In the case of Rothe v. Austria,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Anatoly Kovler,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Erik Møse, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 13 November 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
6490/07) against the Republic of Austria lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a German national, Mr Wolfgang Rothe (“the applicant”),
on 5 February 2007.
The applicant was represented by Ms M. Windhager,
a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the International Law
Department at the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. The
German Government did not make use of their right to intervene (Article 36 § 1
of the Convention).
The applicant alleged that the Austrian courts
had failed to protect him against a violation of his right to respect for his
private life on account of the publication of statements and two photographs in
a weekly newspaper.
On 20 May 2009 the application was communicated to
the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of
the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
At the material time the applicant was the deputy
principal of the St Pölten seminary, where future Roman Catholic priests
are trained. In addition, he was private secretary to the bishop of the St
Pölten diocese, Bishop Krenn. He resigned from his post as deputy
principal in July 2004 and is currently living in Munich.
In the issue of the weekly news magazine Profil
of 5 July 2004 an article was published on searches carried out by police
in the St Pölten seminary. According to the article, police had searched
the seminary on suspicion of someone having downloaded child pornography from
the Internet. The article further stated that, according to rumours, police had
also found photographs showing seminarians engaging in homosexual activities,
and that there were rumours of unwanted homosexual advances towards seminarians
involving abuse of authority. The article was accompanied by a photograph of
the principal of the seminary, showing him standing in a garden, and by an
interview with him in which he said that he did not believe that there had been
any unwanted sexual advances by superiors and that the rumours were part of an
intrigue or a revenge plot by a former seminarian. He denied involvement in any
such incidents.
A. The article at issue
In its issue of 12 July 2004 Profil
published an article entitled “Go on!” (Trau dich doch), with the
sub-heading “Porn scandal. Photographic evidence of sexual antics between
priests and their students has thrown the diocese of St Pölten into disarray.
First the principal and now the deputy principal have resigned. High-ranking
dignitaries expect Kurt Krenn [the bishop of the diocese] to be removed from
office.”
The article stated that the
applicant and the principal of the seminary had had sexual relations with
seminarians, but clarified that there was nothing to corroborate the rumours of
unwanted homosexual advances which had been reported earlier. The article further
reported that some seminarians had downloaded pornography and child pornography
onto their computers. According to the article, the existence of homosexual
relations was well known within the seminary and was even known to the bishop,
who had tried to “hush up” the case at first. The article contained two
photographs of the applicant, one on which he was about to embrace a seminarian,
Mr K., and another one on which he and Mr K. were about to kiss each other. On
this photograph the applicant’s eyes are closed and his mouth is half open. The
photographs had been taken by one of the seminarians at a Christmas party in
the applicant’s private apartment on 24 December 2003. In the article the
applicant was identified by name while the seminarian’s identities were not
disclosed. Likewise, on the published photographs, the applicant’s face was visible
while that of the seminarian was blurred. The article quoted the applicant as
saying that the photographs could be interpreted in different ways and that, at
the Christmas party in question, all the participants had embraced each other
in a friendly manner.
B. The proceedings under the Media Act
On 6 August 2004, the applicant initiated
proceedings under the Media Act (Mediengesetz) against Verlagsgruppe News GmbH,
the publisher of Profil, in respect of the article published on 12 July
2004. Relying on sections 6 and 7 of the said Act, he requested compensation
for defamation (üble Nachrede) and for the violation of his strictly
personal sphere (höchstpersönlicher Lebensbereich) caused by the
publication of the photographs and the impugned article, especially the
following passages:
“Porn scandal. Photographic evidence of sexual antics between
priests and their students has thrown the diocese of St Pölten into disarray.”;
“A painful truth: Krenn’s principal engaged in sex with subordinates, also
Krenn’s private secretary and legal adviser ...” ; “Photos showing, among
others, seminarians from St Pölten in kinky situations, in some cases with
their superiors ... and because they were doing it with the boss and his deputy
too, it was all quite normal and they felt perfectly safe ...”
The publisher of Profil replied that the
content of the article was true. The company also argued that in the light of
the Roman Catholic Church’s position condemning homosexuality, and the fact
that the applicant was responsible for the training of future priests in the
seminary, the public had an interest in knowing about the situation at the
seminary. Moreover, the applicant was the private secretary of Bishop Krenn,
who had repeatedly and publicly condemned homosexuality as being a sin and an
aberration. Consequently, there was a connection with public life. The article
was thus lawful by virtue of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article
10 of the Convention.
On 15 September 2005, after holding several
hearings at which evidence was heard from a number of witnesses, the Vienna
Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht, hereinafter “the Regional Court”)
dismissed the applicant’s request for compensation.
The Regional Court observed that a large
percentage of readers of the weekly Profil that had published the impugned
article and the photographs would read the news magazine in only a cursory
manner and would also consult other media before forming their opinion. Those readers
would learn that there had been homosexual contacts between the applicant and
seminarians and also among seminarians, and that there existed photographs to
support this. The published photographs showed not merely a kiss on the cheek but
a French kiss. The sexual nature of the kiss was visible from the fact that the
applicant had his eyes closed and his mouth open with his tongue visible. Since
the article had also stated that previous rumours about sexual coercion of
seminarians by their superiors had not been confirmed, it was made clear that
the two men had had a consensual relationship.
