European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

 

FIRST SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF MARINA ALEKSEYEVA v. RUSSIA

 

(Application no. 22490/05)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

STRASBOURG

 

19 December 2013

 

 

 

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Marina Alekseyeva v. Russia,

ITMarkIntroductionThe European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 26 November 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 22490/05) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Marina Yuryevna Alekseyeva (“the applicant”), on 31 May 2005.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr A. Yakovenko, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3.  The applicant alleged that the investigation into her son’s death during his military service had not been effective.

4.  On 26 March 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTSITMarkFactsComplaintsStart

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Norilsk.

A.  Death of the applicant’s son

6.  On 1 August 2002 the applicant’s son, Georgiy Alekseyev, became a student at the Irkutsk Military College of Aviation Engineering (Иркутский военный авиационный инженерный институт – “the College”). Studies formed part of his military service, and the applicant’s son served as a private.

7.  On 1 March 2004 the applicant’s son was on duty for twenty-four hours at the checkpoint to the training aerodrome’s parking lot. He was provided with a bayonet while on duty. Upon Private Alekseyev reporting for sentry duty Captain L., who was on duty at the aerodrome, reprimanded him for his untidy appearance and ordered him to rectify this. Captain I., Private Alekseyev’s hierarchical superior, who was present when the sentries reported for duty, warned him that he would be subjected to disciplinary measures for being unprepared for duty.

8.  On 2 March 2004 at 7 a.m., in the course of the twenty-four-hour duty shift, Private Alekseyev let a stranger who had no permission to enter into the aerodrome’s parking lot. Then he let this man freely leave the parking lot in a Toyota Camry car. At the same time, the officer on duty at the aerodrome noticed that a fastener used to attach a glass cover was missing from a lamp, whereas it had been there the day before. He then ordered Private Alekseyev to provide a written explanation concerning the breach of the parking lot’s access control policy and to either find the missing fastener or reimburse its value, as without the fastener it was impossible to use the lamp.

9.  At around 11 a.m. on 2 March 2004 Captains L. and Sh. heard a noise coming from the day room of the aerodrome checkpoint. Upon entering the room they found Private Alekseyev lying on the floor, unconscious and with a knife wound to his chest. The bayonet given to him the day before was near him with traces of blood on it. Private Alekseyev was taken to a military hospital where he was pronounced dead.

10.  In the day room a note written by Private Alekseyev was also found. The note read as follows:

“I have ended my life because I had too many problems today. (1) I owe $30,000 for the Toyota Camry. (2) [I owe] 900 roubles for the shitty ring from the lamp that the officer on duty has [another one of] anyway and (3) [Captain I.] promised to beat the shit out of me after my duty [was over]. I can’t live this way. Mother, father, sister, forgive me please.

2  March 2004, 11 a.m.

Alekseyev”

B.  Criminal investigation

11.  On 2 March 2004 the Irkutsk Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office (“the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office”) instituted a criminal investigation into the death of the applicant’s son under Article 110 of the Russian Criminal Code (incitement to suicide). The case file was given number 11/23/0012-04.

12.  On the same date the investigating authorities conducted an inspection of the scene of the events, including the checkpoint and the day room; seized certain objects, including the bayonet, the note found near Private Alekseyev’s body, his clothes and personal property; and ordered a forensic examination of his body.

13.  Later on the same date the investigating authorities questioned Captain L. According to his statement, on 1 March 2004 he was on duty at the training aerodrome together with four second year students: Privates Alekseyev, Kol., G. and Kob. Upon their reporting for sentry duty he reprimanded Privates Alekseyev and Kob. for their untidy appearance, as their collars were dirty, and ordered them to rectify this. They left and returned shortly afterwards with clean collars. The aerodrome has a parking lot for the officers’ private vehicles. The parking lot is only accessible through the aerodrome gates until 10 p.m. and by vehicles indicated in a list approved by the commander of the aerodrome. At night the gates are closed and there is no access to the parking lot. If a car trying to enter the parking lot is not on the list, the sentry on duty must report this to Captain L., who must request permission from the commander to let the vehicle in. At around 7 a.m. on 2 March 2004 Private Alekseyev, having learned that someone wanted to enter the aerodrome, went to the gates. Once there he let in a man and a woman who had no passes. At the time, Captain L. was having breakfast at the checkpoint. At around 8 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Zh., the deputy head of the College, called him and asked why strangers had entered the aerodrome grounds and taken away a car. He also asked why the access control policy had not been complied with. Twenty or thirty minutes later Major P., Captain Sh. and Private Alekseyev arrived at the checkpoint. Captain L. and Major P. reprimanded Private Alekseyev for having let strangers, who had taken a car, into the aerodrome without having checked their passes. They spoke to him calmly as, in any event, Captain L. knew that the car in question had been parked there on Lieutenant Colonel Zh.’s request and that it had not been stolen. Captain L. ordered Private Alekseyev to provide a written explanation by the end of the day. Private Alekseyev did not seem to be particularly upset. Captain L. later noticed that a fastener was missing from a lamp that the sentries had been provided with for night duty and ordered Privates Alekseyev and G. to search for it. At around 10:30 a.m. Private Alekseyev returned to the checkpoint. Captain L. asked him whether they had found the fastener. He answered “no”, and took a registration journal to the aerodrome so that the officers on duty could sign it in accordance with standard procedure. At 10:50 a.m. he returned to the checkpoint. Captain L. asked him whether the registration journal had been signed, which was confirmed by Private Alekseyev. Captain L. did not notice that Private Alekseyev was particularly upset about something. Afterwards Private Alekseyev had to take up duties at a control panel. However, later on Captains L. and Sh., who were in the same room, heard noise coming from the adjacent day room. It sounded as if something had fallen on the floor. Captain L. went to see what had happened and saw Private Alekseyev lying on the floor of the day room with a knife covered with blood near his head. He was still breathing but could not answer Captain L.’s questions. Captain L. then shouted to Captain Sh. to come over and call an ambulance. Captain Sh. entered, saw what had happened and rushed to get his car. At the same time Captain L. reported what had happened to Major P. and Lieutenant Colonel Zh. and they instructed him to take Private Alekseyev to the hospital immediately. Several officers took him from the room and placed him in a minivan. He was breathing and moaning but could not explain anything. Captain L. could not understand why Private Alekseyev had done what he had, as during his duty shift he had neither threatened nor otherwise pressured him.

