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MAGO AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 12959/05 [2012] ECHR 802 (3 May 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/802.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 802
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF MAGO AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(Applications
nos. 12959/05, 19724/05, 47860/06, 8367/08, 9872/09 and 11706/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 May
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Mago and Others v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Vincent
A. De Gaetano,
Ljiljana Mijović, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 10 April 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in six applications (nos. 12959/05, 19724/05,
47860/06, 8367/08, 9872/09 and 11706/09) against Bosnia and
Herzegovina lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Ms Ljeposava Mago (a Bosnian-Herzegovinian
citizen), Mr Ivan Antonov (a Serbian citizen), Mr Jovan Radović
(a Serbian citizen), Mr Milutin Banović (a Serbian citizen), Mr
Vase Krstevski (a Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Macedonian citizen) and
Mr Milutin Radojević (a Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Montenegrin
citizen) (“the applicants”) between 22 March 2005
and 12 February 2009.
Ms
Ljeposava Mago was represented by Mr N. Milanović, a lawyer
practising in Banja Luka; Mr Ivan Antonov by Mr R. Savanović, a
lawyer practising in Belgrade; Mr Jovan Radović by Mr P.
Bogovac, a lawyer practising in Novi Sad; Mr Milutin Banović by
Mr Z. Ostojić, a lawyer practising in Novi Sad; Mr Vase
Krstevski by Mr S. Poštić, a lawyer practising in
Pančevo; Mr Milutin Radojević by Mr Z.
Braletić, a lawyer practising in Podgorica. The Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the respondent Government”) were
represented by their Deputy Agent, Ms Z. Ibrahimović.
The
case is about the applicants’ failed attempts to repossess
their pre-war flats. Unlike in Đokić v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, no. 6518/04, 27 May 2010, the applicants in the
present case failed to purchase their flats before the war.
On 28 March 2011 the applications were communicated to
the respondent Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the applications at the same time
(Article 29 § 1). The applicants and the respondent Government
submitted written observations. In addition, third-party comments
were received from the Serbian Government, which had exercised their
right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44
§ 1 (b) of the Rules of Court). The respondent Government
replied in writing to those comments (Rule 44 § 6).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Relevant background
Flats
represented nearly 20% of the pre-war housing stock of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
(around 250,000 housing units out of 1,315,000). By local standards,
they were a particularly attractive type of home, equipped with
modern conveniences and located in urban centres. Practically all
flats were under the regime of “social ownership” –
a concept which, while it does exist in other countries, was
particularly highly developed in the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”). They were generally
built by socially owned enterprises or other public bodies for
allocation to their employees, who became “occupancy right
holders”.
All citizens of the SFRY were required to pay a means-tested
contribution to subsidise housing construction. However, the amount
an individual had contributed was not amongst the legal criteria
taken into account in the waiting lists for allocation of such flats.
The rights of both the allocation right holders (public
bodies which nominally controlled the flats) and the occupancy right
holders were regulated by law (the Housing Act 1984, which is still
in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
In accordance with this Act, an occupancy right, once allocated,
entitled the occupancy right holder to permanent, lifelong use of the
flat against the payment of a nominal fee. When occupancy right
holders died, their rights transferred, as a matter of law, to their
surviving spouses (indeed, spouses held occupancy rights in common)
or registered members of their family households who were also using
the flat (sections 19 and 21 of this Act). Furthermore, in the event
of a divorce, the spouses were free to choose which one of them would
continue to use the flat; in the absence of an agreement, either of
them could apply to a court for a transfer of the occupancy right
(section 20 of this Act). In practice, these provisions on transfer
meant that occupancy rights originally allocated by public bodies to
their employees could pass, as of right, to multiple generations for
whom the initial employment-based link to the allocation right holder
no longer existed. Occupancy rights could be cancelled only in court
proceedings (section 50 of this Act) on limited grounds (sections 44,
47 and 49 of this Act), the most important of which was failure by
occupancy right holders to physically use their flats for their own
housing needs for a continuous period of at least six months without
justified grounds. Although inspections were foreseen to ensure
compliance with this requirement (section 42 of this Act), occupancy
rights were rarely, if ever, cancelled on these grounds prior to the
1992-95 war. Moreover, on 24 December 1992 the Constitutional
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina annulled the inspection provisions.
Following its declaration of
independence on 6 March 1992, a brutal war started in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. On 15 May 1992 the United Nations Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
adopted its Resolution 757 urging that all units of the JNA, the
armed forces of the SFRY, and all elements of the Croatian Army
either be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be subject to the
authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be
disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective
international monitoring. While the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia
and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, the United Nations Secretary General
(report of 3 December 1992, A/47/747, § 11) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see its
judgment in the Tadić case of 15 July 1999, § 151)
later established that JNA members born in Bosnia and Herzegovina
actually remained there with their equipment and joined the VRS
forces
and only those born in Serbia and Montenegro left and joined the VJ
forces.
As regards the participation by foreign armed forces in the 1992-95
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Đokić, cited
above, §§ 16-17.
The
concept of “social ownership” was abandoned during the
1992-95 war.
Socially owned flats were thus effectively nationalised. As regards
the administration of such flats during and after the war, see
“Relevant domestic law and practice” below.
B. The facts concerning Ms Ljeposava Mago
The
applicant was born in 1959. She lives in Banja Luka, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
In
1983 her husband, a JNA sergeant, was allocated a military flat in
Sarajevo. As the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1992, he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. The
applicant also moved to Serbia, where she was granted refugee status.
The
applicant’s husband’s military service was terminated in
1998.
In
1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Sarajevo. Shortly thereafter, she filed a petition for
divorce in Serbia and returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. She was
granted a divorce on 2 March 2000.
On
25 March 2000 her restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section
3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998 (“section 3a”;
see paragraph 54 below). On 28 September 2000 the competent Cantonal
Ministry upheld that decision.
On
29 June 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Human
Rights Chamber, a domestic human-rights body set up by Annex 6 to the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the
Dayton Peace Agreement”).
On
27 June 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for
judicial review, quashed the decisions of 25 March and 28 September
2000 and remitted the case for reconsideration.
On 9 July 2002 the restitution commission set up by
Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement (“the CRPC”),
before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that
the applicant’s husband was neither a refugee nor a displaced
person and declined jurisdiction.