Giving a detailed assessment of various witness
statements, the Regional Court found it established that the applicant had had
a homosexual relationship with a seminarian, K., in which he had openly engaged
at the priests’ seminary. One witness had stated, for instance, that the two
men were wearing rings with each other’s names engraved on them together with
the date of the beginning of their relationship. Moreover, one of the published
photographs showed the applicant exchanging a French kiss with the seminarian
K. The photograph had been taken in the applicant’s apartment, which was placed
at his disposal by the diocese, during a Christmas party attended by a number
of seminarians. The statement by the applicant quoted in the article, according
to which the photographs could be interpreted in different ways, would lead the
reader to conclude that the photographs had not been manipulated before
publication. The Regional Court thus held that the publisher had succeeded in
proving that the facts contained in the article were in essence true.
A request by the applicant to obtain the opinion
of an expert in photographic analysis was rejected, as expert opinions were only
to be taken if the resolution of a question of fact required expert knowledge which
the court did not possess. Where the judge was able to assess the evidence on
the basis of his or her own knowledge, no expert opinion was required. The Regional Court noted that the applicant had not alleged that the photograph had been
manipulated. It could therefore be assessed without the help of an expert.
Owing to the considerable importance of the
Roman Catholic Church as a role model, the public had a great interest in
knowing what was going on within the Church. The public also had an interest in
what happened in the seminary, especially since it had become known that
pictures containing child pornography had been downloaded from the Internet.
The circumstances leading to such incidents were a subject of public interest
and had a direct connection with public life. The applicant, as the deputy
principal of the seminary, was a public figure in that capacity. Even though
the impugned pictures had been taken in his private residence there was a
connection to his public life. While accusing a dignitary of the Roman Catholic
Church of having homosexual contacts constituted the actus reus of
defamation within the meaning of section 6 of the Media Act and exposed his strictly
personal sphere within the meaning of section 7 of the said Act, the publisher
had proved that the reported facts were essentially true. Thus, the applicant’s
claim for compensation had to be dismissed.
The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law
and fact with the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht). The Court
of Appeal, after holding a hearing, dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 28
June 2006.
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, holding that the said court had not erred in fact or in law and had rightly
held that the newspaper publisher had managed to prove that the content of the
article was true. Regarding the applicant’s complaint that the publisher had
not proved that there had been a homosexual relationship between him and a
seminarian, the Court of Appeal found that the photographs of the two men
hugging and kissing, together with the evidence from a witness who stated that he
had seen them repeatedly exchanging French kisses at the Christmas party, was
sufficient to prove that such a relationship had existed. As to the complaint
that the first-instance court had refused to obtain an opinion from an expert in
photographic analysis, the Court of Appeal found that the judge had rightly
held that she could interpret the photographs for herself. Furthermore, the finding
that the applicant and the seminarian K. had had a homosexual relationship was
based not only on the photographs but first and foremost on a witness
statement. The court further held that, in reporting on photographic evidence
of seminarians in “kinky situations”, the publisher had provided proof that the
statements were true. The average reader of the magazine would understand the term
“kinky” to mean a deviation from what was considered normal, which would include
photographs of priests and seminarians in a sexual pose wearing clerical
clothing, especially as the persons concerned belonged to a group who publicly
spoke out against homosexuality and denounced homosexual contacts as sinful. The
Court of Appeal went on to state as follows:
“The appellant argues that the substantive law was also incorrectly
applied ... because the court found that the published material was connected
with ‘public life’. In his view, the public interest in occurrences within an
institution did not warrant a report which identified individuals, particularly
when the report dealt with their strictly personal sphere and the individuals
concerned had not been in the public eye. He had merely been deputy principal of
the St Pölten seminary, a purely internal function within the Church which had
no external dimension; accordingly, there had been no grounds for any
interference with the intimate sphere of his private life.
The court is not convinced by this argument. The Catholic
Church, to which the majority of the Austrian population belongs and which,
according to Article II of the Concordat (BGBl. II No. 2/1934), has public-law
status, has a level of importance in Austria going beyond that of a small
association, as is clear from the overall content of the Concordat and the
circumstances in which it was ratified. Accordingly, conduct on the part of
Church dignitaries which is in flagrant contradiction with Catholic teachings
may very well be of public interest, particularly where - as in the present
case - homosexual contacts take place and are maintained, albeit on a
consensual basis, between staff and students in an educational establishment
and between students themselves. The Catholic Church strives for acceptance and
credibility among the public at large, and the activities of a principal and a
deputy principal, as the persons in charge of a training college for future
priests, have a public dimension. The Catholic Church is engaged in public relations
work in many spheres and regularly makes its views on (sexual) morality known
to the population as a whole, with the result that the general public is also
entitled to be informed if individual officials are failing to practise what
they preach, condemning homosexuality as a sin in public while practising it in
private, even between staff and students. It should also be taken into
consideration that the teachings of the Catholic Church on the subject of
homosexuality are contrary to the fundamental right to sexual self-determination
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and to the
prohibition on discrimination; hence, on this basis also, there is a public
interest in the publication of specific allegations that Church dignitaries are
failing to observe their Church’s teachings on sexual morals. This is even more
so where the reports concern homosexual contacts between a teacher and his
students. Such relationships of dependency call for particular vigilance in
order to avoid potential breaches of a fundamental code of conduct designed to
protect the physical and psychological integrity of the students. The media
have a vital role in publicly exposing misconduct in a democratic society
governed by the rule of law.
