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JEMEL JANOVS v Latvia - 37364/05 [2012] ECHR 195 (17 January 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/195.html
Cite as:
[2012] ECHR 195
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THIRD
SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 37364/05
Vasilijs JEMEĻJANOVS
against
Latvia
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 17 January
2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Josep
Casadevall,
President,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Egbert
Myjer,
Ján
Šikuta,
Ineta
Ziemele,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Kristina
Pardalos,
judges,
and Marialena Tsirli,
Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged on 23 September 2005,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The
applicant, Mr Vasilijs Jemeļjanovs, is a Latvian
national who was born in 1965 and is currently serving a prison
sentence in Daugavgrīvas prison in Daugavpils.
A. The circumstances of the case
The
facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant,
may be summarised as follows.
1. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
5 October 2004 the applicant was arrested very shortly after he
had stabbed a person in the chest with a knife in the presence of
multiple eye-witnesses. The victim died in a hospital later on the
same day.
The
applicant was detained and on 4 November 2004 he was officially
charged with murder. The decision to charge him (lēmums par
personas saukšanu pie kriminālatbildības)
indicated that the applicant had stabbed the victim with the purpose
to murder him “because of a personal conflict”. The
applicant and a sworn attorney signed a statement that the decision
and the procedural rights at the pre-trial stage had been explained
to them.
On
3 January 2005 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred
for adjudication to the Daugavpils Court. In a decision to that
effect a judge of the Daugavpils Court declared that the first
hearing would be held on 7 April 2005 and that, among other
persons, a defence counsel would be called.
At
the hearing of 7 April 2005 the applicant was represented by a
court-appointed attorney S. According to the transcript of the court
proceedings, the applicant “refused the services of the
attorney [S.]”. The attorney stated that there was “a
conflict between the interests of the client and the interests of
defence”. For that reason he invited the court to grant the
applicant’s request. The court decided to release S. from his
duties. When asked by the court, the applicant stated that he needed
to be represented by counsel. The court adjourned the trial.
On
27 May 2005 the senior attorney (vecākais advokāts)
of the Daugavpils Court district rejected the trial judge’s
request to appoint an attorney to conduct the applicant’s
defence. The reply indicated that Article 98 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Kriminālprocesa kodekss; KPK; see
below, paragraph 28) did not give the accused the right to freely
choose a lawyer. It was further pointed out that S. had carried out
his duties diligently. The senior attorney indicated that the
applicant could choose to either appoint an attorney of his own
choice (and pay for his services) or to refuse the services of an
attorney.
On
an unspecified date attorney D. was appointed to represent the
applicant.
On
20 June 2005 the applicant wrote a letter to D., indicating that he
was not sure why D. had consented to represent him despite their
“unpleasant” first meeting. The applicant pointed out
that he had not had the intention to kill the victim and had not
suspected that his death would occur. He asked D. to help him to
submit arguments concerning the legal classification of his actions,
since he believed that he had not committed the intentional murder
that he had been charged with. In addition, the applicant asked the
lawyer to request additional evidence, namely, to test him with a
polygraph, to request the presence of additional witnesses and to
request his repeated psychiatric testing. In the conclusion of the
letter the applicant wrote as follows:
“I have no possibility to pay for the quality of
your services. Therefore, if you do not wish to undertake my defence,
you have the possibility to refuse to provide me legal services
[thus] freeing yourself from guilt and freeing me from receiving
legal services of a poor quality.
... with all [due] respect to you, I will be forced to
ask for your removal, if your defence activities will be similar to
the activities of the previous defence counsel and will be limited to
only being present at the court hearings.”
At
the hearing of 1 September 2005 the applicant was represented by D.
At the beginning of the hearing the applicant’s counsel
supported his request for an additional forensic psychiatric
examination and reserved his comments concerning the applicant’s
request to issue a new statement of charges and to carry out a
re-enactment of the crime at the scene of the crime. Immediately
afterwards the applicant “challenged the attorney [D.]”
(просил отклонить
адвоката) and
asked the court to appoint another counsel.
D.
submitted to the court the applicant’s letter of 20 June 2005
and invited the court to establish whether the applicant “needed
to be represented at all”. The court appended the applicant’s
letter to the materials of the case. In response to a question from
the court the applicant stated that he could not name a specific
lawyer to whom he wished to entrust his defence. The court adopted an
interim non-appealable decision, which in the relevant parts provided
as follows:
“At the preparatory stage of the trial [the
applicant] refused the services of his court-appointed attorney [D.]
because the attorney could not guarantee that he would be exculpated
and also because the attorney did not conduct his defence
sufficiently well.
[The applicant] requests that his defence counsel be
replaced, without naming a specific attorney.