On
22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities rejected again the
applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 23 September 2003
the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision.
On
9 September 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the successor of the
Human Rights Chamber, held that the applicant shared the fate of her
former husband as to the restitution of their flat and found no
breach of the Convention owing to her former husband’s service
in the VJ forces.
On
20 January 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for
judicial review, quashed the administrative decisions of 22 November
2002 and 23 September 2003 and remitted the case for reconsideration.
On 5 October 2006 the authorities rejected again the
applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 8 December 2006
the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. The decision of
8 December 2006 was served on the applicant on 30 September 2007. The
applicant did not appeal.
On
17 November 2008 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 6
of the Convention in consideration of the length of the restitution
proceedings and awarded the applicant 1,200 convertible marks (BAM)
for non-pecuniary damage. Regardless of the excessive length of the
restitution proceedings, it held that the applicant should have
nevertheless lodged an application for judicial review against the
administrative decision of 8 December 2006 and rejected her
substantive complaints on non-exhaustion grounds.
C. The facts concerning Mr Ivan Antonov
The
applicant was born in Serbia in 1934. He lives in Serbia.
In
1978, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in
Sarajevo. Whilst he was transferred to Belgrade in 1989, his wife
stayed in that flat until 1994. His military service was terminated
on 31 October 1992.
On
an unknown date, after having renounced his occupancy right on the
flat in Sarajevo, the applicant was allocated a tenancy right of
unlimited duration on a military flat in Serbia. In addition, he was
provided a loan, co financed by the military authorities, for
another flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59 below).
In
1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Sarajevo.
On
8 August 2000 his restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section
3a. On 12 March 2001 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that
decision.
On
15 August 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for
judicial review, quashed the decisions of 8 August 2000 and 12 March
2001 and remitted the case for reconsideration.
On
17 September 2002 the applicant lodged an application with the Human
Rights Chamber.
On 22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities
rejected again the applicant’s restitution claim pursuant to
section 3a. The decision was delivered on 30 December 2002. The
applicant did not appeal.
On 7 July 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the
successor of the Human Rights Chamber, found that there was no breach
of the Convention. That decision was delivered on 11 November 2004.
D. The facts concerning Mr Jovan Radović
The
applicant was born in Croatia in 1944. He lives in Serbia.
In
1983, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar.
When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992,
he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. His military
service was terminated in 2000.
In
1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Mostar. On 4 September 2001 his application was rejected
pursuant to section 3a. The decision was upheld by the competent
Cantonal Ministry, the Mostar Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court of
the relevant Entity on 22 December 2003, 29 December 2004 and 11
October 2006 respectively.
In 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the
Human Rights Chamber. In 2006 the Human Rights Commission found a
breach of Article 6 of the Convention in view of the length of
the restitution proceedings and awarded the applicant BAM 1,000 for
non-pecuniary damage. Given their excessive length, the Human Rights
Commission held that the restitution proceedings did not constitute a
remedy which would have to be used as a condition for the examination
of the applicant’s substantive complaints. It then held, in
line with its well-established jurisprudence, that the applicant’s
occupancy right constituted “possessions” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that his inability to
repossess his flat amounted to an interference with the enjoyment of
that rights. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the
Commission held that the applicant’s service in the VJ forces
had shown his disloyalty to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It concluded that
the interference was therefore justified and found no breach of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Lastly, it considered that it was
unnecessary to examine the discrimination and Article 8 complaints.
E. The facts concerning Mr Milutin Banović
The
applicant was born in Serbia in 1952. He lives in Serbia.
In
1988, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in
Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
he decided to pursue his military career in Serbia.
After
having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, on 1
June 1999 the applicant was provided a mortgage loan, co-financed by
the military authorities, for a flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59
below).
In
1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Sarajevo. On 22 June 2004 his application was rejected
pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by the competent
Cantonal Ministry, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court
on 1 November 2004, 24 September 2007 and 15 January 2010
respectively.
In
the meantime, on 9 July 2002, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16
above, before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held
that he was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined
jurisdiction.
The
applicant’s military service was terminated in 2003.
F. The facts concerning Mr Vase Krstevski
The
applicant was born in 1942. He lives in Serbia.
In
1987, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar.
Although the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on
19 May 1992, he stayed in Mostar. On paper, however, he was a
member of the newly-established VJ forces, the armed forces of the
neighbouring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until 31 July 1992. On 3
August 1992 the HVO forces
arrested the applicant. He was detained at Dretelj internment camp
until 18 August 1992 and then deported to the area controlled by the
VRS forces. Shortly thereafter, the Red Cross Society of Montenegro
transferred the applicant to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. On 26 August 1992 he was examined at Skopje Military
Hospital. According to the medical report, the applicant was
subjected to serious ill-treatment at Dretelj internment camp.
In
1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Mostar. On 9 October 2002 his claim was rejected pursuant to
section 3a. On 7 November the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that
decision. On 16 April 2003 the Mostar Cantonal Court, on an
application for judicial review, quashed both decisions and remitted
the case for reconsideration.
On
11 February 2004 the housing authorities rejected again the
applicant’s restitution claim under section 3a. On 5 July 2004
the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. On 2 December
2004 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed both decisions and remitted
the case to the housing authorities.
On
16 April 2007 the housing authorities rejected for a third time the
restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by
the competent Cantonal Ministry and the Mostar Cantonal Court on
11 February and 2 December 2008 respectively.
On
26 April 2007 the Serbian authorities terminated the proceedings for
the allocation of a flat in Serbia because the applicant had not
renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Mostar (see paragraph 59
below). On 6 October 2009 the applicant was placed in an old
people’s home in Serbia, as he had no other place to live.
G. The facts concerning Mr Milutin Radojević
The
applicant was born in Montenegro in 1941 where he now lives.
In
1981, as an economist employed at a military facility, he was
allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he accepted a similar job at a military
facility in Montenegro.
In
1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the
flat in Sarajevo. On 17 March 2003 his restitution claim was
accepted. On 27 November 2003 the competent Cantonal Ministry quashed
that decision and rejected the restitution claim pursuant to section
3a.