The exposure and public condemnation of such misconduct is thus
in any event in the public interest; the same is true of the reports
identifying those concerned, without which it would not be possible to express
credible criticism of specific inadmissible situations and thus fulfil the role
of “public watchdog”. The weighing of interests in the present case should
undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that the public right to information
prevails. The professional activity of an ordained priest who is active in
public life, as a clergyman, as deputy head of a seminary and as a close
adviser and secretary to the bishop, does not take place merely within the
Church; the Catholic Church has an important and, in some respects even a State
role, and the credibility of its officials, who demand moral standards from the
population and compliance with the Church’s rules of community life, occupies
an important position in that regard. In particular, the fact that the events
involved students who, as future officials of the Catholic Church are supposed
to be taught these moral precepts by example, lends those events a
public-interest dimension extending beyond the Church itself and affects all
sections of the population.
Furthermore, the applicant was widely involved in public relations
work not just through the training of priests but also through his role as
secretary and legal adviser to the bishop; this serves as further justification
for lending greater weight to the report identifying him than to his interest
in preserving his anonymity, and for holding that there was a direct connection
with public life.
...”
. The
Court of Appeal concluded that, since the article had reported essentially true
facts and there was a public interest in their being reported, the Regional Court had rightly rejected the applicant’s request for compensation. The judgment
was served on the applicant’s counsel on 13 July 2006.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND EUROPEAN TEXTS
A. The Media Act
Section 6 of the
Media Act provides for the strict liability of the publisher, inter alia
in cases of defamation. The victim can thus claim damages from the publisher. Section
6 provides as follows:
“(1) Where a medium publishes statements which
constitute the actus reus of disparagement, insult, derision or
defamation the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium
(publisher) for damages for the injury suffered ...”
(2) The right referred to in paragraph 1 above shall
not apply ...
2. in the case of defamation
(a) [where] the statements published are true or
...
(3) Where the publication concerns the strictly
personal sphere, a claim under subsection 1 shall be excluded only on the
grounds set forth in ...subsection 2(2)(a) ...; the case of subsection 2(2)(a),
this shall not apply where the published facts are directly related to public
life.”
Section 7 of the Media Act provides a claim for
damages in cases of interference with the strictly personal sphere of an
individual’s life. It reads as follows:
“(1) If the strictly personal sphere of an
individual’s life is discussed or portrayed in the media in a way liable to
publicly undermine the individual concerned, he or she shall have the right to
claim compensation for the damage sustained from the media proprietor
(publisher). ...
(2) The right referred to in paragraph 1 above shall
not apply where
(i) ...
(ii) the statements published are true and are
directly related to public life;
(iii) ...”
. For
the purpose of Section 6 of the Media Act “defamation” is to be
understood as defined in Article 111 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch),
which reads as follows:
“(1) Anybody who, in such a way that it may be
noticed by a third person, attributes to another a contemptible characteristic
or sentiment or accuses him of behaviour contrary to honour or morality and
such as to make him contemptible or otherwise lower him in public esteem shall
be liable to imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine ...
(2) Anyone who commits this offence in a printed
document, by broadcasting or otherwise in such a way as to make the defamation
accessible to a broad section of the public, shall be liable to imprisonment
not exceeding one year or a fine ...
(3) The person making the statement shall not be punished if it
is proved to be true. In the case of the offence defined in paragraph 1 he
shall also not be liable if circumstances are established which gave him
sufficient reason to believe that the statement was true.”
B. The Copyright Act and the Civil Code
Section 78 of the Copyright Act, in so far as
relevant, reads as follows:
“(1) Images of persons
shall neither be exhibited publicly nor in any way made accessible to the public
where injury would be caused to the legitimate interests of the persons
concerned or, if they have died without having authorised or ordered
publication, those of a close relative.”
Article 1330 of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)
provides as follows:
“(1) Anybody who, as a
result of defamation, suffers real damage or loss of profit may claim
compensation.
(2) The same shall apply if
anyone disseminates allegations which jeopardise a person’s reputation, income
or livelihood, the untruth of which was known or should have been known to him
or her. In this case there is also a right to claim a retraction and the
publication thereof ...”
C. Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy
The Court refers to this resolution, adopted by
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 June 1998. Its relevant
passages are reproduced in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) ([GC],
nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08,
§ 71, ECHR 2012).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained about the courts’
judgments in the proceedings under the Media Act refusing him compensation in
respect of the publication of an article and two photographs in the issue of Profil
of 12 July 2004. He alleged a violation of his right to respect for his
private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The applicant submitted that the right to live one’s
private life without exposure to the public eye and the right to protection of
one’s image were encompassed by Article 8 of the Convention. He asserted that
the courts had failed to fulfil their positive obligation to ensure respect for
his private life in the present case.
The applicant maintained that the article had
been defamatory. In particular he contested the domestic courts’ assessment of
the actual content of the article. According to him, the article implied that
he engaged in perverted sexual practices with seminarians and that photographs
of him engaging in such practices existed. On the basis of that interpretation,
he argued that the publisher of Profil had not succeeded in furnishing proof
of the truth of the allegations raised. He further contested the domestic
courts’ interpretation of the information conveyed by the photographs. In his
view, the photographs did not contain proof of any homosexual relationship
between him and the seminarian concerned. They showed no more than a friendly
embrace and a kiss on the cheek, the impression of a French kiss being an
optical illusion.
Furthermore, the applicant asserted that he was
not a public figure. He had not been known to the general public before the
publication of the article at issue, nor could his position as deputy principal
of the seminary be regarded as a public function. In contrast to Bishop Krenn,
who had voluntarily entered the public arena, he had not participated in the
public debate on homosexuality nor had he entered the public arena in any other
way. The mere fact that he had been the bishop’s private secretary did not make
him a public figure.
The applicant also contested the argument that
there was a public interest in the article at issue. Even if there were a
public debate about the occurrences at the seminary or about the moral
standards proclaimed by the Roman Catholic Church in respect of homosexuality,
this did not justify attacking him in a defamatory manner, giving his full name
and publishing a picture taken at a private party. He alleged that to permit
reporting on his private life and publication of his picture just because he
was a priest deprived him of the protection which was afforded to any other
person under Article 8 of the Convention.
While the Roman Catholic Church had an official
and influential position in Austria and was therefore part of the country’s
public life, his private dealings were of no public interest. Referring to the
Court’s case-law, he noted that the publication of the photographs had
been particularly intrusive. They had been taken by one of the seminarians at a
private party and had been published without his consent. The publication did
no more than satisfy the curiosity and voyeurism of the readership of the
weekly Profil.
The Government noted that the applicant had alleged
a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the
Convention. However, what was at stake in the present case was a weighing of
the applicant’s interests protected by Article 8 on the one hand and the
freedom of the press to disseminate information protected by Article 10 of the
Convention on the other. It followed that the principles developed by the Court’s
case-law under Article 10 also had to be taken into account.
The domestic courts had taken comprehensive
evidence from numerous witnesses. Having carefully assessed that evidence they
had come to the conclusion that the impugned statements were true. Moreover, the
statements were directly related to public life. Consequently, the courts found
that the requirements for awarding the applicant compensation under
sections 6 and 7 of the Media Act were not met.
The Government stressed that the article had
contributed to a debate of public interest. They submitted the following
arguments to support that position. Firstly, the article had to be seen against
the background that criminal investigations had been opened against several
seminarians in the spring of 2004 and child pornographic material had been
seized at the seminary. Thus, the occurrences at the seminary had become an
issue of public discussion at the time. Secondly, the position of the Roman
Catholic Church in Austria had to be taken into account. It occupied an
important place in public life and had a considerable influence on public
opinion. The media regularly reported the statements and positions of
representatives of the Roman Catholic Church on social or political topics and
on questions of belief and morals, including sexual morals. Statements in the
media by the bishop of the St Pölten diocese condemning homosexuality had given
rise to an increased public interest in the conduct of dignitaries of the Church
who did not live up to the moral standards proclaimed by the Church.
Turning to the question whether the press had
overstepped the boundaries of the freedom accorded to it by identifying the
applicant by name and publishing the pictures at issue, the Government asserted
that Profil could not have raised such serious accusations of conduct at
variance with the values taught by the Roman Catholic Church against Church
dignitaries, whose standing was considered by many people in Austria to be above
suspicion, without sound evidence. The manner of reporting, identifying the
applicant and publishing two pictures showing him hugging and kissing a
seminarian, therefore had an information value of its own and added credibility
to the facts reported.
The Government also stressed that the applicant
was a dignitary of the church and held an official position as deputy principal
of the St Pölten seminary, which had become the subject of an intense
public debate owing to the events described above. In the Government’s view the
courts were therefore entitled to consider that the applicant had become a
public figure. In that connection they stressed that the article had duly
distinguished between the applicant as the deputy head of the seminary, who had
been identified by name in the text, and the seminarians, whose identity had
not been disclosed. Likewise, on the photographs, the applicant’s face had been
visible while the seminarian’s face had been blurred.
2. The Court’s assessment
The applicant complained that the courts’
refusal to grant him compensation under the Media Act in respect of the
publication of the article and the two photographs in the issue of Profil
of 12 July 2004 amounted to a failure to protect his right to respect for
his private life.
In cases of the type being examined here what is
in issue is not an act by the State but the alleged inadequacy of the
protection afforded by the domestic courts to the applicant’s private life.
