration in Moscow or the Moscow region, and the risks of him absconding,
reoffending, putting pressure on witnesses or interfering with the investigation
in some other way.
On 21 December 2004 the applicant was charged
with the attempted violent overthrow of the State (Article 278 of the Criminal
Code) and intentional destruction of and damage to property in a public place (Articles 167
§ 2 and 214).
On 11 February 2005 the Zamoskvoretskiy District
Court of Moscow extended the applicant’s detention until 14 April 2005,
referring to the gravity of the charges, the circumstances in which the
offences imputed to him had been committed and the fact that applicant’s
residence registration was in Yekaterinburg rather than in Moscow or the Moscow region. The court concluded that the applicant might abscond, reoffend or interfere
with the proceedings.
The applicant appealed, asking the court to
apply a more lenient preventive measure. He submitted that the District Court’s
findings had not been supported by concrete facts. On 31 March 2005 the Moscow
City Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been
lawful, well-reasoned and justified.
On 15 February 2005 the charges against the
applicant were amended to participation in mass disorder, an offence under
Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code.
On 14 April 2005 the Zamoskvoretskiy District
Court extended the applicant’s detention until 14 July 2005 for the following
reasons:
“There are no reasons to vary the
preventive measure. Taking into account the gravity of the charges and [the
applicant’s] individual situation, the court considers that there are
sufficient indications that [he], once released, might abscond.
At the same time, bearing in mind that
the parties to the criminal proceedings have already started studying the case
file, the extension asked for by the prosecution appears to be excessive and
must be limited to three months. This period will be sufficient for all parties
to the proceedings to effectively study the entire case file.”
In his statement of appeal the applicant asked
to be released. He submitted that he could no longer interfere with the
investigation as it had been completed. He also referred to his clean criminal
record. On 15 June 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on
appeal, finding that it had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified.
On 7 June 2005 the investigation was completed
and thirty-nine people, including the applicant, were committed for trial.
On 20 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court of
Moscow scheduled a preliminary hearing for 30 June 2005 and held that all the
defendants should meanwhile remain in custody.
On 30 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court held
a preliminary hearing. It rejected the defendants’ requests to be released and
ordered that they should remain in custody pending trial, citing the gravity of
the charges against them and the risk of their absconding or obstructing
justice.
The trial started on 8 July 2005.
During a hearing on 27 July 2005 the applicant
and his co-defendants lodged applications for release. On the same date the
Tverskoy District Court rejected the requests, finding that their detention was
lawful and justified. The applicant appealed. In his appeal submissions he
asked to be released. He submitted, in particular, that he had no criminal
record, had a permanent place of residence and had positive character references.
On 5 October 2005 the Moscow City Court rejected his appeal and upheld the
decision of 27 July 2005.
On 10 August 2005 the applicant and his
co-defendants filed new applications for release. On the same date the Tverskoy
District Court rejected the requests. It held:
“The court takes into account the defence’s argument that an individual
approach to each defendant’s situation is essential when deciding on the
preventive measure.
Examining the grounds on which ... the court ordered and
extended detention in respect of all the defendants without exception ... the
court notes that these grounds still persist today. Therefore, having regard to
the state of health, family situation, age, profession and character of all the
defendants, and to the personal guarantees offered by certain private
individuals and included in the case file, the court concludes that, if
released, each of the defendants might abscond or obstruct justice in some
other way ...
In the court’s view, in these circumstances, having regard to
the gravity of the charges, there are no grounds for varying or revoking the
preventive measure in respect of any defendant ...”
On 2 November 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld
the decision on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and
justified.
On 8 December 2005 the Tverskoy District Court
found the applicant and his co-defendants guilty of participation in mass
disorder. It sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment, but
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for three years. The
applicant was immediately released.
On 29 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld
the conviction on appeal.
C. Conditions of the applicant’s detention
From 16 December 2004 to 8 December 2005 the
applicant was held in remand centre no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow.
