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BORISOV v. LITHUANIA - 9958/04 [2011] ECHR 921 (14 June 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/921.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 921
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF BORISOV v. LITHUANIA
(Application
no. 9958/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 June
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Borisov v.
Lithuania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Dragoljub
Popović, appointed to sit in respect of Lithuania,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
András Sajó,
Işıl
Karakaş,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, judges,
and
Stanley Naismith, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 May 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 9958/04) against the
Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Jurij
Borisov (“the applicant”), on 27 February 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Mr A. Liutvinskas and
Mr V. Sirvydis, lawyers practising in Vilnius and Kaunas.
The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.
Danutė
Jočienė, the judge elected in respect of Lithuania,
withdrew from the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly
appointed
Dragoljub Popović, the judge elected in respect of
Serbia, to sit in her place (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention
and Rule 29 § 1, as in force at the material time).
The
applicant alleged that the decision of 9 January 2004 to deport
him from the Republic of Lithuania and the subsequent uncertainty of
his situation breached his right to respect for his private and
family life under Article 8 of the Convention.
On
2 May 2007 the Court decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (former Article 29 § 3). Having been
informed of the case by a letter of 4 May 2007, the Russian
Government did not express any wish to intervene under Article 36 § 1
of the Convention.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1956, in the territory of Primor Oblast, now in
the Russian Federation.
In
1962, the applicant’s father, a military officer in the Soviet
Union army, was posted to the territory of Lithuania to perform his
military service. The applicant also moved to Lithuania, where he got
married in 1977 and where he lives with his wife and daughter, who
was born in 1996 and is therefore still a minor. They are both
Lithuanian citizens. The applicant and his wife also have two
grown-up sons. The applicant’s parents are Lithuanian citizens,
born in 1926 and 1931, and, like the applicant, they live in Vilnius.
On
11 March 1990, at the time of the restoration of the independent
State of Lithuania, the applicant was an officer in the Soviet Union
army. On 27 May 1991, by an order of the Minister of Defence of the
Soviet Union, the applicant was discharged, finishing his military
service with the rank of major.
In
1991 the applicant created an enterprise called Avia Baltika, which
was engaged in the aviation business and related activities. The
applicant is a major shareholder and director.
On
1 November 1991, the applicant made a pledge to the Republic of
Lithuania and was subsequently granted Lithuanian citizenship.
On
20 October 1992, the applicant was issued with a Lithuanian passport.
On
4 November 1999 the Commission on Questions of Citizenship
(Pilietybės reikalų komisija) found that the
applicant’s Lithuanian passport had been issued in breach of
the applicable legislation because Soviet Army personnel could not be
granted Lithuanian citizenship. However, the Commission recommended
that the applicant remain a Lithuanian citizen.
On
11 November 1999 the Migration Department decided to follow the
above recommendation and to make an exception by permitting the
applicant to keep his Lithuanian passport.
At
the end of 2000 the applicant applied to the President of the Russian
Federation, requesting Russian citizenship. His request was
determined by the fact that he conducted business in both the
Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation.
On
18 June 2002 the President of the Russian Federation granted the
applicant Russian citizenship. On 18 March 2003, on a request by the
applicant, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Lithuania issued
him with a Russian passport.
In
June 2002, the applicant participated in the 2002 Lithuanian
Presidential election campaign by providing financial and other
support to one of the candidates, Rolandas Paksas (“RP”).
RP officially declared to the Central Electoral Commission that the
applicant’s enterprise, Avia Baltika, had donated 1,205,000
Lithuanian litas ((LTL), approximately 349,000 euros (EUR)) to RP’s
election campaign.
On
5 January 2003, RP was elected President of the Republic of
Lithuania.
On
24 March 2003, the applicant informed the Minister of the Interior of
the Republic of Lithuania in writing that he had acquired citizenship
of the Russian Federation. By a decision of 10 April 2003, the
Director of the Migration Department found that the applicant had
lost his Lithuanian citizenship, since he had acquired the
citizenship of another State.
On
24 March 2003, the applicant asked RP to grant him Lithuanian
citizenship by way of exception. In his application, the applicant
maintained that since 1991 he had been conducting business in
Lithuania, that he had created more than 200 jobs, that there were
600 other people working in other enterprises providing services to,
or otherwise related to, the enterprise headed by him, that since
1991 Avia Baltika had paid more than LTL 17 million in
taxes to the budget of the Republic of Lithuania, and that he had
donated about LTL 6 million to charity. The applicant also attached
to his application copies of the passports of his relatives, who were
Lithuanian citizens.
In
the meantime, the Director of the State Security Department
(“the SSD”) informed RP on several occasions that an
investigation was being conducted into the activities of the
applicant and the Avia Baltika aviation company. On 17 March 2003 the
Director of the SSD informed RP that the applicant had sworn to
discredit RP in public if the latter did not fulfil his promises
given to the applicant during the electoral campaign.
On
20 March 2003 an interim commission of the Seimas (the
Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) found that in 2001 the
applicant’s company, Avia Baltika, had exported a Mi-8T
helicopter to Sudan without a licence. The commission stated that
such action “did not violate the legislation of the Republic of
Lithuania valid at the relevant time, but it was not compatible with
the rules of the European Union embargo or sanctions applied by the
United Nations”.
On
11 April 2003 RP, the President of the Republic of Lithuania,
issued Decree No. 40 “On Granting Citizenship of the Republic
of Lithuania by Way of Exception”, whereby he granted
Lithuanian citizenship to the applicant by way of exception, that is,
for the applicant’s “special merits” to the
Lithuanian State and without applying the general conditions of
naturalisation.
A. Withdrawal of the applicant’s Lithuanian
citizenship
On
2 December 2003 the Seimas approved the conclusions of its
ad
hoc Inquiry Commission into Possible Threats to Lithuania’s
National Security. The conclusions, as far as relevant, read as
follows:
“the President’s relations with J. Borisov
are specific. Driven by political, economic and personal motives
(...), J. Borisov had an influence on the activities of the
President’s Office and on the President’s decisions. Thus
J. Borisov has secured favourable conditions for his business, which,
among other things, includes trading in spare parts for military
helicopters with countries supporting terrorism. So far, the
President has failed to publicly dissociate himself from J. Borisov
and has implicitly vindicated him by his actions. The extent of J.
Borisov’s influence on the President is made clear by the fact
that the President, aware of J. Borisov’s threats, granted
him citizenship under an accelerated procedure.”