The court considers that [the applicant’s] request
should be rejected because on two occasions [the applicant] has been
appointed defence lawyers [and] twice he has refused [the] services
... of attorneys [S. and D.]
Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...
provides that an accused person’s defence counsel is appointed
by a court; it is not selected by the accused person himself. Defence
counsel for [the applicant] was appointed on two occasions.
According to Article 99 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ... an accused person has a right to refuse the services of
defence counsel altogether but not a right to request a replacement
of defence counsel.
The court considers [the applicant’s] refusal of
[the services of the two] attorneys to be a refusal of [the services
of] defence counsel altogether and an intentional delaying of the
court proceedings. The court considers that the reasons for the
defendant’s refusal of the services of the attorney [D.] are
unjustified. [The applicant’s] rights to defence in the present
case have not been violated.”
The
trial continued with the applicant being unrepresented. He voiced his
displeasure with that fact on numerous occasions and whenever he was
invited to ask questions to witnesses, he refused to do so, usually
explaining that he had some questions to ask but was unable to do so
in the absence of a defence lawyer.
After
the Law of Criminal Procedure (Kriminālprocesa likums;
KPL) replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant lodged a
written request with the court on 25 October 2005, requesting it
to secure the observance of his defence rights. The applicant
referred to section 71 of KPL (see below, paragraph 30). He further
argued that his earlier requests to replace the two court-appointed
attorneys could not have been construed as a waiver of the right to
the assistance of a lawyer. The applicant invited the court to
provide to him a list of all lawyers practicing in Latvia and a means
of communication with them or, in the alternative, to ensure his
representation by one of the two lawyers he had chosen.
At
the hearing of 12 January 2006 the court held that
“the question [concerning the appointment of a
defence lawyer to the applicant] has already been decided and it is
impossible to review that decision, since the Law of Criminal
Procedure does not provide for a possibility to appoint a lawyer with
respect to one part of the court proceedings[;] if a defence counsel
participates [in the proceedings], he does so from the very
beginning”.
On
31 January 2006 a public prosecutor of the Daugavpils City
Prosecutor’s Office amended the charges against the applicant.
The amendment concerned the motive of the applicant’s actions
and indicated that the applicant had committed the intentional murder
“without a reason, being guided by hooligan tendencies”.
The
Daugavpils Court adopted its judgment on 6 February 2006. The court
noted the applicant’s objection that he did not understand the
charges against him. It further remarked that the applicant had
refused to testify for various reasons, insisting that the charges
against him be amended, refusing to testify in the absence of a
lawyer and so on. The court went on to note that during the pre-trial
investigation the applicant had admitted that he had stabbed the
victim but had insisted that he had done so in self-defence, not with
a murderous intent.
Regarding
the applicant’s legal representation the court held that his
defence rights had not been violated, for the following reasons:
“On two occasions the [applicant refused the
services of his] court appointed defence attorneys. The court
considers that the defendant’s refusals were unjustified and
contrary to the legislation applicable at the time when the court was
called to decide on his request to change his defender. The Code of
Criminal Procedure which was in force on 1 September 2005 did
not give a defendant the right to challenge his defence counsel
[“право дать
отвод защитнику”].
On two occasions the defendant refused the services of defence
attorneys, relying on his own appreciation of the quality of the
attorneys’ work. The court considers such grounds ill-founded,
since at that time the investigation of the case had not at all been
started and there was no basis for the defendant’s arguments.
The defendant judged the quality of the attorneys’ work on the
basis of their defence of other defendants in other criminal cases.
In addition, the defendant required the defence attorneys to
guarantee that he would be acquitted.”
The
court then dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the
inadequacy of the charges against him. It held that the prosecutor
had amended the charges (by including a motive of the applicant’s
actions) in accordance with the requirements of the procedural law.
The court furthermore noted that witnesses had been called to give
their testimony on two occasions, once following a request of the
applicant who then refused to pose questions to them in the absence
of defence counsel.
The
court went on to find the applicant guilty as charged. To that end it
relied on the statements of seven witnesses who had been in the
immediate vicinity of the crime. It deemed unreliable the testimony
of another eyewitness who was detained together with the applicant
and with whom the applicant had been transported to the court
hearing. In addition the court took into account a significant volume
of documentary and material evidence. The applicant was sentenced to
twelve years’ imprisonment with a subsequent police control of
two years.
On
26 March 2006 the applicant lodged a preliminary appeal which would
be explained in more detail during a court hearing. The “main
goal” of the appeal was to have the first-instance court’s
judgment quashed due to, inter alia, the violation of the
applicant’s defence rights. The applicant requested the appeal
court to appoint him a lawyer and to call all witnesses heard by the
first-instance court. In addition he requested that he be given an
opportunity to meet with the lawyer prior to the court hearing in
order to reach and agreement on the defence strategy.