According to the applicant, the remand centre
was overcrowded. His cell measured about 15 square metres and housed four to six
inmates. The light in the cell was never turned off, disturbing the applicant’s
sleep. The cell was infested with cockroaches. It was equipped with a lavatory
pan. The pan was separated from the living area by a partition of a metre in
height, with the result that the person using the toilet was in view of other
inmates. The applicant was allowed to take a shower once a week. Hot water was
often unavailable. The applicant had a daily walk of about an hour. The
exercise yard was covered and measured 15 square metres.
According to the
Government, from 16 to 20 December 2004 the applicant was held in cell no. 42, which
measured 8.6 square metres and housed two to four inmates. From 20 December
2004 to 22 April 2005 he was held in cell no. 94, which measured 58.7 square
metres and housed eighteen to twenty-two inmates. From 22 April to 21 June
2005 he was held in cell no. 36, measuring 13.2 square metres and housing four
to six inmates. From 21 June to 6 December 2005 he was held in cell no.
63, which measured 8.6 square metres and housed two to four inmates. From
6 to 8 December 2005 he was held in cell no. 62, which measured 8.3 square
metres and housed two to four inmates. The applicant had a separate bunk at all
times and was provided with bedding. In support of their
position, the Government submitted certificates issued by the remand centre
governor on 18 November 2010 and selected pages
from the prison population register which recorded, for each day, the number of
sleeping bunks and the number of inmates in each cell, and the total number of
inmates in each of the eight wings of the remand centre.
Relying on certificates of the same date from
the remand centre governor, the Government further submitted that all cells
were equipped with toilet facilities which were separated from the living area
by a partition. There was forced ventilation in the cells. The windows were
large and were not blocked by shutters. The cells had sufficient artificial
light, which was located so as not to disturb the sleep of the inmates. There
were no insects or rodents in the detention facility, as all the cells were
disinfected every three months. Inmates had an hour-long daily walk in the
exercise yards, which were sufficiently large to allow each inmate to do physical
exercise. The showers were working properly and hot water was available at all
times.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
For a summary of the
relevant domestic law provisions governing conditions and length of pre-trial
detention, see the cases of Dolgova v. Russia, no. 11886/05, §§ 26-31, 2 March 2006, and Lind v. Russia,
no. 25664/05, §§ 47-52, 6 December 2007.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the conditions of
his detention from 16 December 2004 to 8 December 2005 in remand centre no.
IZ-77/2 in Moscow had been in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which
provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
The Government argued that the applicant had not
exhausted the domestic remedies available to him. In particular, he had not
sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage before a court. To prove the
effectiveness of that remedy, they referred to the case of Mr D., who had been
awarded 45,000 Russian roubles (RUB) by the Novgorod Town Court in compensation
for the inhuman conditions of his detention. They further referred to the
judgment of the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad of 26 March 2007
awarding Mr R. RUB 300,000 in compensation for inadequate medical assistance.
The Court has already
rejected identical objections by the Russian Government in a number of cases
regarding conditions of detention, having found that a tort action could not be regarded as an
effective remedy for the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Aleksandr Makarov
v. Russia, no. 15217/07, §§ 82-91, 12 March 2009; Kokoshkina
v. Russia, no. 2052/08, § 52, 28 May
2009; Ananyin v. Russia, no. 13659/06, § 62, 30 July 2009; Artyomov v. Russia, no. 14146/02, § 112, 27 May
2010; Arefyev v. Russia, no. 29464/03, § 54, 4 November 2010; and Gladkiy
v. Russia, no. 3242/03, § 55,
21 December 2010). In the case of Ananyev
and Others v. Russia (nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 100-119, 10 January 2012), having found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention,
the Court concluded that for the time being the Russian legal system does not offer
an effective remedy that could be used to prevent such an alleged violation or
its continuation and provide the complainant with adequate and sufficient
redress in connection with a complaint of inadequate conditions of detention.
