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Cite as: [2012] ECHR 147

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FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 28102/02
by Grażyna and Jerzy WALASZEK
against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 10 January 2012 as a Chamber composed of:

David Thór Björgvinsson, President,

Lech Garlicki,

Päivi Hirvelä,

George Nicolaou,

Ledi Bianku,

Nebojša Vučinić,

Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges,

and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 January 2001,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants, Ms Grażyna and Mr Jerzy Walaszek, are Polish nationals who live in Wroclaw. They were represented before the Court by Mr S. Waliduda, a lawyer practising in Wrocław. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 27 April 1995 the body of the applicants’ son was found drowned in a canal in Wrocław. As he was doing his military service at that time, having been granted one day’s leave on 1 April 1995, an investigation into the circumstances of his death was instituted on the same day by the Wrocław Military Garrison Prosecutor.

In the morning of 28 April 1995 an autopsy was carried out in the forensic department of the local medical university. It was established that the body had the typical symptoms of drowning. The victim must have been under the influence of alcohol (the alcohol level in his blood was 2.7‰) and this might have contributed to his drowning. The forensic medicine specialist found no traces of injuries.

As the applicants contested the autopsy results, on 13 July 1995 the prosecutor referred the case to the local medical university for an additional forensic opinion. It was requested to explain, inter alia, how putrefaction could have influenced the results of the blood alcohol test.

On 25 July 1995 the opinion was prepared, and stated that the putrefaction process could have increased the alcohol level in the victim’s blood by, at most, 1‰. Therefore the remaining alcohol, 1.7‰, must have originated from the victim’s consumption before his death.

In letters to the prosecutor dated 6, 9, 11 and 29 July 1995 the applicants expressed objections, alleging shortcomings in the investigation, and complained that certain people who might have known the victim’s whereabouts during the last hours of his life had not been questioned.

On 11 September 1995 the prosecutor questioned the doctor who had conducted the autopsy on 28 April 1995. The expert upheld the conclusions of the report, in particular as to drowning as the cause of death, and stated that if there had been superficial excoriations on the body caused by any physical assault on the victim, by the end of April 1995 they would have been invisible due to the putrefaction. The advanced state of the putrefaction indicated that the body must have remained in the water for two to three weeks.

On the same date a marine expert was requested to answer a number of questions; in particular as to whether, given the water conditions which must have existed in early spring, the body could have been taken into the canal by the current from the river.

In the course of the investigation the prosecutor questioned a number of witnesses.

On 20 September 1995 the marine expert submitted his opinion. He answered in the negative the question as to whether the body could have been taken to the canal by the current from the river and stated that the victim must have drowned in the canal.

On 20 December 1995 the applicants, having been granted access to the file, submitted their observations and objections; in particular that the autopsy had been carried out before they had given consent to it; that the autopsy had been very superficial and that the victim’s clothes had been destroyed without being examined. They also referred to certain statements made by R.G., their neighbour, who had said to their daughter that their son had been “floating in the [river] with a knife in his back”.

On 27 December 1995 the prosecutor halted the investigation, finding that no criminal offence had been committed. He outlined the events connected with the discovery and identification of the body. He further referred to the state of the body as described in the autopsy reports, both the initial and the complementary reports, and summarised their findings. The conclusions of the reports were that the victim’s death had been caused by drowning, which had occurred between 1 and 7 April 1997.

As the victim’s clothes had been destroyed, the prosecution had questioned police officers and the doctor present at the scene when the body had been found. They had stated that the clothes were not damaged, nor did they have any stains (which could suggest bleeding) on them.

The prosecutor observed that, as the marine expert had concluded that the victim had drowned in the canal, those responsible for the canals’ maintenance had been questioned. They had stated that normally the canal area was fenced in, but that they did not remember whether in April 1995 the gate was always closed or not.

The prosecutor referred to testimony given by employees of the security company situated in the vicinity of the canal, who had stated that during the evening in question they had not seen anything suspicious.

The prosecutor further referred to the testimony given by eight other witnesses: one colleague from the victim’s military unit, the victim’s mother, his neighbours and friends, and a disc jockey who had seen him on 1 April 1995. It emerged from that testimony that during the evening in question the victim had come home, stayed there for some time, changed his clothes and gone to a nightclub. He had last been seen at around midnight in the nightclub.