14.  Private Kob. was questioned that same day (2 March 2004). According to him, Private Alekseyev was a sociable person and had not been having any problems with his studies. On 1 March 2004 when they reported for sentry duty Captain L. reprimanded him and Private Alekseyev for the untidy appearance of their collars and sent them away to attach new ones. As they only had ten minutes to do it they had to be quick, and so they did not talk to each other much. When they returned, Captain I. said that they would be in big trouble after the duty shift was over for breaching the uniform rules. However, Private Kob. was not too upset about it, and Private Alekseyev did not appear to be upset either. During the night shift Private Alekseyev and Private Kob. kept replacing each other. Around 8 a.m. Private Kob., who was in the day room, heard Captain L. shouting at Private Alekseyev in the adjacent room because he had let a car leave the parking lot, which he should not have done. Captain L. said, in particular, that it was an expensive car and that if it had been stolen this would be considered Private Alekseyev’s fault. Later on at around 9:30 a.m. he heard Captain L. berating Private Alekseyev for having lost a fastener from a lamp. Privates Alekseyev and G. left to search for the fastener, and Captain L. came in and ordered Private Kob. to clean the grounds. While he was clearing away snow, Private Alekseyev came over and told him to put the garbage in the garbage truck and he left to do that. While he was loading the garbage together with three other servicemen, an officer came and said that Private Alekseyev had committed suicide.

15.  Private Kol., questioned on the same date, submitted that he could not provide any information concerning the death of Private Alekseyev. He stated that Private Alekseyev had not been subjected to harassment.

16.  Private G. was also questioned on 2 March 2004. According to him, he was friends with Private Alekseyev. Private Alekseyev was a friendly person, he had no issues with either his studies or money and was not taking drugs. Upon reporting for sentry duty on 1 March 2004 Captain L. ordered Privates Alekseyev and Kob. to change their collars but did so in a respectful manner. At around 9:40 a.m. on 2 March 2004 Captain L. told Private G. that Private Alekseyev had let a car leave the parking lot without having established the identity of the driver and also that they had lost a fastener from a lamp. He said that if they did not find it they would have to pay for the fastener and ordered Privates G. and Alekseyev to search for it. Private Alekseyev seemed upset and told Private G. that he had let a car leave the parking lot even though it had not been driven by its owner and that he would be liable for it. According to Private G., Private Alekseyev seemed to believe that he would have to pay for the car if it appeared that it had been stolen. They returned to the checkpoint without having found the fastener. A couple of officers there told them that if the car had been stolen everyone who had been on duty would have to pay for it, and they would have to pay for the fastener too. Sometime later Private Alekseyev picked up a registration journal from the checkpoint and told Private G. that he had suffered too many misfortunes in one day. At around 11:20 a.m. Private G. again went to the checkpoint where he saw about five people and Private Alekseyev lying on the floor of the day room. Private G. helped to put him in the minivan.

17.  On the same date Lieutenant Colonel Zh. was questioned. According to him, around 20 February 2004 a relative of his, Mr X., came to visit him. X. asked whether it would be possible to leave his car with him as he was going to another town for a few days. Lieutenant Colonel Zh. offered to let X. use his parking place, having obtained the consent of the commander of the aerodrome. Ever since the day he had parked his relative’s car at the aerodrome’s parking lot he had continued to inform all the officers on duty that the parking of this vehicle there had been agreed with the commander. Between 6:30 and 7 a.m. on 2 March 2004 X. and his wife arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Zh.’s home. He offered them to go and collect their car, but X. said that he had already picked it up. Lieutenant Colonel Zh. was very surprised and, after X. had left, called Captain L. and asked how a stranger could have picked up a car from the parking lot without having provided a pass. He did not ask for any specific checks to be conducted in this respect, but explained that he felt embarrassed as he had told X. that they had a very strict access control policy at the parking lot, but, as it happened, X. had tested it and proved that it was lacking.

18.  Also on 2 March 2004 the investigating authorities questioned Major P., deputy commander of the aerodrome. According to his statement, at 8 a.m. on 2 March 2004 he had reported for duty at the checkpoint. The officer on duty reported that during the night shift there had been no incidents, apart from a reprimand from Lieutenant Colonel Zh. concerning the breach of the access control policy in respect of the parking lot. It appeared that a stranger had been let into the parking lot and had later left in a car. Private Alekseyev, who had been on duty that night, failed to give a comprehensible explanation of how this could have happened and was ordered to provide a written explanation of the incident by the end of the day. Officers talked to Private Alekseyev in a respectful manner, nobody raised his voice. At around 11 a.m. Captain L. called him and said that Private Alekseyev had committed suicide. Major P. rushed to the checkpoint, where he saw Private Alekseyev lying on the floor in the day room with a bayonet near his head. Major P. helped to take him to the hospital.

19.  On the same date Captain Sh. was questioned. His statement was consistent with that of Captain L.

20.  Again on 2 March 2004 the investigating authorities questioned Officer B., who had taken Private Alekseyev’s body and his clothes from the hospital. He could not provide any information regarding the incident. According to him, Private Alekseyev was calm, sociable and had a lot of friends among the students, who treated him with respect. He neither took drugs nor abused alcohol.