. In the case at hand, the
Government submitted no evidence to enable the Court to depart from these
findings with regard to the existence of an effective domestic remedy for the
structural problem of overcrowding in Russian detention facilities. Although
they referred to several judicial decisions which had allegedly provided
redress for inadequate conditions of detention, they did not produce copies of
those decisions. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection as
to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Court further notes that this complaint is
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government conceded
that the applicant’s cells had been overcrowded. They argued, however, that he
had spent substantial periods of time outside his cell. In particular, he had
participated in investigative measures, had had meetings with counsel and
family visits and had been taken daily to the exercise yard. Moreover, apart
from the overcrowding, the conditions of his detention had been satisfactory.
The applicant had at all times had a separate bunk and had been provided with
bedding. All sanitary and hygiene standards had been met.
The cells had had natural and artificial light. Inmates had received food three
times a day. In sum, the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been compatible
with Article 3.
The applicant maintained his claim.
The focal point for the Court’s assessment is
the living space afforded to the applicant. It notes that in support of their
submissions as to the cell sizes and the number of inmates per cell, the
Government produced certificates issued by the prison
governor and selected pages from the prison population register which recorded,
for each day, the number of sleeping bunks and the number of inmates in each
cell, and the total number of inmates in each of the eight wings of the remand
centre (see paragraph 28 above).
. The
certificates from the prison governor were issued on 18 November
2010, long after the applicant had left the remand centre.
The Court has repeatedly declined to accept the validity of similar
certificates on the grounds that they could not be viewed as sufficiently
reliable, given the lapse of time involved and the absence of any supporting
documentary evidence (see Belashev
v. Russia, no. 28617/03, § 52, 13 November 2007; Sudarkov
v. Russia, no. 3130/03, § 43, 10 July 2008; Kokoshkina, cited
above, § 60; Kozhokar v. Russia, no. 33099/08, § 95, 16 December
2010; Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, §§ 99-100, 22 May 2012; and Zentsov and
Others v. Russia, no. 35297/05, § 43, 23 October 2012). The
certificates are therefore of little evidentiary value for the Court.
. Turning
next to the copies of the prison population register produced by the
Government, the Court notes, firstly, that the Government preferred to
submit the copies of certain pages only, covering fourteen days out of the 352
days that the applicant spent in the remand centre. It finds such incomplete
and selective evidence unconvincing (see, for similar reasoning, Sudarkov, cited
above, § 43, and Kokoshkina, cited above, § 60). It further observes
that on at least five pages the entries in respect of the
number of detainees in the applicant’s cells were visibly altered, with a
figure having been erased and another figure, corresponding in all cases to the
number of sleeping bunks in the cell, having been written over instead. The
Government did not indicate at what point and for what purpose the information
in the register had been altered. The Court has already found that alterations in
a prison population register, without any explanations as to their origin,
reason and timing, made the information contained in it unreliable (see Glotov
v. Russia, no. 41558/05, § 25,
10 May 2012).
A further factor undermining the
reliability of the documents submitted by the Government is the fact that on
the five pages that contain alterations adding up the numbers of inmates in
each cell of the applicant’s wing gives a number below the total number of
inmates indicated as being detained in the wing. The
Government did not provide any explanation for that discrepancy. Moreover, the
examination of the other entries made in the prison population register on the
same dates reveals that in the other cells of the same wing the number of
inmates exceeded the number of sleeping bunks. The Court finds it noteworthy that
only the applicant’s cells were unaffected by that problem, in particular in view of the visible alterations to the entries
concerning those very cells described above and the above-mentioned
discrepancies in the total numbers of inmates. The foregoing factors make it
impossible to determine whether the amended data has any probative value. In
these circumstances, the Court considers that the information contained in the
copy of the prison population register produced by the Government is not
sufficiently reliable to establish the facts.