Meanwhile,
on 24 April 2003, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16 above, before
which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that he was
neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction.
In
November 2005 he retired. After having renounced his occupancy right
on the flat in Sarajevo, he was allocated a tenancy right of
unlimited duration on a military flat in Montenegro in December 2005
(see paragraph 59 below).
On
6 February 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for
judicial review, quashed the decision of 27 November 2003 and
remitted the case to the Cantonal Ministry. On 29 March 2006 the
Cantonal Ministry quashed the decision of 17 March 2003 and remitted
the case to the housing authorities. On 10 April 2007 the housing
authorities rejected the restitution claim under section 3a. The
Cantonal Ministry and the Sarajevo Cantonal Court upheld that
decision on 5 June 2007 and 24 June 2008 respectively. The last
decision was delivered on 10 December 2008.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Bosnia and Herzegovina
1. Administration of socially owned flats during the
war
During the 1992-95 war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina more than 2.2 million people left their homes as a
consequence of “ethnic cleansing” or generalised
violence. As a rule, they fled to areas controlled by their own
ethnic groups. All parties to the conflict quickly adopted procedures
allowing the flats of those who had fled to be declared “abandoned”
and allocated to new occupants. While the alleged rationale for the
allocation of “abandoned” flats was to provide
humanitarian shelter to displaced persons, particularly attractive
flats were often awarded to the military and political elites. In
some cases, occupancy rights were cancelled pursuant to section 47 of
the Housing Act 1984, because of failure by the pre-war occupancy
right holders to use their flats for a continuous period of at least
six months. In most cases, however, the authorities applied
legislation specially enacted for those purposes: the Abandoned Flats
Act 1992, the Abandoned Flats Decree 1993, the Refugee Accommodation
Decree 1993, the Refugee Accommodation Act 1995 and the Abandoned
Property Act 1996.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, legislation on abandoned flats
remained in force in both Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (namely,
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska)
and reallocation of flats continued nearly unabated, which further
reinforced ethnic separation.
2. Restitution of flats
All such legislation was
repealed under international pressure in 1998, enabling pre-war
occupants to claim restitution. However, that right was
limited in time and failure to make a timely application led to the
cancellation of occupancy rights. The general deadline in
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 4 July 1999, but in some
cases an application could have been made by 4
October 1999 or, for damaged flats, by 29 June 2002 (sections 5 and
18e of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998).
Occupancy rights on military flats can be cancelled also under
section 3a of that Act on the following grounds. First, if the
pre-war occupancy right holder served in foreign armed forces
after 19 May 1992 (when the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and
Herzegovina). Since those who were granted
refugee or equivalent status in a country outside the former SFRY are
exempted, the restriction affects only those who served in the forces
of the successor States of the SFRY and, in reality, almost
exclusively those who served in the VJ forces. The second
category is those who acquired an occupancy or
equivalent right to a military flat in a successor State of the SFRY.
On 22 September 2004 the Constitutional
Court, on an application for abstract constitutionality review,
declared that provision constitutional
(decision U 83/03, published in Official Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina no. 60/04 of 27 December 2004). It has afterwards
rejected numerous individual cases raising the issue of inability to
return to military flats.
Once occupancy right holders have repossessed their
pre-war flats, they are entitled to purchase them under very
favourable terms pursuant to the Privatisation of Flats Act 1997.
Upon the cancellation of a
pre-war occupancy right on a civilian flat, due to failure to make
a timely application, the flat in issue
may be given to another person provided that his or her housing needs
have not already been met (see section 18d of the
Restitution of Flats Act 1998). In accordance with sections 11
and 11a of that Act, it is deemed that one’s housing needs have
already been met when that person or his or her spouse, child or
parent has another habitable flat or house; the person concerned has
sold his or her pre-war home; the person concerned earns as a minimum
one quarter of the average consumer basket
per member of his or her household plus BAM 200; or falls into any
other category specified therein.
Different rules apply to military flats. Upon
the cancellation of a pre-war occupancy right, due to failure to make
a timely application or due to a final decision rejecting a
restitution claim pursuant to section 3a of the
Restitution of Flats Act 1998, the flat may be allocated to
current and retired military officials, current and retired staff of
the Ministry of Defence, war veterans, war invalids or families of
killed members of the former ARBH
or HVO forces provided that their housing needs have not otherwise
been met (see section 30 of the Military Flats Allocation Ordinance
1996).
Section 31 of that Ordinance also provides that a person cannot be
allocated a military flat if he or she or his or her spouse or minor
child had a house or a flat in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war
(even if it has meanwhile been sold or gifted). Other conditions set
out in paragraph 56 above, such as one’s income, do not apply
to the allocation of military flats. Pursuant to section 30 of the
Military Flats Allocation Ordinance 1996, 45%
of flats should be allocated to senior officers and the highest
Ministry officials; 15% to junior officers; and 10% to
non-commissioned officers, other soldiers and Ministry staff. The
remaining flats should be allocated to war veterans, war
invalids or families of killed members of the former ARBH or HVO
forces. During and immediately after the war many military flats were
reportedly allocated to the highest military
and civilian officials whose housing needs had otherwise been met
(see Đokić, cited above, § 10).
In 2002 the High Representative
therefore requested the local authorities to ensure that all flats be
allocated in accordance with the law. It would appear that during
that process, which led to some evictions and which was monitored by
the High Representative and the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the deficiencies mentioned above were for the most part remedied.
3. Procedural issues
Applications for restitution are
dealt with under an administrative procedure. First-instance
decisions are, as a rule, subject to appeal within 15 days of
delivery (section 227 of the Administrative Procedure Act 1998).
Second-instance decisions are, as a rule, subject to judicial review
within 30 days of delivery (section 18 of the Administrative Disputes
Act 2005).
Decisions on applications for judicial review were earlier subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina within 15 days of delivery (section 42 of the
Administrative Disputes Act 1998,
replaced by the Administrative Disputes Act 2005 in March 2005), but
they are no longer subject to appeal. An administrative decision
enters into effect when upheld by the competent Ministry, the
competent Cantonal Court and, until March 2005, by the Supreme Court;
when the parties declare that they will not use either of those
remedies; or when the time-limit for any of them expires.
