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BULFRACHT LTD v. CROATIA - 53261/08 [2011] ECHR 988 (21 June 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/988.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 988
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF BULFRACHT LTD v. CROATIA
(Application
no. 53261/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 June
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Bulfracht Ltd v.
Croatia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Anatoly
Kovler,
President,
Nina
Vajić,
Peer
Lorenzen,
George
Nicolaou,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia
Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos,
judges,
and Søren Nielsen,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 31 May 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 53261/08) against the Republic
of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Bulfracht Ltd, a company incorporated under
Bulgarian law (“the applicant company”), on 7 October
2008.
The
applicant was represented by Mr M. Maćešić, an
advocate practising in Rijeka. The Croatian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š.
StaZnik.
On
9 February 2010 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time (Article 29 § 1).
The
Government of Bulgaria, having been informed of their right to
intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 (a)
of the Rules of Court), did not avail themselves of this right.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant company, Bulfracht Ltd., is a limited liability company
incorporated under Bulgarian law with its head office in Sofia
(Bulgaria).
On
13 April 1990 company J.A. from Rijeka, a shipping agent, brokered a
contract of carriage of goods by sea between the applicant company as
the ship's operator (carrier) and the Cypriot company TWS as the
charterer. The applicant company undertook to transport a certain
quantity of steel tubes from Odessa to Kaohsiung, while TWS assumed
the obligation to pay the freight to the applicant company, amounting
to 515,099.20 United States dollars (USD). It would appear that the
freight was not paid and that on 15 May 1990 company J.A. sent a fax
message to the applicant company, which the latter interpreted as the
former undertaking to pay the freight as a guarantor.
Since
the freight had not been paid, on 15 April 1991 the applicant company
brought a civil action in Rijeka Commercial Court (Trgovački
sud u Rijeci) against company J.A., seeking payment of
USD 515,099.20.
On
26 September 2000 the Rijeka Commercial Court dismissed the applicant
company's action, finding that the text of the fax message of 15 May
1990 could not be interpreted as giving rise to any obligation on the
part of the defendant.
On
6 July 2004 the High Commercial Court (Visoki trgovački sud
Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant company's appeal and
upheld the first-instance judgment.
On
20 October 2004 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of
law (revizija) against the second-instance judgment.
On
27 April 2006 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske)
declared inadmissible ratione valoris the applicant company's
appeal on points of law, as it found that the value of the subject
matter of the dispute was below the statutory threshold of HRK
500,000. In doing so it reasoned as follows:
“The exchange rate between the US dollar and the
domestic currency on 15 April 1991, that is, on the day the action
was brought, was 14.2694 [former Yugoslav] dinars [YUD] to USD 1,
which for USD 515,099.20 amounted to [YUD] 7,350,156.53... After
conversion of the amount sought by the plaintiff, pursuant to the
[relevant] legislation, the value of the subject matter of the
dispute in the present case is HRK 7,350.16.”
On
12 March 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike
Hrvatske) dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the
applicant company and served its decision on the company's
representative on 7 April 2008. The relevant part of that
decision reads as follows:
“In the constitutional complaint the complainant
alleged violation of the constitutional right to a fair hearing
guaranteed by Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Constitution.
...
In the present case the Constitutional Court finds that
the contested decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in the
proceedings conducted in accordance with the law, on the basis of
valid application of the substantive law.
The Constitutional Court therefore holds that that the
proceedings which preceded those before the Constitutional Court were
conducted in a manner which enabled the complainant to have a fair
hearing and did not result in a violation of the constitutional right
guaranteed by Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Constitution.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Civil Procedure Act
1. Relevant provisions
The
relevant part of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom
postupku, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982,
58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and Official
Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993,
112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008 and 123/2008),
as in force at the material time, provided as follows:
C h a p t e r t w o
JURISDICTION
AND COMPOSITION OF THE COURT
S
u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n
Determining the value of the subject matter of the
dispute
Section 35
“(1) When the value of the subject matter of the
dispute is relevant for determining subject matter jurisdiction, the
composition of the court, the right to lodge an appeal on points of
law and in other cases provided for in this Act, only the value of
the principal claim shall be taken into account as the value of the
subject matter of the dispute.
