SECOND SECTION
CASE OF UNGVÁRY AND IRODALOM KFT. v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 64520/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 December 2013
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ungváry and Irodalom Kft v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Işıl Karakaş,
Peer Lorenzen,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Helen Keller,
Egidijus Kūris, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 5 November 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
Irodalom Kft is the publisher of the literary and political weekly Élet és Irodalom.
“... the Dialógus-affair had demonstrated ... how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the ‘social organisations’ - which had taken over some State-security functions covertly, in case of necessity - had been intertwined”.
The lead contained the following passage:
“From the perspective of informing (besúgás) and repression (megtorlás), Officer J. W. ... and the nine “official contacts” (hivatalos kapcsolat) proved to be a lot more important ... [in the Dialógus-affair], [these official contacts including] Mr K. (today judge of the Constitutional Court)... Their respective responsibilities are of course different.”
The author argued that Mr K., without being an actual agent,
“... was in regular and apparently collegial (kollégiális) contact with the State security, quite often anticipating and exceeding its expectations” ... “and as an official contact, he was busy as an informant (besúgó) and demanding hard-line policies”.
The writing made reference to the role of further contemporary public figures, amongst others the Prime Minister, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, a former Member of Parliament and a university professor.
Mr Ungváry characterised Mr K.’s attitude in the Dialógus case as that of a “hardliner”, in comparison to other “social contacts”. He recalled that Mr K. had ordered the removal of Dialógus’s poster, saying that “the country did not need such an ... organisation [i.e. Dialógus]”, and that he had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections for having been supported by Dialógus.
Mr K. initiated proceedings with a view to obtaining a rectification in the press, refuting the applicants’ allegations. His claim was sustained by the courts and the second applicant published a rectification on 22 February 2008.
The second-instance criminal court was of the view that the statements in question constituted opinions. Mr Ungváry was acquitted on 25 February 2010.
On 9 February 2009 the Budapest Regional Court found that Mr Ungváry had infringed Mr K.’s personality rights through his statements made in the study published in Élet és Irodalom, the television interview and the book. The second applicant was found to have violated Mr K.’s personality rights through publishing the study. The court relied on section 84(1) of the Civil Code.
The court further found that Mr Ungváry had falsely interpreted Mr K.’s political criticism towards a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections as an action motivated by the State security.
The court held that the article had not presented fact-driven conclusions of a historical research but mere defamatory and unsubstantiated statements about Mr K. It further affirmed that the applicants had been required to prove the truth of these allegations but had provided no such factual background.
The Supreme Court observed that there was no evidence that Mr K.’s report within the party hierarchy on the Dialógus-affair had been written on the commission, instruction or expectation of the Ministry of the Interior.
The judgment contained in particular the following passages:
“The concept of the author of the impugned article is in essence that, during [the Communist] regime, the so-called ‘official contacts’ also played an important role in the State security’s activities, in addition to the [actual] agents. It is probably true that the Ministry of the Interior indeed considered certain [officials] as ‘official contacts’. It can also be assumed that some of them occasionally cooperated with the State security as ‘official contacts’, that is, carried out State-security tasks, surveyed, reported - in other words, were active in the manner described by the author as ‘unambiguously incarnating the activities of an agent’. However, it is not possible to deduce from this potentiality the general conclusion that every single [official] acted as an ‘official contact’; consequently, in the absence of proven facts, it is not acceptable to qualify all potentially available personalities [i.e. Communist party secretaries] as ‘official contacts’ actually cooperating with the State security. Public opinion condemns those persons who cooperated with the State security, even if they do not fall within the actual category of ‘agent’ or ‘informant’. Therefore, if someone is characterised, without a proper ground, as actually having carried out such activities, this violates that person’s reputation, according to public opinion. ...