B. Serbia
1. Allocation of military flats
It has no longer been possible to acquire occupancy
rights in Serbia since 1992 (see section 30(1) of the Housing Act
1992).
Instead, current and retired members of the armed forces and current
and retired staff of the Ministry of Defence have afterwards been
entitled to an equivalent tenancy right of unlimited duration on
military flats or, in case of a lack of suitable flats, mortgage
loans co-financed by the State on condition that they or their
spouses or children do not have an occupancy or
equivalent right on a flat in any of the former Republics of
the SFRY (the Military Housing Ordinances 1994,
1995,
2002
and 2005
and the Military Pensioners Ordinances 1994
and 2010).
Therefore, those who occupied military flats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina before the war have as a rule been required to give up
their rights on those flats in order to qualify for a military flat
or a loan in Serbia or Montenegro (see sections 6-7 and 87 of the
Military Housing Ordinance 1994; sections 7-8 and 74 of the Military
Pensioners Ordinances 1994; and sections 6-7 and 85 of the Military
Housing Ordinance 1995).
Section 39(2) of the Housing Act 1992 provides that
the holder of a tenancy right of an unlimited duration on a flat may
purchase that flat under the same conditions as an occupancy right
holder.
2. Restitution of flats
While
the number of people who left their homes in Serbia after the
dissolution of the former SFRY is far from the number of such people
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see paragraph 53 above), there were
nevertheless some cases. For example, in 1992 a number of Muslims
left Mali Zvornik, a Serbian town bordering on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as the local authorities were unable to protect them
from militias from across the border. Although their flats were
allocated to other people immediately after their departure, some of
them have subsequently been reinstated by the Serbian courts (see
decisions of the Supreme Court of Serbia Rev/3160/02 of 4 December
2002 and Rev/1856/07 of 4 October 2007 and decisions of the Loznica
Municipal Court in those cases). The Serbian courts held that the
flats in issue should not have been considered as abandoned as the
persons concerned had left them under duress. However, some other
persons in a similar situation have not been able to repossess their
flats (see decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia Rev/2053/08 of 28
November 2008 finding that the restitution claim should have been
made much earlier than in June 2005).
C. Montenegro
Between
1992 and 2003 Montenegro was a constituent unit of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and then, until its independence in 2006, of
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Since Serbia and Montenegro
had common armed forces throughout that period, the ordinances
mentioned in paragraph 59 above applied also in Montenegro until
2006.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
A. Dayton Peace Agreement
The Dayton Peace Agreement was initialled in the
United States on 21 November 1995 and entered into force when it was
signed in France on 14 December 1995. It put an end to the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The
relevant part of Article II § 5 of Annex 4 to the Agreement
reads as follows:
“All refugees and displaced
persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin.”
Article I § 1 of Annex 7 to the Agreement
provides:
“All refugees and displaced persons have the right
freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right
to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the
course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any
property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of
refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the
settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties
confirm that they will accept the return of such persons who have
left their territory, including those who have been accorded
temporary protection by third countries.”
B. Agreement on Succession Issues
The Agreement on Succession Issues was the culmination
of nearly ten years of intermittent negotiations under the auspices
of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and the High
Representative. It entered into force between Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (succeeded in 2003 by the
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and in 2006 by Serbia), Slovenia
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 2 June 2004.
Under Articles 2 and 7 of Annex A to that Agreement,
immovable State property of the SFRY situated in Bosnia and
Herzegovina passed to that State on the date on which it proclaimed
independence. With regard to occupancy rights, Article 6 of Annex G
to that Agreement provides:
“Domestic legislation of each successor State
concerning dwelling rights (‘stanarsko pravo/ stanovanjska
pravica/ станарско
право’) shall be applied equally
to persons who were citizens of the SFRY and who had such rights,
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.”
C. United Nations Principles on Housing and Property
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (“the Pinheiro
Principles”)
The relevant principles, endorsed by the United
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights in 2005 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17), are the following:
Principle 1 (Scope and application)
“1.1 The Principles on housing and property
restitution for refugees and displaced persons articulated herein are
designed to assist all relevant actors, national and international,
in addressing the legal and technical issues surrounding housing,
land and property restitution in situations where displacement has
led to persons being arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of their
former homes, lands, properties or places of habitual residence.
1.2 The Principles on housing and property restitution
for refugees and displaced persons apply equally to all refugees,
internally displaced persons and to other similarly situated
displaced persons who fled across national borders but who may not
meet the legal definition of refugee (hereinafter ‘refugees and
displaced persons’) who were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived
of their former homes, lands, properties or places of habitual
residence, regardless of the nature or circumstances by which
displacement originally occurred.”
Principle 2 (The right to housing and property
restitution)
“2.1 All refugees and displaced persons have the
right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of
which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be
compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually
impossible to restore as determined by an independent, impartial
tribunal.
2.2 States shall demonstrably prioritize the right to
restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement and as a key
element of restorative justice. The right to restitution exists as a
distinct right, and is prejudiced neither by the actual return nor
non-return of refugees and displaced persons entitled to housing,
land and property restitution.”
Principle 7 (The right to peaceful enjoyment of
possessions)
“7.1 Everyone has the right to the peaceful
enjoyment of his or her possessions.
7.2 States shall only subordinate the use and enjoyment
of possessions in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law. Whenever possible, the ‘interest of society’ should
be read restrictively, so as to mean only a temporary or limited
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.”
Principle 16 (The rights of tenants and other
non-owners)
“16.1 States should ensure that the rights of
tenants, social-occupancy rights holders and other legitimate
occupants or users of housing, land and property are recognized
within restitution programmes. To the maximum extent possible, States
should ensure that such persons are able to return to and repossess
and use their housing, land and property in a similar manner to those
possessing formal ownership rights.”
Principle 21 (Compensation)
“21.1 All refugees and displaced persons have the
right to full and effective compensation as an integral component of
the restitution process. Compensation may be monetary or in kind.
States shall, in order to comply with the principle of restorative
justice, ensure that the remedy of compensation is only used when the
remedy of restitution is not factually possible, or when the injured
party knowingly and voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of
restitution, or when the terms of a negotiated peace settlement
provide for a combination of restitution and compensation.
