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Alem BIRAGA and others v Sweden - 1722/10 [2012] ECHR 785 (3 April 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/785.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 785
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FIFTH
SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
1722/10
Alem BIRAGA and others
against Sweden
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on
3 April 2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Dean
Spielmann, President,
Elisabet Fura,
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
Ann Power-Forde,
Ganna
Yudkivska,
Angelika Nußberger,
André
Potocki, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged on 12 January 2010,
Having
regard to the interim measure indicated to the respondent Government
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
Having
regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and
the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The
first applicant, Alem Biraga, and the second applicant, Yosef Kashsay
Tekle, are Ethiopian nationals, born in 1976 and 1980, who live in
Sweden. The third applicant, Abigail Kahsay, is their daughter, an
Ethiopian national, born in Sweden in 2009. They are represented
before the Court by Mr Bo Karlsson, a lawyer practising in
Sollentuna.
The
Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms Gunilla Isaksson from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.
On
1 February 2010 the President of the former Third Section decided, in
the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of the
proceedings, to indicate to the Government of Sweden, under Rule 39
of the Rules of Court that the first applicant should not be deported
to Ethiopia for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.
The
application was transferred to the Fifth Section of the Court,
following the re-composition of the Court’s sections on 1
February 2011.
A. The circumstances of the case
The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
At
some unknown time the first applicant entered Sweden and requested
asylum. In support of her request she explained that she had been a
member of the political party CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy)
since 2005. Following the election in May 2005, a
conflict arose between the Government party and the CUD. She was
summoned by the police in June 2006 but did not appear, as she knew
that three other members of the CUD had disappeared after being
summoned by the police. She was summoned a second time and went into
hiding with her sister. In December 2006 she fled the country.
She travelled by plane from Addis Ababa to Sweden on a false
passport.
On
27 May 2008 the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) refused the
first applicant’s request and ordered her deportation to
Ethiopia. It noted that she had not proved her identity, but in
assessing her request for asylum it assumed that she was from
Ethiopia as she maintained. It found that the general situation in
Ethiopia alone could not justify granting asylum. As to the
applicant’s personal situation, it questioned her credibility,
notably because during the interviews she had shown little knowledge
of the CUD and had given divergent information about where and with
whom she had been hiding from June to December 2006. Moreover, noting
that the applicant had not played a leading role within the party,
the Board found it unlikely that she would be of interest to the
police, especially more than one year after the election, and that,
if she had been of such interest, the police had not come to find her
at her sister’s home. The Migration Board also noted that,
according to international sources, many members of the CUD had in
fact been arrested in connection with the election, but that almost
all had been released in 2006. Those remaining were convicted in June
2007 and granted amnesty in August 2007. In these circumstances, the
Migration Board did not find that the applicant had substantiated
fulfilling the criteria for being granted asylum.
The
first applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen)
and added that for one year and nine months she had had a
relationship with the second applicant, an Ethiopian national, who
had been granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden on 31 August
1998 in order to join his mother. On 18 April 2009 the first and
the second applicants had a daughter, the third applicant, of whom
the parents have joint custody.
On
24 August 2009, the Migration Court upheld the
Migration Board’s decision as to the request for asylum.
As
to the first applicant’s relationship with her partner and
child, the Migration Court pointed out that by virtue of Chapter
5, Section
18 of the Aliens Act, an alien who wants a residence permit in Sweden
must have applied for and been granted such a permit before entering
the country. An application for a residence permit may not be granted
after entry into Sweden except, among other grounds, if the alien has
a very strong connection to a person residing in Sweden and it cannot
reasonably be demanded that the alien travel to another country to
hand in an application there. According to the preparatory work, a
request to be exempted from the main rule should be refused if the
alien’s identity cannot be established and the alien does not
have a right to protection in Sweden.
In the present case the
Migration Court noted that the third applicant did not have a
residence permit in Sweden at the relevant time, thus the first
applicant could not invoke the strong connection to her child to
obtain a residence permit there. As regards the first applicant’s
relationship with the second applicant, the
Migration Court found on the one hand that it spoke in the first
applicant’s favour that the couple had a child together. On the
other hand, it spoke against her that she had not pointed to any
reasons why it could not reasonably be demanded that she return to
her home country and hand in her application for a residence permit
there. In conclusion the Migration Court did not find the conditions
fulfilled to apply the said exception set out in Chapter
5, Section
18, of the Aliens Act.