On
30 December 2003 the Constitutional Court found that the
President’s decree of 11 April 2003 was in breach of the Law on
Citizenship and the Constitution, effectively annulling it. According
to the Constitutional Court:
“... in the sense of the Law on Citizenship, in
general, the merits of a citizen of a foreign state or a stateless
person to the State of Lithuania cannot be evaluated merely by the
amount of money or the amount of material and other support rendered
by the citizen of a foreign state or stateless person to a certain
citizen or a group of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, a State
official, a certain enterprise, establishment or organisation or even
to the State of Lithuania itself. It does not follow from the
Constitution, the Law on Citizenship, or other laws, that citizenship
of the Republic of Lithuania can be acquired by financial, material
or any other support, i.e. ‘bought’. In the context of
apparent citizenship relations, merits to the State cannot be
evaluated only by the money transferred (donated) to a certain
subject or by other support. In terms of the Law on Citizenship, only
the activity of the person is to be considered of merit to the
Republic of Lithuania, when the person very significantly contributes
to strengthening Lithuanian statehood, to the increase of the power
of Lithuania and its authority in the international community, and
when it is evident that the person has already been integrated into
Lithuanian society. Only in such cases may pre-conditions be
considered and a decision taken as to whether a citizen of a foreign
state or stateless person is of merit to the Republic of Lithuania,
as required by the Law on Citizenship.”
As
regards the applicant’s case, the Constitutional Court found
that RP had knowingly ignored, among other facts, that in 1999 the
State institutions had already made an exception with regard to the
applicant and shown special benevolence towards him (see paragraphs
11 and 12 above). According to information from the SSD, the
applicant had sworn to compromise RP if the latter did not fulfil
promises given during the electoral campaign (see paragraph 19
above). The Constitutional Court concluded:
“The fact that, while issuing Decree No. 40 “On
Granting Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania by Way of
Exception” on 11 April 2003, whereby citizenship of the
Republic of Lithuania was granted to J. Borisov by way of exception,
the President of the Republic knowingly disregarded the
aforementioned circumstances that are of essential importance in
deciding whether to grant citizenship ... (especially when one takes
account of the fact that J. Borisov notably supported R. Paksas
financially and in other ways when the latter participated in the
2002 Lithuanian Presidential elections), is evidence that the
decision of the President of the Republic, R. Paksas, to grant
citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania to J. Borisov by way of
exception was determined not by certain merits of J. Borisov to the
State of Lithuania, but by his notable financial and other support
rendered to R. Paksas in the 2002 elections. Thus, the granting of
citizenship to J. Borisov by way of exception was but a reward by the
President of the Republic, R. Paksas, to J. Borisov for the aforesaid
support.
Therefore, [the court]... holds that the President of
the Republic, R. Paksas, when issuing Decree No. 40 ... was following
neither the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, nor the laws,
nor the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, but his
personal interests.
Thus, in granting citizenship of the Republic
Lithuania to J. Borisov by way of exception by Decree No. 40 ... the
President of the Republic, R. Paksas, treated this person as a person
who sought to acquire citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania in an
exceptional manner, and knowingly disregarded the requirement
consolidated in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution that
all persons shall be equal before State institutions and officials,
and the requirement consolidated in Paragraph 1 of Article 82 of the
Constitution that the President of the Republic must be equally just
to all.”
On
31 December 2003 the Constitutional Court’s ruling was
published in the State Gazette and the same day the applicant lost
his Lithuanian citizenship.
On
19 February 2004 the Seimas asked the Constitutional Court to
determine whether specific actions of the State President had
breached the Constitution. The charges included the following:
- that the State President had undertaken to perform a number of
actions in favour of the applicant in exchange for financial and
other support during the electoral campaign, and that the President
had acted under the influence of the applicant;
- that, as a reward for the applicant’s support, the President
had unlawfully granted the applicant Lithuanian citizenship;
- that the State President had revealed a State secret by informing
the applicant that the secret services were investigating the
applicant’s activities and had wiretapped his phone.
On
31 March 2004 the Constitutional Court found that the President had
committed a gross violation of the Constitution and breached the
constitutional oath by:
- unlawfully granting Lithuanian citizenship, by the Decree no. 40,
to the applicant in return for the latter’s financial and other
support, contrary to Article 16 § 1 of the Law on Citizenship
and Articles 29 § 1, 82 § 1 and 84 § 1 (21) of the
Constitution;
- knowingly hinting to the applicant that the law enforcement
institutions had been investigating him and tapping his telephone
conversations, contrary to Articles 3 § 7, 9 § 2 and 14 §
1 of the Law on Official Secrets, as well as Articles 77 § 2 and
82 § 1 of the Constitution.
On
the basis of the Constitutional Court’s conclusion, on 6 April
2004 RP was impeached and the Seimas removed him from the office of
President. The same day the Chairman of the Seimas temporarily took
over the President’s duties.
B. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
1 November 2003 the applicant was accused of having threatened
the State President (Article 287 § 1 of the Criminal Code in
force as of 1 May 2003).
He
was convicted by the Vilnius City First District Court on 22 November
2004 and fined LTL 10,000. It was established that in
March 2003,
and from January to March 2004, the applicant had demanded that the
President appoint him as an advisor, grant him Lithuanian citizenship
and grant other favours, failing which the applicant threatened to
disclose certain information which could damage the President’s
reputation.
The
applicant’s conviction was based on the submissions of ten
witnesses questioned at an open hearing, physical evidence, expert
submissions and the records of the applicant’s telephone
conversations with three persons, secretly made by the SSD in March
2003 upon the courts’ orders. On the latter point the Vilnius
City First District Court noted that, even though two of the
applicant’s interlocutors had not been questioned in court, the
records had been obtained lawfully and were a separate piece of
evidence from witness testimony.
The
applicant appealed, alleging that the provision of the Criminal Code
under which he had been convicted had only come into force on 1 May
2003, while some of the acts for which he had been convicted had been
committed earlier, in March 2003. He further complained - with
respect to the same part of the conviction - that the court should
not have admitted in evidence the secretly made records of his
telephone conversations, because his interlocutors had not been
questioned as witnesses at the court hearing.
On
6 April 2005 the Vilnius Regional Court granted the applicant’s
appeal in part, quashing the conviction for those acts committed in
March 2003, that is, before the entry into force of Article 287 §
1 of the new Criminal Code. The court did not rule on the question of
the admissibility of evidence, as the applicant’s complaints in
this respect related to that part of the judgment which had been
quashed.
The
applicant lodged a cassation appeal, essentially alleging errors of
fact and law; he did not reiterate his complaints regarding the
admissibility of evidence. The prosecution also lodged a cassation
appeal, requesting the reinstatement of the first-instance court
judgment.
