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HALL v. AUSTRIA - 5455/06 [2012] ECHR 390 (6 March 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/390.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 390
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF HALL v. AUSTRIA
(Application
no. 5455/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6
March 2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hall v. Austria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić, President,
Peer
Lorenzen,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Julia Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos,
Erik Møse, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 February 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 5455/06) against the Republic
of Austria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Austrian national, Mrs Marianne Hall (“the
applicant”), on 19 January 2006.
The
applicant was represented by Mr W.L. Weh, a lawyer practising in
Bregenz. The Austrian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the
International Law Department at the Federal Ministry for European and
International Affairs.
The
applicant complained, in particular, about the length of proceedings
concerning a permit to make use of a mountain hut and grazing rights.
On
28 February 2008 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bad Dürheim, Germany.
She was born and grew up in Schwarzenberg (Austria), but moved to
Germany when she married. Her father held shares as a member of the
Alpe Rotenbach Agricultural Association (Agrargemeinschaft -
hereafter “AA”).
The
AA is a public law body, which owns several plots of land in
Schwarzenberg. Membership of the AA is expressed in shares which
comprise 86 grazing rights (Weiderechte) and ten hut rights
(Hüttenrechte).
After
their father’s death in 1993, the applicant and her four
sisters inherited his property. In the subsequent succession
proceedings, the Bezau District Court transferred the title to a
share of the deceased’s property to the applicant
(Einantwortung) which included three and three-quarters
grazing rights and one hut right of the AA Rotenbach. She also
inherited three grazing rights relating to another AA, the Alpe
Obere, from her father.
On
14 April 1994 the Bregenz District Agricultural Authority
(Agrarbezirksbehörde - DAA) rejected, according to
the statutes of the AA, the applicant’s requests to be granted
the necessary permits to make use of her grazing rights. These
decisions were based on the fact that the applicant did not have her
ordinary residence (ordentlicher Wohnsitz) in one of the court
districts of Bezau, Dornbirn or Bregenz. The Land Vorarlberg has
altogether six court districts.
On
29 September 1994 and 3 October 1994, the Vorarlberg Regional Land
Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat - “the Regional Board”)
dismissed the applicant’s appeals.
The
Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s
joint complaint for lack of prospect of success. Subsequently, the
Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint on
23 May 1996 because she did not fulfil the criteria set out
in the statutes of the AA.
At
the beginning of 1997 the applicant sold the three grazing rights
relating to the Alpe Obere to Mr Z., another member of this AA.
On
10 December 1997 the applicant requested the DAA to hold that the
provision of the statutes of the AA concerning the inheritance of
grazing and hut rights was void and that no authoritative permit was
necessary for the enjoyment of these rights. In the alternative she
requested the DAA to grant her the permit.
On
15 December 1997 the DAA rejected the applicant’s alternative
request as res judicata, because it had already decided on the
issue on 14 April 1994. The DAA did not decide on the two main
requests.
On
30 June 1998 the Regional Board, after having held a hearing,
dismissed her appeal against this decision.
On
7 October 1998 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the
complaint.
On
16 December 1999 the Administrative Court quashed the Regional
Board’s decision, holding that European Community Law should be
taken into account following Austria’s accession to the
European Union. Furthermore, the DAA should have decided first on the
applicant’s main requests, before being competent to decide on
the alternative request.
Subsequently,
the Regional Board gave a decision on 21 June 2000, but failed to
serve this new decision on the applicant.
Thereupon,
on 15 December 2000, the applicant filed a request for transfer of
jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag).
On
7 March 2001 the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat –
Supreme Board) granted the applicant’s request for transfer of
jurisdiction and quashed the DAA’s decision of 15 December
1997, because the DAA had not been competent to decide on the
alternative request prior to the main request.
Due
to the DAA’s and the Reform Board’s failure to render new
decisions, the applicant filed two further requests for transfer of
jurisdiction on 27 September 2001and 18 December 2002.