(2) Interest, costs of proceedings, liquidated damages
and other secondary claims shall not be taken into account unless
they constitute the principal claim.”
Section 40 (2)
“... when an action does not concern a sum of
money, the relevant value shall be the value of the subject matter of
the dispute indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim (u
tuZbi).”
C h a p t e r
f o u r t e e n
ACTION
Content of an action
Section 186 (2)
“When the jurisdiction of the court or its
composition, or the right to lodge an appeal on points of law,
depends on the value of the subject matter of the dispute, and the
object of an action is not the sum of money, the plaintiff shall in
the statement of claim (u tuZbi) indicate the value of the
subject matter of the dispute.”
C h a p t e r t w e n t y s i x
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
Appeal
on points of law
Section
382(1) provides that the parties may lodge an appeal on points of law
(revizija protiv presude) against the second-instance judgment
if the value of the subject matter of the dispute of the contested
part of the judgment exceeds a certain amount of money (statutory
threshold). The statutory threshold in commercial cases was changed
as follows:
|
Currency
|
Value
|
Period
|
|
YUD
|
30,000
|
1 July 1977 – 26 November 1982
|
|
YUD
|
300,000
|
27 November 1982 – 21 November 1987
|
|
YUD
|
4,500,000
|
22 November 1987 – 5 October 1989
|
|
YUD
|
45,000,000
|
6 October 1989 – 31 December 1989
|
|
YUD
|
4,500
|
1 January 1990 – 10 April 1990
|
|
YUD
|
45,000
|
11 April 1990 – 22 December 1991
|
|
HRD
|
45,000
|
23 December 1991 – 7 January 1993
|
|
HRD
|
8,000,000
|
8 January 1993 – 12 May 1994
|
|
HRK
|
8,000
|
13 May 1994 – 5 November 1999
|
|
HRK
|
500,000
|
6 November 1999 – 30 September 2008
|
|
HRK
|
100,000
|
after 1 October 2008
|
5.a. Reopening of proceedings following a
final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom
Section 428a
“(1) When the European Court of Human Rights has
found a violation of a human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms or additional protocols thereto ratified by the Republic of
Croatia, a party may, within thirty days of the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights becoming final, file a petition with
the court in the Republic of Croatia which adjudicated in the first
instance in the proceedings in which the decision violating the human
right or fundamental freedom was rendered, to set aside the decision
by which the human right or fundamental freedom was violated.
(2) The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of this
section shall be conducted by applying, mutatis mutandis, the
provisions on the reopening of proceedings.
(3) In the reopened proceedings the courts are required
to respect the legal opinions expressed in the final judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of a fundamental
human right or freedom.”
2. The case-law of the Supreme Court
In
its case no. Rev 885-05-2 of 9 November 2005 the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was not authorised to subsequently change the
value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in his statement
of claim unless he also amended the action (by increasing,
supplementing or replacing the initial claim).
B. The 1999 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act
1. Relevant provisions
On
6 November 1999 the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o
izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o parničnom postupku, Official
Gazette no. 112/1999 of 29 October 1999 – “the 1999
Amendments”) entered into force. They raised the statutory
threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law (revizija) to
the Supreme Court in commercial matters from HRK 8,000 to HRK
500,000. Accordingly, in the period between 6 November 1999 and
1 October 2008, for such an appeal to be admissible ratione
valoris in commercial matters the value of the subject matter of
the dispute had to exceed the latter amount. The Amendments were also
immediately applicable to pending proceedings except to those cases
in which an appeal on points of law had already been lodged.