21.  On 3 March 2004 Captain I. was questioned. He was a physical training instructor and knew Private Alekseyev as his student. Private Alekseyev had satisfactory grades and seemed to be sociable. Upon reporting for sentry duty on 1 March 2004 Privates Alekseyev and Kob. were sent to change their collars. When they came back, Lieutenant Colonel B. asked whose students they were and said to “sort it out”. Captain I. answered that they were his students and that they would do so after the duty shift. He did not speak to either Private Alekseyev or Private Kob. personally.

22.  On the same date Captains L. and Sh. and Major P. were questioned again. They confirmed their earlier statements and gave further details concerning the position of Private Alekseyev’s body when they saw him lying on the floor.

23.  The applicant was also questioned on 3 March 2004. According to her, Private Alekseyev used to say that he was enjoying his studies but found military discipline rather tough. However, he never complained – either in this respect or in respect of his superiors. On the contrary, he said they were helping him. According to Private Alekseyev, he had never been subjected to harassment of any kind at the College. In the applicant’s view, her son was incapable of committing suicide.

24.  On the same date Private Alekseyev’s father was questioned. As far as he could tell, Private Alekseyev had not been having any problems with his studies at the College and quite enjoyed them.

25.  Between 3 and 30 March 2004 a forensic examination of Private Alekseyev’s body was conducted by experts B., G. and A.. According to the results of the examination, his death was caused by one sharp stab wound to the left side of the chest, penetrating into the left pleural cavity causing a perforating wound of the right ventricle of the heart and a penetrating wound of the superior vena cava, followed by massive blood loss.

26.  Between 3 and 31 March 2004 a forensic biological expert examination of Private Alekseyev’s body and the bayonet was conducted by expert T. The blood on the bayonet was confirmed to be that of Private Alekseyev.

27.  Between 4 and 5 March 2004 a fingerprint identification test was carried out, which established that the bayonet had no fingerprints on it.

28.  On 5 March 2004 a number of items were seized for a handwriting examination.

29.  On the same date expert B. conducted an inspection of Private Alekseyev’s clothes and personal effects.

30.  Between 9 and 11 March 2004 Privates D., P., K-r, M-n, S-n, A-v, N., K-z, K-v, B-v, M., G-v, K-n, P-v, G-a, Sh-t, S., G-o and S-v, second-year students at the College, were questioned. As they had not been on duty on the relevant dates they could not provide any specific information concerning the incident. According to them, Private Alekseyev did not have any particular problems; his parents regularly sent him money; he neither took drugs nor abused alcohol; he never expressed suicidal thoughts; he neither had conflicts at the College nor was subjected to harassment; and it was hard to imagine that someone could wish him dead. Some of them added that in some cases for a breach of the uniform rules privates could be subjected to a penalty. However, there had been no incidents of harassment at the College.

31.  On 10 March 2004 X., the owner of the Toyota Camry, was questioned. He stated that he lived in Ulan-Ude and on 19 February 2004 he had gone to Irkutsk in his car together with his wife. Upon arriving in Irkutsk he contacted his relative, Lieutenant Colonel Zh., and asked him where he could leave the car for eleven days, as he was leaving to go on holiday with his wife. At 9 p.m. on 19 February 2004 they went to the training aerodrome parking lot with Lieutenant Colonel Zh. and parked the car there. Upon returning from holiday, X. and his wife went to the parking lot at 7.15 a.m. on 2 March 2004. The private at the checkpoint asked them why they were there. X. replied that they had come to collect his car from the parking lot, and they were let in. They were not asked to present any documents and went straight to the car. The car was not damaged. X. started the engine and let it run for about twenty-five minutes so as to “warm up” the car as it was -25 centigrade outside. Then he drove the car out of the parking lot through the open gates. Afterwards X. stopped off at Lieutenant Colonel Zh.’s home, left a few books there and drove to Ulan-Ude.

32.  On the same date the headmaster of the school that Private Alekseyev had attended provided the investigator, upon the latter’s request, with a reference concerning Private Alekseyev. According to the reference, at school he had been very communicative and had never had a psychological breakdown.

33.  On 11 March 2004 the Norilsk Neuropsychology Clinic informed the investigator, upon the latter’s request, that Private Alekseyev had not been under the supervision of either a psychiatrist or an addiction specialist (narcologist).

34.  On 12 March 2004 S-a, Private Alekseyev’s aunt who lived in Irkutsk, was questioned. She stated that she had regularly talked to Private Alekseyev. He had never expressed suicidal thoughts and she did not know whether he had been subjected to any form of pressure at the College. She did not know whether he had had any serious problems either.

35.  On 15 March 2004 several schoolteachers and a former classmate of Private Alekseyev were questioned. According to them, at school he had had good relations with his teachers and classmates and had not tended to act rashly.

36.  From 21 March 2004 onwards the applicant repeatedly asked the investigating authorities to grant her and her husband victim status, to carry out a variety of expert examinations and other investigative measures with a view to establishing the circumstances of her son’s death, to inform her of the course of the investigation and to provide her with copies of documents from the case file.

37.  By a decision of 25 March 2004 the investigator in charge refused to grant victim status to the applicant and her husband and to provide her with copies of the requested documents from the case file. The decision stated that the investigation had not yet established whether the applicant’s son had committed suicide or whether a crime had taken place and that it had not therefore been established whether the applicant and her husband had suffered any pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage. In addition, in her capacity as a witness in the case the applicant had no right to be provided with copies of documents from the case file.

38.  On 3 April 2004 the investigator in charge partly granted the applicant’s request that a number of expert examinations and investigative measures be carried out.

39.  On the same date the investigator in charge, relying on the same reasons as those stated in his decision of 25 March 2004, refused another request from the applicant for her and her husband to be granted victim status in the case. The applicant’s request to be provided with her son’s suicide note and copies of documents from the case file and to be issued with a detailed report on the steps taken during the investigation were refused with reference to the absence of any obligation on the investigator in charge to provide such information to third parties.