. However,
there is no need for the Court to establish the truthfulness of each and every
allegation concerning the number of inmates per cell, because it finds a
violation of Article 3 on the basis of the facts that have been presented by
the respondent Government for the following reasons. Although
the applicant’s personal space was on some occasions as much as 4.3 square
metres, for most of his one-year detention in the remand centre he had, according
to the information submitted by the Government, between 2
and 3 square metres of personal space. The Court
reiterates in this connection that in previous cases where applicants had less
than 3 square metres of personal space available to them, it found that the
overcrowding was so severe as to justify, in its own right, a finding of a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, it was not necessary to
assess other aspects of the physical conditions of their detention (see, for
example, Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, § 40, 20 January 2005; Labzov v. Russia, no.
62208/00, § 44, 16 June 2005; Andrey Frolov v.
Russia, no. 205/02, §§ 47-49, 29 March 2007;
Kantyrev v. Russia, no.
37213/02, §§ 50-51, 21 June 2007; Lind v.
Russia, no. 25664/05, § 59, 6 December 2007; Kozhokar
v. Russia, cited above, § 96; and Dmitriy Sazonov v. Russia,
no. 30268/03, § 31, 1 March 2012).
Having regard to its case-law on the subject and
the material submitted by the parties, the Court reaches the same conclusion in
the present case. That the applicant was obliged to live, sleep and use the
toilet in the same cell with so many other inmates was itself sufficient to
cause distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of
suffering inherent in detention, and arouse in him feelings of anguish and
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him. The Government’s submission
that he spent considerable time outside his cell (see paragraph 36 above) is not supported by evidence.
There has therefore been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention
in remand centre no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow, which amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment within the meaning of that provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c)
of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the
domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under
Article 5 § 3, he complained of a violation of his right to trial within a
reasonable time and alleged that the detention orders had not been based on
sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority
on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after
having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial ...”
A. Admissibility
As regards the applicant’s complaint that his
detention was unlawful, the Court notes that on 16
December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the
applicant’s remand in custody. The applicant’s detention was subsequently
extended on several occasions by the domestic courts.
The domestic courts acted within their powers in
making those decisions and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid
or unlawful under domestic law. The question of whether the reasons for the
decisions were sufficient and relevant is analysed below in connection with the
issue of compliance with Article 5 § 3 (compare Khudoyorov v. Russia,
no. 6847/02, §§ 152 and 153, ECHR 2005-X (extracts)).
The Court finds that the applicant’s detention
was compatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. It
follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant
to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
As regards the applicant’s complaint of a
violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial, the Court finds that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The applicant submitted that the domestic courts
had not advanced “relevant and sufficient” reasons to hold him in custody for
almost one year. He had offered to post bail. However, the domestic authorities
had continuously extended his detention, without demonstrating the existence of
concrete facts in support of their conclusion that he might abscond, interfere
with the investigation or reoffend. They had shifted the burden of proof to the
applicant to show that there were no such risks and that he could be safely
released.
The Government submitted that the decisions to
remand the applicant in custody had been lawful and justified. They repeated
the reasons given by the domestic courts and argued that the detention orders
had been well-reasoned. Moreover, the criminal proceedings had involved
thirty-nine defendants and had been complex. The Government considered that
there had been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention because the
applicant’s pre-trial detention had been based on “relevant and sufficient”
reasons.
The Court observes that the applicant was remanded
in custody on 14 December 2004. On 8 December 2005 the trial court
convicted him of a criminal offence, put him on probation and immediately
released him. The period to be taken into consideration lasted almost twelve
months.
The Court has already, on a large number of
occasions, examined applications against Russia raising similar complaints
under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and found a violation of that Article on
the grounds that the domestic courts extended an applicant’s detention relying
essentially on the gravity of the charges and using stereotyped formulae
without addressing his or her specific situation or considering alternative
preventive measures (see, among many others, Khudoyorov, cited above; Panchenko
v. Russia, no. 45100/98, 8 February 2005; Rokhlina v. Russia,
no. 54071/00, 7 April 2005; Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, 1 June
2006; Pshevecherskiy v. Russia, no. 28957/02, 24 May 2007; Solovyev
v. Russia, no. 2708/02, 24 May 2007; Ignatov v.