While the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely
compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective
respect for private and family life. These obligations may involve the adoption
of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of
the relations of individuals between themselves. That also applies to the
protection of a person’s picture against abuse by others (see Von Hannover
v. Germany (no. 2), cited
above, § 98, with further
references).
The boundary between the State’s positive and
negative obligations under Article 8 does not lend itself to precise definition;
the applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the relevant
competing interests (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 99).
(a) General principles
Starting from the premise that the present case
requires an examination of the fair balance that has to be struck between the
applicant’s right to the protection of his private life under Article 8 of the
Convention and the publisher’s right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by
Article 10, the Court finds it useful to reiterate some general principles
relating to the application of both articles.
In respect of Article 8, the Court has already
held that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal
identity, such as a person’s name, photo or physical and moral integrity (see Von Hannover
(no. 2), cited above, § 95). Regarding photographs the Court has stated
that a person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her
personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and
distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of
one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal development. It
mainly presupposes the individual’s right to control the use of that image
including the right to refuse publication thereof (ibid., § 96; see also Standard
Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 21277/05, § 48, 4 June 2009, and
Hachette Filipacchi Associés (ICI PARIS) v. France, no. 12268/03, § 53, 23 July 2009).
In certain circumstances, even where a person is
known to the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation”
of protection of and respect for his or her private life (see Von Hannover
(no. 2), cited above, § 97).
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions
for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to
paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or
“ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter
of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the
demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
“democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, freedom of expression is
subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need
for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see, as a recent
authority, Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 78, 7 February 2012 and also, among
other authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49,
Series A no. 24; Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, § 42, ECHR 2004-IV;
and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02
and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007-IV).
The Court has also repeatedly emphasised the
essential role played by the press in a democratic society. Although the press
must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the
reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart - in a
manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities - information and
ideas on all matters of public interest. Not only does the press have the task
of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive
them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of
“public watchdog” (see, as a recent authority, Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 79; see also Bladet
Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, §§ 59 and 62, ECHR
1999-III, and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99,
§ 71, ECHR 2004-XI).
Journalistic freedom also covers possible
recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. Furthermore, it is
not for the Court, any more than it is for the national courts, to substitute
its own views for those of the press as to what techniques of reporting should
be adopted in a particular case (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, §
81; Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298;
and Eerikäinen and Others v. Finland, no. 3514/02, § 65, 10 February
2009).
While freedom of expression
includes the publication of photos, this is nonetheless an area in which the
protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular
importance, as the photos may contain very personal or even intimate information
about an individual and his or her family (see Von Hannover (no. 2),
cited above, § 103, and Eerikäinen and Others, cited above, § 70).
The adjective “necessary” within the meaning of
Article 10 § 2 implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. In
assessing whether such a need exists and what measures should be adopted to
deal with it, the national authorities are left with a certain margin of
appreciation. This power of appreciation is not unlimited but goes hand in hand
with a European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final
ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as
protected by Article 10. The Court’s task in exercising its supervisory
function is to look at the interference in the light of the case as a whole and
determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it
are “relevant and sufficient” and whether it was “proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued” (see, among other authorities, Bladet Tromsø and
Stensaas, cited above, § 58, and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens
and July, cited above, § 45).
Furthermore,
the Court has recently set out the relevant principles to be applied when
examining the necessity of an interference with the right to freedom of
expression in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of
others”. It noted that in such cases the Court may by required to verify
whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two
values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each
other in certain cases, namely on the one hand, freedom of expression protected
by Article 10 and, on the other, the right to respect for private life enshrined
in Article 8 (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 84, and MGN
Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 142, 18 January 2011).
50. In Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (cited above, §§
104-107) and Axel Springer
AG (cited above, §§ 85-88), the Court defined the Contracting States’
margin of appreciation and its own role in balancing these two conflicting
interests. The relevant paragraphs of the latter judgment read as follows:
“85. The Court reiterates that, under Article 10 of
the Convention, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation
in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with the freedom of
expression guaranteed under that provision is necessary (see Tammer v.
Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 60, ECHR 2001-I, and Pedersen and
Baadsgaard, cited above, § 68).
86. However, this margin goes hand in hand with
European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying
it, even those delivered by an independent court (see Karhuvaara and
Iltalehti v. Finland, no. 53678/00, § 38, ECHR 2004-X, and Flinkkilä
and Others, cited above, § 70).
In exercising its supervisory function, the Court’s task is not to take the
place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as
a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of
appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on
(see Petrenco v. Moldova, no. 20928/05, § 54, 30 March 2010; Polanco
Torres and Movilla Polanco,
cited above, § 41; and Petrov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 27103/04, 2
November 2010).