However, [Mr Ungváry] has committed breaches of law also in addition [to the authoring of the article], which themselves have justified - although all the breaches have originated in the article published in Élet és Irodalom - the plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of the statements made in [the television broadcast] and the book, the Supreme Court establishes the further, reasonable non-pecuniary damage due to the plaintiff in the amount of 1,000,000 Hungarian forints.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Article 59
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone shall have the right to good reputation, the inviolability of his home, and the protection of privacy and personal data.”
Article 61
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression and to receive and impart information of public interest.”
Section 75
“(1) Personality rights shall be respected by everyone. Personality rights are protected by law.”
Section 78
“(1) The protection of personality rights shall also include the protection of good reputation.
(2) In particular, the statement or dissemination of an injurious and untrue fact concerning another person, or the presentation with untrue implications of a true fact relating to another person, shall constitute defamation.”
Section 84
“(1) A person whose personality rights have been infringed may bring the following civil law claims, depending on the circumstances of the case:
a) a claim that the court establish that an infringement has taken place;
b) a claim that the infringement be discontinued and the perpetrator be prohibited from further infringement;
c) a claim that the perpetrator be ordered to give satisfaction by making a declaration or in any other appropriate manner and, if necessary, this be made adequately public by or at the expense of the perpetrator;
d) a claim that the prejudicial situation be terminated, and that the situation prior to the infringement be restored by or at the expense of the perpetrator;
e) a claim for damages under the rules of civil law liability.”
“The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary guarantees the freedom of the press. Everyone shall have the right to express his views or publish his works in the press if they do not violate the constitutional order of the Republic of Hungary.”
Section 4
“(1) The Archives authorises a scientific research if the researcher has fulfilled the conditions laid down in [the Act], submits his detailed research plan and his list of publications, if any. The researcher may have access to the documents stored in the Archives within the limits prescribed in subsections (2) and (3); and use them according to the rules concerning the handling of information for the purposes of scientific research, contained in the [relevant law].”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
1. Whether there has been an interference
The Court reiterates that an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 10 § 1 will infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It should therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve those aims.
2. “Prescribed by law”
3. Legitimate aim
4. Necessary in a democratic society
a. The parties’ submissions
i. The Government
ii. The applicants
They maintained, firstly, that by publishing the impugned article in a weekly journal, they had intended to draw attention to the public issues relating to the role of key players in the previous regime, in the present case a former deputy secretary of the local party committee, then a Constitutional Court judge.
They asserted that the impugned statements were directed against Mr K., who as a Constitutional Court judge should have accepted that he attracted public scrutiny in connection with his activities during the Communist rule.
Lastly, they argued that the sanctions imposed on them had been excessive and susceptible to obstructing the discussion on the collaboration of public officials with the previous regime.
b. The Court’s assessment
i. General principles
42. Nevertheless, Article 10 does not guarantee wholly unrestricted freedom of expression to the press, even with respect to coverage of matters of serious public concern. While enjoying the protection afforded by the Convention, journalists must, when exercising their duties, abide by the principles of responsible journalism, namely to act in good faith, provide accurate and reliable information, objectively reflect the opinions of those involved in a public debate, and refrain from pure sensationalism (see, among many others, Fressoz and Roire [GC], cited above, §§ 45, 52; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65, ECHR 1999-III; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 78, ECHR 2004-XI; and Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, §§ 102-103, 149, ECHR 2007-V).
44. Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism may in some circumstances be wider with regard to civil servants exercising their powers than in relation to private individuals. However, the courts - the guarantors of justice, whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law - must enjoy public confidence; and it may therefore prove necessary to protect judges from offensive and abusive verbal attacks (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, § 37, Reports 1997-I; Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I).
45. Where the right to freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for private life, the relevant criteria have been laid down in the Court’s case-law as follows (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 90 to 109, 7 February 2012): (a) contribution to a debate of general interest; (b) how well known the person concerned is and what the subject of the publication was; (c) prior conduct of the person concerned; (d) method of obtaining the information and its veracity; (e) content, form and consequences of the publication; and (f) severity of the sanction imposed.
ii. Application of those principles to the present case
(α) Assessment of the case in respect of the first applicant
In certain cases, the Court has objected to the restrictive definition of a term (e.g. the term “neo-fascist”, see Karman v. Russia, no. 29372/02, § 40, 14 December 2006) resulting in a selective interpretation which may warrant different facts to be proven. The Court finds that the term “official contact” is a wide one, capable of evoking in those who read it different notions as to its content and significance (see Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 86, ECHR 2001-VIII).