On
18 October 2005 the Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s
request and reinstated the judgment of 22 November 2004. The Supreme
Court held that the applicant had been rightly convicted for his
actions committed in March 2003, because, even at that time, the old
Criminal Code had criminalised blackmail (Article 132 § 1).
Because the new provision (Article 287 § 1) provided for a
less-severe sentence, it prevailed over the older one.
Before
the courts, the applicant was represented by a lawyer.
C. Proceedings regarding the deportation of the
applicant
Following
the withdrawal of the applicant’s Lithuanian citizenship, on
2 January 2004 he applied for a permanent residence permit.
On
9 January 2004 the Migration Department of the Ministry of the
Interior refused the applicant’s request and decided to deport
him from Lithuania to the Russian Federation, barring his access to
Lithuanian territory for a year. The Migration Department’s
decision was based on Article 14 § 1 (1) of the Law on the Legal
Status of Aliens (currently Article 35 § 1 (1) of the Law)
and stipulated that the applicant was a threat to national security.
The applicant appealed.
On
22 March 2004 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court quashed
the Migration Department’s decision and ordered the latter to
review the applicant’s situation again and to adopt a new
decision. The deportation proceedings were suspended.
On
29 June 2004 the Migration Department again decided not to issue the
applicant with a permanent residence permit, on the ground that he
posed a threat to national security. It therefore requested the
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court to order the applicant’s
deportation from Lithuania. The Migration Department relied on the
information provided by the SSD in a letter dated 1 April 2004,
in which it had been alleged, inter alia, that the applicant
had sought to destabilise and influence political events in
Lithuania, that he had threatened the President, and that the company
Avia Baltica had sold spare parts for military helicopters to Sudan,
disregarding the international arms embargo on that regime. This
information had been updated in the SSD’s letters of 11 May and
21 June 2004, maintaining that the threat presented by the
applicant persisted. The Migration Department based its decision on,
inter alia, Articles 35 § 1 (1) and 126 §§ 1
(3) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens.
On
2 July 2004, before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the
applicant challenged the decision to refuse him a permanent residence
permit.
On
12 August 2004 and then on 25 May 2005, the Vilnius Regional
Administrative Court decided to adjourn the examination of the
applicant’s appeal until the end of the criminal proceedings
against him (see paragraphs 29-36 above).
On
19 August 2004 the applicant asked the Migration Department to
issue a temporary residence permit to him.
On
10 September 2004 the Migration Department granted the
applicant’s request. The applicant was issued with a temporary
residence permit, valid until the court resolved the applicant’s
administrative case, but not exceeding a period of one year. On
1 September 2005, 4 September 2006 and 19 September
2007 the Migration Department issued the applicant with new residence
permits of the same duration (until the adoption of the decision in
the applicant’s administrative case but not exceeding a year).
On
19 December 2005 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed
the Migration Department’s request that the applicant be
deported, ordering the Migration Department to issue a permanent
residence permit to him. The court found no evidence that the
applicant’s presence in Lithuania could cause a danger to State
security. It relied on the fact that the offence of which the
applicant had been convicted was not considered “serious”
under Lithuanian criminal law and did not fall under the group of
“crimes against State independence, territorial unity and
constitutional order”. Moreover, the court considered that the
commercial activities of Avia Baltika could not be directly imputable
to the applicant, because the company was a separate legal entity.
For the court, taking into consideration the applicant’s family
ties to Lithuania, his expulsion would disproportionately affect the
applicant’s right to respect for his family life as well as his
economic interests.
On
28 June 2006 the Chairman of the Seimas, VM, in his address to
the General Assembly of Lithuanian judges stated that “it was
hard to imagine a State which could allow a foreign citizen to
threaten its President and to remain unpunished or at least not to
deport him from the country in which he had made the threats”
and that “it was bad that our courts had acquitted former
President RP. Maybe the courts would also decide to leave [the
applicant] free to live in Lithuania[?]”.
On
30 June 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of
19 December 2005, remitting the case for fresh examination. It noted
that the first-instance court had not assessed all the circumstances
related, on the one hand, to the applicant’s family and
economic ties in Lithuania and, on the other hand, to the threat to
national security, possibly arising from the applicant’s
presence. On the latter point, the court considered that the threat
presented by the applicant could not be assessed only by reference to
formal provisions of the criminal law qualifying the offence of which
the applicant had been convicted. Moreover, the lower court should
have assessed the influence which the applicant had over the
company’s commercial transactions and which might have been
incompatible with the State’s security policy.
On
the same day the Supreme Administrative Court adopted a separate
ruling on the remarks which VM had made on 28 June 2006.
Invoking Article 6 of the Convention and the Court’s judgments
(Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98, ECHR 2000 X, and
Butkevičius v. Lithuania, no. 48297/99, ECHR
2002 II (extracts)), the court emphasised the need to avoid any
statements which could raise doubts as to the impartiality and
independence of the courts. The court pointed out that VM’s
speech was not in line with the principle that justice is
administered by the courts (Article 109 of the Constitution and
Article 3 of the Law on Courts). The text of the ruling was sent to
the Seimas for consideration.
Having
been questioned by members of the Seimas on 12 September 2006,
VM assured his colleagues that in truth he was not attempting to
influence the courts in any way and he believed that, when adopting
its decision, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court would have
disregarded his words.
On
7 November 2006 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, on the
request of the applicant’s lawyer, adjourned the proceedings to
await the outcome of the present application before the Court. The
Migration Department appealed.
On
14 December 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the
decision of 7 November 2006 as unfounded, noting, inter alia,
that the European Court of Human Rights had not yet declared the
applicant’s case admissible. The administrative proceedings
resumed.
By
a letter of 4 January 2007, JR, a member of the Seimas, who at
that time was the deputy head of the political faction of the
Homeland Union Party (Tėvynės Sąjunga) in the
Parliament, wrote to the Minister of the Interior, to whom the
Migration Department was subordinate. JR asked the Minister whether
the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had indeed suspended
proceedings in the applicant’s case because the applicant had
lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights. For
JR, such a decision by a court would clearly be unlawful, as it was
not provided for under domestic law and especially in a case dealing
with the deportation of a foreign national presenting a threat to
national security. JR asked the Minister whether the Migration
Department had appealed against such a “clearly unlawful”
decision of the first-instance court. JR also asked the Minister to
explain, if no appeal had been lodged, why this was the case and what
measures would be taken in connection with “the failure of the
Migration Department’s officials to fulfil their duty to
protect the State’s interests”.
On
23 April 2007 the applicant’s lawyer asked the Vilnius
Regional Administrative Court to suspend the applicant’s case
and to ask the Constitutional Court to clarify certain questions. The
court granted that request; however, on 22 May 2007 the
Constitutional Court refused to accept the referral as it was deemed
unreasoned.