87. In
cases such as the present one the Court considers that the outcome of the
application should not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been
lodged with the Court under Article 10 of the Convention by the publisher who
has published the offending article or under Article 8 of the Convention by the
person who was the subject of that article. Indeed, as a matter of principle
these rights deserve equal respect (see Hachette Filipacchi Associés (ICI
PARIS) v. France, no. 12268/03,
§ 41, 23 July 2009; Timciuc
v. Romania (dec.), no. 28999/03,
§ 144, 12 October 2010; and Mosley v. the United Kingdom,
no. 48009/08, § 111, 10 May
2011; see also point 11 of the Resolution of the Parliamentary
Assembly - paragraph 51 above). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should
in principle be the same in both cases.
88. Where the balancing exercise between those two
rights has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the
criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, the Court would require strong
reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see MGN
Limited, cited above, §§ 150
and 155, and Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06,
28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06,
§ 57, 12 September 2011).”
The Court
went on to identify a number of criteria as being relevant where the right of
freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for
private life (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, §§ 109-113,
and Axel Springer AG, cited above, §§ 89-95), namely:
(i) contribution to a debate of general interest
(ii) how well known is the person concerned and what is the
subject of the report?
(iii) prior conduct of the person concerned
(iv) method of obtaining the information and its veracity/
circumstances in which the photographs were taken
(v) content, form and consequences of the publication
(b) Application of these principles to the present
case
The Court therefore has to examine whether the
domestic courts balanced the applicant’s right to protection of his private
life in respect of the statements made and the photographs published in Profil
on 12 July 2004 against the publisher’s right to freedom of expression in
accordance with the criteria laid down in its case-law (see paragraph 51
above).
The judgments complained of were given in proceedings
under the Media Act, by the Regional Court on 15 September 2005 and by the
Vienna Court of Appeal on 28 June 2006. The Court observes that in contrast to
Mr Küchl, the principal of the seminary, the applicant did not request an
injunction under section 78 of the Copyright Act against the publication of his
picture in the context of statements similar to those made in the article published
in Profil on 12 July 2004.
(i) Contribution to a debate of general interest
The Court reiterates that in the balancing of
interests under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, the contribution made
by photos or articles in the press is an essential criterion (see Von
Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 109, with further references). Both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal found that the article published in Profil on
12 July 2004 contributed to a public debate. In its judgment of 15
September 2005 the Regional Court referred to the importance of the Roman
Catholic Church as a role model and found that the public had an interest in
knowing what was going on within the Church. It stressed in particular that
following the seizure of child pornography material at the St Pölten seminary,
the public had an interest in being informed about occurrences at that
seminary. In its judgment of 28 June 2006 the Court of Appeal, examining the
issue in more detail, also noted the important position held by the Roman
Catholic Church in Austrian society. It observed that the Church regularly made
its moral values known to the general public. In view of the Church’s position
condemning homosexuality, the public had a right to be informed about the
conduct of a dignitary of the Church which was in open contradiction with that
position, all the more so if such conduct occurred at a training institution
for future priests and involved contacts, albeit voluntary ones, between future
priests and their superiors.
The Court agrees with this assessment. It notes
in particular that the definition of what constitutes a subject of general
interest will depend on the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, it points
out that it has recognised the existence of such an interest not only where the
publication concerned political issues or crimes but also where it concerned
sporting issues or performing artists (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited
above, § 109, and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 90, with further
references). In the Court’s view, material like that at issue, relating to the
moral position advocated by an influential religious community and to the
question whether Church dignitaries live up to their Church’s proclaimed
standards, also contributes to a debate of general interest.
The applicant did not explicitly comment on
whether or not the article as such contributed to a public debate, but contested the assertion that identifying him by disclosing his name and publishing his picture made
any useful contribution to a public debate. In this connection the Court notes that
the domestic courts not only considered that Profil had been entitled to
report on the occurrences at the priests’ seminary, but also did not dispute that
the magazine had been entitled to disclose the applicant’s name.
The Court notes that, when refusing the
applicant’s claim for damages in the proceedings under the Media Act, the
courts did not distinguish between the reporting as such and the publication of
the photographs at issue. Both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal
emphasised the close connection between the reporting - which they accepted as
contributing to a debate of general interest - and the applicant’s function as
deputy principal of the seminary. The Vienna Court of Appeal added that in the particular
context, namely reporting on serious shortcomings in a training institution,
the article could legitimately identify the applicant, as without doing so it
would not be possible for the press to report on the subject in a specific and
credible manner and thus to fulfil its function as “public watchdog”.
At this point the Court observes that the
domestic courts found that Profil had been entitled to publish the
report and to disclose the identity of the applicant in the particular context
of the case. It will revert later to the question of publication of the
photographs.
(ii) How well known is the person concerned and what
is the subject of the report?
The role or function of the person concerned and
the nature of the activities that are the subject of the report and/or photograph
constitute another important criterion, related to the preceding one. In that
connection a distinction has to be made between private individuals and persons
acting in a public context, as political figures or public figures.
Accordingly, whilst a private individual unknown to the public may claim
particular protection of his or her right to private life, the same is not true
of public figures. A fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting
facts capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, relating to
politicians in the exercise of their official functions for example, and
reporting details of the private life of an individual who does not exercise
such functions (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 110, with
further references).