2. The Constitutional Court's case-law
In
decision no. U-III-2646/2007 of 18 June 2008 the Constitutional Court
found violations of the complainant's constitutional rights to
equality before the courts and to a fair hearing and quashed the
Supreme Court's decision declaring the appeal on points of law
inadmissible ratione valoris, in a case where the plaintiff,
who had brought his action in 1978, had sought payment of 48,600
German marks. The Constitutional Court held, inter alia:
“When the civil proceedings for payment of a
relatively high amount of foreign currency have lasted thirty years,
and the value of the subject matter of the dispute in [those
proceedings] (which at the time the action was brought greatly
exceeded the amount prescribed for admissibility of an appeal on
points of law) is being determined according to the nominal amount of
the domestic currency (which had become worthless due to revaluation)
and not according to the real value of the amount sought, then such a
long lapse of time always benefits one party. The outcome in its
favour is due solely to the protracted nature of the proceedings,
which upsets the other party's equal status before the law.”
In
decision no. U-III-4361/2008 of 10 June 2009 in a similar case, the
Constitutional Court confirmed the above case-law.
C. Legislation relating to revaluation and changes of
the domestic currency
The
Dinar Revaluation Act (Zakon o promjeni vrijednosti dinara,
Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no.
83/89), which entered into force on 1 January 1990, established the
new value of the Yugoslav dinar (YUD) so that one new dinar
corresponded to 10,000 old dinars.
By
the Decision on the Introduction of the Croatian Dinar as the
Currency on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia (Odluka o
uvođenju hrvatskog dinara kao sredstva plaćanja na
teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette of the Republic
of Croatia no. 71/1991), which entered into force on 23 December
1991, the Republic of Croatia introduced its own currency, the
Croatian dinar (HRD). The Yugoslav dinar (YUD) was replaced by the
Croatian dinar at an exchange rate of YUD 1 to HRD 1.
On
13 May 1994 the Decision on the Termination of the Validity of the
Decision on the Introduction of the Croatian Dinar as the Currency on
the Territory of the Republic of Croatia and on the Manner and Time
of Calculation of Sums Expressed in Croatian Dinars into Kunas and
Lipas (Odluka o prestanku vaZenja Odluke o uvođenju hrvatskog
dinara kao sredstva plaćanja na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske,
te o načinu i vremenu preračunavanja iznosa izraZenih u
hrvatskim dinarima u kune i lipe, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Croatia no. 37/1994) entered into force, introducing the
Croatian kuna (HRK) as the currency of the Republic of Croatia. It
provided that the Croatian dinar should be replaced by the Croatian
kuna at an exchange rate of 1,000 dinars to one kuna.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LACK OF ACCESS TO COURT
The
applicant company complained about the refusal of the Supreme Court
to examine the merits of its appeal on points of law. It relied on
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The arguments of the parties
(a) The Government
The
Government first submitted that, in a situation such as in the
present case – where the merits of the applicant company's
action had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction – the
impossibility of lodging an appeal on points of law, in cases where
the legislator had clearly prescribed the requirements for its
admissibility, could not be considered to have been a violation of
the right of access to court or the right to a fair hearing.
The
Government further argued that the way the Supreme Court had
calculated the value of the subject of the dispute had been in
accordance with the law, and that it was not for the Court to
interpret domestic law. In particular, the decision of the Supreme
Court to declare the applicant company's appeal on points of law
inadmissible had been based on the relevant provisions of the Civil
Procedure Act and the 1999 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act.
Moreover, given that the applicant company in its action had claimed
an amount in a foreign currency, that amount – in order for the
value of the subject matter of the dispute to be calculated –
had to be converted into domestic currency at to the rate applicable
on the day the action had been brought.
The
Government further argued that rules limiting access to the Supreme
Court by setting a financial threshold for admissibility of appeals
on points of law had the legitimate aim of reducing the number of
cases of lesser importance before the highest court. The legislation
relating to revaluation and changes to the domestic currency had the
same effect and purpose. Namely, as the domestic currency devalued
due to inflation, certain cases had become less important.
In
the light of the foregoing, the Government considered that Croatian
legislation had provided clear and unambiguous rules for cases where
the value of the subject matter in the dispute had dropped owing to a
change and devaluation of the domestic currency, and had regulated
the effect of such changes on the right to lodge an appeal on points
of law. In their view, there had therefore been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) The applicant
The
applicant company admitted that it was the task of the domestic
courts, and not the Court, to interpret domestic law. However, the
Court's role was to ascertain whether the effects of such
interpretation were incompatible with the Convention.