The prosecutor further referred to information obtained by the police, who had been told in an anonymous phone call that the victim had taken part in an affray in a nightclub in Traugutta Street. However, the disc jockey at that club had denied that there had been an affray that evening.

The prosecutor concluded that the death had been caused by drowning as shown by the autopsy and that there had been no other evidence pointing to other possible causes of his death.

The applicants appealed, complaining that the autopsy had been very superficial and carried out hastily; that they had been ordered to authorise it post factum; and that their son’s clothes had been destroyed after the forensic autopsy for unknown reasons, thus making it impossible to establish certain key facts. They also criticised the fact that no visit had been made to the place where the body was found. They averred that it therefore remained unclear how, when and where the victim could have entered the fenced area by the canal. They were of the view that their son’s death could have been caused by a criminal act and requested that his body be exhumed.

On 29 January 1996 the contested decision was upheld by the Śląsk Regional Military Prosecutor.

The prosecutor noted that it had been established that the victim had last been seen at the K. nightclub during the night of 1 April 1995. His body had been found on 27 April 1995 and an autopsy had been performed. The findings of the autopsy did not provide any material for a finding that the victim had been assaulted. While it was true that it had proved impossible to establish the exact place where the victim had fallen into the water, it was not open to doubt that he had met his death by drowning. The prosecution had questioned a number of witnesses in order to establish the course of events since the last time he had been seen in the nightclub. The prosecutor concluded that there was no evidence to support the view that the death had been caused by a criminal act.

Subsequently, in their letters sent to various authorities, the applicants repeatedly criticised various shortcomings in the investigation and requested that it be resumed, arguing that the prosecution had failed to make reasonable attempts to find all possible witnesses; that no evidence had been taken from the victim’s clothes and that they had been destroyed; that the victim had had injuries on his face, which could have indicated that he had been assaulted; that there had been an anonymous telephone call to the police; on the night in question the victim had been seen in a fight in front of a nightclub.

On 20 September 1996 the Wrocław Military Garrison Prosecutor, responding to the applicants’ complaints, ordered the investigation to be resumed. He noted that following their complaints a number of witnesses had been heard, in particular employees of the security agency Z. Their testimony could indicate that the death could have been caused by the criminal actions of some of those employees.

On 24 September 1996 the Wrocław Military Garrison Prosecutor transferred the case to the Wrocław District Prosecutor, on the ground that there was a need to take evidence from employees of a civilian company, namely the security staff referred to above. He noted that two contradictory versions of the events in question had emerged from the testimony given by the employees. The first version indicated that on the night in question the victim had been seen in the fenced area around the canal and that he had been pushed into the water by one of the security men, H.K., and the second version was that he had fallen into the water while fleeing the security men, who had been chasing him. Hence, it was necessary to establish the facts of the matter.

On an unspecified later date an inspection of the fenced area close to the canal was carried out.

On 22 March 1997 the applicants submitted their comments.

On 20 June 1997 the Wrocław Krzyki District Prosecutor stayed the proceedings. She indicated that an analysis needed to be made of tape recordings of the applicants’ conversations with many people who had called them with various information about their son’s last days. The forensic police laboratory was at that time organising a phonoscopy unit. The taking of further evidence had therefore to be stayed until that unit was operational.

On 7 December 1997 the applicants submitted lists of questions to be put to witnesses H.K. and R.G. On 19 February 1998 they submitted three further lists of questions to be put to Z.N. and A.S. and to all the employees of the Z. company.

On 15 June 1998 the Wrocław District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation in respect of inadvertently causing death and of failing to give assistance to a person in danger of life and limb. The prosecutor established that on 1 April 1995 the victim had left home at 10 p.m., telling his parents that he was going to a nightclub. He was later seen at K. nightclub, for the last time around midnight. He was, at that time, inebriated. He had not come back home and had not reported to his military unit. His body had been found in the canal on 27 April 1995. The results of the autopsy had shown that he had drowned. No injuries had been found on his body.

A number of witnesses had been questioned in order to establish his whereabouts during his last hours. In particular, employees of the Z. security company had been questioned. They had first stated that on the night in question nothing in particular had happened. However, when questioned for the second time they had said that one of them, H.K, had seen a man whose unauthorised presence near the company building had alarmed him. There had been discrepancies in their submissions as to whether H.K. had been chasing that man or not. In any event, there was no indication that that man could be the victim, as there was no evidence to indicate any resemblance to the applicants’ son, or that H.K.’s acts could have contributed, even indirectly, to the victim’s death.