Regarding the question of how well known the applicant
was, the Regional Court, in its judgment of 15 September 2005, examined the
issue in close connection with the finding that the subject of the article was
one of public interest. It found that in his function as deputy principal of
the seminary the applicant had to be regarded as a public figure. In its
judgment of 28 June 2006 the Vienna Court of Appeal did not describe the
applicant as a public figure, but emphasised that his activity as deputy principal
of the seminary and his public relations work as private secretary to the
bishop had a direct connection with “public life” owing to the important position
of the Roman Catholic Church in Austria.
With regard to the subject of the article
published in Profil on 12 July 2004, the domestic courts found that
it reported on serious grievances concerning the St Pölten seminary. They held
that the article focused on the discrepancy between the official position of
the Roman Catholic Church in respect of homosexuality and the private conduct
of representatives of that Church. They had regard to the fact that the
applicant was a dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church. They also took account
of the fact that the events reported on in the article (including homosexual contacts
between seminarians and also between seminarians and their superiors) had
occurred at the seminary of which the applicant had been the deputy principal
at the material time. In the domestic courts’ view, these issues were all the
more a matter of legitimate public interest since the homosexual contacts had
occurred, albeit on a consensual basis, in the context of trainer/trainee relationships.
The Court takes note of the
Regional Court’s view that the applicant qualified as a public figure, and observes
that the Court of Appeal apparently did not follow that approach. In any case,
the Court reiterates that whether a person is well known is only one criterion
among a number of others (see, for instance, Standard Verlags GmbH v.
Austria (no. 3), no. 34702/07, § 38, 10 January 2012, where the Court did not consider that a senior
bank manager was a public figure, but nevertheless found a violation of Article
10 in respect of the domestic court’s order to pay damages for the disclosure
of the manager’s name in an article relating to a banking scandal; see
also Eerikäinen and Others, cited above, §§ 66-72, in which the
publication concerned an ordinary individual but where the Court nevertheless
found a violation of Article 10 in respect of an order to pay damages for
publishing the person’s name and picture in the context of a report on an issue
of general interest, namely the abuse of public funds).
In sum, the Court considers that the domestic
courts attached due importance to the link between the applicant’s position as deputy
principal of the seminary in issue and the subject matter of the article, which
contributed to a debate of general interest. The Court agrees with their
conclusion that the public interest in the reporting, including the
identification of the applicant, prevailed over the latter’s interest in the
protection of his private life. As the Court has already mentioned above, it
will revert later to the question of publication of the photographs.
(iii) Prior conduct of the person concerned
The domestic courts’ decisions do not contain
much information in respect of the applicant’s prior conduct. The Court
observes that it may be assumed that he was relatively well known in the St
Pölten diocese. The domestic courts mentioned, albeit without giving details,
that the applicant had carried out public relations work in his function as
private secretary to Bishop Krenn, the bishop of the diocese. However, while
the latter had repeatedly made statements in the media condemning homosexuality
in strong terms and provoking equally strong reactions, it is not clear from
the domestic decisions whether the applicant had contributed to that debate or
had entered the public arena in any other way before the events which gave rise
to publication of the article at issue.
(iv) Method of obtaining the information and its
veracity, and circumstances in which the photographs were taken
The Court reiterates that the way in which the
information was obtained and its veracity are also important factors. Indeed,
the Court has held that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 of the Convention
to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is
subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate
factual basis and provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with
the ethics of journalism (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 93).
Furthermore, the Court has already held that the
context and circumstances in which the published photographs were taken cannot
be disregarded. In that connection regard must be had to whether the person
photographed consented to the taking of the photos and their publication or
whether this was done without their knowledge or by subterfuge or other illicit
means. Regard must also be had to the nature or seriousness of the intrusion
and the consequences of the publication of the photo for the person concerned
(see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 113).
The domestic courts did not deal in detail with
the question of how the publisher of Profil had obtained the information
published in the article of 12 June 2004. However, they thoroughly examined the
veracity of the information. In its judgment of 15 September 2005 the Regional Court found that the average reader of Profil would understand the article
as reporting that there had been homosexual contacts between the applicant and
seminarians and also between seminarians, and that there existed photographs to
support those allegations. It heard evidence from a number of witnesses and
found that the publisher had proved that in essence the allegations were true.
The Vienna Court of Appeal also held a hearing and upheld the Regional Court’s
assessment of the facts as well as its legal view. It dismissed the applicant’s
argument that the Regional Court had wrongly established the content of the
article and had consequently wrongly assumed that the publisher had proved the truth
of the allegations. The Court of Appeal found that the average reader would
understand the term “kinky” to mean a deviation from normal conduct, which was
the case with a priest and a seminarian in a homosexual pose.
In so far as the applicant repeated his argument
that the content of the article had been incorrectly established and the
evidence incorrectly assessed, the Court reiterates that the establishment of
the facts and the assessment of the evidence before them is primarily a matter
for the domestic courts (see, mutatis mutandis, García Ruiz v. Spain
[GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I). In the present case, the Court is
satisfied that the domestic courts came to the conclusion that the allegations
published were true on the basis of a thorough and detailed examination of the
case.