40.  On 6 April 2004 the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office forwarded the investigator’s decisions of 25 March and 3 April 2004 to the applicant.

41.  On 5, 13 and 23 April 2004 the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office forwarded the applicant’s complaints about the investigator’s actions to the Military Prosecutor’s Office for the Siberian Military Circuit (“the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office”) for examination, which in turn sent them to the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office on 15 and 27 April 2004.

42.  On 13 April 2004 Captains L. and Sh. underwent a polygraph test. According to the investigator’s findings, they were not involved in Private Alekseyev’s death.

43.  On 14 April 2004 the investigative authorities took blood tests from Captains L. and Sh. and also seized their uniforms. On 15 April 2004 they conducted an inspection of the uniforms.

44.  On the same date M., the College’s flight instructor, was questioned. He submitted that during the morning on 2 March 2004 he had entered the checkpoint. Captains L. and Sh. and a private whom he did not know personally had been present at the checkpoint. Captain L. had then ordered the private to search for a ring from a lamp and the private had left. M. had later learned what had happened to Private Alekseyev.

45.  Between 15 and 26 April 2004 a handwriting examination of Private Alekseyev’s suicide note was conducted. The expert determined that the note had been written by Private Alekseyev.

46.  On 15 April 2004 B-y and A-v, instructors at the College, were questioned. They were not direct witnesses to the events of 2 March 2004.

47.  On 19 April 2004 Private Alekseyev’s clothes that he had been wearing on 2 March 2004 and his personal effects were inspected.

48.  On 20 April 2004 B-v, an instructor at the College, and M-y, an aircraft mechanic, were questioned. They were not direct witnesses to the events of 2 March 2004.

49.  On the same date the investigator ordered that a posthumous psychological/psychiatric examination of Private Alekseyev be conducted on the basis of the case materials.

50.  On 26 April 2004 the examination was conducted. According to the conclusions of the six professionals involved, Private Alekseyev had not been suffering from any chronic disorder, and had been able to understand the meaning of his actions and control them. His suicidal intent had suddenly appeared at some point during the morning on 2 March 2004 as a result of the tension and anxiety he had felt following that morning’s events. At the time he committed suicide Private Alekseyev had been in a state of psychological distress which had lowered his ability to control himself.

51.  Between 21 and 27 April 2004 a forensic examination of Private Alekseyev’s clothes and personal belongings, as well as of the clothes of Captains L. and Sh., was conducted.

52.  Between 22 and 28 April 2004 Officer D., an instructor at the College, Major L-n. and Captain V-n., who were responsible for different activities at the aerodrome, were questioned. They were not direct witnesses to the events of 2 March 2004.

53.  On 30 April 2004 Privates G-a and G-v were again questioned. They provided certain additional details.

54.  On the same date Colonel Kh., deputy head of military training, was questioned. He stated that after Private Alekseyev’s death he had talked to a number of students trying to establish what might have pushed him towards suicide. However, he had failed to identify any reasons for the suicide. He had also told the students to only tell the truth to the investigative authorities, but he had never threatened them.

55.  Also on 30 April 2004 Captain L. was questioned again. He stated that traces of Private Alekseyev’s blood had been found on his coat because on 2 March 2004 he had helped to get Private Alekseyev out of the checkpoint and transport him to the military hospital.

56.  Lieutenant Colonel Zh., questioned again on 30 April 2004, provided certain additional details.

57.  On the same date B., who had conducted the forensic expert examination of Private Alekseyev’s body on 30 March 2004, was questioned. He made a number of comments concerning the examination. He also noted that no fingerprints had been found on the bayonet because the surface of its blade and shaft had been rugged, and thus contact with a person’s skin would not leave an imprint. Therefore, even though the bayonet might have fingerprints on it, it was not possible to detect them.

58.  On the same date Surgeon G. from the military hospital was questioned. He provided details concerning Private Alekseyev’s condition when he was brought to the hospital.

59.  On 30 April 2004 the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings, referring to the absence of any evidence of a crime in the incident. The applicant was informed of this in a letter of the same date. It does not appear that the applicant was provided with a copy of the decision.

60.  By letters of 18 and 26 May 2004 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the criminal proceedings in connection with her son’s death had been instituted on 2 March 2004 and discontinued on 30 April 2004 owing to the absence of any evidence of a crime in the incident. The letters stated that the investigation had been carried out fully and objectively by the office’s most experienced investigator, who had checked all possible reasons behind her son’s death but obtained no evidence that her son had been killed or incited to commit suicide by College personnel. One of the letters added that the evidence obtained during the investigation, including a report of a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric expert examination, had proven that the suicide of the applicant’s son could be explained by his psychological characteristics and unfavourable life circumstances – problems in his military service. The letters also stated that the investigation had been discontinued and that the applicant could therefore gain access to the case file.

61.  Between 31 May and 3 June 2004 the applicant and her lawyer studied the materials of the investigation.

62.  In a written request of 2 June 2004 the applicant asked the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office to set aside the decision of 30 April 2004, to grant her victim status in the case and to carry out a number of investigative measures.

63.  On 3 June 2004 the applicant complained in writing to the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office about the decision of 30 April 2004 and alleged flaws in the investigation, asking it to resume the criminal proceedings and to carry out the investigation fully and thoroughly.

64.  On 13 August 2004 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 30 April 2004. It was pointed out that a number of investigative measures relevant for establishing the circumstances of the incident had not been carried out. In particular, the applicant had not been granted victim status. In addition, the decision of 13 August 2004 mentioned a number of discrepancies in reports concerning the examination of the applicant’s son’s body, as well as in other expert reports and witness statements, those discrepancies not having been resolved during the investigation. Moreover, a number of relevant witnesses, including a number of College officers and medical personnel from the hospital to which the applicant’s son had been admitted, had not been questioned. It was therefore ordered that the investigation be reopened.