On
24 March 2003 the applicant’s counsel requested access to the
applicant’s files at the Supreme Board. This request was met,
with the exception of two documents. One concerned a legal expert
opinion from the Auditor-General’s Department
(Finanzprokuratur) to the Federal Chancellery
(Bundeskanzleramt), concerning different proceedings
initiated by the applicant against the State. The second document was
a preparatory report by the Regional Board prior to one of its
sessions.
On
4 June 2003 the Supreme Board, after hearing the applicant’s
counsel, again granted the transfer of jurisdiction and thus found
itself competent to adjudicate the case. It rejected the applicant’s
main requests put forward on 10 December 1997. After having
declared the alternative request a res non judicata, the
Supreme Board dismissed the request, because it found that the
statutory provisions of the AA were not discriminatory under national
or European Community law. It held that limiting the right to
property according to the owners’ ordinary residence was in the
common interest and constituted a pressing need in order to guarantee
the good administration and cultivation of the land. Finally, the
Supreme Board also dismissed the applicant’s request for
inspection of two documents in the file. It reiterated that the first
document, a legal opinion prepared by the Auditor-General’s
Department and addressed to the Legal Service in the Federal
Chancellery, concerned civil proceedings pending between the
applicant and the Republic of Austria. It was in essence advice by
the legal representative, namely the Auditor-General’s
Department, to a party to the civil proceedings which it represented
and for this reason confidential. The second document could not be
inspected because, being a draft for a decision to be deliberated on
by the Regional Board, it was covered by the confidentiality of
deliberations (Beratungsgeheimnis).
On 23
July 2003 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional
Court against the decision (Bescheid) of the Supreme Board of
4 June 2003 and, on 4 September 2003, the Constitutional Court
granted suspensive effect to the complaint.
The
Supreme Board submitted observations on 18 September 2003.
On
24 November 2003 the applicant replied to the observations.
On
3 December 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s
request to be granted access to the two documents, for the same
reasons as had been given by the Supreme Board. The Constitutional
Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack
of prospects of success on 23 February 2004. It found that the
decision of the Supreme Board did not breach the applicant’s
constitutional rights. It was not unreasonable that the members of an
AA found it necessary for the purpose of the common administration of
their alp to provide in the statutes adopted by them a requirement of
close residence of all its members. Subsequently, on the applicant’s
request, the Constitutional Court transferred the case to the
Administrative Court.
The
Administrative Court invited the applicant on 27 April 2004 to
supplement her complaint and, on 11 June 2004 the applicant did so.
The Supreme Board submitted observations on 3 August 2004.
On 7 July 2005 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s
complaint. It found that the Supreme Board had acted correctly when
rejecting the requests for a declaratory decision as that matter
could also have been decided in proceedings on the applicant’s
request of transfer of grazing rights. As to the decision on the
alternative request, the Administrative Court found that the request
for granting transfer of the grazing rights was not inadmissible as
res judicata, because, following the accession of Austria to
the European Union, the authorities had to take their decision not
only on the basis of domestic but also EU law. Assuming that the
transfer of shares of an AA was covered by the freedom of movement of
capital, restriction of this freedom was justified if it pursued an
aim in the general interest and applied in a non-discriminatory
manner.
Referring
to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, the Administrative
Court found that a requirement as to residence as laid down in the
AA’s statutes was not a priori discriminatory in nature
as it was intended to achieve the specific objectives of preserving
agricultural communities, viable farms and the promotion of
reasonable use of the available areas. AAs and the structure of
cultivation created by them were means to achieve these objectives as
they secured an efficient and reasonable cultivation and use of the
available land. The active common use by several persons entitled to
do so was a particular feature of an AA and it could function
properly and in accordance with its aim, only with the active
participation of its members. Such participation became all the more
difficult the greater the distance between the land of the AA on the
one hand and the place of residence of the entitled person on the
other. In such circumstances, also a feeling of affinity for the
community property and an understanding for necessary investments as
well as other interests could be lost.
The
Administrative Court further considered that, for ensuring the proper
administration and running of an AA, a less strict means for
achieving this aim than a residence clause for members was not
conceivable. Finally, the Administrative Court found that the fact
that the person acquiring the right, but who was refused a permit by
the agricultural authority in case of inheritance, had to transfer
his or her share right at the usual local estimated value to persons
entitled to an acquisition struck a fair balance between compensation
for the material value of his/her share right and the public interest
in securing that the use the land could be exercised within the
agricultural community.