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the allegations had subsequently been reproduced in a television broadcast and a book (see paragraph 19 above), causing additional injury to Mr K. The Court likewise finds objectionable that the statements were repeated even after the judgment of rectification, by the publication of the book in question (see paragraph 12 above).
The requisite most careful scrutiny (see paragraph 48 above) requires the Court to consider whether the statements were interpreted in light of the article as a whole. For the Supreme Court, it was essential for the finding of lack of factual grounds (and of the resultant false perspective in which the applicants were found to have portrayed Mr K.) that there was no evidence that Mr K.’s report on the Dialógus affair made within the party hierarchy had been written on the commission, instruction or expectation of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 19 above).
55. However, the Court notes that the article intended to demonstrate that collaboration, that is, the activities of “official contacts” meant cooperation without specific, express operational instructions from the State security. Limiting its analysis to this kind of direct cooperation with the State security, the Supreme Court failed to consider that Mr K.’s reports had been in any case available to the authorities of the Communist regime, nor did it attribute any particular relevance to the fact that the first applicant’s undeniably offensive and exaggerated statements were made within the context of the broader presentation of the workings of the oppressive mechanism of a totalitarian regime. It did not consider relevant, either, that the first applicant had indicated the sense in which he had used the term informing (see paragraph 8 above). Indeed, the article was written in order to demonstrate how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the “social organisations” had worked together, and especially, how tight the relation had been between party functionaries and the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 7 above).
The Court notes that the Supreme Court interpreted the first applicant’s description of these officials as one portraying them “guilty by association” - which, in that court’s view, could not prove that Mr K. “actually cooperated” with the State security (see paragraph 19 above).
The Court cannot agree with the deduction of the Supreme Court. This line of reasoning disregards the fundamental tenet of the article, namely that the “official contacts” writing reports had indeed contributed to the work of the State security, and that even the “official contacts” had had a certain degree of freedom in cooperation. In the Court’s eyes, the evaluation of the use of this freedom in cooperation is a fact-related value judgment.
The Court finds that although the first applicant did not prove that Mr K. and his reports had actually been commissioned by the State security, it was nevertheless an undisputed fact that he, as a party secretary, had produced reports on the Dialógus affair.
The Court finds that, on careful scrutiny, the broader connotation of “cooperation” should have also been considered; and in regard to that broader connotation, the restrictive interpretation of the impugned terms of the article by the Supreme Court pre-empted the consideration of other facts which were relevant to these terms and also the possibility to consider them as opinion (see paragraphs 53 and 58 above) with sufficient factual basis.
The Court finds such a selective interpretation of the impugned statements, with the resultant burden of proof incumbent on the first applicant, hardly compatible with the demands of the most careful scrutiny applicable in the present case.
(β) Assessment of the case in respect of the second applicant
Thus, the Court is satisfied that the second applicant acted in accordance with the rules governing journalistic ethics. Moreover, it does not appear that the second applicant acted in bad faith, with the intent to denigrate Mr K.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
They moreover claimed EUR 6,000 and EUR 3,000 respectively in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
It awards the first applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, also having regard to his own conduct. It further awards the second applicant any sums which have been paid by it in execution of the domestic court judgment plus interest.
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares, unanimously, the application admissible;
2. Holds, by four votes to three, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant;
4. Holds, by four votes to three, that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of the non-pecuniary damage which the first applicant suffered;
5. Holds, by four votes to three,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to the first applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Holds, unanimously,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to the second applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) any sums which it has paid in execution of the domestic court judgment and the domestic statutory default interest on these sums, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 December 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Partly dissenting and partly concurring opinion of Judges Raimondi and Kūris;
(b) Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Lorenzen.
