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OSTERMUNCHNER v. GERMANY - 36035/04 [2012] ECHR 519 (22 March 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/519.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 519
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
OSTERMÜNCHNER v. GERMANY
(Application
no. 36035/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 March
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Ostermünchner
v. Germany,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Dean Spielmann, President,
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
Mark Villiger,
Ann
Power-Forde,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Angelika
Nußberger,
André Potocki, judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 21 February 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 36035/04) against the Federal
Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Austrian national, Mr
Franz Ostermünchner (“the applicant”), on 4 October
2004.
The
applicant was represented by Ms A. Haucke-D’Aiello, a lawyer
practising in Munich. The German Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agents, Mrs A. Wittling-Vogel,
Ministerialdirigentin, and Mr H.-J. Behrens, Ministerialrat,
of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that his continued preventive
detention without admitting him to a therapy because of his impending
expulsion to Austria and because of his age had breached Article 5 §
1 of the Convention.
On
13 March 2007 a Chamber of the Fifth Section decided to adjourn the
examination of the application pending the outcome of the proceedings
in the case of M. v. Germany, no. 19359/04. On 22 January 2009
the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government, requested them to submit information
on changes in the applicant’s detention regime and adjourned
the examination of the application until the judgment in the case of
M. v. Germany (cited above) has become final. It was also
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time (Article 29 § 1). In view of the fact that the
judgment of 17 December 2009 in the case of M. v. Germany
became final on 10 May 2010, the President decided on 20 May 2010
that the proceedings in the application at issue be resumed and
granted priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
The
Government of Austria, having been informed of their right to
intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention
and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court), indicated that they did not wish
to exercise that right.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1953 and is currently detained in Vienna
(Austria).
A. The applicant’s previous convictions and the
order for his preventive detention and its execution
1. The applicant’s convictions and the order for
his preventive detention and for his expulsion
Between
1968 and 1988 the applicant was convicted by Austrian courts in seven
judgments of offences including robbery, theft, assault and dangerous
assault. In 1981 he was also found guilty of raping a woman he had
followed from the street into her house on the day of his release
from prison. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment; the
court further ordered his placement in an institution for mentally
disturbed offenders. The applicant was detained altogether for more
than ten years, at times in an institution for mentally disturbed
criminals.
On
14 June 1991 the Munich I Regional Court convicted the applicant of
three counts of sexual abuse of children, combined with attempted
rape in one case and with attempted sexual assault in another case,
committed in 1989 and 1990. It sentenced him to five years and six
months’ imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention
pursuant to Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see
paragraphs 31-32 below). The Regional Court found that the applicant,
who had acted with full criminal responsibility, had sexually abused
and attempted to sexually assault an eight-year-old girl he had
followed from the street into her home. He had further sexually
abused and attempted to rape a ten-year-old girl he had lured into
the cellar of her house and had sexually abused another
eight year-old girl in a playground. The Regional Court found
that the applicant, whom the court-appointed experts had described as
an egocentric anti-social personality lacking empathy, had a
propensity to commit serious offences which considerably harm their
victims physically or mentally.
By
a decision of 19 September 1991 the City of Munich, having regard to
the applicant’s conviction by the Munich I Regional Court on
14 June 1991, decided to expel the applicant from German
territory and prohibited him from ever re-entering Germany. The
expulsion was to be enforced on the applicant’s release from
prison. The decision became final on 30 October 1991.
2. The execution of the preventive detention order
The
applicant served his full prison sentence until 20 March 1996. He was
then placed in preventive detention, for the first time, on 21 March
1996, which was executed in a separate wing of Straubing Prison.
On
15 July 1997 the Regensburg Regional Court ordered the execution of
the preventive detention order against the applicant (Article 67c
§ 1 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 33 below). It noted that
in his reports dated 15 October 1996 and 20 June 1997 the psychiatric
and neurologic expert, A., it had consulted had found that the
applicant suffered from a dissocial personality disorder and had not
wished to undergo a therapy addressing his sexual offences in prison
for fear of being harassed by other detainees. He considered that the
applicant should first undergo a social therapy in prison to test his
readiness to change his personality and should then be admitted to a
therapy for sexual offenders.
The Regional Court found that unless the applicant had
completed a therapy for sexual offenders, there was still a risk that
he would commit further sexual offences if released. The court
further refused to transfer the applicant to a psychiatric hospital
(Article 67a § 2 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 39 below).
The applicant’s reintegration into society could currently best
be furthered by a social therapy; he was not, therefore, transferred
to a psychiatric hospital for a sexual therapy.
The
applicant subsequently attempted to be admitted to a social
therapeutic institution in a different prison, with the help of the
Straubing Prison authorities. However, on 1 August 1997 the social
therapeutic institution of Baden-Württemberg refused to accept
the applicant for treatment. It argued that in view of the
enforceable expulsion order against him, it could not be guaranteed
that the applicant could complete a five-year therapy in that
institution. Likewise, on 6 November 1998 the Erlangen Prison refused
to admit the applicant to its social therapeutic department. It was
argued that under the administrative rules relating to section 9 of
the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 38 below), prisoners
against whom an enforceable expulsion order had been made were
excluded from transfer to a social therapeutic institution. Moreover,
on 22 December 1998 the Munich Prison equally refused to admit the
applicant to a social therapy. It was argued that its department
offered treatment for young sexual offenders and was therefore not
suitable for the then 45-year-old applicant.