65.  It appears that at some point the applicant was notified of the decision of 13 August 2004, but was not provided with a copy.

66.  On 11 September 2004 the applicant asked the investigator in charge to provide her with a copy of the decision of 13 August 2004.

67.  By the investigator’s decision of 11 October 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the case.

68.  On the same date the investigator in charge refused her request of 11 September 2004, stating that the document in question did not belong to the list of documents which a victim of a crime was entitled to receive. The decision also stated that the applicant would be able to gain access to the case file upon completion of the preliminary investigation.

69.  On 12 October 2004 B. was questioned again. He confirmed the findings of the forensic examination conducted between 3 and 30 March 2004. He also explained that after having inflicted the wound Private Alekseyev had remained conscious for a short period of time, during which he had been capable of performing certain actions. This did not rule out that he could have removed the bayonet from the wound himself, as it would have required a far lesser effort than to thrust it in.

70.  Expert Sh. was also questioned on 12 October 2004. She confirmed the findings of the biological forensic examination conducted between 3 and 31 March 2004.

71.  On 13 October 2004 expert G. was questioned. He confirmed the findings of the forensic examination conducted between 3 and 30 March 2004.

72.  On the same date Major P., deputy commander of the aerodrome, was questioned again. In addition to confirming his earlier statement he provided further details concerning the operation of the parking lot on the aerodrome grounds. In particular, he explained that the servicemen on duty were not financially liable for the vehicles parked there. They were, however, responsible for ensuring compliance with the access control policy. He also confirmed that for several days a Toyota Camry had been parked in Lieutenant Colonel Zh.’s parking place at the aerodrome’s parking lot as per his instructions. After having been parked there the car was not removed until 2 March 2004.

73.  Captain Sh. was also questioned again on 13 October 2004. In addition to confirming his earlier statement he provided additional details concerning Private Alekseyev’s transportation to the hospital.

74.  Captain L., questioned again on the same date, emphasised that although he had reprimanded Private Alekseyev for the breach of the parking lot’s access control policy and the loss of the fastener for the lamp, he had never told Private Alekseyev that he would have to pay for the car. He also provided some additional details concerning Private Alekseyev’s transportation to the hospital.

75.  At some point in October 2004 (the date is unreadable) Warrant Officer P., an aircraft mechanic, was questioned. According to him, on 2 March 2004 he was passing by the aerodrome’s checkpoint when Captain Sh. told him to come in. He then saw a student lying on the floor in the day room. His description of the position of Private Alekseyev’s body and his subsequent transportation to the hospital was consistent with that of the other officers.

76.  On 14 October 2004 Lieutenant Colonel Zh. was questioned once again. He confirmed his earlier statement and added that he did not know Private Alekseyev personally and had never subjected him to either physical or psychological pressure. He also explained that servicemen on duty were not financially liable for cars parked at the aerodrome’s parking lot. However, they were responsible for ensuring the access control policy was adhered to and were not to let unauthorised persons enter the aerodrome grounds. In the event that an unauthorised person wanted to enter the grounds, the serviceman on duty was to make a report to his superior and wait for instructions.

77.  On 14 and 15 October 2004 Privates S-v, Kob., Kol. and G. were questioned again. Private S-v provided additional details concerning the procedure by which servicemen on duty are issued with a bayonet. Private Kob. confirmed his earlier statement and stated that, although Captain L. had been talking to Private Alekseyev in a raised voice on 2 March 2004 having adopted a commanding tone of voice, he had not insulted him. Captain L.’s tone had been appropriate, as he had been reprimanding Private Alekseyev, and nothing improper had been said. Captain L. had not ordered him to pay for the car either. Private Kob. had not heard any other officers talking to Private Alekseyev on that date. Private Kol. confirmed his earlier statement and provided additional details concerning Private Alekseyev’s transportation to the hospital. Private G. confirmed his earlier statement and provided additional details. He stated, in particular, that on the morning of 3 March 2004 he and Privates Kob. and Kol. had been called to the office of Colonel Kh., deputy head of military training. Kh. Had asked them about what had happened. During their meeting Lieutenant Colonel Zh. had entered and informed them about the Toyota. Colonel Kh. had then ordered the privates not to speak about the Toyota to Private Alekseyev’s parents, as the car had had nothing to do with what had happened. However, later that day they had met with Private Alekseyev’s parents and had told them everything they knew about what had taken place, including the episode concerning the car.

78.  On 14 and 23 October 2004 the investigator in charge took three decisions refusing in part repeated requests by the applicant dated 2 June, 11 September and 13 October 2004 respectively, in which she had requested that a number of investigative measures be carried out. The decision stated that some of the steps requested by the applicant would be performed during the investigation, whereas others had already been taken before and there was no need to carry them out once again. The applicant was notified of those decisions by letters of 14 and 25 October 2004.

79.  On 16 October 2004 Colonel Kh. was questioned again. He confirmed that on 3 March 2004 he had called Privates Kob., Kol. and G. to his office and had asked them about the events surrounding the suicide of Private Alekseyev. He had also told them not to discuss their thoughts about what might have happened with Private Alekseyev’s parents until all the facts had been established.

80.  On 18 October 2004 additional inspection of the scene of events was carried out.

81.  On 19 October 2004 additional investigative operations were carried out at the training aerodrome grounds.

82.  On the same date S., the head of the emergency department at the hospital, was questioned. She provided further details concerning the admittance of Private Alekseyev to the hospital on 2 March 2004.

83.  Between 19 and 21 October 2004 five instructors from the College, G-v, Kh., Sh-r, B-y and A-v, were questioned. They did not provide any additional details concerning the events of 2 March 2004.

84.  On 21 October 2004 an inspection of certain items seized as a result of the investigative operations carried out on 19 October 2004 was conducted.