The
Latgale Regional Court held its first hearing on 17 May 2006. The
applicant was represented by attorney M. The applicant alleges that
he had had no opportunity to meet with M. before the hearing. The
trial was adjourned until 8 November 2006 because the applicant
needed additional time to prepare his defence. In the hearing of 8
November 2006 the applicant was represented by attorney V. The
applicant told the court that he had no objections to the work of V.
but that he needed a lawyer’s assistance not only during the
court hearings but also in order to carry out certain investigative
steps and gather certain information that would support his defence
position. V. clarified that a lawyer could help the applicant to
obtain information about the personal characteristics of the
witnesses as well as to locate additional witnesses. The applicant
and his lawyer then asked the court to question the witnesses who had
testified at the first-instance court. The court decided to reject
that request because the applicant had not included such a request in
his written appeal.
By
a decision adopted on 8 November 2006 the Latgale Regional Court
dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It fully upheld the
first-instance court’s findings on the merits of the case. As
to the fairness of the proceedings, the appeal court found that the
first-instance court had given “the defendant all possibilities
to choose an attorney and, in order to realise his right to defence,
[had given in] to all whims and fancies of the defendant, [thus]
taking upon it functions uncharacteristic to a court”. The
court went on to point out that the applicant did not belong to the
category of persons whose legal representation at trial is compulsory
(as set down in section 83 of KPL; see below, paragraph 32).
Consequently the appeal court considered the applicant capable of
having been able to perform his own defence. To that end the court
remarked that the applicant had been given full opportunity to defend
himself since the first-instance court had summoned all witnesses on
two occasions. However, the applicant himself had not made use of
that opportunity under various pretexts.
On
13 December 2006 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law.
In a document consisting of thirty-one handwritten pages the
applicant complained of, among many other things, the quality of the
services provided by his court-appointed lawyers at the
first-instance court as well as at the court of appeal and of the
first-instance court’s decision to deprive him of legal
representation.
On
16 January 2007 the applicant was informed that it had been decided
that his appeal on points of law had not disclosed any significant
violations of the Criminal Law or the Law of Criminal Procedure. It
was therefore not accepted for adjudication in the Senate of the
Supreme Court. That decision was final.
2. Other facts
The
crime committed by the applicant received some coverage in the
regional press. One of the articles written about the murder
incorrectly stated that only a year earlier the applicant had been
released from prison after serving a sentence for the murder of his
father. The applicant considered that information libellous and on
numerous occasions attempted to institute civil proceedings in that
respect against the publisher of the newspaper. All of his claims
were not accepted and were returned to him for procedural reasons.
The latest decision in that regard was adopted by the Daugavpils
Court on 14 October 2006.
In
June 2006 the applicant gave some materials from his criminal
case-file to a prisoner who was being released from prison in order
for him to make copies and send them back to the applicant. The
documents were taken away from that prisoner and the applicant only
received them back approximately one month later after multiple
requests to the administration of the prison.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. Code of Criminal Procedure (in force until
30 September 2005)
Article 95 of KPK listed the rights of an accused
person, including the right to request defence counsel at the trial
stage (pieprasīt aizstāvi iztiesāšanā).
Article 96 specified that a defence lawyer had a right to participate
in the proceedings starting from the moment when his client was
declared a suspect. The same Article also provided that if the
defence counsel could not participate in the trial, the person
directing the proceedings, the prosecutor and the court had a right
to recommend to the person under trial to invite a different attorney
or to provide for that person’s legal representation. Article
97 set out a defence lawyer’s rights and obligations,
providing, inter alia, for an obligation to utilise all legal
means to establish circumstances that could mitigate his client’s
guilt or exculpate the client. The same Article also provided that a
defence attorney had no right to refuse to represent a client once
the attorney had undertaken to carry out the defence. Article 971
provided that an attorney could not act as a defence counsel because
of a prior involvement in the same case or because he was a relative
of another person involved in the case.
Article
98 provided as follows:
“Legal counsel’s participation in the trial
at the first-instance court shall be mandatory:
in cases concerning criminal acts committed by minors;
in cases concerning persons who are deaf, blind or
otherwise incapable of independently using their right to defence
because of physical or mental defects;
in cases against persons who do not understand the
language in which the criminal proceedings are conducted;
in cases of contradictions between the defence interests
of [several] accused persons where at least one of the accused is
represented by a lawyer”.
In such cases the accused
could choose their own representative or else the person directing
the proceedings, the prosecutor or the court had an obligation to
ensure a representative’s participation.