In
its decision of 13 January 2000, which was confirmed on appeal, the
Regensburg Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s
preventive detention. It found that there was a risk that the
applicant, who still suffered from a dissocial personality disorder,
would commit further sexual offences if released (Article 67d §
2 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 34 below). The court considered
that the applicant had refused with good cause to participate in a
psychoanalytical group therapy for sexual offenders in Straubing
Prison. He had further made strenuous efforts, with the help of the
prison authorities, to be admitted to a social therapy in a different
prison, which had also been considered to be beneficial by the
psychiatric expert A. heard by that court. However, he had not been
allowed to take part in a social therapy in Germany because of his
age and because he was a foreigner who was to be expelled from German
territory. It should therefore be examined by the prosecution
authorities whether he could be transferred to Austria for the
continuation of his preventive detention and could be admitted to a
social therapy there.
3. Proceedings under Article 456a of the Code of
Criminal Procedure
On
17 December 1993, 19 July 1995, 20 October 1998, 2 August 2000 and 14
February 2003 the Munich I Public Prosecutor’s Office, whose
decisions were confirmed on appeal, dismissed the applicant’s
repeated requests under Article 456a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see paragraph 37 below) to dispense with the further
execution of his prison sentence and his preventive detention in view
of his expulsion from German territory. It argued that there was
still a public interest in the further execution of the preventive
detention order made against the applicant, who was likely to
reoffend and was dangerous to the public. It was noted in these
proceedings that the applicant had not taken up the authorities’
proposal that he should request his transfer to Austria for the
further execution of his preventive detention.
B. The proceedings at issue
1. The decision of the Regensburg Regional Court
On
2 May 2003 the Regensburg Regional Court, having heard the applicant,
his counsel and a psychiatric and psychotherapeutic expert, H.,
ordered the further execution of the applicant’s preventive
detention under Article 67d § 2 of the Criminal Code.
The
Regional Court agreed with the findings of expert H. who had taken
the view that the applicant’s dissocial personality had not
changed and that there was still a risk that he would commit further
violent sexual offences if released. In his report of 25 October 2002
the expert had considered that a therapy should be attempted despite
its limited chances of success because the applicant had repeatedly
stated that he was willing to undergo therapy and because there were
no other means to reduce his dangerousness. He had proposed that the
applicant participate in a discussion group for sexual offenders in
Straubing Prison – which the applicant had, however, refused as
he did not wish his offences to become known within that prison.
The expert had further proposed that the applicant be admitted
to a social therapeutic institution – for instance in Bayreuth,
Amberg or Würzburg Prison or in that which was currently being
built up in Straubing Prison itself.
2. The decision of the Nuremberg Court of Appeal
On
4 July 2003 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s
appeal. Endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court, it found
that it was not to be expected that the applicant would not commit
further offences on his release (Article 67d § 2 of the Criminal
Code). It equally referred to the findings of expert H., which it
considered convincing. It noted, in particular, that the expert had
considered that the applicant should first take part in a discussion
group for sexual offenders in Straubing Prison; however, the
applicant had vigorously refused to do so. In view of this, the court
considered that the applicant’s continued preventive detention
was proportionate.
The
Court of Appeal further noted that the prosecution authority’s
refusal to dispense with a further execution of the applicant’s
preventive detention under Article 456a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was not the subject-matter of the proceedings before it. It
noted, however, that the applicant had not taken up the prosecution’s
proposal to make a (necessary) request for his transfer to Austria
for the further execution of his preventive detention.
3. The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
On
8 August 2003 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a
constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He
claimed that his right to liberty had been violated because his
continued preventive detention, during which he had been refused any
therapy in view of his impending expulsion, was disproportionate.
Moreover, his continued preventive detention without a maximum
duration, which had been abolished after his conviction (Article 67d
§ 3 of the Criminal Code, read in conjunction with section 1a §
3 of the Introductory Act to the Criminal Code, as amended in 1998,
see paragraph 36 below), breached the prohibition of retrospective
punishment. The refusal to offer him any treatment because of the
expulsion order against him also discriminated against him on account
of his Austrian nationality.
By
a decision of 25 March 2004, which was served on the applicant’s
counsel on 7 April 2004, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to
consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file
no. 2 BvR 1355/03).
In
so far as the applicant complained that the prohibition of
retrospective punishment under the Basic Law had been breached, the
Federal Constitutional Court found that his complaint was
inadmissible. The applicant was not yet affected by the provisions of
Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code, read in conjunction with
Section 1a § 3 of the Introductory Act to the Criminal Code. The
court further referred to its leading judgment of 5 February 2004 in
the case of M. (file no. 2 BvR 2029/01; application no.
19359/04 to this Court). Apart from that, the applicant’s
complaint was ill-founded as the impugned decisions of the courts
dealing with the execution of sentences did not violate
constitutional law.