This
decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 1 August
2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
Vorarlberg Agricultural Land Planning Act (Flurverfassungsgesetz),
governing inter alia agricultural associations, defines
agricultural associations as follows:
Ҥ 32
(1) An agricultural association consists of
the totality of the respective owners of the real-estate properties
to which participation rights in a real-estate property of an
agricultural association attach (ancestral real-estate properties),
including those persons who are entitled to person (“walzende”)
shares.”
An
agricultural association has the legal status of a public-law
corporation, but is not endowed with the typical sovereign
competences; it is thus not a state institution, but an association
of private persons. Its tasks are to manage, cultivate, preserve and
improve the property of the association. The members of the
association, which are those holding shares in the association, have
rights and duties vis-à-vis the other members and the property
of the association. The rights of members include participation in
elections and the right to use the common economic facilities and
real-estate properties. The duties include payment of contributions
for proper management of the association, and for the construction
and maintenance of the common facilities.
A
member’s free disposition concerning their shares is largely
excluded, and the transfer of ancestral real-estate properties and
the transfer by legal transaction of the shares attaching to specific
persons are subject to supervision by the agricultural authority.
Section
1 of the 1968 statutes of the AA Alpgemeinschaft Rotenbach sets out
its purpose and reads as follows:
“(1) The AA Alpengemeinschaft Rotenbach is a
public law corporation within the meaning of the Agricultural Land
Planning Act ... It consists of all persons who hold grazing rights
in respect of the corporation’s commune property. The seat of
the AA is Schwarzenberg.
(2) The purpose of the Alpengemeinschaft Rotenbach is
the common administration as well as the use and cultivation, by
separate groups of occupants (Besetzergruppen), of the alps
Klausberg-Hinterstück, Rotenbach and Hochstätten including
all business necessary for this purpose.”
Sections
3 and 4 of the statutes contain the following rules on membership.
They read, insofar as relevant. As follows:
“Section 3
(1) The Alpgemeinschaft Rotenbach consists of 86 grazing
rights and 10 hut rights on Alpe Klausenberg. Persons who hold a
grazing right (members) must be registered by name, date of birth,
place of residence and number of grazing rights in the book of shares
kept by the Alp Committee.
(2) Grazing rights (shares) are acquired by decision of
the Alp Committee.
Section 4
(1) Grazing rights can only be acquired by contract
(Rechtsgeschäft unter Lebenden) by persons who run a farm
situated in the court districts of Bezau, Dornbirn and Bregenz.
(2) The acquisition of grazing rights through
inheritance is possible without any restriction for spouses, children
and siblings, who reside in one of the court districts mentioned
under para. (1). In case the heir is not related in that way to the
deceased (Erblasser), the rules on acquisition by contract
apply. If the heir is not entitled to acquire the grazing and hut
rights, these rights must be sold to a person who is qualified to
acquire them at the local customary price (ortsüblicher
Schätzpreis). Until the rights are acquired by that person,
they are administered by the committee. During this time membership
(use) is dormant. If the membership is dormant for more than five
years the AA may apply to court for having the shares sold at an
auction.
(3) When grazing rights are sold members of the AA have
a right of pre-emption....
...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The
Government argued that the applicant did not exhaust domestic
remedies as she could have filed a request for a transfer of
jurisdiction much earlier.
This
is disputed by the applicant who maintained that she made proper use
of the remedies at her disposal.
The Court reiterates that a request for transfer of
jurisdiction under Section 73 of the General Administrative
Procedure Act (Devolutions-antrag) constitutes, in principle,
an effective remedy which has to be used in respect of complaints
about the length of administrative proceedings (see Egge v.