Leave
to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen)
was refused on 23 September 2009. The
deportation order thus became enforceable.
By
decision of 12 October 2009 the Migration Board granted the third
applicant a permanent residence permit in Sweden on account of her
ties to her father.
Subsequently,
invoking Chapter 12, Section 18 of the Aliens Act the applicant
maintained that there were impediments to her deportation because of
her strong ties to her partner and her daughter.
By
decision of 30 November 2009 the Migration Board refused to suspend
the deportation order of the first applicant. It noted that
Chapter 12, Section 18 of the Aliens Act was an extraordinary remedy
and that the invoked new circumstances could not constitute an
impediment within the said provision.
On
1 July 2010 a new Act entered into force in Sweden amending Chapter
5, Section 18 and Chapter 12, Section 18 the Aliens Act (see relevant
domestic law below).
Invoking
the amended Chapter 12, Section 18 of the Aliens Act, again the first
applicant maintained that there were new circumstances which amounted
to an impediment to enforce the deportation order.
In particular she submitted that the second applicant objected to her
taking their daughter with her to Ethiopia to apply for family
reunification. Moreover, the second applicant worked as a truck
driver, which meant that he was away for long periods and therefore
could not take care of their daughter in Sweden.
By
decision of 4 October 2010 the Migration Board
refused the application since the applicant had not presented her
original passport and therefore had not fulfilled the conditions set
out in Chapter 12, Section 18, of the Aliens Act.
Submitting
a valid passport, the first applicant re-maintained that there were
impediments to her deportation by virtue of Chapter 12, Section 18
of the Aliens Act.
By
decision of 15 November 2010 the Migration
Board disagreed. It commenced by examining whether it could be
considered clear that a residence permit would have been granted the
first applicant, if her application had been examined before her
entry into Sweden.
Firstly,
at the relevant time the first and the second applicants did not
fulfil the conditions set out in Chapter
5, Section
3, of the Aliens Act according to which a residence permit
could be granted to an alien who is the spouse of, or cohabiting
partner, with someone who is residing in Sweden. It was recalled in
this respect that the applicants were not married and they had not
lived together before the first applicant entered Sweden.
Secondly,
at the relevant time the first and the second applicant did not
fulfil the conditions set out in Chapter
5, Section
3 a) of the Aliens Act, which stipulated that a residence permit
could be granted to an alien who
intended to marry or cohabit with someone who was legally residing in
Sweden, if their relationship was
serious and no special reasons spoke against granting such a
residence permit. It was recalled in this respect that the
applicants’ relationship had only commenced in Sweden.
Accordingly,
it could not be concluded that “it
was clear that a residence permit would have been granted to
the first applicant if the application had been examined before her
entry into Sweden”.
Thereafter,
the Migration Board found that there were no new circumstances or
impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order under Chapter
12, Section 18 of the Aliens Act. It pointed out though that the
implementation thereof had been suspended while the case was pending
before the Court in accordance with the Rule 39 indication.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The right of aliens to enter and to remain in Sweden
The
basic provisions mainly applicable in the present case, concerning
the right of aliens to enter and to remain in Sweden, are laid down
in the 2005 Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen, 2005:716). It
defines the conditions under which an alien can be deported or
expelled from the country, as well as the procedures relating to the
enforcement of such decisions.
Chapter
5, Section 1, of the Aliens Act stipulates that an alien who is
considered to be a refugee or otherwise in need of protection is,
with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden.
According to Chapter 4, Section 1, of the 2005 Act, the term
“refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country
of his or her nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political
beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other
membership of a particular social group and who is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country. This applies irrespective of whether the
persecution is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if
those authorities cannot be expected to offer protection against
persecution by private individuals. By “an alien otherwise in
need of protection” is meant, inter alia, a person who
has left the country of his or her nationality because of a
well-founded fear of being sentenced to death or receiving corporal
punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 4, Section 2, of the
Aliens Act).