21.2 States should ensure, as a rule, that restitution
is only deemed factually impossible in exceptional circumstances,
namely when housing, land and/or property is destroyed or when it no
longer exists, as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal.
Even under such circumstances the holder of the housing, land and/or
property right should have the option to repair or rebuild whenever
possible. In some situations, a combination of compensation and
restitution may be the most appropriate remedy and form of
restorative justice.”
D. Resolution 1708 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe of 28 January 2010 on solving property
issues of refugees and displaced persons
The relevant part of the Resolution reads as follows:
“9. In the light of the above, the Assembly calls
on member states to resolve post-conflict housing, land and property
rights issues of refugees and IDPs, taking into account the Pinheiro
Principles, the relevant Council of Europe instruments, and
Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers.
10. Bearing in mind these relevant international
standards and the experience of property restitution and compensation
programmes carried out in Europe to date, member states are invited
to:
...
10.4. ensure that previous occupancy and tenancy rights
with regard to public or social accommodation or other analogous
forms of home ownership which existed in former communist systems are
recognised and protected as homes in the sense of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and as possessions in the sense
of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention;
10.5. ensure that the absence from their accommodation
of holders of occupancy and tenancy rights who have been forced to
abandon their homes shall be deemed justified until the conditions
that allow for voluntary return in safety and dignity have been
restored;”
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
Given their common factual and legal background,
the Court decides that these six applications should be joined
pursuant to Rule
42
§ 1
of the Rules
of Court.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO
THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained about their inability to get back their pre-war
flats in Sarajevo and Mostar. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
1. Compatibility ratione
personae
The
respondent Government submitted that Serbia and Montenegro, rather
than Bosnia and Herzegovina, were responsible for the housing of all
current and retired members of their forces, including the present
applicants, and that the present case was therefore incompatible
ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and the
Protocols thereto.
The
applicants and the Serbian Government disagreed without going into
any details.
The
Court reiterates that compatibility ratione personae requires
the alleged violation of the Convention or any of the Protocols
thereto to have been committed by the respondent State or to be in
some way attributable to it. Since the present case concerns flats
located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and decisions of
Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities, it is clearly compatible ratione
personae with the provisions of Protocol No. 1 within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. This objection of the
respondent Government must accordingly be dismissed.
2. Compatibility ratione
materiae
The
respondent Government underlined that the present applicants, unlike
the applicant in Đokić, cited above, had not
purchased their flats before the war and had thus remained occupancy
right holders. They argued that the occupancy right did not
constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 (they referred to Gaćeša
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 43389/02, 1
April 2008, and Trifunović
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 34162/06, 6 November 2008).
The
applicants and the Serbian Government contested that argument. They
invited the Court to follow the domestic jurisprudence in this field
and distinguish the present case from the Gaćeša
and Trifunović cases.
The
concept of “possessions” has an autonomous meaning which
is independent from the formal classification in domestic law. The
issue that needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of a
case, considered as a whole, conferred on an applicant title to a
substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Former
King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, §
60, ECHR 2000 XII).
The Gaćeša
and Trifunović cases,
referred to above, like the present case, concerned the restitution
of flats following massive migrations linked to the brutal
disintegration of the SFRY. The Court held that the applicants in
those cases did not have “possessions” within the meaning
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because occupancy
right holders in Croatia had no longer been able to purchase their
flats since 1 January 1996. However, the present case must be
distinguished. Pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement (see paragraphs
63-65 above) and domestic laws enacted under international pressure
(see paragraphs 54-55 above), all occupancy
right holders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are as a rule entitled to get
back their pre-war flats and then purchase them under very favourable
terms. In Croatia, this is not the case. Furthermore, unlike the
Croatian authorities, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities
have consistently held that an occupancy right constitutes
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (see, for example, the Human Rights Commission’s decision
mentioned in paragraph 34 above and the Constitutional Court’s
decision mentioned in paragraph 54 above). As the position of the
national authorities appears to be in accordance with international
standards (see paragraphs 68-69 above), the Court does not see any
reason to depart from it. Lastly, the situation in the present case
is not that different from the situation in Đokić,
given that those who purchased military flats located in the
present-day Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not register
their ownership and remained, strictly speaking, occupancy right
holders (see Đokić, cited above, § 12). The
Court therefore dismisses the respondent Government’s
objection.
3. Six-month rule
Although the respondent Government did not raise any
objection under this head, this issue calls for the Court’s
consideration proprio motu.
The
object of the six month rule is to promote legal certainty, by
ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention or the
Protocols thereto are dealt with within a reasonable time, and that
past decisions are not continually open to challenge. It also affords
the prospective applicant time to consider whether to lodge an
application with the Court and, if so, to decide on the specific
complaints and arguments to be raised (O’Loughlin and Others
v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 23274/04, 25 August 2005).
The Court has held that the situation under
consideration in Đokić, cited above, was of a
continuing nature as the applicant’s purchase contract had been
regarded as legally valid as from 5 July 1999 (§ 56). However,
the present applicants did not conclude such contracts. The crux of
the present case is whether the cancellation of the applicants’
occupancy rights, which prevents them from repossessing their pre-war
flats, was contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In a similar case
(Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, ECHR
2006 III), the Court held that the cancellation of an occupancy
right was an instantaneous act rather than a continuing situation (§
86). The Court does not see any reason to depart from that
jurisprudence. Consequently, the six-month period started to run with
regard to each of the present applicants when the decision cancelling
his or her occupancy right entered into effect under the rules of
administrative procedure set out in paragraph 58 above or, if an
applicant used further remedies, such as an appeal to the Human
Rights Chamber or a constitutional appeal, when the final decision
was rendered in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. It
should be emphasised, however, that only remedies which are effective
can be taken into account as applicants cannot extend the strict
time-limit imposed by the Convention by seeking to make inappropriate
or misconceived applications to bodies or institutions which have no
power to offer effective redress for the complaint in issue (see
Fernie v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 14881/04, 5 January
2006). It is true that mere doubts regarding the effectiveness of a
remedy cannot absolve an applicant from the obligation to try it (see
Milošević v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 77631/01,
19 March 2002), but a remedy which did not offer reasonable prospects
of success, for example in the light of settled domestic case-law,
will not be regarded as effective (see Pressos Compania Naviera
S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 27, Series A
no. 332) and will not be taken into account for the purposes of
the six-month rule. The Court now turns to the situation of each of
the present applicants.