85.  Between 22 and 25 October 2004 the investigative authorities questioned six students at the College who had not directly witnessed the events of 2 March 2004. They did not provide any additional details.

86.  On 26 October 2004 the investigative authorities seized two study journals kept by Private Alekseyev.

87.  On the same date the investigative authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against Captain L. on account of a lack of evidence that he had committed an offence.

88.  Again on the same date the applicant lodged a complaint with the higher prosecutor’s office about the investigator’s refusal of 11 October 2004 to provide her with a copy of a procedural decision.

89.  Between 27 October and 2 November 2004 the investigative authorities questioned several indirect witnesses, who did not provide any relevant information.

90.  On 2 November 2004 the investigative authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against Major P. on account of a lack of evidence that he had committed an offence.

91.  On the same date the investigative authorities questioned Doctor S-v., who had pronounced Private Alekseyev dead at the hospital.

92.  Also on 2 November 2004 a confrontation was held between one of the students, G-v, and Captain Sh.

93.  Again on the same date the investigative authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against Captain Sh. on account of a lack of evidence that he had committed an offence.

94.  By letter of 2 November 2004 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office notified the applicant once more that the criminal proceedings in connection with her son’s death had been reopened and the case file had been sent to the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office for investigation, where it had been received on 11 October 2004. The letter went on to say that the investigation was pending and that the applicant would be apprised of its results.

95.  On 4 November 2004 the investigative authorities conducted an additional inspection of Private Alekseyev’s bayonet.

96.  On 5 November 2004 the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office responded to the applicant’s complaint of 26 October 2004 concerning the investigator’s failure to address her requests of 2 June, 11 September and 13 October 2004, stating that these requests had been examined by the investigator in charge and that she had been informed of this in letters of 14 and 25 October 2004. The letter further stated that the investigator’s decision of 11 October 2004 by which he had refused to provide her with a copy of the decision of 13 August 2004 had been based on relevant provisions of criminal procedural law and had been well-founded. The letter added that the applicant would be able to gain access to the case file and obtain copies of any documents after the preliminary investigation was completed.

97.  On 10 November 2004 the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings in case no. 11/23/0012-04, referring to the absence of any evidence of a crime in the incident. On the same date the applicant was notified of that decision and informed that the case file had been sent that day to the Norilsk Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office.

98.  By letter of 3 December 2004 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office stated in response to the applicant’s complaint of 26 October 2004 that the actions of the investigator in charge as regards the handling of her requests revealed no breaches of national law. The letter further stated that the case file concerning her son’s death had been forwarded to the Norilsk Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office on 22 November 2004 so that the relatives of the deceased could gain access to it, and that the applicant could study the file and make copies of any documents.

99.  On 11 January 2005 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office further informed the applicant that once she had studied the case file it would be forwarded to the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office so as to enable them to check whether the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had been lawful and well-founded. They also informed the applicant that she could appeal against that decision in court.

100.  On 12 January 2005, after studying the case file, the applicant contacted the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office requesting that the decision of 10 November 2004 be quashed, the criminal proceedings be resumed and the investigation into her son’s death be conducted by another investigator.

101.  By letter of 18 March 2005 the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office stated that the applicant’s request had been refused, that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had been lawful and well-founded and that the investigation had been carried out fully and thoroughly with due regard to the instructions given by a higher prosecutor.

102.  On 5 May 2005 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office replied to a letter sent by the applicant to the President of Russia. The prosecutor’s office stated that the preliminary investigation had clearly established that the applicant’s son had committed suicide by inflicting a lethal stab wound on himself while in a disturbed psychological state caused by difficulties in his military service. According to the prosecutor’s office, that finding had been confirmed by a body of evidence obtained during the investigation, including: an expert report confirming that the suicide note had been authentic and written by the applicant’s son; an expert report confirming that it was possible to inflict a stab wound on oneself with a bayonet and then to extract the weapon from that wound; witness statements confirming the absence of any other individuals at the checkpoint at the time of the incident; and other pieces of evidence. The prosecutor’s office went on to say that the investigating authorities had taken all possible measures for ensuring a full, objective and thorough investigation and that the decision of 10 November 2004 had been lawful and well-founded.

103.  By a decision of 21 March 2006 the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicant’s complaint about the decision of 10 November 2004, stating that: the decision had been lawful and well-founded, which had also been confirmed by court decisions of 12 July and 20 September 2005; all possible measures for establishing the circumstances of the death of the applicant’s son had been taken during the preliminary investigation; there had been no breaches of criminal procedural law during the investigation; and the applicant’s repeated complaints had already been examined on several occasions by the Garrison Prosecutor’s Office and the Circuit Military Prosecutor’s Office and she had been given detailed responses.

C.  Court proceedings

104.  On 28 April 2004 the applicant challenged the investigator’s decisions of 25 March and 3 April 2004 before the Irkutsk Garrison Military Court (“the Garrison Court”).

105.  In a decision of 6 May 2004 the Garrison Court found that the investigator’s refusal to declare the applicant and her husband victims in the case and to grant her other requests had been unlawful. However, since the investigation had been discontinued on 30 April 2004, the court was no longer in a position to order the investigating authorities to remedy those breaches of the applicant’s rights. The court also noted that the applicant had had the right to study the file of criminal case no. 11/23/0012-04 and to challenge decisions taken in the case.

106.  On 17 November 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Garrison Court against the investigator’s decisions of 11, 14 and 23 October 2004.

107.  On 9 December 2004 the Garrison Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the investigator’s refusal of the applicant’s request to provide her with a copy of the decision of 13 August 2004 by which the criminal proceedings in connection with her son’s death had been reopened had been lawful and well-founded. The court further stated that it was unable to examine the lawfulness of the investigator’s refusal to carry out certain investigative measures requested by the applicant, as the investigation had been discontinued on 10 November 2004 and the case file had been sent to the Norilsk Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office so that the applicant could study it. The court also noted that the applicant had had the right to challenge the aforementioned investigator’s decisions after she had studied the file.