By
a decision of 26 June 2007, the Vilnius Regional Administrative
Court again dismissed the Migration Department’s request to
deport the applicant from Lithuania and ordered it to issue him with
a permanent residence permit. In reaching this conclusion the court
observed that the applicant had been convicted of a minor offence (uZ
baudZiamąjį nusiZengimą) and only a fine had
been imposed on him. It referred to the Court’s case-law
(Amrollahi v. Denmark, no. 56811/00, 11 July 2002; Boultif
v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001 IX; Boughanemi
v. France, 24 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996 II) in which the Court had found a violation of Article 8 §
1 of the Convention even in such cases where a person to be deported
had systematically been committing crimes or had committed major
offences for which he had been imprisoned. The Vilnius Regional
Administrative Court also observed that the applicant had never been
criminally charged with regard to the other grounds to deport him,
namely, that his company had exported a military helicopter to Sudan.
Taking into account the Seimas’ conclusion that such an export
did not breach Lithuanian legislation (see paragraph 20 above), there
were no grounds to rule that the episode proved that the applicant
was a threat to national security. The court also emphasised that, at
the hearing, the SSD had not provided any sufficiently serious and
verified information to show that the applicant was a danger to
national security. Moreover, there was no information in the case
file that since 2004 the applicant had taken part in any illegal
activities.
Next,
the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court turned to the applicant’s
family situation, noting that his wife, daughter and parents had
lived in Lithuania for decades and were Lithuanian citizens. For the
court, had the family been forced to move to the Russian Federation
to follow the applicant, it would have caused them serious hardship.
Alternatively, had the applicant been sent to his country of origin,
these family relationships would have been broken.
Lastly,
when assessing whether the applicant’s expulsion was necessary
in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court turned to the
criteria enumerated by the Court in the case of Üner v. the
Netherlands ([GC], no. 46410/99, § 57, ECHR 2006 XII).
It found that not one single criterion had been fully satisfied to
justify the applicant’s deportation. This was even more so when
those criteria were taken as a whole. In sum, taking into account the
strict criteria of Article 8 of the Convention, the nature of the
crime committed by the applicant, the level of his integration into
Lithuania and his family’s situation, it was not proportionate
or necessary to deport the applicant.
The
Migration Department appealed.
On
16 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court remitted the case
for fresh examination. It noted that the lower court had thoroughly
analysed the Strasbourg Court’s practice with regard to Article
8 of the Convention. Yet, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court
had wrongly interpreted and applied domestic legal norms when
deciding on the applicant’s possible threat to Lithuania’s
national security. In particular, the fact that the applicant had, in
the criminal proceedings, been convicted of a minor offence and had
been punished only by a fine was not sufficient to rule out the
possibility that he was a threat to national security. Moreover, the
lower court had not properly examined the data presented by the SSD,
had not examined all the evidence in the case and had not given
proper reasons for its decision. In sum, from the decision of the
first-instance court it was not clear whether the applicant’s
presence in Lithuania had in the past posed, and still posed a real
threat to Lithuania’s national security.
On
27 October 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court
adopted a separate ruling in the proceedings, changing the procedural
status of the SSD from that of a third party to plaintiff. The ground
for this change was an amendment to Article 1401 of the
Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, adopted on 16 December 2006.
By
a letter of 5 November 2008, the SSD informed the court that the
Migration Department was the proper plaintiff in the case. The SSD
also noted that it concurred with the Migration Department’s
request to remove the applicant from Lithuania.
On
24 November 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court
dismissed the Migration Department’s request to deport the
applicant from Lithuania, and ordered the Migration Department to
issue the applicant with a permanent residence permit. The Migration
Department and the SSD appealed.
On
7 December 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the
lower court’s decision. The court found that, by changing the
procedural position of the parties on 27 October 2008, the
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had wrongly interpreted the
amended Article 1401 of the Law on Legal Status of Aliens.
It had therefore breached administrative procedure, which did not
allow that court to analyse all the claims in the case. The Supreme
Administrative Court also noted that it was well aware of the fact
that the administrative proceedings had already started in 2004 and
that, “had the case been returned for fresh examination one
more time, it could have been a reason [for the applicant] to appeal
to an international court, claiming that the hearing in his case
before the [domestic] courts may possibly have taken too long”.
However, if the Supreme Administrative Court had adopted a final
decision without having answered all the claims, it would have formed
a wrong legal precedent for future judicial practice.
The
Supreme Administrative Court also noted that the lower court had
failed to properly evaluate all the evidence in the case. The case
was returned for a fresh examination.
On
29 January 2010 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court
adopted a new decision, noting that it was essential to look into the
grounds for the applicant’s deportation retrospectively –
how pertinent those grounds were in 2004, when the Migration
Department took its decision, and whether they still remained
relevant in 2010. For the court, the danger that the applicant posed
to the State of Lithuania stemmed from his close personal
relationship with former President RP. Given the Constitutional
Court’s conclusions in the rulings of 30 December 2003 and
31 March 2004 (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above), it was
legitimate to state that the applicant had had significant influence
on RP, when the latter was the President of Lithuania. Such actions
by the applicant, when mainly for his own economic interests he had a
strong influence over the Head of State and the political processes
in Lithuania, had to be evaluated as presenting a threat to
Lithuania’s national security. In this connection the court
noted the Seimas’s conclusions to the same effect (see
paragraph 22 above).
The
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court nonetheless noted that, after
RP’s impeachment on 6 April 2004, the Chairman of the
Seimas had been entrusted to temporarily act as the Head of State. As
the evidence presented by the Migration Department and the SSD
showed, all the circumstances pointing to the applicant’s
threat to national security were related to his close personal
relationship with RP. Consequently, once RP had lost his Presidential
powers, the applicant had lost his opportunity to influence the Head
of State and political processes in Lithuania.
The
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court further noted that, even though
at the beginning of RP’s term in office Lithuania’s
national security guarantees in the foreign and international spheres
were rather delicate, on 16 March 2004 Lithuania had joined the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its national security with
regard to defence had become significantly stronger. A new step in
Lithuania’s security was accession to the European Union on
1 May 2004. As a result, when the Migration Department had taken
its decision on 29 June 2004 to remove the applicant from the
territory of Lithuania, the latter had posed no clear and present
danger to national security. The court also noted that, at the
hearing of 20 January 2010, the representative of the SSD had
testified that, after RP’s impeachment, no actions of the
applicant that could pose a threat to national security had been
established.