(a) The case of Ms Ljeposava Mago
The
applicant’s occupancy right was finally cancelled pursuant to
section 3a on 30 October 2007 when the
time-limit for an application for the judicial review of the decision
of 8 December 2006 expired (see paragraph 20 above). Since the
applicant lodged her application with the Court on 22 March
2005, she complied with the six-month rule.
(b) The case of Mr Ivan Antonov
The
applicant’s occupancy right was finally cancelled pursuant to
section 3a on 29 January 2003 when the
time-limit for an appeal against the decision of 22 November 2002
expired (see paragraph 29 above). Therefore, his application with the
Court, lodged on 28 April 2005, is not out of time only if his
application to the domestic Human Rights Chamber is considered to be
an effective remedy. In this connection, the Court considers that the
domestic case-law concerning the restitution of non-privatised
military flats has been settled since the Constitutional Court’s
decision U 83/03 of 22 September 2004 (see
paragraph 54 above). No domestic remedy
offered any prospects of success thereafter.
As the applicant lodged his application with the Human Rights Chamber
before that date, the six-month period started to run on 11 November
2004 when the Human Rights Commission’s decision was delivered
(see paragraph 30 above). Accordingly, he complied with the six-month
rule.
(c) The case of Mr Jovan Radović
The
applicant’s occupancy right was finally cancelled pursuant to
section 3a on 11 October 2006. Given
that he filed his application with the Court on 21 November 2006, he
complied with the six-month rule.
(d) The case of Mr Milutin Banović
The
applicant’s occupancy right was finally cancelled pursuant to
section 3a on 24 September 2007. Given
that he filed his application with the Court on 8 February 2008, he
complied with the six-month rule.
(e) The case of Mr Vase Krstevski
The
applicant’s occupancy right was finally cancelled pursuant to
section 3a on 2 December 2008. Given
that he filed his application with the Court on 12 February 2009, he
complied with the six-month rule.
(f) The case of Mr Milutin Radojević
The applicant’s occupancy right was finally
cancelled pursuant to section 3a on 24
June 2008. That decision was served on the applicant on 10 December
2008. Given that the applicant filed his application with the Court
on 3 February 2009, he complied with the six-month rule.
4. Conclusion
The
Court notes that these complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor
inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
1. The applicants’ submissions
The
applicants submitted that they had fled Bosnia and Herzegovina
because they feared for their safety. Ms Ljeposava Mago also
submitted that her former husband’s status should not have been
taken into consideration when examining her restitution claim. As
regards the merits of the case, the applicants argued that a fair
balance had not been struck between the public interest and their
individual interests. They referred to Đokić, cited
above.
2. The respondent Government’s submissions
The
respondent Government objected to the applicants’ version of
the facts under which they had fled Bosnia and Herzegovina because
they feared for their safety. In this regard, they provided a copy of
an agreement between the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government and the JNA
of May 1992 concerning the withdrawal of the JNA from Sarajevo,
Zenica, Travnik and Konjic. The agreement guaranteed the safety of
all JNA pensioners and the families of JNA members who wished to stay
in the country. In the opinion of the respondent Government, those
who had nevertheless decided to leave should therefore not be
regarded as refugees.
On the assumption that the applicants had
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, the respondent Government argued that the contested measures
were justified given notably the scarce housing space and a pressing
need to accommodate former members of the ARBH and HVO forces and
their families in the aftermath of the war. According to official
data given by the respondent Government, the JNA had nominally
controlled before the war 12,662 flats in the current Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7,834 of those flats had been abandoned
during the war. Out of that number, no restitution claim had been
lodged within the deadline as regards 1,196 flats; restitution claims
were rejected pursuant to section 3a as regards 1,032 flats;
restitution proceedings were still pending as regards 749 flats; and
4,857 flats had been restored to their pre-war occupants. That
Government also provided data concerning the allocation of the 1,032
flats as regards which restitution claims had been rejected pursuant
to section 3a: 813 flats had been allocated to war veterans and war
invalids; 195 flats had been allocated to families of killed members
of the former ARBH or HVO forces; 14 flats were damaged or vacant;
and as regards 10 flats, no or little information was provided (for
instance, 3 of them were used by “civilians”). The
respondent Government did not submit any information concerning the
income of the current occupants of those flats since that factor had
not been taken into consideration when allocating the flats. They
stated that different rules applied to civilian and military flats
(see paragraphs 56-57 above) and provided a copy of the Military
Flats Allocation Ordinance 1996 mentioned in the latter paragraph
confirming that statement (the Ordinance, published in an internal
gazette of the ARBH forces, was not publicly available).
The
respondent Government further emphasised that some, if not all,
applicants had been allocated an occupancy or equivalent right on a
military flat or a mortgage loan co-financed by the military
authorities in Serbia or Montenegro. They maintained that the Serbian
Government had misled the Court when claiming in Đokić
that members of their armed forces had no longer had the right to
acquire a tenancy right of unlimited duration – a right
equivalent to the erstwhile occupancy right (see Đokić,
cited above, § 54). In this regard, the respondent Government
provided a copy of the Military Housing Ordinance 2005 mentioned in
paragraph 59 above (that Ordinance, published in
an internal
gazette of the
Ministry of
Defence, was not publicly available) and a number of
diplomatic notes showing that the allocation of tenancy rights of
unlimited duration to members of the Serbian armed forces had never
stopped. They also submitted that none of the former members of the
ARBH forces who had occupied a military flat in Serbia until the
1992 95 war had succeeded in getting back that flat. The
respondent Government concluded that the applicants were therefore
not made to bear an excessive burden (they referred to Jahn and
Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, §
117, ECHR 2005 VI, in which the Court held that the lack of any
compensation did not inevitably upset the “fair balance”
that had to be struck between the protection of property and the
requirements of the general interest).
3. The Serbian Government’s submissions
The
Serbian Government argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina must reinstate
all pre-war occupancy right holders into their
flats regardless of whether they had served in the VJ forces
and regardless of whether they had been allocated a military flat in
Serbia or Montenegro. They referred to the international agreements
cited in paragraphs 63-67 above. That Government concluded that a
fair balance had not been struck between the applicants’
interests and the public interest. They referred to Đokić,
cited above.
