SECOND SECTION
CASE OF ERTUŞ v. TURKEY
(Application no. 37871/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 November 2013
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ertuş v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi,
President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
18. On 30 May 2008 the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant in the Van Assize Court under Law no. 2911 (Assemblies and Marches Act) for taking part in an illegal demonstration. On 9 June 2010 he was acquitted of all charges on account of a lack of evidence.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
1. The substantive aspect of Article 3
2. The procedural aspect of Article 3
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds by four votes to three that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive aspect;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural aspect;
4. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 November 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges D. Popović, I. Karakaş and P. Pinto de Albuquerque is annexed to this judgment.
G.R.A.
S.H.N.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES POPOVIĆ, KARAKAŞ AND PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE
We do not share the view of the majority that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb. We adduce five reasons to conclude that there was a violation of the said Article.
Firstly, the applicant was a minor at the time of the events.
Secondly, it is undisputed between the parties that he showed no resistance to the police officers when he was arrested. In this connection the video footage submitted by the parties, which the Court had the benefit of watching, shows that the applicant was scared and crying in the street and that a police officer was holding him by the right arm. The officer then forcefully twisted his arm behind his back, which forced the applicant to bend forward. It is clear that this act caused a lot of pain to the minor, who was not showing any resistance to the police. Moreover, on 31 March 2008 the prison doctor reported a minimal oedema on the applicant’s right elbow resulting from a soft tissue injury, and noted the presence of healing wounds on the distal phalanges of his right hand ring and little fingers. The findings of this medical report confirm the force used against the applicant during his arrest.
Thirdly, the applicant was alone when he was arrested. In addition, he was much smaller than the police officer who was holding him. Besides the police officer twisting the applicant’s right arm, there appeared to be at least four other officers next to him. Hence, the applicant did not represent at any stage a danger to the police officers, who had a clear physical advantage over him.
Fourthly, while this was happening, another police officer called the applicant “dishonourable”. This verbal abuse of the applicant was degrading.
Fifthly, although criminal proceedings were subsequently initiated against the applicant for taking part in an illegal demonstration, he was acquitted of all charges on account of a lack of evidence. As a result, there is no information in the case file to indicate that he had participated in the demonstration or had been among the demonstrators who confronted the police.
These facts must be interpreted in the light of the international standards.
The international standards for the treatment of juvenile offenders or suspects are set by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“The Beijing Rules”), 1985, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (“The Havana Rules”), 1990, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines), 1990, the Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System recommended by Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/30 of 21 July 1997, and, at the European level, by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child-friendly justice, 2011. All these texts call for a child-friendly and sensitive approach to offenders or suspects who are minors and, particularly, for careful treatment of the special needs and particular vulnerability of minors by judges, prosecutors, police and other law-enforcement agents. For example, paragraph 27 of the European Guidelines on child-friendly justice states: “Police should respect the personal rights and dignity of all children and have regard to their vulnerability, that is, take account of their age and maturity and any special needs of those who may be under a physical or mental disability or have communication difficulties.”
In the light of these standards we conclude that the force used by the police against the applicant, who was a minor, had not participated in any unlawful act, did not resist arrest and did not represent any danger to the police officers, was totally unjustified. The use of force during his arrest was not necessary.
Thus, we are of the view that the injuries sustained by the applicant were the result of treatment for which the State bears responsibility. Having regard to the nature and degree of the applicant’s injuries resulting from the excessive use of force, we consider that the treatment in question reached a sufficient level of severity to be characterised as degrading treatment.
Accordingly, we conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb also.