Lastly,
when addressing the applicant’s personal and family situation,
the court observed that the applicant had permanently lived in
Lithuania where all his family – wife, daughter and retired
parents – resided. Admittedly, and as argued by the Migration
Department, the applicant often went abroad for business; however,
that did not mean that he did not have a relationship with his wife
and fourteen-year-old daughter, for whom the applicant played a very
important role. There were no reasons to doubt the genuineness of the
applicant’s marriage. Moreover, regarding the aforementioned
factual circumstances, except for the applicant’s permanent
residence in Lithuania, none had been disputed by the parties. The
court also noted that, since 1991, the companies headed by the
applicant had paid more than 17 million litas in taxes to the State
budget.
Relying
on the above, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court concluded
that the applicant’s request that a permanent Lithuanian
residence permit be issued to him was grounded. The request to deport
the applicant from Lithuania was dismissed.
The
Migration Department appealed.
On
23 June 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found for the
applicant and ended the court proceedings. It noted that in 2004,
when the decision not to grant the applicant a residence permit was
taken, the applicant had indeed posed a danger to national security.
Only upon the lapse of a certain period of time could one ascertain
whether such a threat had ceased to exist. The decision whether to
deport the applicant had to be decided at present; the situation
could not be assessed merely retrospectively. Taking into account the
requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, a very serious threat
would be necessary to outweigh the applicant’s obvious and
unquestionable connections with Lithuania. The case-file did not
contain any evidence about the applicant’s current threat; the
only possible threat was related to the events of 2003-2004. In the
light of the above considerations, the State Security Department’s
request that the applicant be deported was dismissed.
The
Supreme Administrative Court also noted that “if the applicant
was of the view that the examination of the case at issue has
continued too long and therefore his rights that were guaranteed by
the European Convention on Human Rights had been breached, he was
entitled to claim compensation for damage in accordance with the
procedure provided for by law”.
After
the above court decision, the applicant addressed the Migration
Department with a request that he be issued with a permanent
residence permit. On 13 August 2010 the Migration Department
issued the applicant with such a permit.
D. The private prosecution for alleged defamation
On
18 May 2004 the applicant asked the prosecutors and the Inspector of
Journalistic Ethics to conduct an inquiry into an article about his
activities, published by a journalist, ML, in a national daily
newspaper. He alleged that the statements made by ML amounted to the
criminal offence of defamation.
The
article allegedly recounted ML’s interview with an anonymous
person, JL, who maintained that the applicant was connected to the
Russian intelligence service, the GRU.
On
24 May 2004 the prosecution refused to initiate criminal proceedings,
and advised the applicant to bring his claim by way of a private
prosecution.
On
8 July 2004 the applicant brought a private criminal prosecution
against ML, alleging defamation.
ML
was acquitted by the Vilnius City Third District Court on 11 October
2004, because the court found no evidence of a crime.
On
30 December 2004 the Inspector of Journalistic Ethics replied to the
applicant, opining that ML had violated the applicant’s “honour
and dignity”. At the same time, the Inspector addressed the
editor of the daily newspaper concerned, asking him to publish a
denial of the statements about the applicant’s connections to
the GRU. According to the applicant, this was not done.
On
20 January 2005 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s
appeal. That decision was final. The court noted that ML had only
recounted his interview with JL, whose opinion, including the
impugned statement about the applicant’s connections to the
Russian intelligence service, had been cited in the article. There
was no evidence that the journalist had known that the information
given by JL had been incorrect, or that he had intended to defame the
applicant. If it appeared that the information was false, JL could be
held criminally responsible, but not the journalist who had
interviewed him.
On
20 April 2005 the applicant’s lawyer addressed the Supreme
Court, requesting that the appellate decision be quashed and the
proceedings reopened on the basis of newly discovered facts. He
alleged that, following the publication of the appellate decision,
one of the appellate judges had declared his former relations with
the USSR State Security Committee, the KGB. In the applicant’s
view, that affiliation could have affected the judge’s
impartiality in the case.
On
30 May 2005 the Supreme Court advised the applicant that his request
should be addressed to the prosecutor. The Court has no information
as to whether the applicant ever lodged such a request.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
Article
16 § 1 of the Law on Citizenship, as in force until 1 January
2005, provided that the President may grant Lithuanian citizenship by
way of exception - that is, without applying the usual conditions for
naturalisation - to citizens of foreign states who are “of
merit” to the Republic of Lithuania.
Article
2 of the Law on Legal Status of Aliens, as in force since 30 April
2004, defines “an alien” as a person other than a
national of the Republic of Lithuania, irrespective of whether he or
she is a foreign national or a stateless person.
Article
35 § 1 (1) of the Law provides that an alien is not to be issued
with a Lithuanian residence permit if his or her residence in the
country may be a threat to public security, public order or public
health. Under Article 126 § 1 (3), an alien can be expelled if
his or her presence on Lithuanian territory represents a threat to
State security or public order. The decision to deport such a person
is to be taken by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (prior to
30 April 2004, it was the Migration Department).
Pursuant
to Article 128 of the Law, when making a decision to deport an alien,
account is to be taken of the period of his or her lawful stay in
Lithuania, his or her family relationship with persons residing in
Lithuania, social and economic ties with the country and the type and
extent of the danger of the infringement of law committed by that
individual. The execution of a decision to deport an alien from
Lithuania is suspended if it has been appealed against in court.
Article 133 of the Law provides that a deported alien, whose entry
and stay in the country would constitute a threat to national
security, may be prohibited from entering Lithuania for a fixed or
indefinite period.
On
16 December 2006 the Seimas amended Article 1401 of
the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens by providing that it was the
function of the SSD to request the Vilnius District Administrative
Court to annul an alien’s right to reside in Lithuania and to
deport him or her, if that alien posed a threat to national security.
Article
132 of the old Criminal Code, in force until 30 April 2003,
provided for criminal liability for blackmail. This offence required
the performance of certain acts in accordance with the perpetrator’s
instructions, with the threat that, in the event of failure, the
perpetrator would, inter alia, disclose sensitive information
liable to damage the reputation of the blackmailed person.
Article
287 § 1 of the new Criminal Code, in force since 1 May
2003, provides for criminal liability if a person, by using mental
coercion, demands that a public official carry out certain actions in
his or her favour.
Article
154 of the new Criminal Code provides criminal liability for
defamation. According to Articles 407 and 408 of the Code on Criminal
Procedure, defamation is a crime to be prosecuted by private
prosecution, that is to say, by the person defamed. Under Article 367
§ 3 of the Code, in cases of private prosecution a cassation
appeal is not possible.
Article
109 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Law on Courts stipulate
that justice is only administered by the courts. While administering
justice, the judge and courts are independent.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his right to respect for private and family
life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, had been breached
in view of his proposed deportation and the uncertainty of his
situation owing to judicial proceedings which started in 2004 and
ended only in 2010. Invoking Article 6 of the Convention, the
applicant further argued that the delay in resolving his case had
been caused by political pressure on the courts.