Moreover,
if a residence permit cannot be granted on the above grounds, a
permit may nevertheless be issued to an alien if, after an overall
assessment of his or her situation, there are such particularly
distressing circumstances (synnerligen ömmande
omständigheter) as to allow him or her to remain in Sweden
(Chapter 5, section 6 of the Aliens Act). During this assessment,
special consideration should be given to, inter alia, the
alien’s state of health. In the preparatory works to this
provision (Government Bill 2004/05:170, pp. 190-191),
life-threatening physical or mental illness for which no treatment
can be given in the alien’s home country could constitute a
reason for granting a residence permit.
According to a special provision on impediments to
enforcement, an alien must not be sent to a country where there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of
suffering capital or corporal punishment or of being subjected to
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(Chapter 12, Section 1, of the Aliens Act). In addition, an alien
must not, in principle, be sent to a country where he or she risks
persecution (Chapter 12, Section 2, of the Aliens Act).
Under
certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even
if a deportation or expulsion order has gained legal force. This
applies, under Chapter 12, Section 18, of the 2005 Act, where new
circumstances have emerged that mean there are reasonable grounds for
believing, inter alia, that an enforcement would put the alien
in danger of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment,
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or
there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not
be enforced. If a residence permit cannot be granted under this
provision, the Migration Board may instead decide to re-examine the
matter. Such a re-examination shall be carried out where it may be
assumed, on the basis of new circumstances presented by the alien,
that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature
referred to in Chapter 12, Sections 1 and 2, of the Aliens Act,
and these circumstances could not have been presented previously or
the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not doing so.
Should the applicable conditions not have been met, the Migration
Board shall decide not to grant a re examination (Chapter 12,
Section 19, of the Aliens Act).
The provisions on family reunification relating to a
spouse, registered partner or cohabiting partner etc. of a person who
is resident in Sweden
are set out in Chapter
5, Section
3,
of the Aliens Act and were given their present wording on 30 April
2006 in connection with the implementation of the EC Directive on the
right to family reunification (Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September
2003, hereinafter "the Family Reunification Directive"(see
below).
Under Chapter
5, Section
3, first
paragraph of the Act, unless otherwise provided in Sections 17-17b
(about special
grounds against granting a residence permit), a
residence permit shall be granted to an alien who is a spouse or
cohabiting partner (sambo)
of someone who is resident in Sweden
or who has been granted a residence permit to settle in Sweden,
and under certain conditions to the
alien’s minor children.
Under
Chapter 5, Section 3 a) first paragraph
of the Act a residence permit
may be granted to an alien who
intends to marry or become a cohabiting partner with someone who is
legally residing in Sweden, if their
relationship is serious and no special reasons speak against granting
such a residence permit.
By virtue of Chapter 5, Section 18, of the Act, an
alien who wants a residence permit in Sweden
on account of family ties or serious relationships must have applied
for and been granted such a permit before entering the country. An
application for a residence permit may not, as a general rule, be
approved after entry. However, exemptions from this rule can be made
for example if the alien has strong ties to a person who is resident
in Sweden
and it cannot reasonably be required that he or she travel to another
country to submit an application there (Chapter 5, Section 18, second
paragraph, point 5). An exemption may also be made if there are some
other exceptional grounds (Chapter 5, Section 18, second paragraph,
point 6). The requirement that, in principle, residence permits for
family members have to be granted before entry into Sweden
was introduced as one of a number of measures aimed at reducing the
possibilities of obtaining a residence permit by means of marriages
or relationships of convenience. Subsequently, the Swedish Government
and Parliament have underlined on several occasions that the
requirement that residence permits be obtained before entry into
Sweden is an important part of
measures to maintain regulated immigration. Moreover, the preparatory
works to the Aliens Act state that it is important that aliens
staying in Sweden
illegally do not enjoy a better position than those who comply
with decisions by the authorities to return to their country of
origin in order to apply for a permit from there (Government Bill
1999/2000:43). The same requirement is found in Chapter III,
Article 5, point 3 of the Family Reunification Directive (see below).
