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MILOSAVLJEV v. SERBIA - 15112/07 [2012] ECHR 999 (12 June 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/999.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 999
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF
MILOSAVLJEV v. SERBIA
(Application
no. 15112/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 June
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Milosavljev v. Serbia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
Işıl Karakaş,
Guido
Raimondi,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen
Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 May 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 15112/07) against Serbia
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Serbian national, Mr Zivko Milosavljev (“the
applicant”), on 21 March 2007.
The
applicant was represented before the Court by Ms M. KulidZan,
a lawyer practising in Kikinda. The Serbian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.
The
applicant alleged that he had suffered a breach of his right to be
presumed innocent, and complained about the confiscation of his
vehicle.
On
7 December 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.
It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Kikinda.
A. The facts as presented by the applicant
The
facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised
as follows.
In
September 2000 the applicant bought a car (Mercedes 190D) from a
person who lived in Germany. His intention was to use it as a taxi.
Since the car was already more than six years old, the applicant was
unable to have it directly registered in Serbia. Therefore, he first
had the car registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in his relative’s
name, and only registered the car in Serbia in December 2000, which
was when the latter State adopted legislation making this arrangement
possible.
On
21 January 2003 the Municipality of Kikinda issued a decision stating
that the applicant, being a taxi driver since 20 September 2002,
would from now on be using the car at issue as a taxi.
On
6 May 2004 the police seized the applicant’s car because of a
customs violation (carinski prekršaj).
On
5 July 2004 the Customs Office (Komisija za carinske prekršaje
Carinarnice Zrenjanin) discontinued the misdemeanour proceedings
(prekšajni postupak) brought against the applicant, but
decided nevertheless to confiscate his vehicle. The Customs Office
explained that it was convinced that the applicant had committed the
offence in question, i.e. that he had accepted to import a vehicle
which could not have legally been imported and had not informed the
competent customs authorities thereof, but noted that the
misdemeanour proceedings could not be continued in view of the
applicable “relative prescription” period (relativna
zastarelost). The confiscation, however, was warranted since no
“absolute prescription” (apsolutna zastarelost)
had occurred (see paragraphs 23-25 below).
On
21 July 2004 the applicant filed an appeal against this decision,
noting that the Customs Office had failed to properly establish the
relevant facts, and had also come to “an erroneous legal
conclusion” leading to the ultimate confiscation of his car.
On
18 February 2005 the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo finansija)
rejected this appeal. In so doing, it stated, inter alia, that
absolute prescription had not occurred and that the impugned
confiscation was thus lawful.
On
an unspecified date thereafter the Customs Office apparently sold the
applicant’s car to a third person. The money thus obtained was
deposited with the Ministry of Finance.
On
16 March 2005 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (zahtev
za vanredno preispitivanje pravosnaZnog rešenja),
re-stating his earlier arguments.
On
2 February 2007 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Srbije)
rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the
impugned decision of the Ministry of Finance, as well as its
reasoning.
B. Additional facts presented by the Government
The
Government disagreed with some of the facts provided by the applicant
and furnished additional details, which may be summarised as follows.
The
applicant bought a second-hand car (Mercedes 190D) in August 2000
from a person who lived in Germany. The car’s former owner
returned the licence plates to the competent German authorities.
At
that time and given the vehicle age limitation requirement, the car
in question could not have been legally imported to Serbia. In any
event, even if this were possible, the applicant would have had to
pay a significant sum for customs duties and taxes, i.e. a total of
44% of the catalogue value of the car.
At
some point in 2000 the Government announced that it was considering a
decree which would make it possible to import cars from one of the
former Yugoslav republics free from any duties or taxes, and
irrespective of the vehicle’s age. This decree was ultimately
adopted in December 2000 (see paragraph 28 below).
The
applicant then used forged documents to prove that the car had been
registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in another person’s name,
for the past three years. Thus he secured the enjoyment of the
benefits provided by the said decree and succeeded in registering the
car in Serbia on 12 December 2000.