C. Subsequent developments
1. Judicial review of the applicant’s preventive
detention
On
14 July 2005 the Regensburg Regional Court again ordered the
applicant’s preventive detention to continue (Article 67d §
2 of the Criminal Code). It noted that the applicant had not received
any therapy. The applicant had confirmed this, stating that he had
failed in his attempts to be admitted to a therapy in a different
prison in view of his planned deportation. The applicant’s
appeal against this decision was to no avail.
On
27 April 2006 the Regensburg Regional Court decided that the
applicant’s preventive detention was not to be declared
terminated on completion of ten years in such detention (20 March
2006). Having consulted a psychiatric expert, N., it found that there
was still a risk that the applicant would commit further serious
sexual offences resulting in considerable psychological or physical
harm to the victims if released (Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal
Code). It noted that the applicant had refused therapies for sexual
offenders or social therapeutic treatment which had since been made
available in Straubing Prison. On 4 July 2006 the Nuremberg Court of
Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 10 January
2007 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the
applicant’s constitutional complaint.
2. Proceedings concerning the applicant’s
transfer to Austria for the execution of his preventive detention and
his expulsion respectively
On
15 September 2005 and on 28 September 2007 the Bavarian Ministry for
Justice dismissed the applicant’s requests to be transferred to
Austria for the further execution of the preventive detention order
against him as the applicant would have to be released there after
having served ten years in such detention, that is, in March 2006.
The decisions became final.
Furthermore,
on 13 May 2004, 13 April 2005 and 16 May 2007 the Munich I Public
Prosecutor’s Office, whose decisions were confirmed by the
Munich General Public Prosecutor, dismissed the applicant’s
fresh requests under Article 456a of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to dispense with the further execution of his prison sentence and his
preventive detention in view of his expulsion from German territory.
The latter decision was quashed on 4 December 2007 by the Munich
Court of Appeal, which argued that it appeared that the prosecution
authorities had failed to take all aspects relevant to their decision
into account.
On
24 January 2008 the Munich I Public Prosecutor’s Office
dispensed with the further execution of the applicant’s
preventive detention at the date of his expulsion from Germany under
Article 456a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On
16 April 2008 the applicant was released from Straubing Prison and
expelled to Austria.
On
14 May 2008 the Vienna Regional Court revoked the suspension on
probation of the applicant’s placement in an institution for
mentally disturbed offenders ordered in 1981 (see paragraph 7 above).
Since 12 August 2008 the applicant has been detained in Vienna.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Provisions governing preventive detention
A
comprehensive summary of the provisions of the Criminal Code and of
the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the distinction between
penalties and measures of correction and prevention, in particular
preventive detention, and the making, review and execution in
practice of preventive detention orders, is contained in the Court’s
judgment in the case of M. v. Germany
(no. 19359/04, §§ 45-78, ECHR 2009). The provisions
referred to in the present case provide as follows:
1. The order of preventive detention by the sentencing
court
The
sentencing court may, at the time of the offender’s conviction,
order his preventive detention (a so-called measure of correction and
prevention) under certain circumstances in addition to his prison
sentence (a penalty), if the offender has been shown to be a danger
to the public (Article 66 of the Criminal Code).
In
particular, the sentencing court orders preventive detention in
addition to the penalty if someone is sentenced for an intentional
offence to at least two years’ imprisonment and if the
following further conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the perpetrator
must have been sentenced twice already, to at least one year’s
imprisonment in each case, for intentional offences committed prior
to the new offence. Secondly, the perpetrator must previously have
served a prison sentence or must have been detained pursuant to a
measure of correction and prevention for at least two years. Thirdly,
a comprehensive assessment of the perpetrator and his acts must
reveal that, owing to his propensity to commit serious offences,
notably those which seriously harm their victims physically or
mentally or which cause serious economic damage, the perpetrator
presents a danger to the general public (see Article 66 § 1 of
the Criminal Code, in its version in force at the relevant time).
2. The order for the execution of preventive detention
by the court responsible for the execution of sentences
Article
67c § 1 of the Criminal Code provides that if a term of
imprisonment is executed prior to a simultaneously ordered placement
in preventive detention, the court responsible for the execution of
sentences (that is, a special Chamber of the Regional Court composed
of three professional judges, see sections 78a and 78b (1)(1) of the
Court Organisation Act) must review, before completion of the prison
term, whether the person’s preventive detention is still
necessary in view of its objective. If that is not the case, it
suspends the execution of the preventive detention order and places
the person on probation with supervision of the person’s
conduct which commences with the suspension.
3. Judicial review and duration of preventive detention
Article
67d of the Criminal Code governs the duration of preventive
detention. Paragraph 2, first sentence, of that Article, in its
version in force at the relevant time, provides that if there is no
provision for a maximum duration or if the time-limit has not yet
expired, the court shall suspend on probation the further execution
of the detention order as soon as it is to be expected that the
person concerned will not commit any
further unlawful acts on his release.
Under
Article 67d § 1 of the Criminal Code, in its version in force
prior to 31 January 1998, the first period of preventive detention
may not exceed ten years. If the maximum duration has expired, the
detainee shall be released (Article 67d § 3).