G.R.A.
S.H.N.
PARTLY DISSENTING AND PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE
KŪRIS,
JOINED BY JUDGE RAIMONDI
I. CONCURRING VIEWS
1. I agree that in respect of Irodalom Kft, the publisher, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. This publisher applied “the proper standard of care” when it relied on the professional expertise of the author of the offending article, a historian; it also published Mr K.’s statement wherein the former denied the allegations against him. These considerations present a sufficient basis to find that this publisher “acted in accordance with the rules governing journalistic ethics” and should not be held liable for spreading statements of fact and/or value judgments unfavourable to the person whose past activities were judged in the article. This applies to the factual and legal situation examined in this particular case.
2. Still, with a view to possible future cases pertaining to freedom of expression in general, and to alleged defamation or libel in particular, a rider should perhaps have been added to make it clear that this finding (and the reasoning on which it is based) should not be interpreted as a general rule, that is to say as a judicial precedent dispensing publishers of liability in all, most, or even many cases concerning the aforesaid issues. The very fact that a publisher may have published something written by a professional and/or may, a posteriori, have allowed the publication of a rectification or a denial of an accusation, cannot, per se, absolve the publisher of liability for disseminating a text or other message in which a person has been groundlessly accused or defamed by an ill-disposed value-judgment. Such a rider would have been in line with the principles, set out in paragraph 43 of the judgment, that journalistic freedom “covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation”, but that “offence may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression if it amounts to wanton denigration”. This reminder was given in the “general principles” sub-section of the judgment but no reference was made of the second of these two principles in the part of judgment dealing with the assessment of the case in respect of the publisher. In my opinion, that part of the judgment should have explicitly emphasised that principle, as a message from the Court that publishers do have their own responsibility, both in the formal legal and in the wider social and moral sense, which cannot be transferred to the author alone. The Convention defends publisher’s freedom to a very large extent, but not at the cost of absolute non-liability.
II. DISSENTING VIEWS
3. Regarding the finding that in respect of Mr Ungváry, the author of the impugned article, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, and the reasoning on which it is based, I respectfully disagree. The reasoning is sequential, thorough, addresses important aspects of the dispute and refers to the relevant case-law of the Court as established to date. All this is most commendable.
4. However, the dispute regarding the alleged infringement of Mr Ungváry’s freedom of expression is a borderline one where there is no clear-cut landmark precedent to serve as a point of reference, at least in one respect. The finding that the Hungarian authorities violated this applicant’s freedom of expression can be compared with the opposite one: that his freedom was not violated. In principle, such a finding could be as plausible as that of the majority. The notion of “the Hungarian authorities” includes the Supreme Court of Hungary, which acted as the domestic court of last instance. As the juxtaposition of the majority’s finding and the possible contrary finding favours no clear “winner” (as explained in paragraph 16 below), there is no pressing reason not to give the benefit of the doubt to the said court. Regrettably, the majority’s standpoint was different.
5. Their finding is based on the reasoning that the Supreme Court did not strike a fair balance between the author’s freedom of expression and the right of the person concerned to protect his reputation, both guaranteed by the Convention. Mr Ungváry published the article in which Mr K., a local Communist party official in the mid-1980s (deputy secretary in a university under the one-party rule), was reported to have ordered the removal of a poster of a students’ movement, to have reported this to his party hierarchy and, at the secret service’s instigation, to have reproached a candidate in a Communist youth organisation for having been supported by that movement. The author did not state outright that Mr K. was an “agent” of the Communist regime’s State security, but he did invite, if not command of the reader the interpretation that Mr K. was not only “in regular and collegial contact with the State security” but also, presumably of his own free will and on his own initiative, “was in regular ... contact with the State security, quite often anticipating and exceeding its expectations”. He called Mr K. “an official contact ... busy as an informant and demanding hard-line policies”. According to the Supreme Court, such an assessment, if the author appeared unable to prove its veracity, amounted to qualifying Mr K. as a “quasi-agent” of the former undemocratic regime, and it found against Mr Ungváry.