The
applicant company also conceded that the legislation setting a
financial threshold for appeals on points of law pursued the
legitimate aim of reducing the Supreme Court's workload by preventing
cases of lesser importance from reaching it. However, the same aim
could not be attributed to the legislation relating to revaluation
and changes of domestic currency that had been used to declare
inadmissible the applicant company's appeal on points of law.
The
applicant company further submitted that USD 515,099.20, which was
the amount it sought in the above civil proceedings, if converted
into domestic currency at any moment during those proceedings, had
always exceeded the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on
points of law in commercial matters prescribed by the Civil Procedure
Act. Therefore, the effect of the interpretation of legislation
relating to revaluation and changes to the domestic currency by the
Supreme Court in the present case, which interpretation had resulted
in inadmissibility of the applicant company's appeal on points of
law, had been such that it had restricted that company's right of
access to court in such a way that the very essence of the right had
been impaired.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention secures
to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights
and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. The right
of access, namely the right to institute proceedings before a court
in civil matters, constitutes one aspect of this “right to
court” (see, notably, Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21
February 1975, §§ 28-36, Series A no. 18). However, this
right is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations. These are
permitted by implication, since the right of access by its very
nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although
the final decision as to the observance of the Convention's
requirements rests with the Court. However,
these limitations must not restrict or reduce the access left
to an individual in such a way or to such an
extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.
Furthermore, limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 §
1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be achieved (see, for example, Ashingdane v.
the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 57, Series A no. 93,
and Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, 22 October
1996, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996 IV).
Turning
to the present case, the Court first observes that the applicant
company was the plaintiff in the above civil proceedings instituted
in April 1991, in which it sought payment of USD 515,099.20 (see
paragraph 7 above). After the first- and the second-instance courts
ruled against it, on 20 October 2004 the applicant company lodged an
appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 8-10
above). On 27 April 2006 that court declared the applicant
company's appeal inadmissible ratione valoris, considering
that the value of the subject matter of the dispute did not reach the
statutory threshold of HRK 500,000 (see paragraph 11 above). The
applicant company's subsequent constitutional complaint was to no
avail (see paragraph 12 above).
In
the Court's view, the Supreme Court's decision may be regarded as
imposing a restriction on the applicant's right of access to court.
It reiterates in this connection that Article 6 of the Convention
does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or
of cassation. However, where such courts do exist, the guarantees of
Article 6 must be complied with, for instance, in that litigants must
be guaranteed an effective right of access to courts for
determination of their “civil rights and obligations”
(see, for example, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain,
19 December 1997, § 37, Reports 1997 VIII). The
Court must therefore examine whether the applicant company's right of
access to court was unduly restricted by the Supreme Court's decision
in the present case.
As
regards the aim of the restriction, the Court considers that setting
the financial threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court in order to
stop that court being overloaded with cases of lesser importance is a
legitimate aim (see, mutatis mutandis, Brualla Gómez
de la Torre, cited above, §§ 35-36). Accordingly,
the existence of such a threshold per se is not incompatible
with the Convention.
As
regards the proportionality of the restriction,
the Court reiterates that it is
in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the
courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law.
This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules
of a procedural nature. The Court's role is confined to ascertaining
whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the
Convention (see, for example, Tejedor García
v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports
1997 VIII; and Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain,
28 October 1998, § 43, Reports 1998 VIII).
Furthermore, the manner in which Article 6 § 1 applies to
courts of appeal or of cassation depends on the special features of
the proceedings concerned and account must be taken of the entirety
of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and the
court of cassation's role in them; the conditions of admissibility of
an appeal on points of law may be stricter than for an ordinary
appeal (see, for example, Brualla Gómez de la Torre, cited
above, § 37).