The Court considers that all these complaints are in essence related
to an alleged violation of the right to respect for private and
family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, on which the
Court will concentrate its examination in this case, and which reads
in so far as relevant as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life...
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, ...”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
The
Government argued that there was nothing uncertain in the applicant’s
situation in connection with the administrative case concerning his
expulsion from the Republic of Lithuania. Contrary to the Court’s
judgment in Shevanova v. Latvia (no. 58822/00, 15 June
2006), where the applicant had undergone a period of seven years of
uncertainty and insecurity owing to her illegal stay in Latvia, the
applicant in the instant case had been residing in Lithuania legally,
that is, his stay had been regularised ever since the final loss of
Lithuanian citizenship. In particular, by the decisions of the
Migration Department of 10 September 2004, 1 September
2005, 4 September 2006 and 19 September 2007, the applicant
had been issued with one-year, temporary residence permits until the
end of the examination of his administrative case. On that basis he
could legally reside in the country.
For
the Government, it was very important to clarify the circumstances
under which the applicant had arrived at the present situation. On
this point they noted that the applicant had been a Lithuanian
citizen from 1991 to 2003, when he himself had refused Lithuanian
citizenship after having received a passport from the Russian
Federation. Subsequently, the applicant had asked the President of
the Republic of Lithuania to grant him Lithuanian citizenship by way
of exception. The President had granted that request. However, as
established afterwards by the Constitutional Court, the applicant had
in fact “bought” the Lithuanian passport, because
citizenship had been granted for financial and other support rendered
by the applicant to the President during the electoral campaign. As a
result, the President’s decree had been declared null and void.
In addition, by the final decision of 18 October 2005 the
Supreme Court had convicted the applicant of a crime against the
constitutional order of the Republic of Lithuania, namely,
blackmailing the President. In the view of the Government, the
applicant, by causing harm to Lithuanian society, by violating
Lithuanian laws and by threatening the State’s constitutional
order, whilst at the same time demonstrating disrespect for the State
of Lithuania and its citizenship, was expected to undergo at least
some inconveniences.
The
Government further argued that neither the domestic courts nor other
State institutions participating in the court proceedings for the
applicant’s deportation could be blamed for delays. The
Government admitted that, normally in cases regarding alleged
violations of Article 8 of the Convention, the passage of time could
have irremediable consequences for the applicant’s family.
However, in the instant case, the passage of time had had no negative
impact on the applicant’s private and family life. Quite the
opposite, it was a well thought-out strategy, chosen by the applicant
and his lawyers, expecting that the lapse of time would possibly
render the applicant’s threat to national security less
significant. It was true that the administrative proceedings in the
applicant’s case had started already in 2004. Nonetheless, the
delays had been caused by the necessity to await the outcome of the
criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 42 above), and the
applicant’s or his lawyers’ requests to suspend the
administrative proceedings until his case had been heard before the
European Court of Human Rights, or to make interpretative requests to
the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 50 and 53 above).
The
Government also submitted that, owing to his frequent business trips
abroad, the applicant usually spent more than half a year outside
Lithuania, away from his wife and daughter. Accordingly, the gravity
of the applicant’s situation could not be compared to the
gravity of the situations in other cases involving immigration
questions which the Court had examined under Article 8 of the
Convention.
In
sum, the events leading to the possible deportation of the applicant
were preconditioned by his own unlawful conduct. Moreover, the fact
that, pending the administrative litigation, the applicant had never
faced a real risk of deportation and could still legally reside in
Lithuania with his family meant that he had been afforded the
possibility of leading his private and family life without too big a
burden.
Lastly,
in their letter of 27 August 2010 the Government pointed out
that on 23 June 2010 the Supreme Court had ended the
administrative litigation, adopting a decision in the applicant’s
favour. The Migration Department had issued the applicant with a
permanent residence permit. If the applicant was of the view that the
duration of the administrative proceedings at issue caused him
certain inconveniences, he could file a claim for damages pursuant to
the rules of domestic law.
2. The applicant
The
applicant argued that the decision to deport him from Lithuania,
linked to the coercive deprivation of Lithuanian citizenship, was in
breach of his right to respect for his family life, guaranteed by
Article 8 of the Convention. He submitted that he had lived in
Lithuania since 1962, where he had completed his secondary education,
married and had children. He also observed that since 1991 he had run
a business in Lithuania and paid taxes.
Even
assuming that he had represented a threat to national security in
2004, when he had been accused of having significant influence over
the State President, that threat could not be interpreted as being
permanent. Many years have passed since then and no new evidence has
surfaced. No new charges have been brought against him to prove his
continuous danger to the Lithuanian State. As a result, and taking
into account the Court’s case-law as to the need to establish
whether the offence which a person had committed may give rise to
certain fears that he constituted a danger to public order and
security for the future (see Boultif, cited above, § 51),
it was not proportionate to deport him from the country.
As
to what was at stake for him, the applicant submitted that he lived
in Vilnius with his wife and daughter, to whose upbringing and
education he contributed, and that both were Lithuanian citizens. His
retired parents, also holders of Lithuanian passports, lived in
Vilnius. As the applicant’s lawyer had mentioned during the
administrative proceedings, except for their knowledge of the Russian
language, neither his wife nor his daughter had any links to the
Russian Federation. In addition, the applicant disagreed with the
Government that there was no interference with his right to respect
for family life on account of the fact that he spent quite a
significant amount of time on business trips abroad. That
circumstance had been assessed in the decision of 29 January
2010 by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and dismissed as
irrelevant.
Neither
did the applicant share the Government’s view that his
situation had been regularised by issuing him with temporary
residence permits. In fact, such residence permits were granted only
by way of exception and until the administrative courts had decided
his case. Such status hardly ensured legal certainty; on the
contrary, it made the applicant’s private and family life
dependent not on his alleged threat to national security, but on the
hearing of his case in court. The applicant pointed out that on three
occasions the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had found that
the applicant posed no danger to national security and had prohibited
his expulsion from Lithuania. Yet, despite the absence of proof of
the applicant’s actual and present threat, the Migration
Department had abused its procedural right by repeatedly lodging
appeals to the Supreme Administrative Court.
The
applicant also argued that his situation was not so different from
the facts in the aforementioned Shevanova case. Admittedly,
the decision to deport him had not been enforced. Yet, entirely
analogous actions of the State authorities had put him in an
undefined and insecure situation.