4. The Court’s
assessment
(a) The nature of the interference
As
the Court has stated on numerous occasions, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 comprises three rules: the first rule, set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and
enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the
second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph,
covers deprivation of property and subjects it to conditions; the
third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the
Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest. The second
and third rules are concerned with particular instances of
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and
should be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated
in the first rule (see, among other authorities, Iatridis v.
Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 1999-II).
As
noted above, the crux of the present case is the cancellation of the
applicants’ occupancy rights which prevents them from getting
back their pre-war flats. This amounts to a deprivation of their
possessions within the meaning of the second rule of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
(b) The principle of lawfulness
The
Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public
authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be
lawful. Moreover, the law upon which the interference is based should
be in accordance with the domestic law of the Contracting State,
including the relevant provisions of its Constitution (Former King
of Greece and Others, cited above, §§ 79 and 82).
The
present applicants’ occupancy rights were cancelled pursuant to
section 3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998. The Constitutional
Court declared that provision
constitutional (see paragraph 54 above).
Therefore, it is clear that the interference was provided for by law
within the meaning of the second rule of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1.
(c) The aim of the interference
The
Court must now determine whether this deprivation of property pursued
a legitimate aim in the public interest within the meaning of that
rule.
The
Court agrees with the applicants that a deprivation of property
carried out for no reason other than to confer a private benefit on a
private party cannot be in the public interest. That being said, a
taking of property effected in pursuance of a policy calculated to
enhance social justice within the community may be in the public
interest, even if the community at large has no direct use or
enjoyment of the property taken (see James and Others v. the
United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, §§ 40-45, Series A
no. 98).
While
the Court is aware that during and immediately after the war many
abandoned flats were reportedly allocated to the
highest military and civilian officials whose housing needs had
otherwise been met (see Đokić, cited above,
§§ 10 and 61), it would appear that
those deficiencies have later been remedied (see paragraphs 57 and 91
above). In view of that, the Court accepts that the
interference with the applicants’ possessions was aimed at
enhancing social justice, as argued by the respondent Government.
(d) Whether there was a fair balance
An
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a
fair balance between the protection of property and the requirements
of the public interest. With regard to compensation, the Court has
held that a taking of property without payment of an amount
reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a
disproportionate interference and a total lack of compensation can be
considered justifiable under this Article only in exceptional
circumstances (see Jahn and Others, cited above, § 94,
and the authorities cited therein).
Turning
to the present case, the Court first notes that Ms Ljeposava Mago was
deprived of her property because of Mr Mago’s service in the
VJ forces during and after the war. The respondent Government
underlined that under the housing legislation spouses held occupancy
rights in common and maintained that consequently Mr Mago’s
status must have been taken into consideration when examining Ms
Mago’s restitution claim. They referred to a decision of the
domestic Human Rights Chamber CH/02/8202 et al. of 4 April
2003. However, unlike Ms Mago, the applicant in that case was still
married to a member of the VJ forces. It is noted that in the event
of a divorce spouses are entitled under the housing legislation to
choose which one of them will continue to use their flat (see
paragraph 6 above). The Court considers that the authorities must
respect that choice. The respondent Government also argued that the
applicant should have applied to the competent court for a transfer
of the occupancy right following her divorce. However, according to
the housing legislation, such proceedings must be pursued only in the
absence of an agreement between former spouses as to the use of their
flat after their divorce. In the present case, Mr Mago did not
apply for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo and thereby tacitly
agreed that Ms Mago take it back. In those circumstances, his status
should not have been taken into account when examining Ms Mago’s
restitution claim. Since the applicant did not fall into any of the
categories targeted by the contested measures and
the respondent Government did not suggest any other reason for the
deprivation of her possessions, there has been a breach of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 with respect to Ms Mago.
The Court further observes that Mr Jovan Radović
and Mr Vase Krstevski were deprived of their possessions merely
because of their service in the VJ forces during and after the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no indication, let alone proof, that
those applicants participated, as part of the VJ forces, in any war
crimes in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the
respondent Government alleged that those applicants had probably been
allocated flats in Serbia, they failed to substantiate that
allegation. The parties agreed, and this is indeed well known, that
the nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was such that service
in certain armed forces was to a large extent indicative of one’s
ethnic origin (see Đokić, cited above, § 60).
As a result, the contested measures, although apparently neutral,
have the effect of treating people differently on the ground of their
ethnic origin. The Court has held in comparable situations that, as a
matter of principle, no difference in treatment which is based
exclusively or to a decisive extent on one’s ethnic origin is
capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic
society (Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and
34836/06, § 44, ECHR 2009; D.H. and Others v. the
Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 176, ECHR 2007 IV;
and Timishev v. Russia, nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, §
58, ECHR 2005 XII). It does not see any reason to depart from
that finding. As the applicants were not given any compensation, the
Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 with respect to Mr Jovan Radović and Mr Vase
Krstevski.
As regards Mr Ivan Antonov and Mr Milutin Radojević,
the Court notes that they were allocated tenancy rights of unlimited
duration on flats in Serbia and Montenegro respectively. In order to
qualify for those rights in Serbia and Montenegro, they had to
renounce the equivalent rights on their pre-war flats in Sarajevo
(see paragraph 59 above). It is true that States must normally offer
compensation if taking a property. Furthermore, the fact that a
person has acquired a property right in one State is normally not
sufficient in itself to justify a taking of his or her property in
another State. That being said, in the exceptional circumstances of
the dissolution of the SFRY and the wars in the region, the Court
considers that the respondent State has not been required under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to pay compensation to the applicants for
the cancellation of their occupancy rights given that they have
meanwhile been granted equivalent rights in other former Republics of
the SFRY (see Jahn and Others, cited above, § 117). There
has hence been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 with respect
to Mr Ivan Antonov and Mr Milutin Radojević.