As regards the exemptions that can be made according
to Chapter 5, Section 18, second
paragraph, point 5 of the Aliens Act, the preparatory works to the
provision (Government Bill 1999/2000:43, p. 55 et seq.) state that
the main emphasis should be placed on the question of whether it is
reasonable to require that the alien return to another country in
order to submit an application there. Relevant elements, which may be
favourable for the alien, may be whether he or she can be expected,
after returning home, to encounter difficulties in obtaining a
passport or exit permit and this is due to some form of harassment on
the part of the authorities in the country of origin. It may also be
whether the alien will be required to complete a long period of
national service or service under unusually severe conditions. It may
also be relevant whether the alien has to return to a country where
there is no Swedish foreign representation and where major practical
difficulties and considerable costs are associated with travelling to
a neighbouring country to submit the application there. Relevant
elements, which may count against the alien, may be that he or she is
staying in the country illegally, that their identity is unclear or
if there are strong ties to the country of origin.
Under
the Aliens Act, matters concerning the right of aliens to enter and
remain in Sweden are dealt with by three instances; the Migration
Board, the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal (Chapter
14, Section 3, and Chapter 16, Section 9, of the Aliens Act).
2. Relevant provisions of the Aliens Act as of 1 July
2010
On
1 July 2010 Chapter 5, Section 18 was amended adding in the last
paragraph “when assessing what is reasonable under the second
paragraph, point 5, particular attention shall be paid to the
consequences for a child of being separated from its parent, if it is
clear that a residence permit would have been granted if the
application had been examined before entry into Sweden”. The
wording was thus:
Chapter 5, Section 18
An alien who wants a residence permit in Sweden must
have applied for and been granted such a permit before entering the
country. An application for a residence permit may not be approved
after entry. However, the rule given in the first paragraph does not
apply if
1. the alien is entitled to a residence
permit here as a refugee or other person in need of protection under
Section 1 or can be granted a residence permit here pursuant to
Chapter 21, Section 2, 3 or 4,
2. the alien should be granted a residence
permit here pursuant to Section 6,
3. an application for a residence permit
concerns extension of a temporary residence permit that has been
granted to an alien with family ties pursuant to Section 3, first
paragraph, point 1 or 2b or first paragraph, point 1 or 2b or Section
3a, first paragraph, point 1 or second paragraph,
4. the alien can be granted or has a
temporary residence permit pursuant to Section 15,
5. the alien has strong ties, as defined in
Section 3, first paragraph, points 1-4 or Section 3a, first
paragraph, points 1-3 or second paragraph, to a person who is
resident in Sweden and it cannot reasonably be required that the
alien travel to another country to submit an application there,
6. an application for a residence permit
concerns extension of a temporary residence permit that has been
granted to an alien pursuant to Section 10 in a case referred to in
Chapter 6, Section 2, first paragraph.
7. the alien can be granted a residence
permit under Section 15a,
8. the alien has been granted a temporary
residence permit for studies pursuant to Section 10 and has either
completed studies equivalent to 30 higher education credits or has
completed one academic term in the case of postgraduate education, or
9. there are some other exceptional grounds.
Furthermore, the rule given in the first paragraph does
not apply if the alien has been granted a visa to visit an employer
in Sweden or is exempt from the visa requirement if he or she is
applying for a residence permit for work in a type of occupation in
which there is great demand for labour. An additional requirement is
that it would cause the employer inconvenience if the alien had to
travel to another country to submit an application there or that
there are some other special grounds. When assessing what is
reasonable under the second paragraph, point 5, particular attention
shall be paid to the consequences for a child of being separated from
its parent, if it is clear that a residence permit would have been
granted if the application had been examined before entry into
Sweden. With regard to a residence permit for an alien who is to be
refused entry or expelled in accordance with a judgment or order that
has become final and non-appealable, the regulations in Section 15a,
Chapter 8, Section 14 and Chapter 12, Sections 18-20 apply.
Chapter 12, Section 18
This
provision was also amended on 1 July 2010 adding in the last
paragraph “when assessing under the first paragraph, point 3
... particular attention shall be paid to the consequences for a
child of being separated from its parent, if it is clear that a
residence permit would have been granted ... if the application had
been examined before entry into Sweden”. The wording was thus:
If, in a case concerning the enforcement of a
refusal-of-entry or expulsion order, new circumstances come to light
that mean that
1. there is an impediment to enforcement
under Section 1, 2 or 3,
2. there is reason to assume that the
intended country of return will not be willing to accept the alien or
3. there are medical or other special grounds
why the order should not be enforced, the Swedish Migration Board may
grant a permanent residence permit if the impediment is of a lasting
nature.
