European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

THIRD SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE OF DMF a.s. v. SLOVAKIA

 

(Application no. 27082/09)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

STRASBOURG

 

5 February 2013

 

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

 




In the case of DMF a.s. v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Luis López Guerra, President,
          Ján Šikuta,
          Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 15 January 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE




  The case originated in an application (no. 27082/09) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a joint-stock company established under the Slovak laws, which name is DMF a.s. (“the applicant company”), on 6 May 2009.




  The applicant company was represented by Mr M. Kuročka, a lawyer practising in Michalovce. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.




  On 24 February 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

The circumstance of the case




  The applicant company was established in 1998 and has its seat in Michalovce.




  On 14 August 2001 the Malacky Police Office of the Regional Transport Inspectorate instituted criminal proceedings following an accident involving a lorry belonging to the applicant company. The applicant company joined a claim for compensation in respect of damage caused by the accident.




  On 5 September 2001 a prosecutor of the Bratislava IV District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 14 August 2001. The prosecutor ordered to proceed and establish the damage to the lorry and the goods transported.




  By a decision of 17 October 2002 the Bratislava Regional Directorate of the Police charged the lorry driver with the offence of endangering others under the influence of alcohol.




  On 6 December 2002 the applicant company complained to the District Prosecutor’s Office about delays in the criminal proceedings.




  On 3 January 2003 the prosecutor of the District Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant company of the course of the proceedings.




  In August 2004 and May and June 2008 the applicant company complained to the Minister of the Interior and the Police General Directorate that the criminal proceedings had been delayed. The Police General Directorate acknowledged by two letters of July 2008 that the delays in the criminal investigation had been partly attributable to the police.




  Between October 2002 and January 2006 the police investigator, according to the prosecutor’s instruction, gathered evidence necessary to establish damage and to identify the aggrieved party.




  On 13 January 2006 the applicant company complained to the Office of the Prosecutor General that the investigation had been delayed and the District Prosecutor’s Office, who was in charge of supervising the investigator, had been inactive.




  On 26 January 2006 a prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor General informed the applicant company that the complaint would be dealt with by the Bratislava Regional Prosecutor’s Office.




  By a letter of 10 February 2006 a prosecutor of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant company of the course of the investigation and confirmed that the proceedings had been delayed. He stated that the delays had been caused mainly by the police conducting investigation and that the prosecutor supervising the investigation had used all means possible to eliminate shortcomings in the proceedings.




  On 20 February 2006 the applicant company complained to the Office of the Prosecutor General about the reaction of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office to its complaint.




  On 24 April 2006 the Office of the Prosecutor General advised the applicant company that both subordinate levels of the Public Prosecution Service had acted lawfully and no reasons for taking measures against their conduct had been found. It accordingly set the complaint aside and informed the applicant company that the course of the proceedings would be monitored by the Office of the Prosecutor General in order to complete the investigation in due time.




  According to the summary of the course of the proceedings by the Police General Directorate of July 2008, between 4 December 2007 and 16 May 2008 the investigator repeatedly summoned the representative of the applicant company to hear him. The summons could not be served since he had not collected them or he had not appeared before the investigator despite having been informed of them during telephone conversations.




  On 4 June 2008 the representative of the applicant company was heard by the Judicial and Criminal Police in Michalovce.




  In August 2008 the applicant company complained to the Constitutional Court that its rights to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated by the conduct of the Office of the Prosecutor General.




  On 15 October 2008 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company’s constitutional complaint on the ground that the criminal proceedings in issue did not concern the applicant company and therefore there was no casual link between the violation alleged and the conduct of a State body in the criminal proceedings. As to the requirement of exhaustion of effective remedies it held that, before turning to the Constitutional Court, the applicant company had not requested the Public Prosecution Service to take appropriate measures to rectify shortcomings in the proceedings complained of. It referred to section 34 (1 and 2) of the Public Prosecution Service Act according to which a petitioner may demand a review of the lawfulness of how the petition has been resolved by means of a repeated petition, which shall be dealt with by a prosecutor at a higher level. A further repeated petition shall be dealt with by a prosecutor at a higher level only if it contains new information. Finally the Constitutional Court stated that neither the Constitution nor the Convention guarantee the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in a matter of a criminal complaint.




  On 30 January 2009 the lorry driver was accused before the Bratislava IV District Court.




  On 2 February 2009 the District Court found the lorry driver guilty of having committed the crime of endangering others under the influence of alcohol. It referred the applicant company with its claim to a civil court. The decision became final on 11 March 2009.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION




  The applicant company complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a...hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

A.  Admissibility




  The Government argued that the applicant company had failed to exhaust the existing domestic remedies in that, before lodging its constitutional complaint, it had not addressed a petition to the Public Prosecution Service in accordance with the Public Prosecution Service Act. Its application should therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.




  The Court observes that the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company’s complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution on the ground that the criminal proceedings in issue did not concern the applicant company. It also held that the applicant company, before lodging its constitutional complaint, had failed to request the Public Prosecution Service to take appropriate measures to rectify shortcomings in the proceedings complained of. Finally it stated that neither the Constitution nor the Convention guarantee the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the matter of a criminal complaint.




  However, the Court notes that, before turning to the Constitutional Court, the applicant company had complained several times to the police and the Public Prosecution Service of the length of the proceedings. Namely, in August 2004, May and June 2008 it complained to the Minister of the Interior and the Police General Directorate. In December 2002 it complained to the District Prosecutor’s Office and in January and February 2006 to the Office of the Prosecutor General. The Public Prosecution Service at all three levels dealt with the complaints and informed the applicant company of the results of the examination of the case-file accordingly. On 24 April 2006 the Office of the Prosecutor General advised the applicant company that no measures were to be taken against the lower levels of the Public Prosecution Service and that the case would be monitored by it.




  Having regard to the facts above, the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.




  The Court further observes that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision the proceedings had been pending for six years and more than eleven months. They ended on 11 March 2009. Their overall duration was thus seven years and almost six months.




  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits




  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, or Pfleger v. the Czech Republic, no. 58116/00, § 50, 27 July 2004).




  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above, or Krumpel and Krumpelová v. Slovakia no. 56195/00, 5 July 2005 and Loveček and Others v. Slovakia, no. 11301/03, 21 December 2010).




  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.




.  In particular, while noting that the applicant company contributed to the length of the proceedings to a certain extent, the Court cannot ignore that there have been several periods of delay attributable to the investigative bodies confirmed by both the police and the supervising Public Prosecution Service.




  Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

II.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION




  The applicant company further alleged that the facts of its case amounted to a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, Article 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 separately and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.




.  However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.




.  It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION




  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage




  The applicant company claimed EUR 37,474.11 in respect of pecuniary damage. It did not submit any claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage.




  The Government contested the claim stating that there was no causal link between the pecuniary damage claimed and the violation alleged.




  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.

B.  Costs and expenses




  The applicant company also claimed EUR 600 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and the Court.




  The Government argued that no award should be made to the applicant company since it failed to support its claim with necessary documents.




.  According to the Court’s case-law, the applicants are entitled to reimbursement of their costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the absence of any documents supporting the applicant company’s claim for the legal costs, the Court makes no award in this respect (Loveček and Others, cited above, § 71).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

 

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

 

3.  Dismisses the applicant company’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 February 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

  Marialena Tsirli                                                                 Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar                                                                       President