6. Calling a person an “official contact” and a “quasi-agent” of the former Communist regime, however reproachful in the eyes of today’s citizenry, is not a legal but a moral and a political statement and per se does not entail legal consequences. Both the notion of an agent and that of a quasi-agent of a secret service suggest that the person’s actions contribute to the ends of that agency and, in the broader sense, of the corresponding regime. Such actions are typically covert, as others are not supposed to know about the agent’s or quasi-agent’s relationship with that agency. Both notions, at least for the purposes of this case, are limited to outsiders to the agency, that is to volunteer helpers, informants and other “outside” collaborators whose services are made use of by the agency, and exclude “normal” employees thereof. The relation between these notions, as they are perceived by the public at large, must also be considered. When one is called an agent of a secret service, it means that one is presumed to receive orders from that agency, to carry them out and (more often than not) to receive payment or other benefits for doing so; one is also presumed to be listed as an agent in a corresponding register not accessible to outsiders to the agency concerned (as a rule, a nomenclature of agents comprises more than one category, and the exact titles of collaborators vary). On the other hand, the label of a quasi-agent of a secret service designates a person who has volunteered or has been otherwise drawn into collaborating with that agency without entering into a formal relationship with it: he or she does not receive orders from the agency but acts on his or her own discretion along the policy lines sustained by the regime, does not (save in exceptional cases) receive financial or other incentives from the agency, and is not listed in its register. The distinction between an agent and a quasi-agent of a secret service is a formal one, as they both report actions the regime discourages, or help to prevent such actions. Irrespective of this difference, in the eyes of the public at large, both agents and quasi-agents of a secret service of an undemocratic regime deserve condemnation (see paragraph 11 below).
7. Establishing who is an agent/quasi-agent of a secret service and who is not is no easy matter even in a democracy, but it is infinitely more complex in a totalitarian system. In the judgment the one-party regime in Hungary in the mid-1980s is called “totalitarian” (paragraphs 55, 65). Even allowing for the fact that, by then, the Hungarian regime had become less repressive than it was, say, in 1950s, this does not alter the fact that it was, in essence, an undemocratic one.
8. Under totalitarianism, by definition, the official tends to penetrate all things non-official. In a one-party totalitarian system, all institutions and offices (including those nominally far removed from politics) are “official” in the sense that all institutions function, and offices are held, as long as they accept the possible interference with their activities by officials from the regime (including the secret service), that is to say, the possibility of a contact approaching them (whether officially or otherwise, as was often the case), whenever the regime decides to bring pressure to bear on an institution or an office-holder. Contrary to stereotype, it is a regime not of only all-penetrating downward surveillance and repression but also of wide-scale bottom-up collaboration (whatever its motives may be); people have little choice but to more or less toe the line. Also, under one-party totalitarianism, by definition, formal orders or informal requests are often given to people by institutions and officials far more “innocent” than secret services. As to the secret services prompting “official contacts” in a totalitarian regime, anyone who has been “officially” (in the aforementioned sense) approached by a secret service officer with a request and did not refuse to comply (which would have been risky not only for the person concerned) but did what was required of him or her can be thought of, in a formal sense and if one is so inclined, as having collaborated with that agency and, thus, having been “an official contact” thereof, albeit grudgingly. This holds also for those who, either guided by their affection for a totalitarian regime or merely simulating loyalty thereto, have on their own initiative, “officially” entered into contact with its agents or otherwise attempted to contribute, or actually contributed, to the policies upheld by the regime. Does this automatically, in all cases, amount to one’s being a quasi-agent of a regime or its secret service? In my opinion, the answer is no. In order for such categorisation, especially if made public, to be recognised as accurate, a lot more is needed.