In
order to satisfy itself that the very essence of the applicant
company's “right to a tribunal” was not impaired by
declaring its appeal on points of law inadmissible, the Court must
examine whether the way in which the Supreme Court calculated the
value of the subject matter of the dispute in the present case,
infringed the proportionality principle.
The
Court notes in this connection that under section 35(1) of the
Civil Procedure Act the value of the subject matter of the dispute is
equal to the principal amount a plaintiff seeks to obtain by his or
her civil action (see paragraph 13 above), and that the applicant
company in its civil action of 13 April 1990 sought USD
515,099.20 (see paragraph 7 above). The Court also notes that the
applicant company did not seek payment of a counter value of USD
515,099.20 in domestic currency but asked that it be awarded that sum
in USD, and that the domestic courts would have awarded the amount
claimed in USD had they found for the applicant company. The Court
further observes that according to the Croatian National Bank, the
exchange rate between HRK and US dollar on 20 October 2004, that is
the day on which the applicant company lodged its appeal on points of
law, was HRK 5.880826 to one US dollar. That means that the
counter value in domestic currency of the applicant company's claim
on that day was HRK 3,029,208.77, a value that exceeded the
statutory threshold of HRK 500,000 sixfold.
That
being so, the Court considers that the way in which the Supreme Court
calculated the value of the subject matter of the dispute in the
present case may be qualified as excessive formalism. The restriction
in question was therefore not proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursed, and impaired the very essence of the
applicant company's right of access to court as secured by Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
This
view is corroborated by the subsequent case-law of the Constitutional
Court (see paragraphs 16-17 above), which decided to change its
practice three months after dismissing on 12 March 2008 the applicant
company's constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court
decision. In particular, on 18 June 2008 the Constitutional Court, in
its decision no. U-III-2646/2007, found that the manner in which
the Supreme Court had calculated the value of the subject matter of
the dispute for the purposes of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction ratione valoris to examine the merits of an
appeal on points of law in the proceedings, which had lasted a long
time and where the plaintiff had sought payment of a relatively high
amount of foreign currency, was contrary to the right to a fair
hearing guaranteed both by the Convention and by the Croatian
Constitution (see paragraph 16 above).
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant company further complained, also under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention, about the outcome of the above proceedings. In
particular, it complained that the judgments of the domestic courts
had not given adequate reasons.
The Court notes that the applicant company complained
about the outcome of the proceedings, which, unless it was arbitrary,
the Court is unable to examine under that Article. Moreover, there is
no evidence to suggest that the courts lacked impartiality or that
the proceedings were otherwise unfair. In the light of all the
material in its possession, the Court considers that in the present
case the applicant company was able to submit its arguments before
courts which offered the guarantees set forth in Article 6 §
1of the Convention and which addressed those arguments in decisions
that were duly reasoned and not arbitrary.
It
follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a)
of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected
pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant company did not submit any claim in respect of pecuniary or
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Court first reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress in
cases where it finds that an applicant has not had access to court in
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention would, as a
rule, be to reopen the proceedings in due course and re examine
the case in keeping with all the requirements of a fair hearing (see,
for example, Lungoci v. Romania,
no. 62710/00, § 56, 26 January 2006; Yanakiev
v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, § 90, 10 August 2006; and
Lesjak v. Croatia, no. 25904/06, § 54, 18 February
2010). In this connection the Court notes that the applicant company
can now file a petition under section 428a of the Civil Procedure Act
(see paragraph 13 above) for the reopening of the above civil
proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Having
regard to the foregoing, and given that the applicant company's
representative did not submit a claim for just satisfaction in
respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers
that there is no call to award any sum on that account.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed HRK 35,640 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and HRK 10,000 for those incurred before
the Court.
The
Government contested these claims.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of 674 euros (EUR) for costs
and expenses in the domestic proceedings and EUR 1,348 for the
proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable on
the applicant company.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning access to
court admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant company, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,022 (two
thousand and twenty-two euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable
on the applicant company, in respect of costs and expenses, to be
converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable on the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period, plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 June 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Anatoly
Kovler
Registrar President