In respect of the photographs the domestic
courts observed that they had been taken at the private home of the applicant
during a Christmas party.
The Court notes that the photographs were taken
by one of the seminarians and were not intended for the eyes of any outsiders.
It appears from the article published in Profil that they were part of
the material seized during the search of the premises of the seminary. While
the question of how the pictures had come into the possession of the publisher
of Profil was not at issue in the domestic proceedings, it is clear that
they were obtained and published without the applicant’s consent.
(v) Content, form and consequences of the publication
The way in which the photo or report are
published and the manner in which the person concerned is represented in the
photo or report may also be factors to be taken into consideration (see Von
Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 112).
The article published in Profil on 12
July 2004 was accompanied by the impugned photographs (described at paragraph 8
above) and contained a detailed report, portraying the St Pölten diocese as
being in disarray over the events at the seminary. It repeated the information
about the seizure of child pornography material already reported in the article
of 5 July. It also reiterated the information about homosexual relationships
between seminarians as well as between seminarians and their superiors, but
explicitly stated that there was no abuse of authority involved as had been
suggested in the previous article. The article also devoted space to the
applicant’s replies to the allegations raised, including his view that the
photographs could be interpreted in different ways and showed no more than a friendly
embrace.
The Court has already observed that it agrees
with the assessment made by the courts as far as the reporting is concerned,
including the disclosure of the applicant’s identity. However, it has also
indicated that an issue may arise on account of the fact that the courts did
not distinguish between the text of the report and the publication of the photographs.
In other words, they did not carry out a separate balancing of the conflicting
interests in relation to the photographs.
The Court observes that the
photographs showed the applicant exchanging a French kiss with a seminarian,
and thus exposed an intimate detail of his private life. Taking into account
also the fact that his physical appearance was not known to the general public
before publication of the article, the Court considers that the publication of
his photograph amounted to more substantial interference than the written
article (see Erikäinen and Others, cited above, § 70).
(vi) Conclusion
The Court reiterates that two aspects may have
to be distinguished when examining the applicant’s complaint that the courts’
decisions in the proceedings under the Media Act failed to protect his right to
respect for his private life. The first aspect concerns the publication of
statements about the applicant’s alleged homosexual relationship with a
seminarian, while the second concerns the publication of two photographs, one
showing the applicant about to kiss the seminarian concerned and the other
showing him exchanging a French kiss with the same seminarian.
The domestic courts found that the text of the
article published in Profil on 12 June 2004, including the disclosure of
the applicant’s identity, fell within the limits of permissible reporting on a
matter of general interest. They took extensive evidence, in particular from a
number of witnesses, and came to the conclusion that in essence the allegations
made in the article were true. The Court sees no reason, let alone any strong
reason, to deviate from the domestic courts’ findings, which were based on
thoroughly established facts and a detailed assessment of the conflicting
interests, in accordance with the criteria established by the Court’s case-law.
The Court will now turn to the second aspect of
the applicant’s complaint, namely that the courts failed to protect him against
the publication of the photographs at issue. In the Court’s view this aspect of
the case raises a difficult question of a borderline nature. In the proceedings
under sections 6 and 7 of the Media Act, the domestic courts applied the
criteria established by the Court’s case-law in examining the question whether Profil
had violated the applicant’s rights by publishing the photographs, although
they went into less detail than in respect of the statements made in the
report. The Court does not see any strong reasons to substitute its own view
for that of the domestic courts.
Finally, the Court reiterates that the choice of
means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention in the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a
matter that falls within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation,
whether the obligations of the State are positive or negative (see Von
Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 104). The Court observes that, in addition
to proceedings under the Media Act, Austrian law provides protection against
the publication of a person’s picture under section 78 of the Copyright Act.
That provision aims specifically at protecting individuals against publication
of their image and allows them to obtain an injunction, preceded if need be by
a preliminary injunction. The request for an injunction may also be combined
with a claim for damages. By contrast, sections 6 and 7 of the Media Act are
more generally concerned with protection against defamation or exposure of an
individual’s strictly personal sphere through any form of publication in the
media. Persons whose rights have been infringed are entitled to compensation. The
Court notes that the applicant chose not to bring proceedings under section 78
of the Copyright Act. In these circumstances, the fact that the applicant was
refused compensation in respect of the publication of his picture in the proceedings
under the Media Act does not disclose a failure on the domestic authorities’
part to protect the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
The foregoing considerations are sufficient for
the Court to conclude that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant further complained of a violation
of Article 6 of the Convention in that the courts had refused to obtain an
opinion from an expert in photographic analysis in order to show that the
impression created by one of the published photographs, namely that he was
exchanging a French kiss with the seminarian K., was an optical illusion.
Lastly, the applicant complained under Article
13 of the Convention that he did not have any possibility of challenging the
Vienna Court of Appeal’s decision of 28 June 2006 before the Supreme Court.
In the light of all the material in its
possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention
or its Protocols. It follows that these complaint are manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the
Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the applicant’s complaint under
Article 8 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 December 2012,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre
Registrar President