On
23 March 2005 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in
Kikinda found the applicant guilty of having committed the crime of
securing official certification of false information (navođenje
na overavanje neistinitog sadrZaja). In particular, the Municipal
Court established that the applicant had submitted a forged document,
i.e. a false Bosnian-Herzegovinian traffic permit, meant to indicate
that the car in question was being imported from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, rather than Germany, on the basis of which the competent
Serbian authorities had issued him with a Serbian traffic permit
(saobraćajna dozvola). The applicant, who had paid 5,000
German Marks (DEM) for the car, was sentenced to three months’
imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year.
On
1 June 2005 the District Court (OkruZni
sud) in Zrenjanin upheld this judgment on appeal, and it thereby
became final.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Customs Act 1992 (Carinski zakon, published in the
Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - OG FRY- nos.
45/92, 16/93, 50/93, 24/94, 28/96, 29/97, 59/98, 23/01, 36/02 and
7/03)
Article
199 provides that customs-related misdemeanour proceedings may not be
instituted if more than three years have elapsed as of the date of
commission of the offence in question (relative prescription).
Article
204 § 2 provides, inter alia, that a vehicle used for the
commission of a customs-related offence may be confiscated even when,
for legal reasons, no proceedings may be brought against the
perpetrator, except in cases of absolute prescription.
B. Federal Misdemeanours Act 1977 (Zakon o prekršajima
kojima se povređuju savezni propisi, published in the Official
Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – OG
SFRY – nos. 4/77, 36/77, 20/82, 14/85, 74/87, 57/89, 3/90 and
35/91, as well as in OG FRY nos. 50/93, 24/94, 28/96 and 64/01)
Article
48 provides, inter alia, that even if misdemeanour proceedings
have been instituted absolute prescription shall occur when twice the
time required for relative prescription has elapsed.
C. The Misdemeanours Act 1989 (Zakon o prekršajima,
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia –
OG RS – nos. 44/89, 21/90, 11/92, 20/93, 53/93, 67/93, 28/94,
16/97, 37/97, 36/98, 44/98 and 65/01)
The
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 55/04 of 21 May 2004
published an amendment to this Act, whereby, inter alia, the
Federal Misdemeanours Act 1977 was repealed in its entirety.
However,
Article 69 § 7 of the Misdemeanours Act 1989, as amended,
substantively corresponds to Article 48 § 1 of the former
Federal Misdemeanours Act 1977.
D. The regulations concerning the registration of certain vehicles
in Serbia
In
1997 and 2000 two separate decrees were adopted by the Government
(Uredba o registraciji vozila iz bivših republika SFRJ koje
nisu u sastavu Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, published in OG FRY
no. 32/1997, and Uredba o posebnoj naknadi za registraciju
određenih vozila, published in OG RS nos. 49/2000, 51/2000
and 7/2001.) They set out the requirements for the registration of
certain vehicles in Serbia, including those registered in one of the
former Yugoslav republics.
E. The General Criminal Code (Osnovni krivični
zakon, published in OG SFRY nos. 44/76, 46/77, 34/84, 37/84, 74/87,
57/89, 3/90, 38/90, 45/90 and 54/90, in OG FRY nos. 35/92, 16/93,
31/93, 37/93, 24/94 and 61/01, as well as in OG RS no. 39/03)
Article
69 § 1 provides, inter alia, that objects used for the
commission of a crime may be confiscated if they belong to the
perpetrator.
Articles
84-87 provide, inter alia, that any pecuniary benefit obtained
as a result of the commission of a crime shall be confiscated. The
pecuniary benefit in question may include money, physical objects and
any other valuables. Should confiscation in kind be impossible, the
perpetrator may be obliged to pay a certain sum which shall be
proportionate to his or her illegal gains.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
The
applicant complained that the Customs Office had violated his right
to be presumed innocent as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the
Convention.