Russia, no. 27193/02, 24 May 2007; Mishketkul and Others v. Russia,
no. 36911/02, 24 May 2007; Shukhardin v. Russia, no. 65734/01, 28 June
2007; Belov v. Russia, no. 22053/02, 3 July 2008; Matyush v. Russia,
no. 14850/03, 9 December 2008; Aleksandr Makarov v. Russia, no.
15217/07, 12 March 2009; Avdeyev and Veryayev v. Russia, no. 2737/04, 9
July 2009; Lamazhyk v. Russia, no. 20571/04, 30 July 2009; Makarenko v. Russia, no. 5962/03, 22 December 2009; Gultyayeva
v. Russia, no. 67413/01, 1 April 2010; Goroshchenya v. Russia,
no. 38711/03, 22 April 2010; Logvinenko v. Russia, no. 44511/04, 17
June 2010; Sutyagin v. Russia, no. 30024/02, 3 May 2011; Khodorkovskiy
v. Russia, no. 5829/04, 31 May 2011; Romanova
v. Russia, no. 23215/02, 11 October 2011; and Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia,
no. 57541/09, 24 January 2012).
The Court further notes that it has previously
examined similar complaints lodged by the applicant’s co-defendants and found a
violation of their rights set out in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Dolgova
v. Russia, no. 11886/05, §§ 38-50, 2 March 2006; Lind, cited
above, §§ 74-86; Kolunov v. Russia, no. 26436/05,
§§ 48-58, 9 October 2012; and Zentsov and Others, cited above, §§
56-66). In each case the Court noted, in particular, the domestic courts’ reliance
on the gravity of the charges as the main factor for the assessment of the
applicant’s potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice, their
reluctance to devote proper attention to discussion of the applicant’s personal
situation or to have proper regard to the factors militating in favour of his
or her release, the use of collective detention orders without a case-by-case
assessment of the grounds for detention in respect of each co-defendant and the
failure to thoroughly examine the possibility of applying another, less rigid,
measure of restraint, such as bail.
Having regard to the materials in its
possession, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact
or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Indeed, the domestic courts inferred the risks of absconding,
reoffending or interfering with the proceedings essentially from the gravity of
the charges against the applicant. They did not point to any aspects of the
applicant’s character or behaviour that would justify their conclusion that he
presented such risks. They gave no heed to important and relevant facts
supporting the applicant’s petitions for release and reducing the above risks,
such as his clean criminal record, a permanent place of residence and positive character
references. Nor did they consider the possibility of ensuring the applicant’s
attendance by the use of a more lenient preventive measure. Finally, after the
case had been submitted for trial in June 2005 the domestic courts issued
collective detention orders, using the same summary formula to refuse the applications
for release and extend the pre-trial detention of thirty-nine people,
notwithstanding the defence’s express request that each detainee’s situation be
dealt with individually.
Having regard to the above, the Court considers
that by failing to address specific facts or consider alternative “preventive
measures” and by relying essentially on the gravity of the charges, the
authorities extended the applicant’s detention on grounds which, although
“relevant”, cannot be regarded as “sufficient”. In these circumstances it is
not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with “special
diligence”.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 1,000,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government submitted that the claim was
excessive. In their opinion, the finding of a violation
would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
The Court observes that
the applicant spent almost a year in custody in inhuman and degrading
conditions. His detention was not based on sufficient reasons. In these
circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s suffering and
frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation alone.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 6,000 in respect
of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
. The
applicant did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to
make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning the conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention and
the excessive length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into the currency of the respondent State
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 April 2013, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre
Registrar President