Lastly, Mr Milutin Banović obtained a mortgage
loan to purchase a flat in Serbia. The Serbian Government argued that
his position was totally different from the position of those who had
been granted tenancy rights on military flats in Serbia. However, the
Court disagrees. First, the applicant’s loan was co-financed by
the military authorities. Secondly, like those who were granted a
tenancy right on a military flat in Serbia, the applicant had to
renounce the occupancy right on his flat in Sarajevo. There has thus
been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 with respect to Mr
Milutin Banović.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the
contested measures amounted also to an unnecessary interference with
the right to respect for their homes. Article 8 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
The
respondent Government contested that argument.
The
Serbian Government agreed with the applicants.
The
Court notes that there is no indication in the case file that the
applicants intend to resettle in their pre-war places of residence.
Indeed, in the proceedings before this Court, they expressly agreed
to compensation in lieu of restitution. The Court accordingly does
not find that the facts of this case are such as to disclose any
present interference with the applicants’ right to respect for
their homes (see Đokić, cited above, § 66, and
the cases cited therein). It follows that this complaint is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
TAKEN IN CONJUCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
The
applicants further alleged a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
relying essentially on the considerations underlying their complaint
under the latter provision taken alone. Article 14 provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The
respondent Government contested that argument.
The
Serbian Government agreed with the applicants.
Having
already taken those arguments of Ms Ljeposava Mago, Mr Jovan
Radović and Mr Vase Krstevski into account in its examination of
the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court declares
the Article 14 complaint admissible but considers that it is not
necessary to examine the matter under these provisions taken together
(Đokić, cited above, § 68).
As
regards Mr Ivan Antonov, Mr Milutin Banović and Mr Milutin
Radojević, the Court notes that their occupancy rights on
military flats in Sarajevo were cancelled not because of their
service in the VJ forces, but because they had renounced those rights
in order to acquire flats in Serbia or Montenegro (see paragraphs 104-105
above). Since their occupancy rights were cancelled on the basis of
objective and reasonable criteria rather than on the basis of their
personal characteristics, there is no appearance of a breach of
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4
of the Convention.
V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly,
the Court has examined the remaining complaints submitted by Mr
Antonov, Mr Radović and Mr Banović under Articles 6 and 17
of the Convention. However, having regard to all the material in its
possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It
follows that this part of the case must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and
4 of the Convention.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
Ms Ljeposava Mago claimed a sum corresponding to the
value of her pre-war flat in Sarajevo, which she estimated at 53,000
euros (EUR) and costs of renting another flat from 1992 until 2011 in
the amount of EUR 23,400 in respect of pecuniary damage. She further
claimed EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Mr
Jovan Radović claimed a sum corresponding to the value of his
pre-war flat in Mostar, which he estimated at EUR 170,000 together
with a sum corresponding to the value of his other belongings left in
Mostar, which he estimated at EUR 32,000 in respect of pecuniary
damage. He claimed EUR 24,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Mr
Vase Krstevski claimed a sum corresponding to the value of his
pre-war flat in Mostar, which he estimated at EUR 76,000. He also
claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
respondent Government considered the amounts claimed to be excessive.
They emphasised the fact that the applicants were not the owners of
the flats in issue, but merely occupancy right holders.
In
accordance with the Court’s settled jurisprudence, a judgment
in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal
obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its
consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the
situation existing before the breach (see Iatridis v. Greece (just
satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 32, ECHR 2000 XI).
Since the present applicants expressly agreed to compensation in lieu
of restitution, the respondent Government should pay them the current
value of the flats in issue (Đokić, cited above, §
72). Having regard to the information available to it on prices on
the local property market, the Court considers that the applicants
should be paid EUR 1,000 per square metre of their pre-war flats.
While it is true that the applicants were not the owners of their
flats, all occupancy right holders had the possibility of purchasing
their flats under very favourable terms (see paragraph 55 above). The
Court thus awards the applicants the following amounts under this
head, plus any tax that may be chargeable: EUR 53,000 to Ms Ljeposava
Mago; EUR 85,000 to Mr Jovan Radović; and EUR 76,000 to Mr Vase
Krstevski.
As
regards compensation for costs of renting another flat from 1992
until 2011 (see paragraph 117 above) and for belongings left behind
in the beginning of the war, the Court emphasises that it is only
competent ratione temporis to examine the period after the
ratification of Protocol No. 1 by Bosnia and Herzegovina (that is,
after 12 July 2002). As to the subsequent period, the Court rejects
the claim for lack of substantiation.
Lastly,
it is clear that the applicants sustained some non-pecuniary loss
arising from the breach of the Convention found in this case, for
which they should be compensated. Making its assessment on an
equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it
awards EUR 5,000 to each applicant under this head, plus any tax that
may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
Mr
Jovan Radović also claimed EUR 2,400 and Mr Vase Krstevski EUR
740 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
The
respondent Government considered Mr Jovan Radović’s claim
to be unsubstantiated.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. That is, the applicant must have paid them,
or be bound to pay them, pursuant to a legal or contractual
obligation, and they must have been unavoidable in order to prevent
the violation found or to obtain redress. The Court requires itemised
bills and invoices that are sufficiently detailed to enable it to
determine to what extent the above requirements have been met. Mr
Jovan Radović failed to submit evidence that any costs had been
actually incurred. Accordingly, the Court rejects his claim. On the
contrary, Mr Vase Krstevski submitted a relatively detailed bill of
costs. Since the sum claimed is reasonable, the Court considers that
it should be met in full.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the complaints under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the complaints of Ms Ljeposava
Mago, Mr Jovan Radović and Mr Vase Krstevski under
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with respect to Ms Ljeposava
Mago, Mr Jovan Radović and Mr Vase Krstevski;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with respect to Mr Ivan
Antonov, Mr Milutin Banović and Mr Milutin Radojević;
Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaints of Ms Ljeposava Mago, Mr Jovan Radović and
Mr Vase Krstevski under Article 14 of the Convention taken in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following sums, to be converted into
convertible marks at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
53,000 (fifty three thousand euros) to Ms Ljeposava Mago, EUR 85,000
(eighty five thousand euros) to Mr Jovan Radović and EUR 76,000
(seventy six thousand euros) to Mr Vase Krstevski, plus any tax that
may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
5,000 (five thousand euros) each to Ms Ljeposava Mago, Mr Jovan
Radović and Mr Vase Krstevski, plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR
740 (seven hundred and forty euros) to Mr Vase Krstevski, plus any
tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 May 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President