The prosecutor noted that there had been various anonymous calls to the applicants, providing various information. Some callers had told them that their son had been murdered and that his body had been taken by car to the canal and thrown into the water. However, the individuals indicated by the anonymous informers as potential culprits had been questioned by the prosecution and no links could be established between them and the death of the applicants’ son.

On 7 July 1998 the applicants, who had apparently not been served with that decision, complained to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor of lack of diligence on the part of the District Prosecutor in the conduct of the case and about the length of the investigation. On 15 July 1998 they also complained that the investigation had been discontinued.

On 28 August 1998 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor allowed the applicants’ complaint and ordered further investigative measures to be taken.

On 2 October 1998 the applicants submitted a letter to the prosecutor’s office containing their comments on the testimony given by the witnesses so far.

On 11 December 1998 the investigation was again halted by the Wrocław Krzyki District Prosecutor. The decision reiterated the findings concerning the discovery of the victim’s body, the autopsy, the autopsy report, the cause of death established by that report, and the victim’s consumption of alcohol.

The testimony given by the security staff of the company was examined in detail. When questioned for the first time, they had said that on the night in question no third party had entered the fenced area they were guarding. However, they were questioned again and their statements diverged. It showed that late on the night in question one of them, H.K., had been pursuing a young man, most probably wearing military clothing, who had entered the fenced area of the company’s premises which were being guarded by the security men. They had said that H.K. had been seen by some other employees struggling with a young man at the edge of the canal and hitting him. The man had fallen into the canal and had not come out. According to statements by some other employees, a soldier had fallen into the water while fleeing H.K., who had been chasing him.

The prosecutor also examined the information submitted by the applicants, who had allegedly received an anonymous phone call stating that their son had been beaten up by the security company’s employees and then taken to the canal. According to the prosecutor, the evidence gathered during the investigation did not confirm this.

The applicants appealed, alleging serious shortcomings in the investigation, including failure to examine certain witnesses, namely the victim’s friends who had seen him arguing with the security staff, and the fact that he had been beaten. The applicants also criticised the brevity of the autopsy report and complained of the failure to secure physical or biological evidence or traces of a possible assault on the victim, which could have been found on his clothes. A metal military badge had been found at the scene, which indicated that the victim’s clothes might have been damaged during the fight. However, the prosecuting authorities had failed to examine that possibility.

The applicants alleged that the authorities had disregarded important facts and submissions, had not conducted the investigation thoroughly and had failed to establish the circumstances and to identify the perpetrators of their son’s death.

The Regional Prosecutor refused to allow the applicants’ appeal, and transmitted it to the Wrocław District Court for examination.

On 10 March 1999 the Wrocław District Prosecutor decided that documents concerning a possible criminal offence of giving false evidence, committed by employees of Z. company in connection with the investigation of the applicants’ son’s death, should be taken out of the file so that that suspicion could be investigated separately. On 24 March 1999 the Wrocław District Prosecutor informed the applicants accordingly.

On 24 April 1999 these proceedings were discontinued in respect of H.K., P.S., W.J., S.K. and Z.N. The prosecutor found that while there were certain discrepancies between their statements made at the beginning of the investigation and later on, these did not amount to the criminal offence of giving false evidence. They could be explained by the fact that when questioned for the first time the suspects could not have seen the link between the death of the applicants’ son and the events in the area they had been guarding; it was only after they had learned about the body being found in the vicinity and were questioned about the material events that they realised that they should have told the investigators about a man they had seen that night.

The prosecution found that Z.N. had not told the truth when he told the investigators that he had not telephoned the applicants after their son’s death. In fact, he had done so and his recorded voice was recognised. However, the prosecutor considered that this offence was of minor importance and did not ultimately affect the conduct of the investigation, and stayed the proceedings against him on a provisional basis.

On 20 January and 7 May 1999 the applicants reiterated their complaints about the decisions to terminate the investigation, given on 11 December 1998 and 24 April 1999.

On 23 June 1999 the Wrocław District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the decision to terminate the investigation into their son’s death.

The court observed that during the investigation the prosecuting authorities had taken all possible measures to establish the facts of the case. As a result, a great deal of evidence had been taken, the prosecuting authorities cooperating very closely with the applicants. The prosecuting authorities had examined multiple hypotheses as to the circumstances of the applicants’ son’s death. However, the material gathered in the case did not provide any basis on which to formulate criminal charges against any person.