Concerning
the refusal of the services of an attorney, Article 99 provided as
follows:
“A suspect, an accused and a person under trial
shall have a right to refuse [the services of] an attorney. Such a
refusal shall only be permissible upon the initiative of the suspect,
the accused or the person under trial ...”
2. Law of Criminal Procedure (in force from 1 October
2005)
According to section 71 of KPL an accused has a right
to appoint a lawyer or to ask that a defence lawyer be appointed for
participation in the trial (lūgt nodrošināt
aizstāvja piedalīšanos tiesas sēdē)
(section 71 (2)) as well as to ask for a replacement of the defence
lawyer in case his participation in the trial is precluded by law
(section 71 (5)). Those rights apply both in the first instance
court as well as in the appeal court. Section 87 precludes a
lawyer’s participation in trial in cases of personal or
professional conflict of interests.
In
so far as is relevant, section 83 provides for a compulsory
participation of a defence lawyer in cases concerning persons who
cannot fully make use of their procedural rights because of physical
or mental deficiencies and also in cases concerning illiterate
persons or persons whose educational level is so low that they cannot
adequately make use of their procedural rights.
According
to section 80 a defence counsel is normally recruited by the accused
person. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of that section the police, the
prosecutors and the courts cannot invite a specific attorney to
represent the accused person. However, they can provide to the
accused the necessary information and the necessary means of
communication for inviting a defence lawyer.
Once
a lawyer has agreed to represent a person, section 79 (3) prohibits
him to refuse to represent his client without the client’s
consent. On the other hand, section 88 permits the accused person to
refuse the services of defence counsel. The refusal should always be
initiated by the accused person himself. The refusal should be noted
in the minutes of the respective procedural stage and confirmed by a
signature of the accused person.
COMPLAINTS
The
applicant complains under Article 6 §§
1 and 3 (a), (b) and (d) of the Convention that he was not
immediately and in detail informed of the nature and the basis for
the charges against him, as a result of which during the pre-trial
investigation the necessary witnesses were not questioned and he did
not have sufficient time to prepare his defence. In addition, the
first instance and appeal courts had refused to summon witnesses
requested by the applicant.
The
applicant complains under Article 6 § 3 (c)
that he was deprived of a right to legal assistance at the pre-trial
stage, in the first-instance court and while he was preparing his
appeal and appeal on points of law. In particular, he criticises the
quality of the work of the court-appointed lawyers S. and D. He
furthermore complains that the first-instance court intentionally
misinterpreted his request to replace the attorney D. with another
one as a waiver of a right to be represented by an attorney. As a
result, he was unrepresented after 1 September 2005 and was unable to
adequately conduct his defence.
The
applicant complains under Articles 5 § 3, 6 § 1 and 13 of
the Convention about the length of his pre-trial detention and the
impossibility to submit complaints in that respect.
Without
invoking any Articles of the Convention the applicant complains that
the domestic authorities obstructed the preparation of his
application to the Court when for a month they failed to return him
the documents from his criminal case file.
In
a letter sent to the Court on 15 June 2007 the applicant added the
following complaints:
a) under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention he
complains about the quality of the work of the appeal court. More
specifically, he denounces their refusal to summon witnesses, order
additional expert reports and so on;
b) under the same Article the applicant criticises the
fact that the decision-making in the Senate of the Supreme Court
concerning his appeal on points of law did not follow the basic
procedural requirements, such as his being informed ahead of time
about the date of the forthcoming hearing, being given an opportunity
to demand a disqualification of a judge and to receive a motivated
court decision;
c) under Articles 6 § 1, 8 § 1 and 13 the
applicant complains about the domestic courts’ refusal to
accept for adjudication on merits his civil-law claim concerning the
allegedly libellous newspaper article, as a result of which the State
had failed to protect his right to respect for his private life;
d) under Article 14 of the Convention the applicant
complains that the domestic authorities refuse to give reasoned
replies to the complaints written in his native Russian language.
THE LAW
The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 3
(c) that he was deprived of a right to legal assistance at the
pre-trial stage, in the first instance court and while he was
preparing his appeal and appeal on points of law, in particular
complaining that he was unrepresented after 1 September 2005.
Article
6 § 3 (c) of the Convention provides as follows:
“3. Everyone charged with a criminal
offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require ...”
The
Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file,
determine the admissibility of the above-mentioned complaint and that
it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of
the Rules of Court, to give notice of the application to the
respondent Government.
The
applicant further submitted numerous other complaints (see paragraphs
34 and 36-38 above). However, in the light of all the material
in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are
within its competence, the Court finds that the applicant’s
complaints in that regard do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its
Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s
complaint concerning the alleged deprivation of his right to legal
assistance after 1 September 2005;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Marialena Tsirli Josep Casadevall Deputy Registrar President