9. The aforesaid does not exonerate people who collaborated - to a greater or lesser extent, whether willingly or against their will - with a totalitarian regime’s secret service from their moral or, where applicable, legal responsibility. Some were hard-hearted hardliners and informants; others compromised with the political climate; yet others succumbed to direct pressure (sometimes after agonising reflection). There was also a variety of other patterns and motives of behaviour. It is not necessarily possible, therefore, to deduce from the actual instance(s) of a person’s communication or interaction with the secret service that he or she was in a “collegial” contact with it, or acted on his or her own initiative or at the instigation of the secret service, or in accordance with what they thought was expected of them. The Supreme Court rejected the automatic assumption and the “guilty by association” reasoning (see paragraph 11 below), but the majority have rejected this rejection. I believe that the Supreme Court’s standpoint deserves to be upheld.
10. The conduct of anyone who, under totalitarian rule, chose to behave in a loyalist manner must be judged not only from today’s perspective but also in the light of the reality of the situation at the material time, including prevalent patterns of behaviour in a comparable situation in that society, the behavioural options (if any) open to that person in that situation, the realistic consequences of alternative conduct and the assessment thereof by the person concerned. In the eyes of the law most of this is irrelevant. Whether every single loyalist to such a regime or anyone who informed its agents of any activities the regime discouraged, or anyone who carried out a request or order of its secret service, can be categorised as (and, where this is done publicly, accused of being) “an official contact”, “an informant”, or “a quasi-agent” of that regime’s secret service is a matter of political opinion, a moral judgment, an academic topic, and not a question to be decided in court. What is legally relevant is that, if a dispute arises regarding such public categorisation, which is tantamount to condemnation in the eyes of the public at large, whoever disseminated the accusation must be able to prove its accuracy, to prove that it is based on facts which have been interpreted without prejudice.
11. I share the majority’s view that a historian’s freedom to formulate judgments of this kind (provided they are based on facts) is protected by Article 10 of the Convention. Yet I disagree with the assessment that the Supreme Court, when finding against Mr Ungváry, overstepped the line drawn by the provisions of that Article. True, the facts related to Mr K.’s position (not a top one) in the party hierarchy and to his ordering of the removal of the poster and his writing of the report were not contested by Mr K. himself. However, the Supreme Court’s argument (quoted in paragraph 19 of the judgment) must not be ignored: “it is not possible to deduce from this potentiality [the possibility that the Ministry of the Interior indeed considered certain officials as ‘official contacts’ and that some of the so-called ‘official contacts’ occasionally cooperated with the State security and were active in the manner described by Mr Ungváry as ‘unambiguously incarnating the activities of an agent’] the general conclusion that every single [official] acted as an ‘official contact’; consequently, in the absence of proven facts, it is not acceptable to qualify all potentially available personalities ... as ‘official contacts’ actually cooperating with the State security. Public opinion condemns those persons who cooperated with the State security, even if they do not fall within the actual category of ‘agent’ or ‘informant’. Therefore, if someone is characterised, without a proper ground, as actually having carried out such activities, this violates that person’s reputation, according to public opinion.” Mr Ungváry offered no proof of his characterisation of Mr K., even at the national courts’ insistence. The Supreme Court also took into consideration the fact that, in the television interview, Mr Ungváry called Mr K. (who by then had already denied the allegations) “trash”, obviously not a scholarly term but an open insult, and apologised for having done so only in the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings.
12. The Supreme Court did not deny Mr Ungváry’s right to have his own assessment of Mr K.’s conduct at the material time, or to express that assessment in public. If it had done so, that would indeed have been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. What the Supreme Court urged the author to do was to prove his public assessment of Mr K.’s conduct, which Mr Ungváry appeared not to be able to do. This requirement is in line with the ethical imperatives applicable to anyone emitting any fact or value-judgment in respect of any person, in general, and with the ethical imperatives of academic research and journalism, in particular.