The
applicant further complained that the confiscation of his vehicle had
been in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The
provisions referred to by the applicant read as follows:
Article 6 § 2
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
1. As regards both complaints
The
Government argued that the applicant had failed to provide all of the
facts relevant to his complaints. In particular, they submitted that
he had omitted to inform the Court about his criminal conviction (see
paragraphs 21 and 22 above), in order to deliberately misguide it and
to force the success of his application. The Government suggested,
therefore, that the applicant had abused his right of petition, and
that his application should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §
3 of the Convention.
The
applicant stated that his application concerned the proceedings
resulting in the confiscation of his vehicle, not his criminal
conviction.
The
Court observes that an application may only be rejected as abusive
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention in
extraordinary circumstances, such as if an application was
deliberately grounded on a description of facts omitting or
distorting events of central importance (see, for example, Akdivar
and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, §§ 53-54,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; Varbanov
v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 36, ECHR 2000-X;
and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, Commission decision
of 27 June 1996, Decisions and Reports (DR) 86-B, p. 54). The
applicant is not expected to present all possible information on a
case. It is, however, his duty to present at least those essential
facts which are at his disposal and which he must be aware are of
significant bearing for the Court to be able to properly assess the
case (see, for example, Al-Nashif and Others v. Bulgaria, (dec.)
no. 50963/99, 25 January 2001).
The
Court notes that in his initial application the applicant made no
mention of his criminal conviction of 23 March 2005, which had become
final by 1 June 2005 (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). Following the
Government’s submissions to this effect, he merely stated that
his application before this Court concerned the misdemeanour
proceedings resulting in the confiscation of his vehicle, not the
criminal conviction.
The
Court considers therefore that, on the one hand, the applicant, even
if he did not submit any false information, may indeed have tried to
present his case as a simple, straightforward, matter. On the other
hand, however, there was absolutely no reference to the applicant’s
criminal conviction within the said misdemeanour proceedings (see
paragraphs 9-15 above), the criminal conviction itself ordered no
confiscation (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above), and the applicant’s
confiscated vehicle had even been sold to third persons before the
said conviction (see paragraphs 13, 21 and 22 above). Finally, it is
true that the applicant’s complaints in the case before this
Court concern the misdemeanour proceedings only.
In
these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the facts
omitted by the applicant, however regrettably, were not of such
significance as to prevent it from properly assessing the case. The
Government’s objection in this regard must therefore be
rejected.
2. As regards the complaint under Article 6 § 2
The
Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies,
referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, obliges those
seeking to bring a case before it to use first the remedies provided
by the national legal system, thus dispensing States from answering
before the Court for their acts before they have had an opportunity
to put matters right domestically. In order to comply with the rule,
normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are
available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches
alleged (see, among other authorities, Assenov and Others v.
Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 85, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII).
Turning
to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not
complain about the violation of the presumption of innocence either
in his appeal or in his subsequent appeal on points of law lodged
within the misdemeanour proceedings (see paragraphs 11-15 above
above). This part of the application is hence inadmissible for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and must, as such, be rejected
under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the
Convention.
3. As regards the complaint made under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1
The
Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits (as regards the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1)
1. The parties’ submissions
The
applicant re-affirmed his complaint.
He
added that the confiscation of his vehicle was unjustified in view of
the fact that he had never been found guilty of a customs offence in
the misdemeanour proceedings, as well as disproportionate considering
that he had been using the vehicle in question to secure his
livelihood as a taxi driver.
The
applicant submitted that he had imported his car to Serbia fully in
accordance with the applicable regulations at that time. Thousands of
other cars were imported in the same way.
Finally,
the applicant noted that between 2000 and 2004 he had repeatedly
re-registered his car in Serbia, with the police, but had never had
any problems.