108.  On 8 February 2005 the Eastern Siberian Circuit Military Court (“the Circuit Military Court”) upheld the decision of 9 December 2004 on appeal.

109.  On 7 May 2005 the applicant applied to the Garrison Court seeking to have the decision of 10 November 2004 by which the criminal proceedings into her son’s death had been discontinued set aside and the proceedings resumed.

110.  By a decision of 12 July 2005 the Garrison Court rejected the applicant’s complaint. It noted that the investigation had established that the applicant’s son had inflicted a lethal stab wound on himself triggered by his personal anxiety which could be explained by his personal characteristics, and that he had not been incited or influenced in any way by other persons. Those findings had been made on the basis of witness statements, the deceased’s suicide note, and reports of psychological and psychiatric expert examinations. The court opined that the investigating authorities had taken all possible measures with a view to establishing the circumstances of the incident, and that there had been no breaches of criminal procedural law during the investigation. The court thus concluded that the decision of 10 November 2004 had been lawful and reasoned.

111.  On 20 September 2005 the Circuit Military Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court on appeal.

112.  The applicant’s attempts to have the above decisions quashed in supervisory review proceedings were to no avail.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

113.  Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the procedure for the judicial examination of complaints. The orders of an investigator or prosecutor refusing to institute criminal proceedings or terminating a case, and other orders and acts or omissions which are liable to infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of the parties to criminal proceedings or to hinder citizens’ access to justice, may be appealed against to a local district court, which is competent to check the lawfulness and grounds of the impugned decisions.

THE LAW

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

114.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into her son’s death. She claimed, in particular, that she had been excluded from the investigation at its initial stage as a result of the investigator’s refusal to grant her victim status, and that, even after the decision granting her victim status had been taken, her requests to be informed of the progress of the investigation had been refused. The applicant referred to Articles 6, 10 and 13 of the Convention in connection with her complaints. The Court shall examine the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

A.  The parties’ observations

115.  The Government submitted that, as was clear from the results of the domestic investigation, Private Alekseyev had died of a stab wound that he had inflicted on himself with a bayonet, which had constituted suicide. At the same time, the materials obtained by the investigation, including statements of numerous witnesses, had contained no evidence that Private Alekseyev had been subjected to any form of pressure. In particular, it had not been shown that he had been asked to pay for the car. On the contrary, he had been aware that under the applicable regulations College students did not bear financial liability for the cars at the aerodrome parking lot. Hence, it had not been possible to hold someone responsible for Private Alekseyev’s suicide, and therefore, the State’s responsibility under Article 2 of the Convention had not been engaged.

116.  As regards the subsequent investigation, it had been instituted on the day of Private Alekseyev’s death and had been prompt and thorough. A considerable number of investigative actions had been carried out and numerous witnesses had been questioned. Therefore, the investigation had been effective and thus in compliance with Article 2 of the Convention. The Government further noted that the applicant had fully exercised her right to an effective remedy. In particular, she had appealed to a court against a number of the investigator’s decisions. Furthermore, as Private Alekseyev had died while he was serving in the armed forces, the applicant had been entitled to an insurance payment, which she had received. She had also received an allowance to pay for her son’s burial.

117.  The applicant made no observations in response.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

118.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

(a)  General principles

119.  The Court reiterates that Article 2, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 146-47, Series A no. 324).

120.  The first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III). In the context of cases concerning prisoners, the Court has had previous occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them. It is incumbent on the State to account for any injuries suffered in custody, an obligation which is particularly stringent when an individual dies (see, for example, Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 99, ECHR 2000-VII).

121.  Similarly to persons in custody, conscripts are entirely in the hands of the State and any events involving the army lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities. Therefore, the State is also under an obligation to account for any injuries or deaths occurring in the army (see Beker v. Turkey, no. 27866/03, §§ 41-42, 24 March 2009, and Mosendz v. Ukraine, no. 52013/08, § 98, 17 January 2013).

122.  The Court further reiterates in this connection that, in all cases where it is unable to establish the exact circumstances of a case for reasons objectively attributable to the State authorities, it is for the respondent Government to explain, in a satisfactory and convincing manner, the sequence of events and to exhibit solid evidence that can refute the applicant’s allegations (see Mansuroğlu v. Turkey, no. 43443/98, § 80, 26 February 2008, with further references).

123.  Where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State, Article 2 entails a duty on the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate response – judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that right are suppressed and punished (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 91, ECHR 2004-XII, and, mutatis mutandis, Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 54, ECHR 2002‑II).

124.  In that connection the Court has held that, if the infringement of the right to life or to physical integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation to set up an “effective judicial system” does not necessarily require criminal proceedings to be brought in every case and may be satisfied if civil, administrative or even disciplinary remedies were available to the victims (see, for example, Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, §§ 90, 94 and 95, ECHR 2002‑VIII, and Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004-VII). However, the minimum requirement for such a system is that the persons responsible for the investigation must be independent from those implicated in the events. This means hierarchical or institutional independence and also practical independence (see Paul and Audrey Edwards, cited above, § 70, and Mastromatteo, cited above, § 91).

125.  The Court further reiterates that, in cases of homicide, the interpretation of Article 2 as entailing an obligation to conduct an official investigation is justified not only because any allegations of such an offence normally give rise to criminal liability, but also because often, in practice, the true circumstances of the death are, or may be, largely confined within the knowledge of State officials or authorities. Therefore the applicable principles which the Court has already had occasion to develop, notably in relation to the use of lethal force, lend themselves to application in other categories of cases (see Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, § 87, 5 July 2005).