Article
67d of the Criminal Code was amended by the Combating of Sexual
Offences and Other Dangerous Offences Act of 26 January 1998, which
entered into force on 31 January 1998. Article 67d § 3, in its
amended version, provides that if a person has spent ten years in
preventive detention, the court shall declare the measure terminated
(only) if there is no danger that the detainee will, owing to his
criminal tendencies, commit serious offences resulting in
considerable psychological or physical harm to the victims.
Termination shall automatically entail supervision of the offender’s
conduct. The former maximum duration of a first period of preventive
detention was abolished. Pursuant to section 1a (3) of the
Introductory Act to the Criminal Code, the amended version of Article
67d § 3 of the Criminal Code was to be applied without any
restriction ratione temporis.
B. Provision on the execution of sentences in case of
expulsion
Pursuant
to Article 456a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Public Prosecutor’s Office may dispense with the execution of a
prison sentence or a measure of correction and prevention if the
convicted person is expelled from German territory. The execution of
the sentence or measure may be continued if the expelled person
returns to Germany territory (Article 456a § 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure).
C. Provision of the Execution of Sentences Act
Section
9 § 2 of the Execution of Sentences Act provides that prisoners
may be transferred to a socio-therapeutic institution with their
consent if the special therapeutic measures and social aids of the
institution are advisable for their rehabilitation. The transfer is
conditional upon the consent of the head of the socio-therapeutic
institution concerned.
D. Transfer for enforcement of a different measure of
correction and prevention
Article
67a of the Criminal Code contains provisions on the transfer of
detainees for the execution of a different measure of correction and
prevention than the measure ordered in the judgment against them.
Under Article 67a § 2, read in conjunction with § 1, of the
Criminal Code, the court may subsequently transfer a perpetrator
against whom preventive detention was ordered to a psychiatric
hospital if the perpetrator’s reintegration into society can be
better promoted thereby.
E. Recent case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court
on preventive detention
On
4 May 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court delivered a leading
judgment concerning the retrospective prolongation of the
complainants’ preventive detention beyond the former ten-year
maximum period and also concerning the retrospective order for the
complainants’ preventive detention (file nos. 2 BvR 2365/09, 2
BvR 740/10, 2 BvR 2333/08, 2 BvR 1152/10 and 2 BvR 571/10).
Reversing its previous position, the Federal Constitutional Court
held that all provisions on the retrospective prolongation of
preventive detention and on the retrospective ordering of such
detention were incompatible with the Basic Law as they failed to
comply with the constitutional protection of legitimate expectations
guaranteed in a State governed by the rule of law, read in
conjunction with the constitutional right to liberty.
The
Federal Constitutional Court further held that all the relevant
provisions of the Criminal Code on the imposition and duration of
preventive detention were incompatible with the fundamental right to
liberty of persons in preventive detention. It found that those
provisions did not satisfy the constitutional requirement of
establishing a difference between preventive detention and detention
for serving a term of imprisonment (Abstandsgebot). These
provisions included, in particular, Article 66 of the Criminal Code
in its version in force since 27 December 2003.
The
Federal Constitutional Court ordered that all provisions declared
incompatible with the Basic Law remained applicable until the entry
into force of new legislation and until 31 May 2013 at the latest.
The provisions on the imposition and duration of preventive detention
which did not concern the retrospective ordering or prolongation of
preventive detention could only continue to be applied in the
transitional period subject to a strict review of proportionality. As
a general rule, proportionality was only observed where there was a
danger of the person concerned committing serious violent crimes or
sexual offences if released.
In
its reasoning, the Federal Constitutional Court relied on the
interpretation of Article 5 and Article 7 of the Convention made by
this Court in its judgment in the case of M. v. Germany (cited
above; see §§ 137 ss. of the Federal
Constitutional Court’s judgment). It stressed, in particular,
that the constitutional requirement of establishing a difference
between preventive detention and detention for serving a term of
imprisonment and the principles laid down in Article 7 of the
Convention required an individualised and intensified offer of
therapy and care to the persons concerned. In line with the Court’s
findings in the case of M. v. Germany (cited above,
§ 129), it was necessary to provide a high level of care by a
team of multi-disciplinary staff and to offer the detainees an
individualised therapy if the standard therapies available in the
institution did not have prospects of success (see § 113 of the
Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his continued preventive detention without
admitting him to a therapy because of his impending expulsion to
Austria and because of his age violated Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court; ...”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Scope of the case before the Court
The
Court observes that in the applicant’s submission, the present
case concerned the prolongation of his preventive detention ordered
in 2003 until his expulsion to Austria in April 2008. The Court
notes, however, that the proceedings at issue, in respect of which
the applicant lodged his application with the Court (in compliance
with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention), cover only the prolongation of his preventive detention
as ordered by the Regensburg Regional Court on 2 May 2003 and as
confirmed on appeal. The present application before the Court
therefore concerns only the applicant’s preventive detention as
a result of these proceedings. In particular, the applicant did not
lodge a fresh application with the Court in respect of the Regensburg
Regional Court’s decision of 27 April 2006, confirmed on
appeal, not to declare his preventive detention terminated on
completion of ten years in such detention. The Court further observes
that, other than in the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional
Court where he brought a separate complaint alleging discrimination,
the applicant complained before this Court about his continued
preventive detention without offering him treatment because of the
expulsion order against him only under Article 5 of the Convention.
B. Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The Government
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to complain about
the refusal of therapeutic measures before the Federal Constitutional
Court and had therefore not exhausted domestic remedies as required
by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in that respect.
In
their further observations dated 14 June 2011 the Government objected
that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies also on
another ground. They argued that in its leading judgment of 4 May
2011 on preventive detention (see paragraphs 40-43 above), the
Federal Constitutional Court had introduced a new domestic remedy for
the review of the ongoing preventive detention of persons concerned
by that judgment. For persons in preventive detention which had not
been ordered or prolonged retrospectively, as in the applicant’s
case, the Federal Constitutional Court had set stricter standards for
their preventive detention to continue. The applicant had been
obliged to avail himself of that new domestic remedy.
The
Government further took the view that the applicant could no longer
claim to be the victim of a violation of his Convention rights. In
its above-mentioned judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court had
implemented the findings the Court had made in its judgments on
preventive detention in Germany. The Convention violations found had
thus been remedied in part by the Federal Constitutional Court in its
transitional rules, and would be remedied as soon as possible as to
the remaining part.
(b) The applicant
The
applicant did not comment on these objections within the prescribed
time-limit.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies
The
Court notes that the Government objected, first, that the applicant
had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had failed to complain
about the refusal of therapeutic measures before the Federal
Constitutional Court. The Court notes that in his complaint to the
Federal Constitutional Court in the proceedings here at issue, the
applicant had claimed that his continued preventive detention had
breached his right to liberty as he had been refused any therapy in
view of his impending expulsion (see paragraph 20 above). It is
therefore satisfied that the applicant submitted the complaint about
a breach of his right to liberty caused by a refusal of therapeutic
measures here at issue to the domestic courts prior to bringing it
before this Court. He thus exhausted domestic remedies in this
respect.
As
regards the Government’s additional objection of non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies, made in their further observations dated 14
June 2011, the Court notes, irrespective of the question whether the
Government should be considered estopped from raising that objection
(see Rule 55 of the Rules of Court), the following. According to its
well established case law, under Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, recourse should be had to remedies which are available
and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breach of the
Convention alleged (see, among many other authorities, Akdivar and
Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV).
As
noted above, the proceedings here at issue concern the applicant’s
preventive detention ordered and confirmed in 2003/2004. The
applicant was released from preventive detention and expelled to
Austria on 16 April 2008. The new domestic remedy introduced
subsequently, on 4 May 2011, by the Federal Constitutional Court
for the review of ongoing preventive detention is not, therefore,
capable of affording redress to the applicant in relation to his
preventive detention at issue in the present case and which had
previously already come to an end. The applicant thus did not have to
avail himself of that remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. Consequently, the Government’s objection of
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must also be rejected in this
respect.
(b) Loss of victim status
The
Court observes that the Government also objected that the applicant
could no longer claim to be the victim of a violation of his
Convention rights within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention
as the Federal Constitutional Court had remedied the alleged
Convention violation by its judgment of 4 May 2011 and, in
particular, by the transitional rules it contained.
The
Court refers to its well-established case-law on that issue (see,
inter alia, Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, § 66,
Series A no. 51; Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, §
36, Reports 1996 III; and Dalban v. Romania [GC],
no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI). It agrees with the Government
that by its said judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court
implemented in the domestic legal order the Court’s findings in
its judgments on preventive detention in Germany (M. v. Germany
(cited above) and the follow-up cases thereto).
Having
regard to the scope of the Federal Constitutional Court’s
judgment, however, it appears doubtful whether that court intended to
acknowledge a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in
the circumstances at issue in the present application. In any event,
the Court, referring to its findings above (see paragraph 53),
considers that the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 4
May 2011 cannot be deemed to have afforded redress for the alleged
breach of Article 5 § 1 resulting from the applicant’s
preventive detention as ordered by the Regensburg Regional Court on 2
May 2003 and as confirmed on appeal and by the Federal Constitutional
Court itself on 25 March 2004.
The
Government’s objection that the applicant has lost his victim
status must therefore likewise be rejected.
(c) Conclusion
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
C. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant took the view that his preventive detention had violated
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, it had not been
justified under sub-paragraph (a) of that provision. He argued,
firstly, that the developments which had occurred after he had lodged
his application in 2004 had to be taken into account. Since 21 March
2006 he had been in detention for a period exceeding ten years. His
preventive detention as of that date had, in any event, breached
Article 5 of the Convention for the reasons set out in the judgment
in the case of M. v. Germany (cited above).
The
applicant further submitted that Article 5 had been breached in that
he had persistently been refused a social therapy in view of his
impending expulsion as an Austrian national or in view of his age. He
had therefore been refused any suitable therapy in Germany. At the
same time, his preventive detention had not been suspended and he had
not been expelled as the domestic courts had considered that there
was a risk that he might reoffend as he had not completed a therapy.
Under these circumstances, his continued preventive detention was
disproportionate.