The
Government accepted that the applicant’s complaint fell within
the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
His
car, however, was confiscated in accordance with the law and in the
light of an obvious customs violation. It is irrelevant that the
applicant was never formally found guilty of this offence within the
misdemeanour proceedings, since Article 204 § 2 of the Customs
Act 1992 provided, inter alia, that a vehicle used for the
commission of a customs-related offence could be confiscated even
when, for legal reasons, no proceedings could be brought against the
perpetrator, except in cases of absolute prescription. There had been
no absolute prescription in the applicant’s case and, in any
event, the applicant was subsequently convicted in a criminal case on
the same facts.
The
Government further noted that the confiscation of the applicant’s
car was aimed at securing the payment of taxes/import duties and
enforcement of penalties, within the meaning of Article 1 § 2 of
Protocol No. 1.
Lastly,
the Government maintained that the impugned confiscation was
undertaken in pursuit of a legitimate public interest, i.e. the
suppression of smuggling, and argued that they were entitled to a
wide margin of appreciation in this respect, extensively citing the
Court’s case-law.
2. The Court’s assessment
The
Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees in
substance the right of property and comprises three distinct rules.
The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first
paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down the principle of
peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The second rule, in the second
sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and
makes it subject to certain conditions. The third, contained in the
second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are
entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest. The second and third rules,
which are concerned with particular instances of interference with
the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, are to be construed in
the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule (see,
among other authorities, Draon
v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, § 69, 6 October
2005).
The
“possession” at issue in the present case was the
applicant’s vehicle which was confiscated by a decision of the
administrative authorities, subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.
It is not disputed between the parties that the confiscation
constituted an interference with the applicant’s right of
property, and that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is therefore
applicable. It remains to be determined whether the measure was
covered by the first or second paragraph of that Article.
The
Court reiterates its consistent approach that a confiscation measure,
even though it does involve a deprivation of possessions,
nevertheless constitutes control of the use of property within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see
Riela and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 52439/99, 4
September 2001; Arcuri and Others v. Italy (dec.), no.
52024/99, ECHR 2001-VII; C.M. v. France (dec.), no. 28078/95,
ECHR 2001-VII; Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, 5 May
1995, § 34, Series A no. 316-A; and AGOSI v.
the United Kingdom, 24 October 1986, § 34,
Series A no. 108). Accordingly, it considers that the same
approach must be followed in the present case.
The
Court further notes that the confiscation, albeit in the absence of a
conviction in the misdemeanour proceedings, was based on Article 204
§ 2 of the Customs Act 1992 (see paragraph 24 above), taken in
conjunction with Article 199 of the same Act, Article 48 of the
Federal Misdemeanours Act 1977, and/or Article 69 § 7 of the
Misdemeanours Act 1989 as amended in 2004 (see paragraphs 23 and
25-27 above). Moreover, the Court accepts that the interference
pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest, namely the
prevention of uncontrolled registration of vehicles imported from
abroad.
Accordingly,
the only remaining question to be determined is whether there was a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
by the authorities to achieve that aim and the protection of the
applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
The
Court, in this respect, firstly notes that the applicant’s
vehicle was confiscated within the misdemeanour proceedings even
though these proceedings were terminated on the basis of the
applicable prescription period, and without the applicant having been
found guilty of any offence (see paragraphs 8-15 above).
Secondly,
this confiscation was upheld on appeal, and the car was sold to third
persons, before the applicant had been convicted in a separate set of
criminal proceedings on the same facts (ibid., see also
paragraphs 21 and 22 above)
Thirdly,
at no stage during the misdemeanour proceedings was there any
reference to the criminal charges brought against the applicant (see
paragraphs 8-15 above).
Fourthly,
the criminal conviction itself contained no order concerning the
confiscation of the applicant’s car even though the criminal
court could also have ruled in this respect (see paragraphs 21, 22,
29 and 30 above).
Fifthly,
there was no consideration within the misdemeanour proceedings, nor
did the relevant domestic law provide for such a possibility, as to
whether the respondent State’s legitimate aim, i.e. to prevent
the uncontrolled registration of vehicles imported from abroad, might
also have been achieved by some other means.