Austria
(dec.), no. 74159/01, 9 October 2003). In the Court’s
view, a detailed examination of whether the applicant could have made
more efficient use of the remedy by using it at other stages of the
proceedings, would overstretch the duties incumbent on an applicant
pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Kern
v. Austria,
no. 14206/02, § 49, 24 February 2005, and,
mutatis mutandis,
Wohlmeyer Bau GmbH v. Austria,
no. 20077/02, § 45, 8 July 2004). This is all the
more so, as the applicant used the remedy not only once but on
three occasions, namely on 15 December 2000, on 27 September
2001 and again on 18 December 2002. The Court concludes that the
applicant complied with her obligation to exhaust domestic remedies.
Thus, the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion is
dismissed.
The
Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions
The
applicant submitted that the subject matter of the present case was
not of a complex nature as all facts of the case had been clarified
in the proceedings on her previous application to the DAA and all the
agricultural authorities had to do in the proceedings at issue was to
decide one additional legal aspect of the case which could have been
done very quickly. Instead the proceedings were conducted at such a
slow pace that the applicant had been compelled to make use of a
remedy for accelerating the proceedings three times.
The
Government contended that the length of proceedings had complied with
the reasonable time requirement. There had been no periods of
inactivity. Moreover the applicant had caused delays by filing
requests to remit the case to the Administrative Court only after the
delivery of the negative decisions of the Constitutional Court
instead of filing the alternative request already in her complaints
to the Constitutional Court. Given the complexity of the case, the
length of proceedings should be regarded as reasonable.
2. The Court’s assessment
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 15 December 1997,
when the DAA rejected the applicant’s request for a declaration
that no authoritative permit by the agricultural authorities was
necessary for the transfer of the grazing and hut rights, as it was
at that moment that a “dispute” arose within the meaning
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see König v.
Germany, 28 June 1978, § 98, Series A no. 27 and
Morscher v. Austria, no. 54039/00, § 38, 5 February
2004). The proceedings ended on 1 August 2005 when the
Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s
lawyer. The proceedings therefore lasted for seven years seven months
and sixteen days and during this period the case was dealt with by
three levels of jurisdiction (namely the Supreme Land Reform Board,
the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court).
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France
[GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court considers that the proceedings at issue, even if, as the
applicant pointed out, there was no particular need to take further
evidence, were of some complexity as they involved difficult
questions of law. However, this cannot justify the whole length of
the proceedings.
There
is nothing to indicate that the applicant’s conduct contributed
to the length of the proceedings. The mere fact that the applicant
had not filed together with her complaint to the Constitutional Court
also a request to transfer the case to the Administrative Court, if
the Constitutional Court would decline to deal with it, did not in
the Court’s view cause any particular delay. The Constitutional
Court declined to deal with the applicant’s case on 23 February
2004 and already on 27 April 2004 the Administrative Court invited
the applicant to supplement her complaint.
As
regards the conduct of the domestic authorities the Court considers
that the proceedings progressed at a very slow pace while pending
before the agricultural authorities. The applicant filed on three
occasions requests for transfer of jurisdiction in order to
accelerate the proceedings and all requests were allowed because the
authorities against which the requests were directed had failed to
give their decisions in time.
In
sum, the Court finds that the applicant’s case has not
been determined within a reasonable time and there has, accordingly,
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the refusal of the agricultural authorities
to grant the transfer of the grazing and hut rights to her infringed
her right to inherit. She relied on Article 8 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
Admissibility
The
Government argued that this complaint had been lodged out of time
since the Administrative Court had already decided on the lawfulness
of the refusal of the transfer of the grazing and hut rights on 23
May 1996 and this decision had not subsequently been contested
by the applicant before the Court. Moreover, there had been no
interference with the right to inherit since the applicant’s
father was not the owner of the plot of land for which there was a
right of use. It was rather owned by the agricultural community and
thus he could not transfer such property rights. Even if there had
been an interference, the statutes of the AA required a permit from
the agricultural community for the transfer of moving shares. This
measure served legitimate aims in the public interest, namely to
secure the future existence of farmers, to secure a distribution of
the land permitting the development of viable farming units and the
harmonious cultivation of the area and the landscape and to promote a
reasonable use of available areas while preventing natural dangers.