Lastly,
the applicant submitted that his unpredictable and insecure situation
had been incited by political pressure on the Supreme Administrative
Court, which had failed to remain impartial in the applicant’s
case. In this connection, the applicant referred to the statements by
VM to the General Assembly of Judges (see paragraph 46 above), noting
that, after that speech, the Supreme Administrative Court had quashed
the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, which had
been in the applicant’s favour (see paragraph 47 above). As
another illustration of political pressure, the applicant drew the
Court’s attention to the letter of parliamentarian JR (see
paragraph 52 above), who directly interfered with the actions of the
Government by requesting that a minister, to whom the Migration
Department is subordinate, provide explanations, as well as urging
the Migration Department to relentlessly challenge the court
decisions favourable to the applicant.
B. The Court’s assessment
The
Government submitted, among other arguments, that during the whole
period at issue the applicant was afforded the opportunity to lead
his normal and family life. Most importantly, the administrative
proceedings in connection with the decision to expel the applicant
from Lithuania had come to an end. The applicant was issued with a
permanent residence permit. The Government could be understood as
arguing that the applicant may no longer claim to be a “victim”
of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
For
its part, the Court finds the applicant’s complaint about a
violation of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention admissible.
However, the Court does not consider it necessary to rule on whether
the applicant can still claim to be a “victim” of a
violation of Article 8. In the light of the decisions of 23 June
2010 and 13 August 2010 (see paragraphs 70-72 above), the Court
considers that there is no longer any justification for examining the
merits of the case, for the reasons set out below.
The
Court reiterates that, under Article 37 § 1 (b) of the
Convention, it may “at any stage of the proceedings decide to
strike an application out of its list of cases where the
circumstances lead to the conclusion that ...the matter has been
resolved...”. To be able to conclude that this provision
applies to the instant case, the Court must answer two questions in
turn: firstly, it must ask whether the circumstances complained of
directly by the applicant still obtain and, secondly, whether the
effects of a possible violation of the Convention on account of those
circumstances have also been redressed (see Pisano v. Italy
[GC] (striking out), no. 36732/97, § 42, 24
October 2002). In the present case, that entails first of all
establishing whether the risk of the applicant being deported
persists; after that, the Court must consider whether the measures
taken by the authorities constitute adequate redress in respect of
the applicant’s complaint (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia
[GC], no. 60654/00, § 97, ECHR 2007 II).
With
reference to the first question, the Court observes that the
authorities’ request for the applicant’s deportation has
been dismissed by a final court decision and that, as matters stand,
he therefore faces no real and imminent risk of being deported. In
this connection the Court points to the Supreme Administrative
Court’s decision of 23 June 2010 affirming the applicant’s
close family links to Lithuania and explaining that the applicant may
not be considered as posing a threat to national security merely on
the basis of the events of 2003-2004. The Court also finds that the
measure indicated by the Lithuanian Government, the permanent
residence permit granted to the applicant on 13 August 2010,
allows him to remain in Lithuania, maintain his relationship with his
wife, children and parents and thus to exercise freely in that
country his right to respect for his private and family life, as
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and interpreted in the
Court’s case law (see, mutatis mutandis, Sisojeva
and Others, cited above, §§ 98 and 102).
In
short, the material facts complained of by the applicant have ceased
to exist. It therefore remains to be determined whether
regularisation of his stay is sufficient to redress the possible
effects of the situation of which he complained to the Court.
In
the instant case the Court acknowledges that from the time when the
Migration Department refused the applicant’s request for a
permanent residence permit and decided to deport him from Lithuania
on 9 January 2004 the applicant experienced a lengthy period of
insecurity and legal uncertainty in Lithuania. That period lasted six
years and seven months. The Court observes that the expulsion of a
person who possesses strong personal or family ties in the host
country may give rise to serious issues under Article 8 of the
Convention (see, for example, Moustaquim v. Belgium,
18 February 1991, § 36, Series A no. 193; Amrollahi
v. Denmark, cited above, § 27).
As
regards the facts of the instant case, the Court notes that the
applicant’s father moved to Lithuania in 1962, when the
applicant was six years old. Until 2004, when the applicant was
forty-eight years old, he continued to live in Lithuania; the
applicant has been married for twenty-seven years of his life in
Lithuania and has conceived two sons there, who are now adults, and a
daughter, who is still a minor and lives with her parents. The
applicant’s parents live in Lithuania. As noted by the Vilnius
Regional Administrative Court, since being discharged from the Soviet
Army in 1991, the applicant has created a private business and paid
taxes (see paragraph 67 above). Accordingly, the Court has no doubt
that, during all this time in Lithuania, the applicant has forged the
personal, social and economic ties that make up the private and
family life of every human being (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC],
no. 48321/99, § 96, ECHR 2003 X).
Assessing
further, the Court notes with deep concern that
the decision making in the applicant’s case was politicised
(see paragraphs 46 and 52 above). Neither can the Court fail to
observe that the Supreme Administrative Court chose to remit
the case for fresh examination two times on somewhat contrived
grounds (see, in particular, paragraphs 58 and 62 above), thus
continuing to keep the applicant and his family in a state of
uncertainty. Even so, and whilst regretting that the Lithuanian
authorities did not find an earlier solution to the matter, the Court
does not consider that these facts on their own make the measure
regularising the applicant’s stay in Lithuania inadequate in
view of the applicant’s personal situation, as it appears that
pending the administrative litigation he was effectively able to
remain in Lithuania on the basis of temporary residence permits (see,
mutatis mutandis, Kaftailova v. Latvia (striking out)
[GC], no. 59643/00, § 53, 7 December 2007).
Consequently, at no stage was the applicant actually deported or
otherwise restricted in the enjoyment of his private and family life
in Lithuania. This reduces considerably the extent of the redress
which needs to be afforded in the present case. Lastly, the Court
notes the Supreme Administrative Court’s suggestion to the
effect that the applicant could address the domestic courts with a
claim for damages, should he consider that the administrative
proceedings had lasted too long.
Consequently,
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the case, the
Court considers that the regularisation arrangements granted to the
applicant by the Lithuanian authorities constitute an adequate and
sufficient remedy for his complaint under Article 8 of the
Convention.
Having
regard to all the above considerations, the Court concludes that both
conditions for the application of Article 37 § 1 (b) of the
Convention are met in the instant case. The matter giving rise to
this complaint can therefore now be considered to be “resolved”
within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b). Finally, no particular
reason relating to respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention requires the Court to continue its examination of the
application under Article 37 § 1 in fine.