13. According to the majority, “the Supreme Court did not assess the impact on Mr K.’s personality rights in the light of the role of the press and did not apply the ‘most careful scrutiny’”, and “it did not consider the fact that many of the allegations regarding the involvement of Mr K. in the actions directed against the students’ movement had been proved true” (paragraph 57 of the judgment). In my opinion, not only did the Supreme Court assess the said balance but, having done that, it found that Mr Ungváry had upset it to the detriment of Mr K.’s personality rights. The quotation from the Supreme Court’s judgment (see paragraph 11 above) attests just that. The Supreme Court did not overstep its margin of appreciation in qualifying the author’s statement as a statement of fact and not as a value-judgment (cf. paragraph 46 of the judgment) but took the view that, although there was a public interest in discussing the issues concerned, there was no public interest in irresponsible, defamatory language in respect of a person without proper substantiation.
14. The core of my disagreement with the majority’s position is the methodology of interpretation of polysemous terms. “Official contact” is a “wide” term, “capable of evoking ... different notions as to its content and significance” (paragraph 52 of the judgment). Still, a court should not give the benefit of the doubt to an author who has used (especially by design) an ambiguous or vague word or expression in order to portray a person in an unfavourable light. If a word or expression used in respect of a person has, say, two meanings one of which is contemptuous, scathing, disdainful, scornful or otherwise hurtful and the other is unbiased, unprejudiced, disinterested, dispassionate or otherwise impartial, but a reader will tend to understand the former meaning, if any dispute arises the author should be required to justify using that particular term, failing which he or she should be held liable, if the law so provides, for not having chosen a more fair-minded vocabulary. The same holds for words and expressions that may be understood as statements of fact by some and as value-judgments (opinions) by others. Relying on freedom of expression as a fundamental value protected by the Convention, inter alia, is not convincing enough to allow an author to evade responsibility for inviting a reasonable reader (not necessarily most of them) to form the opinion that a certain characteristic attributed to a person is actually an impartial statement of fact. The majority have concluded that a broad connotation should be given to a whole set of terms: not only “official contact” but also “cooperation”, “reporting”, “informant” and “collegial contact” (see paragraphs 59, 60 of the judgment). The frequency with which the terms thus collectively exculpated are used attests to precisely the opposite conclusion: that they were used in respect of Mr K. in a restrictive sense. Clemency towards the expanded connotation of the disputed terms (justified from the linguistic or semantic perspective but not from the legal one) has allowed them to be interpreted in this case as “opinions with sufficient factual basis”. I object to this interpretation because it conceals the fact that a reasonable reader will naturally grasp their restrictive meaning, and, thus, perceive them not as value-judgments but as statements of fact. As to the meaning of the terms in issue preferred by the author himself, and his prejudice against Mr K., they are revealed and corroborated by the fact that the author did not bother to change them in a publication which followed the court-ordered rectification of the statement of fact, as well as by his vocabulary in the television interview (see paragraph 11 above). Therefore, I cannot join the majority in reproaching the Supreme Court for failing to follow the broader rather than the restrictive connotation of the terms “cooperation”, “official contact”, “reporting”, “informant”, “collegial contact” and so on.
15. Mr Ungváry’s assessment of Mr K’s personality is based on his perception of the motives that led Mr K. to act as he did. For him, in the mid-1980s Mr K. anticipated and exceeded the expectations of the State security, being an informant of the regime and a hard-line Communist policy supporter. A historian, like anyone else, has the right to be critical of any activity that compromised with the totalitarian regime instead of resisting it, and the right to maintain that every single person who held a position (however low) in the party hierarchy was a pillar on which that regime rested. The right to hold such an opinion is protected by the Convention. A historian can also categorise, in his own academic taxonomy, those who collaborated or at least compromised with the totalitarian regime as “official contacts” or “informants”, or “quasi-agents”, or “agents”, for example. It is not for a court to decide whether such extra-legal categorisation is appropriate. Still, in this Court’s jurisprudence, an essential distinction is drawn between the right to hold an opinion and the right to express it openly and publicly. An analyst has to accept the condition that if and when any of the aforementioned labels is publicly attached to a person and this can result in public condemnation of the person concerned (especially if the category was coined in an academic discourse and was not actually used to classify people at the material time), the burden of proof of the accuracy of the categorisation lies upon the analyst. If the latter fails to prove it, then one has to accept that a sanction provided for in law can be imposed on him or her. Mr Ungváry failed, in the domestic court proceedings, to prove the veracity of his categorisation of Mr K. as an “official contact”, an “informant” or a “quasi-agent” of the former regime. Therefore, in my opinion, the Supreme Court, in deciding that Mr Ungváry infringed Mr K.’s personality rights, did not deviate from the standards set forth in the Court’s case-law.