On 6 July 1999 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor allowed the applicants’ appeal against the decision of 24 April 1999 and decided that the investigation in respect of charges of giving false evidence should be resumed.

On 31 December 1999 a bill of indictment against H.K., P.S. and Z.N. on charges of giving false evidence was submitted to the Wrocław Krzyki District Court. H.K. and P.S. were charged with hiding from the police the fact that during the night of 1 April 1995 they had seen an unknown man near the Z. company building and had chased him. Z.N. was charged with giving false evidence in that he had denied that he had telephoned the applicants and told them about that incident.

On 19 October 2000 the Wrocław Regional Court gave a judgment in these criminal proceedings. It stayed the proceedings against H.K. and P.S. on a provisional basis, and placed them on probation for two years. The decision to stay the proceedings was based on Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see Relevant domestic law). It also terminated the proceedings against Z.N., finding that the offence was of minor significance. H.K. appealed.

On 28 September 2001 the first applicant complained to the Wrocław District Court that the circumstances of his son’s death remained unexplained. There was no reply to the applicant’s letter.

On 7 January 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed H.K.’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 19 October 2000.

B. Relevant domestic law

Article 66 et seq. of the 1997 Criminal Code concern the staying of criminal proceedings on a provisional basis. Article 66 reads, in so far as relevant:

“§ 1. The court may provisionally stay criminal proceedings if the guilt and social danger of the act are not significant and the circumstances of its commission do not raise doubts, and that the attitude of the perpetrator, who has not been previously punished for an intentional offence, his personal characteristics and his way of life to date provide reasonable grounds for the assumption that, even in the event of the discontinuance of the proceedings, he will observe the legal order and in particular will not commit an offence.”

Article 67 provides, in so far as relevant:

“§ 1. Provisional discontinuance shall apply for a probationary term of between one and two years, which shall run from the date the judgment becomes valid and final.”

COMPLAINT

The applicants alleged that there had been no effective investigation into the death of their son, in breach of the Article 2 of the Convention.

THE LAW

The applicants alleged that there had been no effective investigation into the death of their son. They referred to Article 2 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”

The Government first submitted that the application had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit. The final decision to discontinue the investigation had been given by the Wrocław District Court on 23 June 1999 and, consequently, it was from that date that the six-month period had started to run. As the case before the Court concerned the question whether the investigation of the circumstances of the applicants’ son’s death by the domestic authorities was in compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the Convention, it was that decision which had been relevant for the purposes of the six-month period.

They further averred that the proceedings against the security employees, concerning the charges of giving false testimony in the investigation, which had come to an end on 7 January 2002, should be regarded as a separate set of proceedings and irrelevant to the applicants’ case before the Court. Since their application had been introduced on 13 January 2001, the applicants had not complied with the requirement laid down by the Convention.

The applicants submitted that on 19 October 2000 the Wrocław District Court found the three employees guilty of giving false testimony in the investigation into their son’s death. This judgment should be seen as confirmation of their guilt; however the courts only decided to place them on probation. One defendant appealed. His appeal was later dismissed by a decision of 7 January 2002. The defendants had been key witnesses in the investigation and had had important information about the last minutes of the victim’s life. The applicants’ attempts to resume the investigation after the judgments had been given in the case were unsuccessful. Therefore, the six-month period should be regarded as having started to run on 19 October 2000, when they were found guilty.

The Court notes that in the domestic proceedings the applicants tried to obtain clarification of the circumstances of their son’s death, while before the Court they sought to establish whether the State had complied with its procedural obligation to conduct a thorough and effective investigation. The Court is aware that the applicants argued that there had been a close link between the issues examined in the criminal proceedings against the three members of the security staff and the substance of their Convention complaint.

However, the Court considers that it is appropriate to leave open the issue of whether that link could affect the manner in which the running of the six-month time-limit should be determined in the present case, because the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

The applicants submitted that the investigations had not been conducted thoroughly or efficiently. In their opinion, the authorities had failed to take appropriate measures to establish the circumstances of their son’s death. The investigations had been halted several times and only the applicants’ determination and persistent efforts had resulted in their being resumed. In the applicants’ last appeal against the decision to discontinue the investigation, given on 11 December 1998, they had indicated serious shortcomings in the investigation, including the failure to examine certain witnesses, in particular their son’s friend who had seen the victim arguing with the security men and had seen them beating him up.