(b) The Government
The
Government considered that the applicant’s preventive detention
had complied with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. They stressed
that at the time of the proceedings at issue in the present
application, in 2003, the preventive detention order against the
applicant had been executed for less than ten years. Therefore, the
present application was not a follow-up case to the application of M.
v. Germany (cited above). During the period at issue, the
applicant’s preventive detention had been justified under
sub paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1. In any event, the
applicant’s detention had been justified under sub-paragraph
(e) of Article 5 § 1 as the applicant suffered from a dissocial
personality disorder and alcoholism and was therefore “of
unsound mind”.
The
Government further contested that the applicant had not been offered
any suitable treatment in Straubing Prison in view of the enforceable
expulsion order against him. Having regard to the findings of the
experts consulted by the courts, in particular those made by expert
A. in his reports dated 15 October 1996 and 20 June 1997, the
applicant should first have completed a social therapy in prison in
order to ensure that he was motivated to undergo further treatment
before making a therapy for sexual offenders. The applicant, however,
had repeatedly rejected offers for a suitable therapy made to him. In
particular, between 1997 and 1999 he had refused participating in a
psychoanalytic discussion group for sexual offenders offered in
Straubing Prison which would have been appropriate to start his
treatment. In March 2003 he had confirmed that he was unwilling to
apply for a therapy for sexual offenders.
The
Government further noted that the applicant had not been admitted to
a social therapy in Erlangen Prison as that prison had considered
that in view of the enforceable expulsion order against him, the
applicant could not be accepted for treatment under the
administrative rules relating to section 9 of the Execution of
Sentences Act (see paragraph 38 above). A therapy could not attain
its aims in those circumstances as its key elements comprised
preparations of the detainee for release, including the search for a
job, and an offer of care after his release which could not be
realised if the detainee was not to reside in Germany after his
release. In any event, given the applicant’s dangerousness,
relaxations in the conditions of his detention, which were also part
of the social therapy, had not been possible, irrespective of his
foreign nationality.
The
Government further stressed that the applicant had persisted in
refusing to participate in the discussion group for sexual offenders
in Straubing Prison even after another expert, H., had considered in
his report of October 2002 that this would be useful. Moreover, when
a social therapeutic department was opened in Straubing Prison in
2003, the applicant repeatedly refused his transfer to that
department.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Recapitulation of the relevant
principles
(i) Grounds for deprivation of liberty
The
Court reiterates the fundamental principles laid down in its case law
on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which have been summarised
in relation to applications concerning preventive detention, in
particular, in its judgment of 17 December 2009 in the case of M.
v. Germany (cited above):
“86. Article 5 § 1 sub-paragraphs
(a) to (f) contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for
deprivation of liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful
unless it falls within one of those grounds (see, inter alia,
Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, § 96, Series A no.
39; Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, § 49, ECHR
2000 III; and Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.
13229/03, § 43, ECHR 2008 ...). ...
88. Furthermore, the word ‘after’
in sub-paragraph (a) does not simply mean that the ‘detention’
must follow the ‘conviction’ in point of time: in
addition, the ‘detention’ must result from, follow and
depend upon or occur by virtue of the ‘conviction’ (see
Van Droogenbroeck, cited above, § 35). In short, there
must be a sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the
deprivation of liberty at issue (see Weeks v. the United Kingdom,
2 March 1987, § 42, Series A no. 114; Stafford v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 64, ECHR 2002 IV;
Waite v. the United Kingdom, no. 53236/99, § 65, 10
December 2002; and Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04,
§ 117, ECHR 2008 ...). However, with the passage of time,
the link between the initial conviction and a further deprivation of
liberty gradually becomes less strong (compare Van Droogenbroeck,
cited above, § 40, and Eriksen, cited above, § 78).
The causal link required by sub-paragraph (a) might eventually be
broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to release
or to re-detain was based on grounds that were inconsistent with the
objectives of the initial decision (by a sentencing court) or on an
assessment that was unreasonable in terms of those objectives. In
those circumstances, a detention that was lawful at the outset would
be transformed into a deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and,
hence, incompatible with Article 5 (compare Van Droogenbroeck,
cited above, § 40; Eriksen, cited above, § 78; and
Weeks, cited above, § 49).”
(ii) “Lawful” detention “in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”
Any
deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the
exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 §
1, be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of
detention is in issue, including the question whether “a
procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention
refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to
conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof (see, among
many other authorities, Erkalo v. the Netherlands, 2 September
1998, § 52, Reports 1998 VI; Baranowski v.
Poland, no. 28358/95, § 50, ECHR 2000 III; and
Saadi, cited above, § 67).
Compliance
with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1
requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in
keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from
arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Winterwerp,
cited above, §§ 37, 45; Erkalo, cited above, §§
52, 56; Saadi, cited above, § 67; and Mooren v.
Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 72, 9 July 2009).
(b) Application of these principles to the
present case
The
Court recalls at the outset its above finding that the present
application concerns the compliance with Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention of the applicant’s preventive detention as ordered
by the Regensburg Regional Court on 2 May 2003 and as confirmed on
appeal (see paragraph 46).