If there is only a temporary impediment to enforcement,
the Board may grant a temporary permit. When assessing under the
first paragraph, point 3, whether there are other special grounds why
an order should not be enforced, particular attention shall be paid
to the consequences for a child of being separated from its parent,
if it is clear that a residence permit would have been granted on the
grounds of strong ties under Chapter 5, Section 3, first paragraph,
points 1-4, or Chapter 5, Section 3a, first paragraph, points 1-3, or
second paragraph, if the application had been examined before entry
into Sweden. The Swedish Migration Board may also order a stay of
enforcement.
3. The process of application for family reunification
from Addis Ababa
The
Government submitted that according to information received from the
Embassy of Sweden in Addis Ababa in September 2011, it would
take approximately two months to process an application for a
residence permit at the Embassy. The subsequent processing time by
the Migration Board in Sweden would normally be less than eight
months depending on whether the application needed to be supplemented
or not. Cases involving children were given priority. The time from
the filing of an application at the Embassy until a decision is
reached should thus not be longer than ten months. The applicants
disputed this information. Referring to e-mail correspondence between
the Embassy and their representative from February 2010, they
maintained that it would take at least one year to have an
application considered.
4. Family Reunification Directive
Council
Directive, 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on
the right to family reunification, which applies to all EU
Member States, except the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, deals
with the conditions for the exercise of the right to family
reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the
territory of the Member States. Its Chapter III, Article 5, which
carries the heading “Submission and examination of the
application”, provides:
Article 5
1. Member States shall determine whether, in
order to exercise the right to family reunification, an application
for entry and residence shall be submitted to the competent
authorities of the Member State concerned either by the sponsor or by
the family member or members.
2. The application shall be accompanied by
documentary evidence of the family relationship and of compliance
with the conditions laid down in Articles 4 and 6 and, where
applicable, Articles 7 and 8, as well as certified copies of family
member(s)’ travel documents. If appropriate, in order to obtain
evidence that a family relationship exists, Member States may carry
out interviews with the sponsor and his/her family members and
conduct other investigations that are found to be necessary. When
examining an application concerning the unmarried partner of the
sponsor, Member States shall consider, as evidence of the family
relationship, factors such as a common child, previous cohabitation,
registration of the partnership and any other reliable means of
proof.
3. The application shall be submitted and
examined when the family members are residing outside the territory
of the Member State in which the sponsor resides. By way of
derogation, a Member State may, in appropriate circumstances, accept
an application submitted when the family members are already in its
territory.
4. The competent authorities of the Member
State shall give the person, who has submitted the application,
written notification of the decision as soon as possible and in any
event no later than nine months from the date on which the
application was lodged. In exceptional circumstances linked to the
complexity of the examination of the application, the time limit
referred to in the first subparagraph may be extended. Reasons shall
be given for the decision rejecting the application. Any consequences
of no decision being taken by the end of the period provided for in
the first subparagraph shall be determined by the national
legislation of the relevant Member State.
5. When examining an application, the Member
States shall have due regard to the best interests of minor children.
COMPLAINT
The
applicants complained that the implementation of the Swedish
authorities’ decision to deport the first applicant would
contravene Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
THE LAW
A. Article 8 of the Convention
The
applicants maintained that an implementation of the order to
deport the first applicant to Ethiopia in order
for her to apply for family reunification from there, would
lead to a separation of the family which would amount to a violation
of Article 8 of the Convention, which read:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
At
the outset, the Government pointed out that it has not been decided
whether the first applicant is entitled to a residence permit based
on family reunification in Sweden, and that an appeal against a
decision thereon by the Migration Board lays to the Migration Court
and the Migration Court of Appeal. What has been finally decided by
the domestic authorities in the present case is that, in accordance
with the general rule that an application for a residence permit
based on family relations is to be submitted before the alien enters
the country, the first applicant is obliged to return to Ethiopia and
to apply from there for a residence permit in Sweden.