63. The Government submitted that the case concerned the death of the applicants’ son as a result of drowning while under the influence of alcohol, and not as a result of the use of force by agents of the State. The criminal investigation had been conducted by independent public prosecutors. They obtained evidence from a number of witnesses and from independent experts in marine matters, phonoscopy and forensic medicine. The decisions given by the prosecutors were subsequently examined and confirmed by the Wrocław District Court.

64. The public prosecutors were independent. The prosecutors were bound by the principles of objectivity and legality, being obliged by the latter principle to take action if there was an indication that a criminal offence could have been committed. They were under the obligation to take into consideration not only incriminating, but also exonerating circumstances. Hence, there could have been no doubt that the institutional and procedural framework in which the investigation was conducted complied with the requirements laid down by the Court’s case law.

The Government further submitted that in the present case the authorities had taken all reasonable steps to secure the evidence concerning the incident. In particular, an autopsy had been carried out immediately after the applicant’s son’s body had been found, and a forensic opinion as to the cause of death had subsequently been prepared. As the applicants had contested the results, an additional opinion had been prepared by the local medical university. The prosecutor had questioned the doctor who had conducted the autopsy. During the investigation 191 sessions had been held, during which witnesses were questioned and evidence taken. The victim’s mother had been questioned by the prosecutors on nine occasions and his father four times. Opinions by two experts had been prepared. Both the forensic expert and the marine expert had visited the area where the victim’s body had been found. The prosecutor had questioned most of the witnesses requested by the applicants, even those who had no connection with the incident.

Furthermore, the Government stressed that in their applications to the Wrocław District Prosecutor dated 7 and 15 July 1998, the applicants had acknowledged that the investigation conducted by the prosecutor E.T. had been thorough.

The Government considered that the investigation had been reasonably prompt. An autopsy had been carried out immediately after the body had been found. All material witnesses had been heard within a short period of time. The only interval in the investigation had resulted from the necessity to obtain the opinion of an expert in phonoscopy, but even when the investigation had been stayed the prosecutor had been taking further necessary measures. The additional opinions and the questioning of witnesses which had prolonged the investigation had resulted, on the one hand, from the new facts disclosed during the investigation and, on the other, from the fact that the applicants had made use of their procedural rights, contested the experts’ findings and suggested new witnesses to be questioned.

The Government further averred that the applicants and their daughter, as the next of kin of the victim, had been actively involved in the procedure. This had enabled them to safeguard their rights. Their requests for evidence to be taken were often granted. In particular, the investigation had been resumed twice as a result of their requests. Certain witnesses proposed by the applicants had also been questioned by the prosecuting authorities. When questioning the witnesses, the prosecutors referred to the lists of questions prepared and submitted by the applicants. The applicants had also actively participated in the visit to the scene of crime, questioning the experts and the witnesses.

The Government concluded that the authorities had complied with their procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention.

The Court recalls that, according to its case law, the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2, read in conjunction with the State’s duty under Article 1 to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have died as a result of the use of force. The nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfies the minimum threshold of an investigation’s effectiveness depends on the circumstances of each particular case. It must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of investigation work (see Buldan v. Turkey, no. 28298/95, § 83, 20 April 2004; Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 80). The investigation must be, inter alia, effective and impartial.

71. The investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, §§ 136 39, ECHR 2002 IV with further references).

The applicants’ case is to be distinguished from cases involving the alleged use of lethal force either by agents of the State or by private parties with their collusion (see, for example, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, judgment of 4 May 2001, ECHR 2001-III (extracts); Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, judgment of 4 May 2001, ECHR 2001-III (extracts), or in which the factual circumstances imposed an obligation on the authorities to protect an individual’s life, for example where they have assumed responsibility for his welfare (see, for example, Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, judgment of 14 March 2002, ECHR 2002-II), or where they knew or ought to have known that his life was at risk (see, for example, Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII). The applicants have not laid any blame on the authorities of the respondent State for the death of their son. The Court reiterates, however, that the absence of any direct State responsibility for the death of an individual does not exclude the applicability of Article 2. The procedural obligations flowing from that Article require that there should be some form of effective official investigation , as described above (see paragraph 70) when there is reason to believe that an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries in suspicious circumstances (see, among other authorities, Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), no. 37393/02, 27 November 2007; Weber and Others v. Poland, no. 23039/02, § 68, 27 April 2010).