In
determining whether the applicant was deprived of his liberty in
compliance with Article 5 § 1 during that period, the Court
refers first to its judgment of 17 December 2009 in the case of M.
v. Germany (cited above). In that judgment, it found that Mr M.’s
preventive detention, which, as in the present case, was ordered by
the sentencing court under Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code,
was covered by sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 in so far as
it had not been prolonged beyond the statutory ten-year maximum
period applicable at the time of that applicant’s offence and
conviction (see ibid., §§ 96 and 97-105). The Court
was thus satisfied that Mr M.’s preventive detention, in
so far as it fell within that maximum period, occurred “after
conviction” by the sentencing court for the purposes of Article
5 § 1 (a).
Having
regard to these findings in its judgment in the application of M.
v. Germany, the Court considers that the preventive detention
under Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code of the applicant in
the present case was based on his “conviction”, for the
purposes of Article 5 § 1 (a), by the Munich I Regional Court on
14 June 1991. The domestic court decisions here at issue cover a
period from 2 May 2003 to 14 July 2005 (when a new order for the
prolongation of the applicant’s preventive detention was made,
see paragraph 23 above). During that period, the applicant, having
been placed in preventive detention for the first time on 21 March
1996, was in preventive detention for less than the statutory
ten-year maximum period applicable at the time of his offence (see
paragraph 35 above).
The
Court must further determine whether the applicant’s preventive
detention at issue occurred “after” conviction, that is,
whether there was still a sufficient causal connection between his
conviction and his deprivation of liberty. That causal link may be
broken, in particular, if the domestic courts’ decision not to
release the applicant were based on grounds that were inconsistent
with the objectives of the decision of the sentencing court to order
preventive detention (see paragraph 65 above). The Court observes in
this respect that the order for the applicant’s preventive
detention by the sentencing Munich I Regional Court in June 1991 and
the decision of the Regensburg Regional Court in May 2003, confirmed
on appeal, not to release the applicant, were, in principle, based on
the same grounds. Both aimed at preventing the applicant from
committing further violent sexual offences such as those he had been
previously convicted of.
However,
the Court notes in this connection that in the applicant’s
submission, the domestic courts’ assessment in the proceedings
at issue that there was still a risk that he might reoffend if
released was based on the fact that he had not completed a therapy.
The applicant claimed that he had not been admitted to a suitable
social therapy either in view of his impending expulsion as a
foreigner or in view of his age.
The
Court observes that in the proceedings at issue, the domestic courts,
having consulted a psychiatric and psychotherapeutic expert, have
made clear that there was no other way for the applicant to reduce
his dangerousness but the successful completion of a suitable therapy
(see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). Otherwise, the courts would be
unable to arrive at the conclusion that it was to be expected that
the applicant would not commit further sexual offences and could thus
be released. The Court therefore agrees that the successful
completion of such a therapy as an essential precondition for the
applicant’s release was a reasonable one.
The
Court considers that a decision not to release a detainee as he still
posed a threat to the public may be inconsistent with the objectives
of the sentencing court’s order for preventive detention if the
person concerned is placed and remanded in detention as there was a
risk that he would reoffend, but is, at the same time, deprived of
the necessary means, such as a suitable therapy, to demonstrate that
he was no longer dangerous. In such circumstances, a detention which
complied with Article 5 § 1 (a) at the outset would be
transformed into a deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and,
hence, incompatible with that provision (see paragraph 65 above).
The
Court is therefore called upon to determine whether, in the
circumstances of the case, the applicant must be said to have been
deprived of the possibility successfully to complete the necessary
therapy / therapies to obtain his release. It notes in this
connection that in the proceedings at issue, the psychiatric and
psychotherapeutic expert H. consulted by the domestic courts, whose
findings the latter had endorsed, had proposed that the applicant
should first participate in a discussion group for sexual offenders
in Straubing Prison. The expert had further proposed that the
applicant then be admitted to a social therapeutic institution,
either in a different prison or in that which was currently being
built up in Straubing Prison itself (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above).
The
Court further observes that according to the findings of the domestic
courts, which have not been contested by the applicant, the applicant
refused to take part in the discussion group for sexual offenders in
Straubing Prison which he had been free to participate in, apparently
because he did not wish his sexual offences against children to
become known within that prison. The applicant therefore has not been
refused this therapy, considered as a suitable first step by the
medical expert and the domestic courts, and neither his age nor his
foreign nationality played a role in his not completing that therapy.
In view of the applicant’s failure to participate in that first
therapy, the availability of social therapeutic treatment to the
applicant in a different prison or in Straubing Prison itself was
not, at that stage, decisive for the question whether the applicant
had been offered the treatment necessary for him to prove that he was
no longer dangerous to the public.
The
Court does not overlook in that context that in the proceedings
preceding those here at issue, the Regensburg Regional Court had
considered, in its decision of 13 January 2000, that the applicant
had refused with good cause to participate in a psychoanalytical
group therapy for sexual offenders in Straubing Prison. Furthermore,
that court had noted that, despite his efforts and the help of the
Straubing Prison authorities, the applicant had not been admitted to
a suitable social therapy in a different prison in Germany either
because of his age or because he was a foreigner who was to be
expelled from German territory (see paragraph 14 above).