Such
a process should take no longer than ten months and the decision does
not entail that the first applicant and her child have to be
separated or that the family have to be separated. The Government
noted in that respect that the applicants have only claimed that the
second applicant refuses to let their daughter travel with the first
applicant to Ethiopia. They have not pointed to any concrete
obstacles preventing them all from going to Ethiopia, thereby
avoiding a separation. All the applicants are Ethiopian nationals;
the first applicant lived in Ethiopia until she was thirty years old,
the second applicant until he was seventeen or eighteen years old.
The third applicant is still at such a young age that her wellbeing
is rather linked to the contact with her parents than to the country
in which she is living; and there are no elements indicating that the
applicants would be at risk of ill treatment upon return to
Ethiopia. Finally, even if the second and the third applicants do not
follow the first applicant for the whole period in Ethiopia awaiting
a decision on whether or not she can be granted a residence permit in
Sweden, which should not exceed ten months, nothing prevents them
from visiting the first applicant in Ethiopia. The applicants have
not pointed to any insurmountable obstacles for them to go or to go
together, nor are there any indications that either parent would not
be able to take care of their child on their own.
The
Government emphasized that the deportation of the first applicant
would not necessarily entail a separation of the applicants at all.
Thus, they found it questionable whether there was an interference.
In any event, they stated that the procedural requirement that an
alien must apply for and be granted a residence permit on grounds of
family ties before entering a country is a common requirement in
those EU Member States which are bound by the Family Reunification
Directive. The requirement in the present case was in accordance with
the law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the economic
well-being of the country and preventing disorder. In addition, it
was important that aliens who stay illegally in Sweden do not enjoy a
better position than those who follow the authorities’ rules
and decisions. They also pointed out that the relationship between
the first and the second applicants had commenced and developed at a
time when they were aware that the first applicant’s
immigration status was such that the persistence of their family life
in Sweden would be precarious from the outset. Moreover, there are
exceptions from the main rule, namely where it cannot reasonably be
required that the alien return to their country to apply from there.
The decision thereon falls, in the Government’s view, within
the margin of appreciation of the domestic authorities. In the
special circumstances of the present case, as set out above, the
Government maintained that the decision was proportionate and
necessary in a democratic society and that upholding the decision
that the first applicant should return to Ethiopia in order to apply
for a residence permit would not amount to a violation of the
applicants’ right to respect for their family life under
Article 8 of the Convention.
The
applicants maintained that the deportation of the first applicant
would lead to separation of the family which contravened Article 8 of
the Convention. In their view the separation of a mother and a
nursing child could not be considered necessary in a democratic
society.
They
also submitted that it could not be concluded that the second and the
third applicants could return to Ethiopia without any safety risk,
and that in any event it would pose serious difficulties for them to
return.
Finally,
they submitted that the fact that other EU Member States may apply
the same procedural rule did not mean that it was compatible with the
Convention.
The
Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right as a matter
of international law and subject to their treaty obligations,
including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and
expulsion of aliens (Üner v. the Netherlands [GC],
no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006-....; Abdulaziz, Cabales
and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May
1985, Series A no. 94, p. 34, § 67, Boujlifa v. France,
judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI,
p. 2264, § 42).
Article
8 does not entail a general obligation for a State to respect
immigrants’ choice of the country of their residence and to
authorise family reunion in its territory. Nevertheless, in a case
which concerns family life as well as immigration, the extent of a
State’s obligations to admit to its territory relatives of
persons residing there will vary according to the particular
circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest (see
Gül v. Switzerland, judgment of 19 February 1996, Reports
1996-I, pp. 174-75, § 38; and Rodrigues da Silva and
Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, § 39, ECHR
2006 I). Factors to be taken into account in this context are
the extent to which family life is effectively ruptured, the extent
of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are
insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the
country of origin of one or more of them and whether there are
factors of immigration control (for example, a history of breaches of
immigration law) or considerations of public order weighing in favour
of exclusion (see Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer, cited
above, ibidem; Ajayi and Others v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), no. 27663/95, 22 June 1999; Solomon v. the
Netherlands (dec.), no. 44328/98, 5 September 2000).