126.  Accordingly, where a positive obligation to safeguard the life of persons in custody or in the army is at stake, the system required by Article 2 must provide for an independent and impartial official investigation that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness. In such cases, the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness and must of their own motion initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the State officials or authorities involved. The requirement of public scrutiny is also relevant in this context (see, for example, Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 114, 4 May 2001; McCann and Others, cited above, § 161; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 63, ECHR 2000-VII; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 148, ECHR 2001-III; and Trubnikov, cited above, § 88).

(b)  Application to the present case

127.  Turning to the present case and bearing in mind the above principles, the Court will examine the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention from the following two perspectives. Firstly, it will assess whether the authorities gave a plausible explanation for the death of the applicant’s son. Secondly, the Court will assess whether under the circumstances the State can be regarded as having discharged its obligation to sufficiently protect his life (see Mosendz, cited above, § 96).

128.  The question of whether the authorities gave a plausible explanation is, moreover, closely linked to the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation of the matter. Indeed, in order to establish whether the State satisfactorily accounted for the death of Private Alekseyev, the Court will have regard to the investigation carried out by the authorities and the conclusions reached by them.

129.  The Court notes, firstly, that the investigation was opened on 2 March 2004, the date of Private Alekseyev’s death, immediately after the authorities became aware of the incident. Initial inquiries and investigative actions were carried out within days. That included an inspection of the scene of events; the seizure of certain items, including Private Alekseyev’s bayonet and suicide note; questioning of the main witnesses; and a forensic examination of Private Alekseyev’s body and his bayonet. Taking into account that, after certain additional investigative actions were taken, the final decision to discontinue the investigation was taken on 10 November 2004, the Court considers that the investigation was sufficiently prompt.

130.  Although the applicant was initially refused victim status, it was eventually granted to her, as was access to the materials of the investigation, which she studied with her lawyer between 31 May and 3 June 2004 and in January 2005. Furthermore, the applicant had the right to challenge the decisions taken by the investigating authorities, which she used after having studied the investigation file (see paragraphs 106-12 above). The Court thus finds that the authorities complied with the requirement of public scrutiny.

131.  The Court observes that overall the authorities made diligent efforts to establish the circumstances surrounding Private Alekseyev’s death. They took a significant number of investigative actions including questioning of numerous witnesses and conducting pertinent forensic examinations. Notably, the investigating authorities thoroughly examined various theories as to the reasons behind Private Alekseyev’s death, including the possibility of murder or incitement to suicide (cf. Mosendz, cited above, § 98). From the investigating authorities’ letters it is clear that different lines of inquiry were being pursued (see paragraphs 37 and 60 above). In order to establish whether Private Alekseyev’s death could have been the result of murder the authorities conducted a fingerprint identification test on the bayonet; a handwriting examination of the note found near Private Alekseyev’s body; and a forensic examination of Private Alekseyev’s clothes and personal items and the clothes of Captains L. and Sh., who claimed to have found his body in the day room with a stab wound. They also questioned Captains L. and Sh., including with the use of a polygraph test, and many other witnesses, who stated that they could not think of anybody having a motive to kill Private Alekseyev. They also questioned expert B. so as to establish whether, having supposedly inflicted the wound himself, Private Alekseyev could have removed the knife. Therefore, the investigating authorities’ dismissal of the possibility of a murder having taken place was based on sufficient evidence.

132.  At the same time the authorities investigated the possibility of incitement to suicide. Numerous witnesses questioned stated that they had neither information nor reasons to believe that Private Alekseyev had been subjected to any form of pressure while at the College. As for the events of 2 March 2004, and in particular as regards the reprimand concerning having a dirty collar and losing the fastener for the lamp, it is clear from the witness statements that the reaction of Private Alekseyev’s superiors did not go beyond what constituted a legitimate reprimand for breaching the applicable rules. As for the incident with the car, the Court notes that whereas Private Kob. submitted that he had heard Captain L. saying to Private Alekseyev that it was an expensive car and if it had been stolen this would be his fault (see paragraph 14), Captain L. denied ever having told Private Alekseyev that he would have to pay for the car, which was confirmed by a number of the College’s students (see paragraphs 74 and 77). Furthermore, Major P. explained to the investigating authorities that servicemen on duty were not financially liable for cars in the parking lot (see paragraph 72), a fact of which, according to the Government, Private Alekseyev must have been aware. The Court thus cannot but share the domestic authorities’ conclusion that there was no evidence of Private Alekseyev’s having been asked to pay for the car. The Court concedes that Captain L. might have pointed out to Private Alekseyev that should it appear that the car had been stolen it would be his fault in order to raise his awareness of the importance of compliance with the internal rules and to make him feel responsible for their breach. However, this by no means could be considered to have constituted an order to pay the cost of the car’s replacement, especially when Captain L. was well aware that the car had been taken from the parking lot by its owner. The fact that Private Alekseyev believed himself to be financially liable for the car, which is evident from his suicide note and Private G.’s submissions (see paragraphs 10 and 16), appears to have been the result of him having misinterpreted the situation due to the state of anxiety which, according to the results of the psychological/psychiatric expert examination, he was in that morning (see paragraph 50).

133.  The Court thus finds that the authorities conducted a prompt and thorough investigation into Private Alekseyev’s death and on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence reached a reasonable conclusion that it had been a suicide. Furthermore, in view of the finding of the psychological/psychiatric expert examination that Private Alekseyev had not been suffering from any chronic disorder, as well as taking into account numerous witness statements to the effect that he did not appear to have any psychological problems, the authorities could not have been aware of the risk of his suicide and thus cannot be found to have been under an obligation to take any measures in this regard. The Court thus cannot hold the State responsible for Private Alekseyev’s suicide.

134.  Therefore, there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention, either in respect of the State’s positive obligation to protect the life of the applicant’s son while under its control and to adequately account for his death, or in respect of the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the application admissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s son’s death and the subsequent investigation.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 December 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

André Wampach Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
Deputy Registrar President