However,
the Court observes that the assessment of the domestic court in that
set of proceedings that the applicant could refuse with good cause to
participate in a group therapy addressing his sexual offences in
Straubing Prison itself has not been shared by the domestic courts in
the proceedings preceding those in 2000 (see paragraphs 11-12 above),
nor in the present proceedings or in those succeeding them (see
paragraphs 17 and 18 and paragraphs 23 and 24 above). It further
considers that the domestic courts’ assessment in the
proceedings at issue that the applicant’s readiness to change
his personality should first be tested in a therapy in Straubing
Prison and that such a therapy was therefore suitable for the
applicant cannot be considered as arbitrary.
The
Court further notes that the Straubing Prison authorities had
previously nevertheless supported the applicant in his attempts to be
admitted to a social therapeutic institution in a different prison.
It refers in that context to its findings in its judgment of M. v.
Germany (cited above, § 129) that the achievement of
the objective of crime prevention requires a flexible approach aimed
at providing persons in preventive detention with an individualised
and intensified offer of therapy which had the best prospects of
success (see also the findings of the Federal Constitutional Court in
its leading judgment of 4 May 2011, cited in paragraph 43 above). It
further notes that the applicant must be said to have been refused
social therapeutic treatment in three different prisons either in
view of the enforceable expulsion order against him or in view of his
age (see paragraphs 13-14 above).
However,
as set out above, the Court considers that the applicant was not,
therefore, exempt from starting his therapeutic treatment by
participating in a group therapy for sexual offenders offered to him
in Straubing Prison. Having regard to the material before it and the
domestic courts’ reasoning, it is also not convinced that in
view of his status as a foreign national or his age, the applicant
would not have been subsequently offered further suitable therapeutic
treatment which, if completed successfully, might have been
sufficient for the domestic courts to conclude that he was no longer
dangerous to the public.
The
Court notes that the administrative rules relating to section 9 of
the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 38 above) raise an
issue of discrimination of foreign nationals in that context as under
those rules, prisoners against whom an enforceable expulsion order
had been made were excluded from transfer to a social therapeutic
institution (see paragraphs 13 and 63 above). However, there was a
wider range of suitable therapies which could be offered to the
applicant as a sexual offender following a first therapy in prison to
test his readiness to change his personality, such as a therapy for
sexual offenders in a psychiatric hospital (see paragraphs 11-12
above). Furthermore, it appears that, despite the above-mentioned
administrative rules, the applicant was considered eligible for
social therapeutic treatment at least in Straubing Prison itself (see
paragraph 24 above). The Court also notes in that context that at the
relevant time, the applicant did not make a – necessary –
request to be transferred to Austria for the further execution of his
preventive detention, where a social therapy would have had more
prospects of success (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).
In
view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, in the circumstances
of the present case, the applicant had not been deprived of the
possibility successfully to complete the necessary therapy /
therapies to obtain his release. It was the applicant’s conduct
and attitude, and not his status as a foreign national or his age,
which were decisive for the fact that he did not complete a required
therapy, enabling him to show that he was no longer dangerous to the
public. The decision of the domestic courts in the proceedings at
issue not to release the applicant were therefore not inconsistent
with the objectives of the decision of the sentencing court to order
preventive detention and thus not arbitrary, for the purposes of
sub paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1. There is further
nothing to indicate that the assessment that the applicant, who had
not made any therapy, was likely to commit further violent sexual
offences if released was unreasonable in terms of the objectives of
the initial preventive detention order by the sentencing court.
The
applicant’s preventive detention was also lawful in that it was
based on a foreseeable application of Article 66 § 1 and Article
67d § 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court takes note, in this
connection, of the reversal of the Federal Constitutional Court’s
case-law concerning preventive detention in its leading judgment of 4
May 2011 (see paragraphs 40-43 above). In its said judgment, the
Federal Constitutional Court considered, inter alia, Article
66 of the Criminal Code in its version in force since 27 December
2003 not to comply with the right to liberty of the persons
concerned.
The
Court notes, however, that the applicant’s preventive detention
here at issue was ordered and executed on the basis of a previous
version of Article 66 of the Criminal Code. In any event, Article 66
of the Criminal Code in its version in force since 27 December 2003
was not declared void with retrospective effect, but remained
applicable and thus a valid legal basis under domestic law, in
particular, for the time preceding the Federal Constitutional Court’s
judgment. Therefore, the lawfulness of the applicant’s
preventive detention at issue for the purposes of Article 5 § 1
(a) is not called into question.
Furthermore,
for the reasons set out above, the fact that the applicant was not
admitted to a therapy he had wished to complete in view of either his
impending expulsion or his age does not raise an issue in relation to
the “lawfulness” of his detention, including the absence
of arbitrariness, either.
There
has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that his continued preventive detention
violated Article 3 § 2 of Protocol no. 4 to the Convention as
the German authorities had deprived him of his right to enter the
territory of Austria of which he was a national.
The
Court notes that the applicant failed to raise this complaint in the
proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court. Consequently,
this part of the application must be dismissed for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint under Article 5 § 1
of the Convention concerning the execution of the applicant’s
preventive detention ordered in 2003 admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 March 2012, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Dean Spielmann
Registrar President