Furthermore this measure was in line with the proportionality
principle and was necessary. Since the applicant only wanted to use
the hut during the holidays, this would clearly be in conflict with
these interests.
The
applicant contested these arguments. She submitted that she had
exhausted domestic remedies. Furthermore, the Bezau District Court
had considered the grazing and hut rights as civil rights that could
be transferred by inheritance, as in numerous previous cases.
The
Court observes that the Administrative Court did not uphold the
argument of the DAA and the Regional Board that the applicant’s
additional request of 10 December 1997 was res judicata.
Rather, it found that it raised an additional legal aspect which had
only come up after Austria’s accession to the European Union
and which had to be examined by the agricultural authorities. Having
regard to the reasoning of the Administrative Court in its decision
of 7 July 2005 the Court considers that the question of the
lawfulness of the agricultural authorities refusal to grant transfer
of the grazing and hut rights to the applicant was still an issue in
the proceedings conducted after 23 May 1996 and they did not concern
a separate and different subject matter. It is, however, not in
dispute that as regards the supplementary request of 10 December 1997
the applicant exhausted domestic remedies. The Court therefore
dismisses the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion.
The
Court notes further that according to the Court’s case law,
inheritance rights may in principle fall within the scope of Article
8 (see Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, §§
51-53; Camp and Bourimi v. The Netherlands, judgment of 3
October 2000, § 35). Moreover, the Court has held that family
life comprises also interests of a material kind such as obligations
in respect of maintenance and the institution of the reserved portion
of an estate (reserve héréditaire) (see Pla
and Puncernau v. Andorra, judgment of 13 July 2004, §
26).
In
the present case, however, the applicant’s right to inherit was
not interfered with, since the District Court had already transferred
(Einantwortung) her deceased father’s property to her.
By this act the applicant and her four sisters each acquired one
fifth of their father’s property. Prior to this property
transfer, the specific grazing rights at issue were assigned to the
applicant according to a procedural protocol (Abhandlungsprotokoll).
Since the applicant could – and concerning some of her grazing
rights, did – sell her grazing rights to a member of the AA,
who fulfilled all statutory requirements, there was no infringement
of her right to inherit.
It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3(a) and
4 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained under Article 6 that her right to
equality of arms was infringed, because the Supreme Land Reform Board
denied her the right to consult specific parts of the court files.
Under the same provision she complained that the Regional and Supreme
Land Reform Board were not independent and impartial because of the
participation of civil servants as expert members of these boards.
Under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 and Article
1 Protocol No.1 she complained that the rules under which
transfer of the grazing right to he had been refused, namely the
residence clause, were discriminatory.
However,
in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a)
and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 5,000 euros
(EUR).
The
Government contested that claim as being excessive.
Having
regard to the violation found the Court finds that the applicant has
sustained non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated by the
finding of a violation. Assessing the claim on an equitable basis, it
awards EUR 4,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed EUR 20,330.24 plus value-added tax (VAT) for costs
and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 2,289.60
plus VAT for costs incurred before the Court.
The
Government contested also the claim for costs as being excessive.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum.
Regarding
the domestic proceedings, the Court notes that only the costs for the
requests for transfer of jurisdiction (see paragraphs 18 and 20
above) were incurred in order to prevent the excessive length of the
proceedings. According to the bill of fees submitted by the applicant
the costs for these remedies amounted in total to EUR 552.81 plus
VAT. The Court awards this sum in full plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant on this amount.
In
respect of the Convention proceedings the bill submitted by the
applicant gives an amount of EUR 2,289.60 plus VAT. The Court notes
that only the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings was
declared admissible. The Court considers it reasonable to award the
applicant the sum of EUR 1,500
In
sum the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,052.81 under the head of
costs and expenses plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant on this amount.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares
the complaint about the length of proceedings admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention
the following amounts:
(i)
EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)
EUR 552.81 (five hundred and fifty two euros eighty one cents), plus
any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs
and expenses incurred before the domestic courts;
(iii)
EUR 1,500 (one thousand fife hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses
incurred before the Court;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 March 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina
Vajić
Registrar President