Another
important consideration is whether family life was created at a time
when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of
one of them was such that the persistence of that family life within
the host State would from the outset be precarious (see Jerry
Olajide Sarumi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43279/98,
26 January 1999; Andrey Shebashov v. Latvia (dec.), no.
50065/99, 9 November 2000). Where this is the case the removal of the
non-national family member would be incompatible with Article
8 only in exceptional circumstances (see Nunez v. Norway,
no. 55597/09, § 70, 28 June 2011 and Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 68, Series
A no. 94).
The
Court is aware that, where Contracting States tolerate the presence
of aliens in their territory while the latter await a decision on an
application for a residence permit, an appeal against such a decision
or a request to re-open such proceedings, this enables the persons
concerned to take part in the host country’s society and to
form relationships and to create a family there. However, as set out
above, this does not entail that the authorities of the Contracting
State involved are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to
Article 8 of the Convention to allow the alien concerned to settle in
their country. In this context a parallel may be drawn with the
situation where a person who, without complying with the regulations
in force, confronts the authorities of a Contracting State with his
or her presence in the country as a fait accompli. The Court
has previously held that, in general, persons in that situation have
no entitlement to expect that a right of residence will be conferred
upon them (see Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway, no.
265/07, § 64, 31 July 2008, Roslina Chandra and Others v. the
Netherlands (dec.), no. 53102/99, 13 May 2003; Yash Priya
v. Denmark (dec.) 13594/03; 6 July 2006; cf. Rodrigues da
Silva and Hoogkamer, cited above, § 43).
What
is at issue in the present case, however, is not a final decision by
the Swedish authorities to grant or to refuse the first applicant a
residence permit based on family reunification. No decision thereon
has been taken yet.
The
crucial issue is whether it would be in breach of Article 8 of
the Convention if the Swedish authorities implement the order that
the first applicant return to Ethiopia to apply
for family reunification from there.
The
Court notes in this respect that in accordance with Chapter III,
Article 5, point 3 of the Family Reunification Directive which set
out that by way of derogation, a Member State may, in appropriate
circumstances, accept an application submitted when the family
members are already in its territory, Sweden does allow for such a
possibility under Chapter 5, Section 18, point 5, when the alien
can point to reasons why it cannot reasonably be demanded that he or
she travel to another country to submit an application there. In the
present case, however, the Swedish authorities did not find that the
applicants had pointed to such reasons.
The
Court does not find it necessary to determine whether the impugned
decision constitutes an interference with the applicants’
exercise of their right to respect for family life or is to be seen
as one involving an allegation of failure on the part of the
respondent State to comply with a positive obligation, since in the
context of both positive and negative obligations the State must
strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the
individual and of the community as a whole, and in both contexts the
State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.
As
to the further question whether the interference was justified under
Article 8 § 2, the Court is satisfied that it had a legal basis
in national law, and that it pursued the legitimate aims of
preventing “disorder” and protecting the “economic
well-being of the country”. Indeed this seems undisputed.
However, the question arises whether the interference was necessary
in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing
social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued (see, as a recent authority, Üner v. the Netherlands
[GC], cited above, § 54).
In
this assessment, the Court refers to the main decision taken thereon
by the Migration Court on 29 August
2009, which became final on 23 September
2009 when leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal was
refused. In its balancing test the Migration Court noted that the
third applicant did not have a residence permit in Sweden at
the relevant time, thus the first applicant could not invoke the
strong connection to her child to obtain a residence permit there. As
regards the first applicant’s relationship with the second
applicant, the Migration Court found on the one
hand that it spoke in the first applicant’s favour that the
couple had a child together. On the other hand, it spoke against her
that she had not pointed to any reasons why it could not reasonably
be demanded that she return to her home country and hand in her
application for a residence permit there. In conclusion, the
Migration Court did not find the conditions fulfilled to apply the
exception set out in Chapter
5, Section
18, of the Aliens Act. Accordingly, the first applicant could not
apply for a family reunification from Sweden.
Moreover,
the Court notes that the first applicant at no time has been granted
lawful residence in Sweden (cf. Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer
v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, § 43, ECHR
2006-) and it is not in dispute that the applicants’ family
life was created at a time when they were aware that the first
applicant’s immigration status was such that the persistence of
that family life within Sweden would from the outset be precarious.