16. Mr Ungváry’s assessment of Mr K.’s conduct in 1983 may be correct or incorrect. The majority have not contradicted his interpretation, but nor have they endorsed it. Alternative interpretations may be as plausible as the one discussed here, especially if an analyst makes an effort to pronounce judgement on an individual’s past conduct not only from today’s perspective but also having regard to the reality of the situation at the material time (see paragraph 10 above; although this may not be an easy thing for a person born in 1969 to do in respect of one born in 1951), and with a deeper understanding that the motives behind a person’s politically relevant conduct, especially under totalitarianism, do not fit into an oversimplified “black or white” scheme, of “cooperation or non-cooperation”, but are often much more complicated. For instance, one could take into account that in the former Communist totalitarian regimes in Europe many reports were written along official hierarchy lines not only because people were eager or happy to write them but also because they were an important element of “official” discipline. Account could also be taken of the fact that such reports might be written not in order to inform the regime of activities it discouraged and persecuted, but because people were well aware of the likelihood that they themselves would be reported on by someone else. One might also imagine that Mr K.’s conduct in the students’ movement case in ordering the removal of a poster by a university party official was meant as a message to the State security that it need not interfere because the matter had been settled. Such speculations are every bit as plausible as Mr Ungváry’s. None of them is advocated here; they illustrate that writing a report within an official hierarchy does not necessarily stamp the writer as a hard-liner working for the secret service, anticipating its orders and so on. Post-Communist countries’ history is full of examples of individuals who, having been loyal to the regime and even having held important positions under it, later turned out to be among those who effectively brought about its downfall, not to mention those who put on a show of co-operating with the regime but only out of wariness, precaution, prudence, or fear, and not because they sympathised with the ruling party’s policy.
17. Because Mr Ungváry was unable to prove the veracity of his assessment of Mr K.’s conduct, his assessment cannot be considered legally defensible. The Supreme Court did not grant it legal protection, and I support this view because there was no evidence that such arbitrary categorisation of Mr K. contributed to any progressive development in a democratic society. Now the Court has found in favour of Mr Ungváry, thereby lending his statements at least some legal credence, notwithstanding the failure of their author to substantiate them. Such a finding cannot but encourage the publication, as opinions, of abusive statements wittingly expressed in polysemous terms, even if the authors cannot prove their veracity, when in fact the reader perceives them as statements of fact not distorted by prejudice. Thus, this finding may have an undesirable cascade effect.
18. One more point has to be made. At the material time Mr K. was, and at the time of examination of this case still is, a sitting Constitutional Court judge. The publication of the offending article coincided with his re-election to that position. In the “general principles” part of the judgment, it is stated that “the limits of acceptable criticism may in some circumstances be wider with regard to civil servants exercising their powers than in relation to private individuals. However, the courts - the guarantors of justice, whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law - must enjoy public confidence; and it may therefore prove necessary to protect judges from offensive and abusive verbal attacks” (paragraph 44). Yet this principle was not brought into play in the Court’s assessment of the case in respect of the author of the offending article.
PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF
JUDGE LORENZEN
Like Judge Kūris, I voted for finding no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant; and my reasons for that largely correspond to those advanced in his separate opinion.