The Court first observes that the victim’s body was found on 27 April 1995. The authorities opened an investigation on the same day. An autopsy was carried out on the next day. As the applicants contested the autopsy results, on 13 July 1995 the prosecutor requested that an additional opinion be prepared by another forensic expert. Subsequently, the prosecutor questioned the doctor who had performed the autopsy. Another expert was questioned in order to address the question whether the body could have been thrown into the water at a different place from where it was actually found. The applicants, in their numerous letters to the prosecuting authorities, expressed views and made suggestions and were granted access to the case file.

The Court is therefore satisfied that the first investigative measures in the case were taken very promptly and that the authorities took appropriate steps in order to provide a response to the applicants’ concerns expressed at an early stage of the proceedings.

During this stage of the proceedings the applicants were also given an opportunity to participate in the investigation and to submit their comments and requests to the prosecution. They availed themselves of that opportunity by submitting, inter alia, a list of questions to be put to the civilian witnesses, employees of Z. company, addressing new factual aspects of the investigation. The Court further notes that the prosecution also questioned individuals indicated by anonymous informers who had told the applicants that those individuals might have been involved in their son’s death. However, no links were ultimately established between those individuals and the death of the applicants’ son. Moreover the authorities carried out an inspection of the area where the victim’s body had been found, also in response to the applicants’ request.

The investigation was subsequently discontinued for the second time on the same ground as previously, namely for lack of evidence that the death had been the result of a criminal offence. In reaction to the applicants’ complaint, it was resumed again and further investigative measures were taken.

To sum up, the Court observes that the authorities took all reasonable steps to investigate applicants’ son’s death. In this respect, the Court refers to the Government’s submission that during the investigation 191 sessions were held, during which evidence was taken and witnesses questioned. In particular, the authorities tried at all stages to identify and interview additional witnesses who could have shed light on the events in question.

The Court observes that the applicants were of the view, early on, that their son’s death had been caused by a criminal act. The Court notes that their view was taken into consideration by the prosecuting authorities and appropriately addressed by the questioning of new witnesses, indicated by the applicants. Furthermore, the applicants participated actively in the investigation and availed themselves of their procedural rights to influence its course. Their requests for specific evidence to be taken were considered by the prosecution and often granted. They had also been questioned as witnesses.

It is true that the investigation lasted four years, from 27 April 1995 to 23 June 1999. However, the Court considers that this delay did not affect the effectiveness of the investigation, as it did not lead to a loss of opportunities for the collection of evidence. In this respect the Court refers, in particular, to its finding that the investigation was begun immediately and that the autopsy and preparation of the two forensic expert opinions concerning the findings made on the victim’s body were carried out promptly.

The Court further observes that the conduct of the investigation was reviewed by a higher-ranking prosecutor. Ultimately, the applicants’ appeal against the decision of 11 December 1998 to discontinue the investigation was examined by an independent court. The Wrocław District Court found, in its decision of 23 June 1999, no grounds on which to accept that either the proceedings or their substantive outcome were in breach of the applicable laws or otherwise open to criticism. On each occasion when the investigation was halted, the applicants were given a reasoned decision in writing which set out the evidence as well as the findings made during the proceedings.

The Court further notes that the applicants insisted that the employees of the security company should be questioned again, after the investigation was halted for the first time on 27 December 1995. It was their insistence which ultimately resulted in the investigation of their suspicion that the employees had given false evidence. This investigation was halted but, as a result of the applicants’ complaints, was subsequently resumed. This led to a bill of indictment being brought before the court in respect of three individuals suspected of attempting to mislead the prosecuting authorities during the investigation. Two of them were found guilty, even though the proceedings against them were halted on a provisional basis. One of them was convicted of giving false evidence and sentenced.

To sum up, the mere fact that it was not established that the victim’s death had been caused by a criminal act does not of itself suffice for a finding that in the present case the State failed in its procedural obligations.

In the light of the above considerations, the Court finds that the investigation into the circumstances of the death of the applicants’ son was sufficiently thorough to be considered compatible with the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.

It follows that the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Declares the application inadmissible.

Fatoş Aracı David Thor Bjorgvinsson Deputy Registrar President