Finally,
the facts that the applicant had been making his living as a taxi
driver and that there was no indication that he had ever been
convicted for another customs-related offence seem to have been
disregarded when it came to the confiscation issue, as was the fact
that he had purchased the vehicle from its lawful owner in Germany.
On that latter ground the present case can also be distinguished from
cases in which the confiscation measure extended to assets which were
the proceeds of a criminal offence (see Phillips v. the
United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, §§ 9-18, ECHR
2001-VII), which were deemed to have been unlawfully acquired (see
Riela and Arcuri, both cited above, and Raimondo
v. Italy, 22 February 1994, § 29, Series A
no. 281-A) or were intended for use in illegal activities (see
Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 41661/98, 27 June
2002).
In
these circumstances, the impugned confiscation was, in the Court’s
view, disproportionate, in that it imposed an excessive burden on the
applicant.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed a total of 26,978 euros (EUR) in respect of the
pecuniary damage suffered, consisting of EUR 5,000 as the real value
of his car, and another EUR 21,978 on account of his lost earnings as
a taxi driver. Concerning the latter sum, the applicant explained
that his car was confiscated on 6 May 2004. He had therefore been
without a car until 1 January 2008, which was when he had bought
another car, i.e. for a period of 1,221 days. Since insurance
companies in Serbia valued one “taxi day” for vehicles
awaiting repair at EUR 18, the total lost earnings for the period in
question was the said EUR 21,978.
The
Government contested these claims, noting that they were
unsubstantiated, not directly connected to the alleged violation
and/or excessive.
The
Court recalls that the principle with regard to pecuniary damage is
that the applicant should be placed, as far as possible, in the
position in which he or she would have been had the violation found
not taken place – in other words, restitutio in integrum.
This can involve compensation for both loss actually suffered (damnum
emergens) and loss, or diminished gain, to be expected in the
future (lucrum cessans). It is for the applicant to show that
pecuniary damage has resulted from the violation or violations
alleged. The applicant should submit relevant documents to prove, as
far as possible, not only the existence but also the amount or value
of the damage. Normally, the Court’s award will reflect the
full calculated amount of the damage. However, if the actual damage
cannot be precisely calculated, the Court will make an estimate based
on the facts at its disposal. It is also possible that the Court may
find it reasonable to award less than the full amount of the loss.
In
view of the above, the Court notes that the applicant had paid for
the vehicle in question DEM 5,000 (see paragraph 21 above), i.e.
approximately EUR 2,500, which is why it considers it appropriate to
award him this amount for the loss actually suffered.
As
regards the lost earnings, the Court notes that the insurance
calculation offered by the applicant was based on a single e-mail
provided by an insurance company in response to his lawyer’s
prior query. It therefore lacked both sufficient detail and the
company’s formal certification. Further, the applicant stated
that he had been unable to earn his living as a taxi driver until he
bought a new car on 1 January 2008. However, it remains unclear
whether or not the applicant could have bought this car at some point
earlier, or indeed, absent any evidence to this effect, whether the
said car had indeed been bought as claimed on 1 January 2008. Lastly,
the applicant’s implied claim that, effectively, he would have
been on the streets almost every day between 6 May 2004 and 1 January
2008 seems unrealistic.
In
view of the above and based on its assessment that the applicant,
undisputedly a taxi driver, has nevertheless suffered some pecuniary
damage on account of lost earnings, the Court awards him the sum of
EUR 5,000 under this head.
The
applicant did not submit a claim seeking compensation for the
non-pecuniary damage suffered. Accordingly, the Court considers that
there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 500 for the costs and expenses incurred
domestically, as well as EUR 1,920 for those incurred before the
Court.
The
Government described these claims as excessive.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to their quantum. In the present case, regard
being had to the documents in its possession and the
above criteria, as well as the fact that the applicant has
already been granted EUR 850 under the Council
of Europe’s legal
aid scheme,
the Court considers it reasonable to award him the additional sum of
EUR 700 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Serbian dinars at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
700 (seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 June 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President