In
these circumstances it cannot be said that the Migration Court failed
to strike a fair balance between the applicants’ interests on
the one hand and the States interest in ensuring effective
immigration control on the other, or that the case contained such
exceptional circumstances that the return of the first applicant to
Ethiopia to apply for a residence permit from there would constitute
a violation of Article 8.
Subsequently,
the first applicant maintained that there were impediments to the
enforcement of the deportation order due to her relationship with her
cohabiting partner and her daughter in Sweden, which in her view
amounted to “other special grounds” within the meaning of
Chapter 12, Section 18 of the Aliens Act. The Court notes that the
assessment thereof was made by the Migration Board in three
subsequent decisions, which must be seen as supplementary to the
Migration Court’s decision of 29 August 2009.
The
Migration Board’s task was thus limited to asses whether new
circumstances had emerged which could amount to an impediment to the
enforcement of the deportation order within the meaning of Chapter
12, Section 18 of the Alien Acts. By decisions of 30 November
2009, 4 October and 15 November 2010 the Migration Board found
that this was not the case and that therefore the first applicant had
not fulfilled the criteria set out in the said provision.
When
compared to the proceedings before the Migration Court, it appears
that in the subsequent proceedings before the Migration Board, as new
circumstances, the first applicant submitted that the
second applicant objected to her taking their daughter with her to
Ethiopia to apply for family reunification. Moreover, the second
applicant worked as a truck driver, which meant that he was away for
long periods and therefore could not take care of their daughter in
Sweden.
Before
the Court, the applicants have added that the second and the third
applicants could not accompany the first applicant to Ethiopia
because that would pose serious difficulties and safety risks. The
applicants have not developed or substantiated this argument any
further. However, it is clear from the facts that the second
applicant was granted a residence permit in Sweden on 31 August
1998 in order to join his mother, when he was eighteen years old.
Moreover there are no elements in the case to show that before the
domestic authorities the applicants have pointed to any real and
concrete safety risk for the second and the third applicants to
accompany the first applicant to Ethiopia.
In
these circumstances, the Court finds no grounds for concluding that
the Migration Board in its decisions of 30
November 2009, 4 October and 15 November 2010 failed
to strike a fair balance between the applicants’ interests on
the one hand and the State’s interest in controlling
immigration on the other or that those decisions appeared at variance
with Article 8 of the Convention.
It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the
Convention.
B. Article 3 of the Convention
The
applicants also complained that an implementation of the order to
deport the first applicant to Ethiopia in order
for her to apply for family reunification from there would
subject the third applicant to treatment contrary to Article 3, which
reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
In
the Government’s view the applicants have not pointed to any
insurmountable obstacles for the third applicant to join the first
applicant and there are no indications that either parent would not
be able to take care of their child on their own. Having regard
thereto and to the minimum level of severity required under Article 3
of the Convention, the Government found no support in the Court’s
case-law for finding that deportation of the first applicant in the
circumstances of the present case, or a possible separation of the
first applicant and her daughter, which the applicants could choose
to avoid or limit, would constitute a violation of the latter’s
rights under the said provision.
The Court reiterates that expulsion
by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3,
and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing
that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.
In such a case, Article 3
implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that
country (Saadi v. Italy
[GC], no. 37201/06, § 125, 28 February 2008). Ill-treatment
must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the
scope of Article 3.
The
present case differs in that the applicants maintained that the third
applicant, namely the child born in April 2009, would be subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 if the first applicant were returned
to Ethiopia to apply for a residence permit from there, because that
would entail a separation of the mother and her child.
The
Court is aware that the separation at a very young age of a child
from his or her mother may cause suffering and even irreparable
damage. Nevertheless, referring to its settled case-law (see, among
many authorities, Nunez v. Norway, cited above) it
reiterates that issues concerning separation of children from their
parents in deportation cases have so far been dealt with under
Article 8 of the Convention.
Moreover,
the applicants have failed to point to any elements in the present
case which could attain the minimum level of severity needed to fall
within the scope of Article 3.
It
follows that this part of the application must likewise be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with Article 35 §§
3(a) and 4 of the Convention. The application of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court thus comes to an end.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
Claudia Westerdiek Dean Spielmann
Registrar President