Accordingly,
this part of application should be struck out of the Court’s
list of cases.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, whereby he had
been deprived of his Lithuanian citizenship, had been unfair. He
further argued that he had had no remedy, in accordance with Article
13 of the Convention, to challenge the loss of Lithuanian citizenship
following the decision of the Constitutional Court of 30 December
2003. In the same connection, the applicant also complained under
Article 14 of the Convention that he had been discriminated against
as a person of Russian ethnicity, to the extent that he had
automatically lost Lithuanian citizenship following the acquisition
of a Russian passport.
With respect to the applicant’s complaints
regarding the decision of the Constitutional Court to withdraw his
Lithuanian citizenship, the Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention does not apply to proceedings regulating a person’s
citizenship, as such proceedings do not involve either the
“determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him” within the meaning of that
provision. Consequently, Article 6 § 1 does not apply to these
proceedings (see S. v. Switzerland (dec.), no.
13325/87, DR 59, 15 December 1988, and Šoć
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 47863/99, 29 June 2000).
It follows, that the applicant’s complaint is to be rejected as
being incompatible ratione materiae, pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention. Similarly, the Court notes that the
Convention does not guarantee the applicant any right to citizenship
(see Makuc and Others v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 26828/06, § 208,
31 May 2007). Hence, without an arguable claim under Article 13
of the Convention, the applicant’s complaint thereunder must
also be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
The
Court reiterates that Article 14 of the Convention has no independent
existence because it solely has effect in relation to “the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by the
Convention and its Protocols. Given that the Court has found the
applicant’s citizenship complaint to be incompatible with the
provisions of Article 6 § 1, so too the complaint under Article
14 must be similarly rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
In
the context of the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant
complained that the principle of the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of impartiality on the part of the courts had not been
respected because, at the time of those proceedings, a number of
publications about him and his activities had been printed in the
press. The applicant also alleged that one of the appellate court
judges could not be considered impartial because, during the Soviet
period, that judge had had relations with the Soviet intelligence
agencies. The applicant invoked Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the
Convention in this respect.
Having
analysed the documents presented to it, the Court finds that the
applicant did not properly raise the above-mentioned issues during
the domestic proceedings. Consequently, this part of the application
must be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, pursuant
to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
Invoking
Article 6 the Convention and in the context of the same criminal
proceedings, the applicant further argued that the Lithuanian courts
had incorrectly admitted in evidence and wrongly assessed the secret
recordings of his telephone conversations, because two out of three
of his interlocutors had not been heard by the court at an open
hearing. The applicant next alleged that the charges against him were
not specific enough to enable him to prepare his defence, as required
by Article 6 § 3 of the Convention; in particular, they did
not specify who had been the purported victims of his acts. Lastly,
the applicant complained, under Article 7 of the Convention, that
there had been no legal basis for his conviction in respect of the
acts carried out in March 2003.
The
Court has examined the complaints raised above as submitted by the
applicant. It notes that the applicant’s pleas have been
addressed and examined by the Lithuanian court’s, whose
decisions do not seem arbitrary. Having regard to all the material in
its possession, the Court finds that the complaints raised above do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
In
the context of criminal proceedings in relation to his purported
defamation claim and, invoking Article 8 of the Convention, the
applicant complained that his right to respect for his private life
had been breached. The applicant contended that, in the proceedings
against ML, the courts had incorrectly interpreted and applied
domestic law and the Convention, and had failed to strike a fair
balance between his rights under Article 8 and the journalist’s
right to impart information, guaranteed by Article 10 of the
Convention.
In
the same connection and relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the
applicant alleged that he had had no effective remedy to protect his
right to respect for privacy. In particular, the applicant complained
that the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings
against ML, that the Inspector of Journalistic Ethics had failed to
examine his complaint within the time-limits set by law, and that the
courts had not instituted – of their own motion –
separate criminal proceedings against the person who had allegedly
given information to ML. The applicant did not consider that a
private criminal prosecution was an effective remedy, inter alia,
because a cassation appeal was not available in such proceedings,
whereas the case of a prosecution by a public prosecutor could be
examined at three levels of jurisdiction.
The
applicant also invoked Article 14 in conjunction with his Article 13
complaints, alleging that he had suffered discrimination on the
grounds of his ethnic and social origin, as well as on the grounds of
his political views.
The
Court notes that the applicant has raised various complaints
regarding alleged defamation by the press and seems to imply that the
State failed to properly prosecute and punish the journalist. In this
connection, it must be recalled that the Convention does not grant
the right for an applicant to have third parties prosecuted or
sentenced for a criminal offence (see, mutatis mutandis, Perez
v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004 I).
Furthermore, the Court observes that the prosecutors refused to
institute criminal proceedings for defamation but indicated the
possibility of a private criminal prosecution, a remedy which the
applicant pursued. The mere fact that the outcome of those criminal
proceedings was not in the applicant’s favour, does not render
them ineffective. Moreover, the Court finds nothing discriminatory in
leaving private defamation cases to two levels of jurisdiction
compared to the extra protection afforded to the public interest at
three levels of jurisdiction in a prosecution brought by the State.
The protection of the public interest represents an objective and
reasonable basis for that difference. Finally, the Court finds that
there was nothing arbitrary or discriminatory in the decisions of the
domestic courts. Consequently, this part of the application must be
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. COSTS AND EXPENSES
Rule
43 § 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
“When an application has been struck out, the
costs shall be at the discretion of the Court. ...”
The
Court points out that, unlike Article 41 of the Convention, which
comes into play only if the Court has previously found “that
there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto”, Rule 43 § 4 allows the Court to make an award
solely for costs and expenses
(see Sisojeva and Others,
cited above, § 132).
The
applicant noted that litigation costs before the domestic courts and
the Court had been substantial, but did not itemise them or submit
any documents to substantiate them.
The
Government submitted that no sum should be awarded to the applicant,
because the applicant had not specified his claims for legal costs
and expenses.
The
Court reiterates that the general principles governing reimbursement
of costs under Rule 43 § 4 are essentially the same as under
Article 41 of the Convention (see Pisano, cited above, §§
53-54). In other words, in order to be reimbursed, the costs must
relate to the alleged violation or violations and be reasonable as to
quantum. Furthermore, under Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court,
itemised particulars of any claim made under Article 41 of the
Convention must be submitted, together with the relevant supporting
documents or vouchers, failing which the Court may reject the claim
in whole or in part (see, for example, Lavents v. Latvia,
no. 58442/00, § 154, 28 November 2002).
In
the instant case and in the absence of any supporting documentation,
the Court makes no award for costs and expenses.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the applicant’s complaint under
Article 8 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Declares that the matter giving rise to the
applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention has
been resolved and decides to strike the application out of its
list of cases in so far as it relates to that complaint.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 June 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Françoise
Tulkens
Registrar President